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I

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

A.

General Statement of the Problem and Objectives
This is a study of the Japanese foreign policymaking

process.

The field, of public policymaking, domestic and foreign,-

has recently gained importance and popularity in the United States
and elsewhere.*

Increasingly, the students in the area of foreign

policymaking seek in each individual country to ask such questions
as who makes the foreign policies of that country and how the
foreign policies are determined and implemented.

Superficial similarities in the institutions of the foreign
policymaking notwithstanding, there are important differences
among various foreign policymaking processes some of which are
subtle and others not so subtle.

It is some of the important dif

ferences with which this study deals.

To state it differently,

this study deals with certain selected aspects of the structural
and behavioral characteristics that appear to be peculiar to the
Japanese foreign policymaking process.

Specifically, the focus

A
T. J. Pempel, "Introduction," in Pempel (ed.), Policy
making in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca, N.I.: Cornell University
Press7 1977)» p. 13.
—

-

1

-

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

-2 -

I
of this study is the fragmented, structure of policymaking power
and. consensus politics in the foreign policymaking process of
Japan, relative to its ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970.

Having reluctantly signed the treaty in 1970, Japan had
for six years refused to ratify the treaty until 1976.

On the

surface, there was no conflict between postwar Japan's nuclear
policy and the alleged objectives of the NPT.

As the first and

only nation in history to have experienced the atomic holocaust,
postwar Japan's nuclear policy was based on what has come to be
r

?

known as the "three-non-nuclear principles":

non-possession, non-

production, and non-introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons.

2

The NET was ostensibly intended to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons by obligating nuclear-weapons states (NWS) not
to transfer weapons or weapon technology to non-nuclear weapons
states (NNWS) and obligating the latter not to make or receive
them.

Notwithstanding its "three-non-nuclear principles" policy,

Japan had failed to ratify the treaty for six long years until
May 1976.

Questions that one may ask are (l) why the delay?

2
Japan, Gaimusho [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Waga
Gaiko no Kinky5, no. 12 (October 1968), Shiryg, p.
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What were the problems Japan had with the NPT issue?

(2)

who opposed the treaty ratification and for what reasons?
(3) who supported the treaty and for what reasons?

(4) in

what manner was the decision to ratify the treaty implemented?
and finally, (5) of what was the NPT policymaking a case?

Scholars have characterized the Japanese foreign policy
making process as being essentially a diffused and immobilist
process of compromise and consensus.

3

Donald Hellmann, for

example, applies this characterization of the Japanese foreign
policymaking process to all of its "past major political [italics
in the original] decisions regarding foreign affairs."^ Describing
a collective (or group) character of the foreign policymaking
process in prewar Japan, Robert Scalapino had this to say:
In the Tokyo trials of major war criminals that followed
the Japanese surrender, the Allied prosecutors repeatedly
sought the answer to one central question: Who bears the
responsibility for leading Japan toward aggression and
war? Few questions involved greater difficulties . . . .
Japan [under the imperial Meiji Constitution] appeared as
a society [where] there seemed no measure of .........
individualism to alleviate the rigidities of a hierarchical
system . . . and an emperor-centered mythology........
But in fact, the essence of power in Japanese society has
not been that of personal absolutism. The vital center
3

-'Donald C. Hellmann, Japan: Its Domestic Politics and
Foreign Policy. Reprint No. 19"(Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1973)> P* ?•
Ibid.
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V
of decision-making has uniformly lain in its collective
or group character and in its extensive reliance on
consensus as the primary techniques.
The importance of understanding the tradition of the collective
decision-making in Japan in terms of groupism and consensus
politics is stressed by Scalapino.

He notes:

It is critical to understand that, despite all superficial signs to the contrary, the basic nature of Japanese society
can only be approached by a thorough appreciation of the
intricate refinements of small group interaction, the great
importance of induced voluntarism, and the generally eclec
tic quality of final agreements.6
7
8
As for the structure and dynamics of the foreign policymaking
process of contemporary Japan, Hellmann also provides observations
similar to Scalapino's of prewar Japan:
Today Japan confronts a radically altered and uncertain
international order, along with the ills of "postindustrial’' society which has undergone the most rapid
and far-reaching economic growth ever experienced by any
nation. In spite of these fundamentally new internal
and international conditions, Japan’s politics continues
to be remarkable for its fundamental continuity. Little
basic change in the structure and dynamics of the country’s

^Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of Modem Japan,"
in Soy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics, 5th ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976)> PP. 277-278.
6Ibid.
7
The term "structure,” as used in this study, refers to
"the patterns of action and resultant institutions of the systems
themselves." See, for example, Oran R. Young, Systems of Political
Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hail, 1968), p. 30*
g
The term "dynamics," as used in this study, refers to all
formal and informal interaction among role players in the Japanese
foreign policymaking process.
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political system or foreign policymaking process is
likely in the next five to ten years. The Liberal
Democratic party (LDP) or a similar conservativedominated coalition will hold the reigns [reins?] of decision
making. The factioaally fragmented nature of the LDP,
together with the culturally sanctioned need for con
sensus in reaching all decisions will ensure brokertype political leaders and a foreign policy noted for
its passive and responsive character [emphases added]9
In sum, what Zbigniew Brzezinski calls "the vaunted style of
Japanese decision-making"^ and the consensus decision-making
process are, as Brzezinski puts it, "a study in prudence,
circumspection, and collective responsibility."

11

In spite of these observed patterns of the structural
and behavioral peculiarities of the Japanese foreign policy
making process, not much is yet known about the Japanese way of
making and implementing their foreign policies.

The paucity

of our current knowledge of the Japanese foreign policymaking
process has amply been evidenced in a recent study by scholars
of the Brookings Institution.

12

In this study, I. M. Destler

9
Hellmann, o]3. cit., p. .
10
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Tha Fragile Blossom; Crisis and
Change in Japan (New York: Harper and How, 1972), p. 4-9*
11Ibid.
12I. M. Destler, Priscu'.l.-. Clapp, Hideo Sato, and Haruhiro
Fukui, Managing an Alliance; Tl.
e Foiitics of U.S.-Japanese
Relations (Washington, D .C .; Brookings Institution, 1976).
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K
and his associates conducted a penetrating analysis of the ■
politics and processes that influenced the postwax U.S.Japanese relations>drawing heavily upon three major bilateral
issues between the two nations:

the U.S.-Japan security treaty

revision process of 1957-1960; the agreement on reversion of
Okinawa to Japan in 1969; and the dispute in 1969-71 over Japanese
textile export to the United States.

Frequently during these

three episodes, there had been profound misperceptions and mis
understandings between Washington and Tokyo aue to the lack of
the knowledge of each other’s way of thinking and making foreign
policies.
f

In reference to the misperceptions and misunderstandings

resulting from both political and cultural differences between the
two nations, the authors had this to say:
In these, as in all instances of relations between govern
ments, officials in one capital had to make judgments about
what would transpire in the politics of the other. They
had to interpret what their counterparts had said and were
doing, and predict how they might subsequently behave.
They had to make certain assumptions about the broader poli
tical arena abroad and the abilities of particular leaders
to prevail in that arena. They had to make at least crude
calculations as to how particular negotiators would respond
to different types of personal negotiating styles and ap
peals. Often their perceptions and calculations were
reasonably accurate, and seldom did their errors have such
serious consequences as the three [episodesJ cited above.
Yet misperceptions have been frequent enough in U.S.Japanese relations, and at times very serious problems
[emphases added].*3

~*~^rbid., p. 89*
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The nature and the extent of the misperceptions and mis
understandings of this kind are of immediate relevance to
the problems with which this study deals.

It is, therefore, in

order to briefly review these misperceptions and misunderstandings
as well as their underlying causes as provided by the Brookings
scholars.

Destler and his associates divided the topic into two
categories:

/ ■\
1^
(1) "Misperceptions Booted in Politics as Usual,"

and (2) "Misperceptions Rooted in Cultural Differences."^
The authors included in the first categories the following three
variables:

(1) "Seeing the Other Government as United,"

16

(2)

17
"Seeing the Other Government as Parallel to One’s Own,"
and
(3) "The Stakes of the Beholder.”^-8

(1) "Seeing the Other Government as United."

Robert Jervis

is quoted as noting that "actors see others as more internally
united than they in fact are and generally overestimate the
degree to which others are following a coherent policy."

19

lZjIbid., pp. 90-100.
ljIbid., pp. 100-121.
*8Ibid., pp. 91-9^.
^Tbid., pp. 9^-96.
18Ibid., pp. 96-100.
19
Ibid., p. 91 citing Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on
Misperceptions," World Politics, no. 3 (April 1963) reprinted in
Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American
Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1973). PpT 13^-35*
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Destler and his associates point out that "because actors
’’see a particular action as a deliberate and calculated
attempt by the foreign government to influence the behavior
of their own, they tend sometimes to overreact, creating or

20

increasing tension between the two countries."
how this type of

misjudgment

They note

was present in two decisive

21

episodes during the slide toward Pearl Harbor in 194-1.

As another example of such a misconception, the Brookings
scholars cite the "Japan, Inc." image.

They maintain that this

image, which was held by many Americans in the late sixties and
early seventies, reinforced the American tendency to misperceive
f

I

the Japanese government as more united and purposive than it
really was.

22

Moreover, such a tendency helped the Americans

20
Destler, op. cit.t p. 91*
21
Ibid., pp. 91-94-. References were made, in this regard,
to Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New fork: Norton,
1969)» PP* 24-27; Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950)* P* 242;
Koichi Kido, Kido KOichi nikki [Koichi Kido diary], vol. 2
(Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, I966), p. 896; Teiji Yabe,
Konoefumimaro [Fumimaro Konoe] (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1958),
pp. 154—555 and James MacGregor Bums, Roosevelt: The Soldier
of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 157*
22
Destler, on. cit., p. 94-.
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exaggerate "the extent to which the Japanese Government
effectively controlled the development of its domestic economy
23
and international trade.”

Finally, American misunderstandings

of the Japanese policymakers throughout the textile dispute
stemmed, in part, from the American ignorance of the sharp divi
sions among the Japanese officials and industrialists.

Each

time, as Brookings scholars note, the Japanese gave "minimal,,
temporizing responses to U.S. proposals"

due to the internal

diffusion of policymaking power, the American officials blamed
the Japanese for being "arrogant" or for using "delaying tactics"
unresponsive to the United States desire.

(2)

"Seeing the Other Government as Parallel to One's Own."

This type of problem, which is "a more sophisticated pattern of
misperception,"

arises "when officials project assumptions derived

from their own political framework onto the politics of the other
27
country."

Problems relative to this type of misperception are

23
•'ibid. Reference is made to Philip H. Trezise with the
collaboration of Yukio Suzuki, "Politics, Government, and Economic
Growth in Japan,” in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky (eds.), Asia's
New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works (Washington, D.C.:
Erock4ng-s Institut ion, 1976).
Destler, op. cit., p.
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
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more difficult to avoid.

As the Brookings scholars indicate,

officials "recognize political complexities and divisions in
the counterpart government, and yet still err by assuming
[emphases added] that the details of the other country's decision-

28

making are like those at home."

It is pointed out that "this

form of misperception is so natural that it is particularly
29
difficult to avoid."

The misperceptions of this variety take

place where there is little, if any, language harrier as well as
cultural differences.

The Brookings scholars point out:

In his study of Anglo-American relations Richard E.
Neustadt finds that crises between counterpart officials
follow a recurrent pattern of "muddled perceptions, stifled
communications, disappointed expectations, and paranoid
reactions. In turn, each 'friend' misreads the other, each,
is reticent with the other, each is surprised by the other,
each replies in kind."3^ This pattern he finds in dealings
between two countries where the cultural and the language
differences are markedly small, but where officials (as
everywhere) are preoccupied with domestic and bureaucratic
politics in their respective home capitals. This suggests
that politically based misperceptions are endemic in relations
between any two large countries.31
This being the case in

Anglo-American relations, "the intel

lectual conditioning as well as governmental gamesmanship makes
it extraordinarily difficult to transcend one's own frame of
reference and to avoid assuming, by analogical reasoning, that

28 Ibid.
29Ibid.
30
Quoted from Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 66.
31
Destler, op. cit., p. 90.
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the frame of reference of counterparts in Tokyo is comparable
to the political environment in Washington, and vice versa."
Instances of this form of misperception

32

and miscalculation

rooted in the tendency to project homeland political assumtions
onto the other are numerous.

It has been

observed

by the

Brookings scholars that "perhaps the most prominent postwar
misperception of this type has been Americans’ cvsrestimation
of the Japanese premier’s power [emphases added].

Destler

and his associates note, for example, how the then Presidential
Assistant Henry Kissinger repeatedly tried to achieve a
breakthrough in the textile case (where the mistake "proved most
>34
costly”) ^ by negotiating directly with the Prime Minister's
35
personal office, the Kantei.
of this form of misperception.

The Japanese too were a victim
It occurred, for example, when

the "Tokyo political leaders acquiesced in the import control plan
that the Japanese industry leaders had negotiated with Congressman
Mills [during the height of the textile controversy] in the
36
expectation that President Richard Nixon would acquiesce also"--

32
Ibid., p.. 94, quoting Michael H. Armacost, "U.S.-Japanese
Relations: Problems and Modalities of Communications," Department.
of State Bulletin, January 15, 1973> p. 68.
33
^Destler, ojo. cit., p. 95*

^Ibid.
35Ibid.
3^Ibid., pp. 95-96.
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which Nixon did not do.

(3) "The Stakes of the Beholder." This particular source of
various misperceptions and misunderstandings among nations, as
among individuals, pertains to somewhat objective bureaucratic
and political variables and to a more subjective dimension of
psycho-cybernetic variables.

As Graham Allison notes, "in

government where you stand depends on where you sit.

37

Officials

tend to view the world from their perspectives according to their
day-to-day concerns and expectations. Likewise, they tend to fit
incoming information into their own existing theories and images
of the world and the other party, perceiving what they expect or
OO
choose to perceive.
Thus, the seemingly "objective" nature of
the day-to-day "concerns" and "expectations" are cognitive in

37
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston! Little, Brown, 1971), p. 176, cited
in Destler, ibid., p. 96 .
OQ
~
Jervis, loc. cit., cited in Destler, cp. cit., p. 96 .
Reference is made to John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory
of Decision; New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1974), especially Chapter 4, as cited
in Destler, op. cit., p. 96. Two articles of particular relevance
in this regard for their contents and rich bibliographical infor
mation are: Karl V. Deutsch, "Communication Models and Decision
System," in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political
Analysis (New York: Free Press, 196?), pp. 273-299; an& Robert C.
North, "The Analytical Prospects of Communication Theory," in
Charlesworth, ibid., pp. 300-316.
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nature as "specific events or signals are perceived not
independently, as pure new facts; they are interpreted—
sometimes distorted—
mind already knows."

so that they may fit in with what the

39

The Brookings study indicates that

misperceptions and miscalculations of this type were also a
serious problem relative to the three episodes analyzed by the
Brookings scholars.

The authors remark that perhaps the most

dramatic example of this variety was the humiliating eleventh
hour cancellation of President Eisenhower’s planned visit to
lf,Q
Tokyo in June i960.
The United States misperceived the nature
of the controversy in Japan over the i960 security treaty revision
issue.

Douglas MacArthur, the American ambassador in Tokyo,

was concerned about his position and "his personal stakes made
him far more an advocate and promoter of the trip than an objective
evaluator of whether it should take place."'-

Not only did the

30

"^Destler, o£. cit., p. 96.
40
Assistant Secretary of State J. Graham Parsons,
"Chronology of Ambassador MacArthur's Meetings with Prime Minister
Kishi and Other Japanese Government Officials Prior to Post
ponement of President’s Visit” (memorandum to Secretary of State
Christian Herter, June 27, i960) cited in Destler, 00. cit., p. 98.
41
/
Destler, ibid., p. 99* Citing the New York Times (June
16, i960), the authors note that "there was . . . some concern
within the administration that the fall of the Kishi government
might be inevitable . . . 'why the prestige of President Eisenhower
and the United States should be so deeply committed to so precarious
and uncertain a cause,"’ ibid. p. 98.
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ambassador's personal identification with the success of the
trip encourage him to persevere^ he saw U.S. Interests as tied
42
very closely to the Kishi regime.”
The American ambassador
simply misjudged the nature of the political turbulence
surrounding the security treaty revision.

The real issue was

not the security treaty revision but Kishi's defiance of the
culturally sanctioned consensus norm in his handling of the issue.

43

In the final analysis, Prime Minister Kishi's downfall was a function
of his defiance of the consensus norm and the intrigues of factional
politics within his own party.

The Brookings scholars explain:

"Why did Eisenhower persist in his plans?

A crucial reason was

42

"The perceptions of the embassy and Washington were also
substantially colored by the 'shared Images' of a bipolar, coldwar world that shaped American attitude generally. Kishi was
anticommunist, his opponents were communists and socialists and
vehement critics of the American connection. Thus MacArthur, like
most Americans, exaggerated-ihe extent of foreign instigation in
the antitreaty, anti-Kishi movement ("Moscow and Peking are
committing all their available reserves to present internal struggle
in Japan to defeat security treaty" [Cable no. 4082, U.S. Embassy,
Tokyo]). He concluded that 'the very survival of Japanese democracy'
depended on thwarting the campaign by 'minority groups’ against
Kishi, the treaty, and the visit . . .," Destler, ibid., p. 100,
footnote 25.
43
-'Accou/jis of this event include George Packard, IH,
Protest in Tokyo (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
I966) and Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and
Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkel&y and Los Angeles: Uni
versity of California Press, 1962), Chapter V (pp. 125-153)> "The
Crisis of May-June, i960— A Case Study." The latter work is a
particularly insightful analysis of the role of factional politics
relative to this event involving Christians and Communists, school
girls, housewives, and university professors, all protesting against
Kishi's method of ramming the security revision bill through the
Diet. ^
Scalapino and Masumi, loc. cit. , pp. 125-153*
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that he perceived the situation . . . through the eyes of
the U. S. embassy in Tokyo and Ambassador Douglas MacArthur

n."1*5
Of particular relevance to the thematic focus of this
study is the second category of the misperceptions and mis
understandings which are rooted in cultural differences.
While acknowledging that "the line between -what is political
46
and what is cultural is not easy to draw,"
the authors note
that "certain, characteristics of Japanese and American policy
behavior appear to be based on deep-rooted cultural values and
47
interpersonal relationships."

Moreover, these character

istics stemming from the cultural differences "are not adequately
explained by the structures of the two [American and Japanese]
48
political systems."

^Destler, op. cit., pp. 98-99*
46
Ibid., p. 101.

^Ibid.
48

Ibid. An excellent recent study of similarities and
dissimilarities between the Japanese foreign policymaking
process and that of the United States is Chihiro Hosoya and
Joji Watanuki (eds.), Taigai Seisaku Kettei no Nichibei Hikaku
[A Comparison of the Japanese and the United States Foreign
Policymaking Processes] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1977)*
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Included in the "Misperceptions Rooted in Cultural
Differences" are the following six cultural variables and
concepts*

(l) "Consensus;”^

(3) "Haragei Bargaining;

(2) "Amae and Sincerity;"*^
(*<•) "Form versus Substance;

(5) "Universalism and Cultural Arrogance;"^ and (6) "Language
D i f f e r e n c e s . T h e first five of these variables and concepts
are directly and indirectly related to the two critical variables
selected for this study:

(1) The diffusion of policymaking power

resulting from groupism; and (2)

consensus politics.

To the extent that the Japanese people hesitate to say a direct
"no" in dealings with other individuals or nations, the language
difference, the sixth and the most obvious cultural variable, is
also related to the first one, i.e. the concept cf "consensus."
It is for thwe reasons that much of the 3rookings scholars'
analysis of these cultural variables and concepts and the mis
perceptions resulting from them will be discussed later in this
study.

^Destler, op. cit., pp. 101-108.
5°Ibid., pp. 108-111.
51Ibid., pp. HI-113.
52Ibid., pp. 11^-117.
53Ibid., pp. 117-119.
^Ibid., pp. 119-121.
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Some of the cultural variables and concepts are more
critical than others relative to the underlying causes of various
misperceptions.

Accordingly, a proper understanding of the

Japanese foreign policymaking process calls for identification
and examination of these critical variables and concepts.
end, this study has two broad objectives:

To that

firstly, this study purports

to analyze the structural/behavioral characteristics of the Japanese
foreign policymaking process in terms of the two variables, as noted
earlier, that appear to be most critical; and secondly, within the
thematic parameters of the first objective, this study seeks to

55

ask a broad typological -^ question relative to the NPT policymaking
process:

of what was it a case?

Specifically, the second objective

involves an analysis of the two basic dimensions of a policymaking
process:

(a) what was the nature of the HIT issue as seen by the

Japanese policymakers?

What were the interissue relationships?

and (b) how were the two critical variables

the diffusion of

policymaking power and consensus politics—

manifested in the NPT

policymaking process, relative to the first dimension, namely,
the nature of the policy issue?

-^The term,"typological," as used in this context, simply
means "classificatory." See, for example, Julian L. Simon,

Basic Research Methods in Social Sciences: The Art of Empirical
Investigation (New York: Random House, 1969), P* 5^> 292-295*
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B . Theoretical Framework

There are a large number of approaches and analytic
models relevant to this study with varying degrees of immediate
utility.

Some of these are conceptual perspectives for the

explanation of the foreign polipy behavior of states^ while
others are analytic models for the study of the foreign policymaking processes of states.

57

These analytic models are gener

alizations designed to help us pose and answer questions about
how foreign policies are made.

Included in these analytic
CO

models are:

(1) Comprehensive rational decision-making model;

(2) incremental decision-making m o d e l (3) human behavior model;

According to the variable stressed, for example,
traditional explanations of foreign policy are provided in terms
of five principal categories in Harold K. Jacobson and William
Zimmerman (eds.), The Shaping of Foreign Policy (New Yoik:
Atherton Press, I969). These five categories are: The systemic,
the environmental, the societal, the governmental, and the idio
syncratic or psychological.
57
A good summary of these models is found in Thomas L.
Brewer, American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction
(Englewood Cliffs, N.j 7: Prentice-Hall, 1980), Chapter 2. "
58
D Graham T . Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Allison,
"Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American
Political Science Review, LXHI, 3 (September 1963), 689-718.
59
David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of
Decision (New York: Free Press, I963) •
Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social
Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
1965).
•
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(^) organizational behavior model;

61

(5) democratic politics
/Co

(\0

model;

(6) pluralistic and bureaucratic politics model;

(7) ruling elite model;

(8) international politics model;

(9) transnational
politics model;^
ans

and (10) world system

model. 67

The problem that confronts the student of foreign policymaking processes is not one of the paucity of approaches and
t

analytic models.

Rather, it is one of the overabundance of

conceptual perspectives and analytic models in the absence of

[’

ZT
Allison, Essence of Decision, 0 0 . cit.; John D.
Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, or. cit.
^^Kenneth N. Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics
(Boston: Little, Brown, I967)
'
^Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policymaking in Defense
and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Hilsman,
To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 196?); Allison, Essence
of Decision, pp. cit.; Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics
and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
197*0 5 Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in
American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1973)*
fk
Steven Rosen,R e s t i n g the Theory of the MilitaryIndustrial Complex (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath-Lexington, 1973)»
especially the contribution by Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin,
’The Concept of a Military-Industrial Complex," pp. 27-60.
^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York:
Knopf, 1973).
^Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Transnational
Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973)? Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)•
Jay W. Forrester, World Dynamics (Cambridge, Mass.:
Wright-Allen, 1971).
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a single comprehensive theory or model of foreign policymaking
process. As an analytic model designed to describe and explain
the foreign policymaking processes of states, each of the models
is a "general" analytic model.

However, to the extent that each

of them is limited to selected aspects which it emphasizes, each
model is only a "partial” model.

None are specifically useful for

an analysis of the diffusion of policymaking power resulting from
the groupism peculiar to Japan and the consensus politics rooted
in the traditional Japanese social relations.

Fortunately, there

are a few analytic models advanced by Japanese scholars which
contain relevant conceptual elements of some of the "general" ana-

68

lytic models

and yet are sensitive to the features peculiar to

the Japanese foreign policymaking process.

Before discussing the

theoretical perspective of this particular study, it is in order
to take a brief overview of the field of

Japanese policymaking

in general in terms of the problems and the proposed solutions to
the problems.

1.

Overview, (a) Problems:

The State-of-the Art.

An excellent comprehensive review of the current literature in
the field of

Japanese policymaking is provided by Haruhiro

go
Of particular relevance to the study of the Japanese
foreign policymaking process are the ruling elite model, the
incremental decision-making model, and the pluralistic and bu
reaucratic politics model.
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Fukui.

69

Using the elitist-pluralist debate as his main

organizing principle, Fukui examines the major points of agreement
and disagreement among the various authors reviewed.

The charac

teristics of the Japanese elite model, as emerged from Fukui's
extensive review of the relevant literature, are (1) it is "the
single most popular and influential model of policymaking in con- temporary Japan identifiable in the existing literature;"'

(2) it

is based on the concept of a tripartite power elite "composed of
leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic party (LDP), senior
*7i_

bureaucrats, and big businessmen;"'

(3) "there are some important

variations, depending on which, of the three groups is regarded as
72
the most or more powerful,"
however, "the three major groups
comprise a regular and effective alliance and control decisionmaking on major policy issues}"

and (4) there exists a mutually

supportive log-rolling relationship among the three component
groups of the ruling power elite.

74

Three basic "propositions"

69
Haruhiro Fukui, "Studies in Policymaking: A Review of
the Literature," in T. J. Pempel, op. cit., Chapter 2 (pp. 22-48).
7^Fukui, ibid., p. 22.
7iIbid.
72Ibid., pp. 22-23.
73Ibid., p. 23.
7^Ibid., p. 24.
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of the elite model based on the concept of a tripartite power elite,
as summarized by Fukui, are (i) "the major groups comprising
the elite triumvirate are united, normally if not always, both
in purpose and action;"7^ (2) they participate "in most, if not
'76
all, important policy decisionsr and (3) "individuals and groups
other than those included in the elite categories axe regularly
excluded from decision-making processes involving important policy
issues." 77

On the other hand, there are "pluralistic views" which are
opposed to the elitist views.

According to Fukui, the pluralists

argue that none of the three basic propositions of the power elite
model meet rigorous empirical tests.

Based on several empirical

case studies, the pluralists point out, first of all, there
are divisions within the ranks of each group of the allegedly
cohesive tripartite elite group.

The Liberal Democratic party has

had a perpetual factional strife (or cross-factional groupings)
78
which has played important roles in foreign policymaking.' The
national administration is no more united than is the LDP.
Constantly there are ongoing intrabureaucratic conflicts which have

75Ibid., p. 35.
?6Ibid.
77Ibid.
78Ibid.. pp. 35-36.
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been referred to as "jungle warfare.'

79

As for big business,

the pluralists argue that the era of a close cooperation and
coordination between the government and the big business ended
go
in 1958 for all practical purposes.
Moreover, the pluralists
point out the fact that the three component groups of the tri
partite power elite have clashed over various issues according
to the interests of each own group.

Secondly, a few LDP poli

ticians, notably the prime minister and his close associates,
have emerged as the major initiators and promotors of particular
policies.

81

Thirdly, depending on the nature of a given issue,

there have been other non-elite groups which have also provided
significant input in initiating and promoting particular policies.

Merits and demerits of each view aside, Fukui offers his
overall comments on the literature reviewed.
is

His main concern

that the works he reviewed

are generally "not consciously
go
and explicitly designed to be typical or representative."

79Ibid., p. 38.
80roid.t p. 39.
81Ibid., p. 41.
82.„.Ibid.
83Ibid., p. 50.
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Specifically, as Fukui sees, there are two problems in the
current literature, especially among the case studies:

(i)

the problem of typicality and representativeness; the
8 if
typological framework of our research and writing; and (2) the
problem of a "systematic description and analysis of the elements
35
of complexity and dynamism found in each case,”
involving "the
problem of defining, identifying, and classifying a range of

86

relevant variables in each case study."

Commenting on the

problems in the current state-of-the art, Pempel offers, among
others, the following two observations:

(l) there are a number

of information-rich case studies in the field.

However, there

is the critical shortage of middle-range theories of the Japanese
policymaking relating the information-rich case studies to some
broader context:

87
"Of what is it a case?"
and (2) the Japanese

policymaking is extremely heterogeneous and the existing gener
alizations are like the old adage about
u

*

an elephant.

the. blind men describing

88

Ibid., p. 49•
85Ibid.
86Ibid.
8^T. J. Pempel, "Introduction," in Pempel (ed.), ibid.,
P•

lb•

op

Pempel, "Conclusion," in Pempel (ed.), ibid., p. 309-310*
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(b) Proposed Solutions:

The State-to-be-of the. Art.

As noted above, the major problem which Fukui sees with
the state-of-the art is the lack of typological perspectives
especially among the case studies.

Emphasizing the need to go

even beyond the typological perspectives, which are, as he puts
89
it, "basically static," ordering and clustering policy issues
at any given time, Fukui recommends the following for a more
rigorous methodology:

(i) We

must

"focus on the complexity

of relationships among the issues or on the dynamism of the
developmental process through which each issue moves;"9^

(2) in

order to cope with the elements of complexity and dynamism more

(

systematically and effectively, we can

separate and divide cases

along three distinct dimensions, viz., (a) actors and their
definition of a policy issue; (b) interissue relationships; and
91
(c) issue evolution and process continuity; and, finally, (3)
we must be sensitive to cross-national comparability.

92

Fukui

concludes his recommendations for the future agenda with the
following remarks:
The state-to-be of the art which I envisage wilL
thus be characterized by more case studies and
generalizations based on them which are informed

^9Fukui in Pempel, ibid., p. 539QIbid.
91Ibid., p. 5^92Ibid., p. 59.
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^

and guided by greater concern with and sensitivity
to the problems of representativeness, complexity,
dynamism, and cross-national comparability.93

Pempel's proposed solutions to the problems that he sees with
the field of the Japanese policymaking are threefold.

In the

first place, information-rich case studies must be counter
balanced by relating them to some broader context in terms of
oh
"of what is it a case?"
Secondly, since Japanese policymaking
is so extremely heterogeneous, and because the existing generali
zations about the subject are contradictory, the latter must be
reexamined with the awareness of and sensitivity to (a) the
different policymaking procedures through which different issues
are resolved (e.g., Pempel’s three ideal types of such processes
for one’s orientation are policymaking through camp conflict,
pressure-group policymaking, and incremental policymaking such
as the foreign policymaking);

(b) the basic dimensional factors of

policymaking (e.g. Pempel's three basic dimensional factors are
issues, political institutions and their structure, and individual
decision-makers' personalities or their role perception and moti
vation) ;^and (c) the level of analysis in terms of the interaction

Qlj,
^Pempel in Pempel, ibid., p. 14.

^ Ibid., p. 19*
96Ibid., pp. 313-314.
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of state and society on one hand, and intrastate "behavior on
the other.

Thirdly, we must be aware of and be sensi

tive to longitudinal variations, that is, changes in the perspective on a problem and in the context of policymaking in general.

2.

97

Theoretical Perspectives of the- Study

Much of the methodological orientation of this study has
been influenced by the foregoing problems and proposed solutions.
98
The basic approach
underlying the theoretical perspectives of
this study is eclectic in nature, encompassing both perspectives
of the tripartite ruling elite model and the pluralist views.

97Ibid., p. 317.
98
The term ’’approach" is used in this context to mean
"a predisposition to adopt a particular conceptual framework and
to explore certain types of hypotheses towards the generation of
theory........ An approach is the particular orientation that
one adopts when addressing a subject or issue. It is a line of
advance that a scholar takes in initiating his investigation.
This orientating framework is of crucial import to the theorizing
process since it determines what sets of concepts, questions,
perspectives, and procedures the researcher will adopt in pursuing
his inquiry. The approach that one selects will decidedly shape
the hypotheses that are generated and ultimately the theory that
is formulated. An approach may be implicit or explicit; it may be
crudely developed or highly refined; and it may be utilized either
to describe or explain,” James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave,
Jr., Comparative Politics; The Quest for Theory (Columbus, Ohio:
Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1973)» P* 25*
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Moreover, the basic approach adopted for this study is broader
in scope than that of either of the two perspectives.

This study utilizes two analytical perspectives currently
on the horizon of the theorizing activities in the field of the
Japanese foreign policymaking process.

99
One is the "tripod system

model" (San Kyakuchu sisutemu modern) proposed try Chihiro Hosoya,

In addition, the conceptual orientation of this study
owes much to: Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, 0£. cit.;
Albert M. Craig, "Functional and dysfunctional Aspects of Govern
ment Bureaucracy," in Ezra F. Vogel (ed.), Modera Japanese Organ
ization and Decision-Making (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1975); Gerald L. Curtis, "Big Business and .
Political Influence," in Vogel (ed.), ibid.; Gerald L. Curtis,
Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1971); Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Chicago:
Aldine, 19^6); Destler, et al., o p . cit.; Haruhiro Fukui, Jjyu
Minshuto to Seisaku Kettei [The Liberal Democratic Party and PolicyMaking] (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1969); Fukui, Party in Power: The
Japanese Liberal Democrats and Policy-Making (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1970); Morton H. Halperin
with the assistance of Prisci lla Clapp and Arnold Kanter, Bureau
cratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 197^); Donald C. Hellmann, Japan: Its Domestic Poli
tics and Foreign Policy, Reprint No. 19, December 1973 (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1973); Donald C. Hellmann,
"Japanese Security and Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy," in Robert
A. Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Modem Japan (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977); Takeshi
Hatakeyama, Habatsu no Naimaku [The Inside of Factions] (Tokyo:
Rippu Shobo, 1975);
Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970); Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics:
Patron-Client Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972); and
Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit.
^^Chihiro Hosoya, "Sosetsu: Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katei
ni okeru Nichibei no Tokushitsu'*[The Characteristics of the Japanese
and the United States Foreign Policymaking Processes: An Overview]
in Chihiro Hosoya and Joji Watanuki (eds.), o p . cit., p. 5*

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 29 -

(
and the other, a modified version of the "critical case" decisionmaking model advanced by Haruhiro Fukui.

101

While the former

pertains mainly to the actor dimension (the elite and the intra
elite relationship), the latter combines the actor dimension with
the policy issue dimension.

(a) The "Tripod System Model." Hosoya’s "tripod system
model” (San Kyakuchu sisutemu moderu) is based on a bureaucraticfactional-politics perspective relative to the Japanese foreign
policymaking process.

It is a refined version of his own "troika
102
system model" (toroika sisutemu moderu) which is, in turn, a mod-

^

ified version of the tripartite ruling elite model as discussed
earlier.

There is, essentially, a basic agreement between Hosoya's

"troika system model” and the ruling triumvirate model as to who
rules Japan. It has been pointed out that, according to the elite
model, the ruling triumvirate is "composed of leaders of the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), senior bureaucrats, and big

Haruhiro Fukui, "Okinawa Henkan Kosho: Nihon Seifu ni
okeru Kettei Katei [Negotiations for the Okinawa Reversion: The
Decision-Making Process in the Japanese Government]," in Nihon
Kokusai Seiji Gakkai (ed.), Kokusai Seiji [international Relations],
no. 52 (TokyoL Yuhikaku, 1975)» PP* 97-127 (hereinafter referred
to as "Fukui, Okinawa Henkan Kosho").
^^Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.), 00. cit., p. 5«

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 30 -

(

103
businessmen” ^ and that the three major groups comprise a regular
and effective alliance and control decision-making on major foreign
policy issues.

1 04.

Moreover, ’’individuals and groups other than

those included in the elite categories are regularly excluded from
105
decision-making processes involving important policy issues,"
according to the tripartite power elite model.
"troika system model” avoids

However, Hosoya's

conceptual rigidity of the tripartite

power elite model based on the assumptions of an intraelite unity
and cohesion.

Recognizing the ’’generally" great influence of the

three major groups on important policy decision-making, Hosoya
notes:
Certainly, compared to the other political groups, the
extent of participation in Japan's foreign policymaking
processes by the leaders of government, the ruling LDP,
bureaucracy, and big business, and their influence on
decision-making, are generally great. It is fitting to
call it a "troika system." [emphasis added]
Hosoya then hastens to refine his concept of the "troika system"
by incorporating into it the prime minister.

He stresses the

centrality of the role played by the Prime Minister of the LUPgovemment in the foreign policymaking process.

The "troika

103
•'Supra, p. 21.
10^.,
Ibid.
105
•'Supra, p. 22.
106
Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.), op. cit., p. 5•
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system model" is thus modified into what he calls the "tripod
system model.” Hosoya notes:
............ Instead of the concept of a troika
system, one feels that a "tripod system model" has a
higher degree of explanatory capability because the
tripod concept views the three elite groups of the
LDP, bureaucracy, and big business as forming an advisory
support group in the [final] policy "decisonal unit" the
core of which is the prime minister. The position of the
three major groups [in the "decisional unit” as Hosoya
calls it] is, so to speak, like that of three pillars
[supporting the prime minister].10?
As the pluralists argue, Hosoya's tripod system concept thus
recognises the important special role of the prime minister of
the LDP-govemment in the foreign policymaking process.

However,

unlike the pluralists' view, the prime minister's position visa-vis the three groups is not outside of the group. On the
contrary, the prime minister is not only part of the final decision
making group but also his role is central in the final "decisional
unity"

hence the primacy of the prime minister's role in the

foreign policymaking process in Japan under the LDP-govemment.
Hosoya's graphic description of his "tripod system model" indicates
equal distance among the three major groups and vis-a-vis the prime
minister (see Figure 1 on page 32).

The equidistance model appears

to be another aspect of the tripod system model that avoids a con108
ceptual rigidity in view of the current state-of-the art.

Ibid.
108
The question of which component group plays more
important role on what kind of issues in assisting the prime
minister falls outside the scope of this study.
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Figure 1:

The "Decisional Unit" in Hosoya's 'Tripod System
Model" of the Japanese Foreign Policymaking Process
under the Liberal Democratic Party-govemment .109

109roid., p. 6.
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Moreover, befitting an elite analysis theorist,
Hosoya further refines his tripod system model by turning to
the intraelite relationship (factions and factional groupings)
relative to the ruling circle, which is of particular relevance to
this study.

Hosoya states:

Moreover, what constitute asymmetry between the patterns
01 the Japanese foreign policymaking process and- that of
the United States are the existence of factions within
the LHP and the projection of factional struggles into
the [foreign policy] decision-making process. The fac
tional struggles for intraparty leadership constitute
important inputs into the decision-making_process, and
act as a disruptive cause [in the
the rationality (gorisei) of a policy.

110
Bill and Hardgrave, for example, point out that the
intraelite relations are the focus of an elite analysis as
follows: "Elite analysis is preeminently conflict analysis that
stressed vertical stratification. All political systems are
stratified into political elites and non-elites, and the tension
that inheres in this division is the basis for explaining the
similarities and differences in political systems. Conflict and
competition are everpresent in a basic situation of inequality
between elites and non-elites (or masses), haves and have-nots,
those who rule and those who are ruled. At least as important
in this perspective is the fact that virtually all emphasis is
placed upon one side of the conflict line, i.e., upon the poli
tical elite. Thus hy its very nature the elite approach assumes
stratification with a heavy emphasis upon one side of that which
is stratified. The practioners of comparative elite analysis,
therefore, more often draw their comparisons on the basis of
elite-non-elite relations," Bill and Hardgrave, op. cit., p. 160.
Ill
According to Hosoya, the fact that the political
"strategic considerations in the factional dimension" influence
"the direction and timing of extremely important foreign policy
decisionmaking" has been observed in the cases of the resumption
of diplomatic relations with China and the normalization of the
Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations, Hosoya in Hosoya and
Watanuki (eds.), pp. cit., p. 1^.
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Furthermore, Hosoya enriches his tripod system model
"by including the perspective of the ‘bureaucratic politics model:
The "factional politics*1 is also clearly related to
the ""bureaucratic politics." At times, there arise
coalitions between a particular bureaucratic body or
its subunit and the factions. Therefore, it becomes
frequently effective to analyze and explain the policy
decision-making process by the bureaucratic-factionalpolitics model (kanryo habatsu seiji moderu) .112

(b)

The "Critical Case" Model. This model is based on a

dichotomous perspective of "routine" (or "ordinary") case vs.
"non-routine" (or "critical") case decision-making.

As noted above,

the perspective of this "critical case" model, as proposed by Fukui,

f

^

relates the nature of a policy issue to the main role player (or
actor) relative to the type of policy issues.

According to Fukui,. apart from a "crisis" situation in which
"crisis'* decision-making takes place, all policy matters may be
classified into the two categories of policy issues:

"Routine"

(or "ordinary") and "non-routine” (or "critical"). The "routine"
policymaking model pertains .to all policy matters in the Japanese
government which involve routine administrative management of the
matter.

The management of these "routine" matters may be

characterized "by the likelihood of institution
alized rigidity, conservatism, the avoidance of a clear-cut [policy]
i-ip

Ibid., p. 3k.
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selection, deference to the principle of unanimity, emphasis
113
on procedural propriety, etc."
These "routine" matters are
essentially "bureaucratic" matters, involving
"routine" and "noncontroversial” situations.

114*

Policy decisions

on these routine matters bear no political significance, for they
are technical and administrative in nature.
the "routine" decisions is different from
"critical”) policy decision-making.

The mode of making
"non-routine" (or

"There are different ways

in which [these "routine"] decisions are made or, perhaps more
11*5
appropriately, evolve."
"Discussions and consultations are
largely contained within the bureaucracy, but also involve, as a
rule, all officials with jurisdictional interest in and respon116
sibility for the particular policy subject." The resultant mode
of such "routine" policymaking within the Gaimusho

(the Foreign

Ministry), for example, is one in which "information and ideas
flow both horizontally and vertically among the officials but
in an orderly manner through well-defined channels close to the

113Fukui, "Okinawa Henkan Kosho," ojd. cit., p. 99*
114*
Ibid.
^^Ibid. Commenting on the complexity of such a "routine"
bureaucratic policymaking process, for example, in the Gaimusho,
Fukui notes that it is "confusing not only to outsiders, but ap
parently even to those inside the bureaucracy," Fukui, "PolicyMaking in the Japanese Foreign Ministry," in Robert A. Scalapino
(ed.), The Foreign Policy of Modem Japan (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), P* 8, footnote
13* Fukui also notes that a Gaimusho division head whom he inter
viewed denied the existence of any set pattern of decision-making
within the ministry, ibid.
116-,.,
Ibid.
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117
image conveyed by the conventional model of "ringisei."

The "critical case model," as Fukui explains it, is an
unfinished "experiential" (keiken teki) model and, at the same
time, an "analytical concept" (bunseki teki gainen) to be refined
in the future.

118

According to Fukui, postwar Japan "was under

119
peculiar political circumstances.*

Under these circumstances,

there developed, from time to time, 'situations in which

117
There have been some controversy over the concept ox
ringisei as to whether or not it is unique to the Japanese as will
be discussed later in the study. Literally, ringisei means a
"system of reverential inquiry about the superior's intentions . .
. . . . It is an archaic term that is scarcely comprehensible to
many postwar Japanese. Yet it is commonly used in academic and
professional circles to describe a method of decision-making that
has been extensively employed in Japanese governmental and private
agencies since the early days of the Meiji era (1868-1912),"
Kiyoaki Tsuji, "Decision-Making in the Japanese Governments A
Study of Ringisei," in Robert E. Ward (ed.), Political Development
in Modem Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1968), pp. 4-57-53, as cited in Brzezinski, The Fragile Blossom, op.
cit., p. 49* Other sources of information on ringisei include:
Ezra F. Vogel, "Introduction: Toward More Accurate Concepts," in
Ezra Vogel (ed.), op. cit., pp. xvii-xviii; Fukui, "Policy-Making
in the Japanese Foreign Ministry,” in Scalapino (ed.), op. cit.,
p. 8; Bernard S. Silberman, "Ringisei: Traditional Values or
Organizational Imperatives in the Japanese Upper Civil Service,
1868— 1945," Journal of Asian Studies (February 1973)» 251-264;
Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.), o p . cit., pp. 17-18; and
Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making
System in Japan," World Politics, vol. XXVI, no. 3 (April 1974),

363-364.
118
Fukui, "Okinawa Henkan Kosho," o p . cit., p. 97*
119Ibid., p. 98.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n p ro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 37 -

"extremely intense controversy and tension were manifested
involving certain particular type of foreign policy questions
and a pattern of decision-making has emerged from such a critical

120
[emphasis added] situation."

Fukui's "critical case model"

is a "generalization" (ippaaka) in terms of an "abstract construct*
(chusho-ka) of such a pattern of decision-making involving those
"critical" cases.

121

More specifically, Fukui notes:

. . . . in a nutshell, this ["critical" case concept]
represents a model constructed, on one hand, from the
regularly observed pattern of those who have partici
pated in a given ["critical"] policy decision-making
and, on the other hand, the pattern of these partici
pants* behavior under the given [controversial and
tense] circumstances surrounding a particular type of
policy questions which have, along with other foreign
policy questions, confronted postwar Japan. 2
Fukui*s characterization of his "crisis case" model may be
summarized in terms of (1) the dimension of what he calls
"domestic political disturbances,"

and (2) the dimensions of

the final decision-making unit and the mode of the final policy
12^
decision-making.

Regarding the first point, the "critical case" is character
ized by

unusual visibility and controversy, that is,

domestic political disturbances.

The cases which cause domestic

120IMd.
121IMd.
122
Ibid., p. 97.
^^Haruhiro Fukui, 'Tanaka Goes to Peking: A Case Study in
Foreign Policymaking,” in Pempel (ed.), op- cit., p. 60.
12^
Fukui, "Okinawa Henkan Kosho," op. cit., p. 99-
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political disturbances, as Fukui maintains,
appear particularly amenable to this [the "critical
case model"] approach and hold special interest to a
political scientist because of their unusual visibility
and controversiality in the society. 125
According to Fukui, the 1951 peace settlement at San Francisco,
the 1956 peace-making with the Soviet Union, and the i960 revision .
of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty were all cases of this
variety.

They were not cases of a "crisis" decision-making as the

term "crisis” is used in the specialized literature on international
crises.

Fukui notes that the three elements usually attributed to

an international "crisis"—

short decision-time, high degree of

perceived threat to the decision-makers' central values or goals,

•
[:

and surprise— were not all present in the three cases cited above.

i2i

"Of the three elements attributed to an international crisis by
Charles F. Hermann and others . . . these cases shared, more or less,
the first and second but not, or only very weakly, the last.

They

were nevertheless clearly distinguishable from the routine operations
127
of government."
In other words, a case which lacks a sufficient
presence of all three elements of a"crisis" situation and which
causes a high degree of "domestic political disturbances" is a

^■^Fukui, "Tanaka Goes to Peking,” op. cit., p. 61.
126
'
Ibid. Reference is made to Charles F. Hermann (ed.),
International Crises (New York: Free Press, 1972), especially
parts 1 and 6.
.
127
Fukui, "Tanaka Goes to Peking," op. cit., p. 61.
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"critical” case as distinguished from a "crisis” case.

The second group of dimensions, as noted above, pertains
to the final policy decision-making unit and the mode of the
final policy decision-making.

According to Fukui, the "critical"

case policy decision-making is characterized by the"modality of
a positive action" (sekkyokuteki kodSsei), "progressiveness”
(kakushinsei), the "defiance of the so-called SOP— the standard
operational procedures," "the acceptance of decisions arbitrarily
imposed from above,” and "the clear locus of responsibility"
[for the final policy decisions].

123

Specifically, according to

Fukui, in a typical "critical case" policymaking situation there
are, on one hand, parties, certain pressure groups, mass media
(masukomi, i.e., mass communication), and citizen groups which
are swept into a wide-spread general controversy over a given
"critical" policy question.

On the other hand,"paradoxically,"

as Fukui puts it, there is a remarkable "peculiarity that the
number of participants in

the decision-making process within

129
the government circle is extremely small."The typical mode
of decision-making in this case is, according to- Fukui, charac
terized by the central, role of the prime minister:
1Pft
Fukui, "Okinawa Henkan Kosho," on. cit., p. 98.
129Ibid.
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[the prime minister as the] one with the supreme respon
sibility of the government [seifu no saiko sekininsha]
plays the role of the central leading figure, and,
typically, is the chief figure of one partv (the positive
group) [sekkyokuha] in the controversy.
The prime minister's policy advisory group is small ordinarily
consisting of the chief Cabinet secretary, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, senior bureaucrats of the Foreign Office from the Vice
Foreign Minister to section chiefs, and several others.
explains that the "several others"
LDP politicians.

Fukui

frequently mean influential

However, occasionally, depending on the given

issue at hand, there is a small group of "non-regular” indi
viduals, such as members of the opposition parties, journalists,
and scholars, who participate in the inner circle policymaking
process. Such an ad hoc temporary group participation in the
policymaking process is limited to only those policy matters which
become controversial from time to time.

131

Both Hosoya’s "tripod system model" and Fukui’s "critical
case model," as noted above, recognize the centrality of the prime
minister's role in the Japanese foreign policymaking process
under the LDP-govemment domination.

However, the two models

differ from each other in their focus, with different implications
and different conceptual utlity.

13°Ibid.
131Ibid.
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C.

Nature, Scope, and Significance of the Study

1.

Nature. Studies on the Japanese foreign policymaking

132
process abound. J

However, as noted above, our knowledge of the

subject remains fragmentary.

There is the need of middle-range

theories that will eventually lead to an empirically sound com
prehensive typology of the foreign policymaking process in Japan.
In view of the state of the field which is, as Fukui puts it, at

13^These studies includes Bernard G. Cohen, The Political
Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace
Settlement (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957),
Scalapino and Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan,
op. cit., Chapter 5» PP* 125-153» Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese
Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with
the Soviet Union (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 19°9); Donald Hellmann, Japan: Its Domestic Poli
tics and Foreign Policy, op. cit.; Haruhiro Fukui, Jiyu Hinshuto
to Seisaku Kettei, op. cit.; Fukui, Party in Power, pp. cit.;
Fukui, "Okinawa Henkan Kosho," pp. cit.; Fukui, ’Tanaka Goes to
Peking," pp. cit.; Frank Langdon, "Japan's Foreign Policy-Making
Process," in Young C. Kim (ed.), Japan in World Politics (Wash
ington, D.C.: Institute for Asian Studies, 1972), Frank Langdon,
Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver: British Columbia University
Press, 1973)» Chapter 2, pp. 7-21; Chihiro Hosoya, "Character
istics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan,"
World Politics, vol. XXVI, no. 3 (April 1974), 353-369; Chihiro
Hosoya and Joji Watanuki (eds.), Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katei no
Nichibei Hikaku, pp. cit.; I.M. Destler, et aJL., Managing an
Alliance, op. cit.; Ezra P. Vogel (ed.), Modem Japanese Organi
zation and Decision-Making, pp. cit.; Shigeo Misawa, "An Outline
of the Policy-Making Process in Japan," in Hiroshi Itoh (ed. and
trans.), Japanese Politics, An Inside View; Readings from Japan
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973)*
John Toland,
The Rising Sim: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire,
1936-1945 (New York; Bantam Books, 1971)-
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a "pretaxonomical" J stage, this study is singularly modest
in nature.

Attempting to characterize the structure and

dynamics of the Japanese foreign policymaking process over a
period of time in terms of the two critical variables, this study
represents an exploratory exercise with a sensitivity to the
need of relating case studies to a broader context:

"of what

is it a case

The major fissure in past dialogue among behavioralisis,
as I .11 and Hardgrave point out, has been "between those seeking
to confine the meaning of behavioralism to the sophisticated em^

V

ployment of quantitative techniques and precision of measurement
and those identifying behavioralism more with the scientific metho
dology of conceptual rigor, hypothesis formulation, and theory
building."'*'^

If the nature of this study were to be pigeonholed

into one of the two categories, it belongs to the latter in view
of the objectives of and the methodology adopted for this study.

This study is also comparative in nature inasmuch as
a comparative knowledge rests on discerning both similarities and

^•^Fukui, 'Tanaka Goes to Peking," op. cit., p. 60.
^•^Supra, p. 2k, footnote 87.
^-^Bill and Hardgrave, op. cit., p. 16.
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dissimilarities relative to a common yardstick.
way,

Stated in another

this study is structurally and functionally comparative

in nature to the extent that it focuses on the selected structural/
functional variables that appear to be characteristic of the
Japanese foreign policymaking process in spite of institutional
similarities relative to other democracies.

No explicit attempt is made in this study to systematically
apply a set of some structural/functional variables, such as those
cross-cultural comparative categories advanced by Gabriel Almond and
James Coleman.However, the thematic focus and the methodological
orientation of this study are different from traditional comparative
^

politics.

Bill and Hardgrave, for example, characterize the tra

ditional comparative politics in terms of the following six cate.137
gories: •"

firstly, it was essentially a configurative description.

"Characteristic studies included discussions and checklists of
important names, dates, relevant- historical events, sections of
legal and constitutional documents, and committee and cabinet
138
organization."

Secondly, it was a "formal-legal" approach

reflecting a preoccupation with formal structures and legal
strictures.
4

'•

Emphasis was placed upon the organized and evident
F

Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The
Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, i960), especially pp. ^-6b for comparing Western
and non-Westem governments.
137
•' Bill and Hardgrave, 00. cit., pp. 2-10.
l38Ibid., p. 3 .

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 44 -

(
institutions of government,concentrating almost exclusively
upon constitutions, cabinets, parliaments, courts, and bureau
cracies*

Thirdly, it was parochial,.focusing exclusively upon

European governments.

"Even within the study of comparative

European politics, the scope was narrowed to consider again and
again the same four societies:
139
and Russia.”

Great Britain, France, Germany,

Fourthly, it was essentially conservative with

little concern for a study of political dynamism.

In the absence

of the sensitivity to various competing forces in the political
process, relative to such concepts as "political modernization”
and "transforming change," it remained essentially conservative,
evolving "inexorably and inevitably . . . in the direction of
140
liberal democracy."

Fifthly, it was nontheoretical without

any effort to formulate "tightly organized and testable gener141
alizations relating to political process."

Finally, the

traditional comparative politics lacked methodological sensi
tivity.

"The gathering and perusal of documents and the intel

lectual interpretation of the legal intricacies of formal
government were considered relevant procedures to the tasks at
142
hand."

139Ibid.. p. 5.
^^ I b i d ., pp. 6-7.
141
1 1Ibid.. p. 7.
li|2Ibid., p. 8.
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Understandably, "the earliest Western writings on
Japan, largely those of missionaries, overseas traders,
journalists, government officials, and miscellaneous part-time
or permanent expatriates, are conspicuously marked by sweeping
attempts to portray for a bemused and captivated West the idiosyncracies of an overwhelmingly alien culture.”

J As recently

as the American occupation period of Japan following World War
II,

culturally deterministic interpretations of Japanese

people and their social and political institutions were still
prevalent.

In the postwar period, as the pendulum began to swing
away from

cultural determinism, the area of critical cultural

variables has either remained underdeveloped or it has become
subsumed in a different framework. While "Japanese authors . . .
usually emphasize the impact of traditional behavior on the poli
tical system, and some even deny the political modernity of Japan
ike
under a capitalist regime,"
■ many foreign studies of Japanese

-Tempel in Pempel (ed.), on. cit., p. 13.
Ibid.
■^•^Frank Langdon, Politics in Japan (Boston:

Little,

Brown, I967), pp. 4~5 . References are made to: Kikuo Nakamura,
Gendai Seiji no Jittai (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1958), pp. 80-88, 145-52,
I97-238, 255-4-09} Yoshitake Oka (ed.), Gendai Nihon no Sei.ji
Katei (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1958); and Nohon Seiji Gakkai,
Nihon Sei.jigaku Nempo I960: Nihon no Atsuryoku Dantai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, i960).
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government and politics have been "mainly conserned with
describing those Japanese institutions similar to the ones
usually covered in books on Western government.
exceptions of a few works,

147

148

these studies

146

With the

give little

material about traditional groups and behavior.

149

Emphasis

is placed on the institutional structure and behavior of the
Japanese government and politics without any serious attention
to political dynamics, in the Japanese political process.

The

^

critical cultural variables, such as Janapanese groupism and
their social norm of consensus decision-making, involved in the
political process, were given less attention.

Only in 1962 were,

for example, the Japanese party factions first given serious

146
Langdon, Politics in Japan, pp. cit., p. 5*
^ F o r example, Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics (New
York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1957)(The 1972 second edition even has the
subtitle, "Patron-Ciient Democracy," emphasizing the cultural
variables); Richard K. Beardsley, John W. Hall, and Robert E. Ward
(eds.), Village Japan (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1959)»
especially Robert Ward, chaps. 12 and 13; and Chitoshi Yanaga,
Japanese People and Politics (New Yoik: John Wiley & Sons, 1956),
as cited by Langdon, ibid.. p. 5> footnote 2.
148
The standard textbooks in this category include; Ardath
W. Burks, The Government of Japan (2nd ed.; New York; Thomas Y.
Crowell, 19^4); John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan
(New York; Frederick A- Praeger, I962); and Theodore McNelly,
Contemporary Government of Japan (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1963)»
cited in. Langdon, Politics in Japan, op. cit., p. 5* footnote 2.
149
Langdon, ibid., p. 5« Ti should be noted that this is
merely to indicate that cultural variables have not received the '*
attention- they deserve. It is hot to imply that the authors of
these studies were completely oblivious to the traditional groups
and behavior.
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attention by Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi in their
analysis of the characteristics ox the Japanese parties and
politics.

On the other hand, there is of late a tendency
among scholars to subsume the critical cultural variables in a
larger theoretical framework. As part of their attempt to
refine the critical cultural concepts, these scholars are alert
to the possiblity of exaggerating the importance of the cultural
variables relative to Japan.

Ezra Vogel, for example, states:

A number of concepts currently used to describe
various features^Japanese organization have taken
on exaggerated importance in Western scholarly
literature. In part, the exaggeration occurs
because observations at a particular time and place
have been assumed to be general characteristics
over a long period with applicability to a wide
range of phenomena. In part it occurs because
certain Japanese expressions are assumed to repre
sent unique practices, which,upon closer exami
nation., are not very different from practices in
the United States or other Western countries .1-51
It has been pointed out that

Japanese groupism and

social norm of consensus decision-making are responsible for
the diffusion of policymaking power and

. consensus politics

in the Japanese foreign policymaking process.

The structural

and behavioral characteristics of the Japanese foreign policy
making process as such may not be unique to Japan.

They may

very well be a matter of differences in the degree of emphasis

Scalapino and Masumi, on. cit.
^•■^Ezra F. Vogel, "Introduction: Toward More Accurate
Concepts,” in Vogel (ed.), on. cit., p. xv.
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rather than of kind.
In order to answer these questions
eventually; it appears that more comparative studies are needed
which, using a common yardstick ("be it similar dimensions of
critical variables or similar institutional units of comparison),
attempt to analyze the cultural variables responsible for structural/
functional peculiarities in spite of institutional similarities.
As noted earlier, this study focuses on the selected aspects of relevant
variable' specific to Japan, without explicitly comparing them to
those in other political systems.

However, to the extent that

the two basic dimensions of the Japanese foreign policymaking
process selected for this study (actor and issue) are found in
any foreign policymaking process elsewhere, this study has com
parative implications.

Likewise, the selected units of analysis

relative to the policymaking institutions (Chapter III) are also
commonly found in other democracies.
2.

Scope. The temporal domain of this study is relatively

long and the spatial domain involved in this study wide.

These

two domains together make the scope of this study broad.

First of

all, this study attempts to describe and analyze the structural
and behavioral pattern of the Japanese foreign policymaking process
over a period of time.
is longitudinal.

The pattern analysis involved in this study

It requires a broad historical/descriptive analysis.

Secondly, the long temporal domain of this study is matched by the
spatial domain involving

Japanese society as a whole as well as

the structure and behavior of the Japanese policymaking-process.
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Each of the temporal periods and the spatial domain specific
to the period deserves a full analysis.

However, it is beyond

the task of a single study to cover all that is involved and
do justice.

Consequently, the scope of this study is limited

to a brief look at the origins of the two critical variables;
an overall descriptive analysis of the structural/behavioral
characteristics of the foreign policymaking process in Japan,
under the Meiji Constitution, in terms of the two critical
variables; a similar analysis relative to the foreign policy
making process in contemporary Japan under a new democratic
constitution, with emphasis on an analysis of elements of con
tinuity; and, finally, an application of the structural/be
havioral characteristics of the foreign policymaking process
to the NPT policymaking case only to the extent necessary to
test the hypothesis of this study.

3.

Significance. The following two considerations

render the problem with which this study deals not only
relevant but also significant:

first, a broad general sig

nificance of practical implications; and second, specific
theoretical considerations.

Firstly, as stated above, the

focus of this study is on the two peculiar features charac
teristic of the Japanese foreign policymaking process on the one
hand, and their manifestation in the NPT policymaking process
on the other. As such, it is hoped that this study will, in
some small way, shed light 011 a little known area of the
Japanese foreign policymaking process.
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I
As Dester and his associates state,
problems— actual and potential— continue. Americans
inevitably worry about whether Japan will one day choose
to acquire nuclear arms and about the impact of such a
choice on world power relationships. And although
Japan's particular vulnerability to the recent economic
ills of the industrialized world has tempered visions of
an economic superstate, Americans worry about the possi
bility of future Japanese trade offensives. Underlying
these genuine substantive concerns is a widespread anxiety
about what "the Japanese" really want, who "the Japanese"
really are. For many Americans, the cultviral gap raises
questions about the foundations of the relationship and
the extent of mutual understanding, about what officials
on the other side of the negotiating table are really
thinking. And in Japan, where the psychology of the
junior partner still prevails, concern about "the Amer
icans" is far more pervasive. Opposition Communists and
Socialists have long challenged American policies; now
conservative politicians and bureaucrats worry about the
dependability of U.S. policies.152
£

The underlying causes of the numerous misperceptions and the
misunderstandings, which stem from the cultural gap, include
the two critical variables selected for this study.

In fact,

these two variables constitute the structural/behavioral charac
teristics of the Japanese foreign policymaking process as noted
by scholars such as Scalapino, Hellmann, and Hosoya. In today's
international dealings, bilateral or multilateral, the silhouette
of a nuclear cloud looms larger than ever before.

How does Japan,

the third largest economy in the world, make its foreign policies?
The importance of this question need hot be belabored.
Secondly, from a theoretical point of view, the following
two specific considerations make the thematic focus of this study
significant:

152

first, refinement of the concept of the centrality of

Destler, on. cit., p. 2.
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v
an LDP prime minister's role in the Japanese foreign policymaking process (involving important "political" issues); and
second, refinement of the dichotomous perspective of the "routine
case model” versus the "critical case model."

It has been pointed out that both Hosoya's "tripod
system model" and Fukui's "critical case model" conceptualize
the role of the LDP-prime minister in the Japanese foreign policy
making process as being central.

This study purports to refine

the concept of the centrality.of the prime minister's role as such.
According to Hosoya's "tripod system model," the complexity of the

(

bureaucratic factional politics notwithstanding, the final
"decisional unit” in a given important foreign policymaking process
is composed of the triumvirate supporting the prime minister as a
"three-pillar" advisory group.

According to this study, although

the prime minister's role is central, the nature of the centrality
as such depends on his "positional"
centrality within the LDP.

153

and "functional"

154

Moreover, there are variations in the

composition of the "decisional unit" depending on the nature of a
given issue

which, in turn, affect the nature of the central role

played by the prime minister.

Stated in another way, both the

institutional position of a prime minister in. the LDP-govemment
—

For a definition of this term as used in this study,
see infra, p. 65.
154
For a definition of this term as used in this study,
see inf3a , p. 66 .
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and his functional effectiveness as the central figure in the
LDP government depend largely on a shifting coalitional equi
librium at any given time.

Moreover, the prime minister's

functional effectiveness in initiating and implementing an
important foreign policy decision is also dependent upon the
kind of support he can receive from the triumvirate.

The tri

partite (’three pillar") elite group is by no means a monolithic,
united, and cohesive elite group.

The relative role*played by

each of the three groups vary from time to time depending on the
nature of a given issue.

In addition to the complexity of the

relative role played by each group and the varying degrees of
their role effectiveness, occasionally there are extraelite
variables involved in the final policymaking process, as pointed
out by Fukui.

These additional variables may be the role played

by a few opposition politicians as in the case of Prime Minister
Tanaka's

preparations for his trip to Peking for the normal

ization of diplomatic relations with the Peoples' Republic of
nu*55
China.

The same can be said of Fukui's notion of the

centrality of the prime minister's role in the Japanese foreign
policymaking process.

To put it broadly, this study 'maintains
that the nature of the central role of the LDP crime minister

135

!

—----

Fukui, "Tanaka Goes to Peking," op. cii
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(
and a small group of his close associates represents, more
often than not,

a wozking consensus among various actors

(role players) involved; rather than the kind of "arbitrary
decisions"^^ "imposed from above,” as indicated in Fukui*s
"critical case model.

The second theoretical consideration pertains to the
dichotomy of the "routine" and "critical" cases.
the "critical case model,"

According to

as advanced by Fukui, except for

"crisis cases" all other cases fall into one of the two cate
gories:

(

the "routine" bureaucratic and non controversial policy-

159
making cases and the "politicized,"
"critical" policymaking
cases.

A "critical policymaking’ case, as Fukui notes, "differs

from the process of routinized and incremental adjustment."
It has been pointed out that a "critical policymaking" case is
characterized by (1) the absence of a simultaneous and strong
presence of all three elements which are commonly attributed to

^ Fukui cited the following three cases as examples of
a "critical policymaking”: the 1951 peace settlement at San
Francisco, the 1956 peace-making with the Soviet Union, and the
i960 revision of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, Fukui,
ibid., pp. 60-6l.
157
Fukui, "Okinawa Hehkan Kosho," on. cit., p. 98•
l58'Ibid, pp. 97-98.

^ Ibid.
Fukui, "Tanaka Goes to Peking," on. cit., p. 61,
footnote 1.
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(
an international crisis—

(a) "short decision time"; (b) "high

perceived threat to the decisionmakers' central values or
goals"; and (c) "surprise"

;

(2) the presence of a high

degree of "domestic political disturbances" as manifested in a
a high visibility and intense controversy within the body politic
over the given "critical” policy issue; and (3) the final policy
decision-making unit being the prime minister and a small group
of his close advisors and associates on one hand, and the mode
of making and implementing the final policy decision one of an
"arbitrary imposition from above," on the other.

|

The case of the NTT policymaking process presents a
theoretical question.

On one hand, it was not a "crisis" case

according to the three elements criteria for an international
crisis.

The NIT case lacked the first ("short decision time")

and the third ("surpirse") elements altogether and had an insufficient
presence of the second element ("high perceived threat to the
decisionmakers' central values or goals").

On the other hand,

the NIT issue U4£ neither a "routine" case nor a "critical" case
as defined by Fukui.

As the first major postwar nuclear foreign

policy issue requiring a concrete policy decision, it was not a
routine bureaucratic administrative policymaking case involving
the application of a precedent or a marginal incremental ad
justment.

It was a political decision-making case without the
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"benefit of an overall policy guideline.

The NTT issue was

an extremely diffuse issue defying easy definition.

The

diffuseness of the issue was due to complex interissue
relationships relative to the NTT issue.

There were no

domestic political disturbances surrounding the issue.

Charac

teristically, there was a remarkably low degree of visibility
161
and "valance"
of the issue outside the immediate policy
making circles within the LDP and the government.

The NPT

case was thus neither a "rountine" nor a "critical" issue, but
fell into some gray area.

This being the case, how were the

diffusion of policymaking power and the consensus politics
|

manifested in the NTT policymaking process?

Who opposed and who

supported the treaty ratification and for what reasons?
the central role player in the policymaking process?

Who was

How did the

central role player achieve the necessary consensus for the treaty
ratification?
a case?"

Finally, as Pempel would put it, "of what was it

As an attempt to answer these questions typologically,

this study is relevant specifically to the dichotomous perspective
of the "routine case" model and the "critical case" model.
*
Daniel I. Okimoto, "Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy: The
Problem of the NPT," Asian Survey, vol. XV, no. ^ (April 1975)»
p. 321.

r
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D.

Conceptual Framework

162

The structural/behavioral peculiarities of the foreign
policymaking process in postwar Japan, as in prewar Japan, have
been characterized, as pointed out earlier, in terms of the
diffusion of policymaking power resulting from the Japanese pre
dilection for groupism on one hand, and the consensus politics
resulting in policy immobilism on the other.

The groupism tends

to act as a centripetal force (group cohesion and unity) working
against intergroup harmony and cohesion while the consensus norm
requires intergroup interaction toward agreement on a given policy
issue.
v

The two critical variables are, by definition, opposed to

each other.

However, in the Japanese political culture in general

and in their foreign policymaking process in particular, the two
are paradoxically co-exfcensive.

Groupism is ubiquitous in
as in all Japanese organizations.

Japanese political parties
The LDP, for example, is,

££2

The term "conceptual framework,” as used in this study,
is understood as a system of working hypotheses formulated specif
ically for the purpose of this study. As David Easton puts it,
"a conceptual framework consists of those theories and assumptions
which an investogator u s e s ....... It is a system of working
hypotheses, adopted and used only as. long as it helps to orient
empirical research in such a way t h a t ........ problems are better
understood," David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knoof,

I960), p. 57.
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in essence, a loose federation of factions ("mini-parties")*
The intraparty power configuration at any given time is a
function of coalitions of usually a dozen or so factions.

By

virtue of having been the majority party, the president of the
LDP is automatically the prime minister of the LDP-dominated govern
ment of Japan.

Since the presidency of the LDP has been a function

of the intraparty factional politics, the prime ministership in the
LDP-govemment has also been a function of the intraparty factional
politics.

For reasons that will be discussed later in this study,

foreign policymaking^ involving important issues, has been one
arena where

intraparty factional politics has been closely

intertwined with the policymaking process.

Accordingly,

the centrality and effectiveness of an LDP-prime minister’s
role in the foreign policymaking process are a function of
the LDP factional politics.

This being the rule rather than

exception, almost all prime ministers have been sensitive to
the intrigues of the intraparty factional politics, relative
especially to important foreign policy matters.
Thus, in a typical foreign/security policymaking process in
contemporary Japan, one finds the following four dimensions of
__
Some prime ministers, however, have exercised autonomous
and strong policymaking leadership independently of the factional
political intrigues. The former prime minister Kisni, for example,
was a strong and assertive policy initiator and promoter. It is
generally believed, however, that his defiance of the consensus
norm and his insensitivity to the factional intrigues within his
own party (LDP) spelled the end of his political career. See, for
example, Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., Ch. 5> PP* 125-153*
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variables at work:

(l) intra- and interelite factional politics;

(2) attendant need of building a working consensus within the LDP,
among the ruling triumvirate, and between the LDP and the opposition
parties; (3) the central role player and a small group of his close
advisors and associates; and (4) the policy issue.

As Hellmann

notes, in Japan the primacy of these internal factors is of supreme
importance independently of external factors.

16b

Compounding

the complexity of a policymaking process, involving these four
dimensions of variables, are the additional factors of public
opinion and various external constraints.

/

As pointed out earlier, the NPT case represented a typically
diffuse issue because of the complexity of interissue relationships.
Initially, the reaction of the Japanese Government to the NPT was to
do nothing toward the treaty ratification internally.

Bather, Tokyo

had tried, externally, through diplomatic channels, to make portions
of the treaty provisions less objectionable.

Then largely due to

external pressure, as will be noted later, the policymaking leadership
began to move slowly and cautiously toward the treaty ratification
from one stage of interissue relationships to another.

In the

meantime, numerous definitions of the NPT issue were provided both
in and out of the immediate policymaking circles.

The LDP policy

makers were divided on the issue with a powerful coalition of

(•

1Ah.
Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Security and Postwar
Japanese Foreign Policy," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign
Policy of M o d e m Japan, op. cit., pp. JZl-JbO, passim.
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LDP politicians adamantly opposed to the treaty ratification.
The powerful bureaucracy was also opposed.

While there was the

transfactional group within the LDP opposed to the HPT on one
hand, and the intrabureaucratic disunity vis-a-vis the NPT issue
on the other, the stand of big business on the issue was strangely
weak.

Throughout the six year period of the HIT policymaking

process, the big business circles in general and the immediately
affected power industry in particular were neither enthusiasti
cally supportive of, nor vehemently opposed to,
ratification.

This attitude was similar to the one taken by the

opposition parties as well.
^

treaty

Following their initial

platitude

of a routine ideologically oriented opposition to the HPT, the
two major opposition parties in Japan

Japan Socialist party

(JSP) and Japan Communist party (JCP)

did little to extract a

domestic political gain out of the NPT issue.

The initial intrabureaucratic opposition to the NPT came
165
from Kinji Moriyama, head of the Science and Technology Agency,
while the foreign office (Gaimusho) was supportive of the treaty
ratification from an early stage of the NPT policymaking process.
Moriyama's opposition to the NPT was centered on the question of
an international safeguards inspection by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) versus Japan's longterm strategic/economic/
commercial interests relative to a peaceful nuclear industrial
f

^Okimoto, op. cit., p. 319*

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

-6o -

(
development.

Unlike the Science and Technology Agency, the

166
foreign office, which has traditionally been pro-American,
wan aware that the United States wished Japan to ratify the
treaty at an early date and was anxious to promote the NPT case
through the LDP policymaking apparatus for an early ratification.
The initial opposition from Moriyama *s Science and Technology
Agency was neutralized as progress was made toward improving
technicalities of the IAEA inspection system.

The foreign office

did not fare as well vis-a-vis the LDP where there was a resolute
and powerful transfactional faction of politicians all opposed to
the NPT ratification for one reason or another.
^

The foreign

office had made little, if any, progress until 1975 toward mol
lification of the intra-LLP opposition to the treaty ratification.
It was in this situation of an intraparty stalemate that, in 1975,
Prime Minister Takeo Miki began to play an active personal role
in the NPT policymaking process.

Aided by a small group of close

advisors, associates, and "voluntary" supporters of the treaty
ratification, Miki embanked upon a personal effort for building a
working consensus within his own party on one hand, and for
enlisting the necessary support from the opposition parties on the
other.

1 See, for example, Brzezinski, The Fragile Blossom,
op. cit., p. 11^ citing Asahi Shimbun, May 20, 1956.
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As pointed out earlier, our current knowledge of the
Japanese foreign policymaking process is at a "pretaxonomical"
stage.

There is the need of typologically oriented empirical

case studies and middle-level theories "based on them.

This

applies to the case of a policymaking process involving an important
’’diffuse” issue (such as the NPT) as well.

In view of the state

of the art, this study represents, on one hand, a broad pattern
analysis of the structural and behavioral characteristics of the
Japanese foreign policymaking process, and an application of these
characteristics to the NPT case in terms of the nature of the policy
issue and the main role player in the policymaking process, on the
other.

It is with this in mind that the following thesis and

hypotheses of this study are formulated:

1.

Thesis. It is the thesis of this s'uay that the

final ratification by Japan of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty was a function of successful personal effort in achieving
the necessary working consensus by Prime Minister Takeo Miki,
assisted hy a small group of close advisors, associates, and
important supporters of the treaty.
2.

Hypothesis. It is hypothesized that, because of the

positional and functional centrality which the prime ministership
entaiis in the LDP-govemment, the prime minister plays the central
role in the case of ’’diffuse" (but important) issues as he does in
the case of "critical" issue foreign policymaking.
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3.

Subhypothesis. It is further hypothesized that the

higher the degree of the diffusion of policymaking power within
the political structure (i.e., within each of the ruling tri
partite elite groups, among the three groups, and between the
ruling elite groups on one hand and the opposition parties on
the other) the more central the role played by the prime minister
in the policymaking processtinvolving a diffuse, "non-critical,"
but important policy issue.

The prime minister's role as such

may be one of a policy initiator, a policy promoter, a debater,
or a mediator toward the necessary consensus building within the
political structure.

A full analysis, which is not within the scope of this
particular study, may include alternative thesis and hypothesis in
terms of other dimensions of variables. In view of the Japanese
dependence on the United States nuclear "umbrella," for example,
these other variables may include the presence or absence of the
American pressure on the Japanese for their ratification of the
KPT or the Japanese perception of the changing external context
of the policymaking in general and their perception of the credi
bility of the United States security guarantee of Japan in
particular. John Endicott, for example, concluded that "what
Japan has ultimately done in this act of ratification is to re
affirm its faith in the U.S. nuclear guarantee,” in Endicott,
"The-1975-76 Debate over Ratification of the NPT in Japan,"
Asian Survey, vol. XVII, no. 3 (March 1977)» p. 292. A full
analysis of the Japanese perception per se falls outside the
scope of this study as Jrus a detailed descriptive analysis of the
factional configuration relative to the NPT policymaking process.
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4.

Definitions. Some of the terms and concepts used

in this study are "broadly defined for the conceptual framework- of
this study as follows:
Small group. Unlike the term "group," defined as pluralities of
168
individuals,
a small group is, as Robert Bales puts it,
any number of persons engaged in interaction with each
other in a single face-to-face meeting or a series of
such meetings, in which each member receives some im
pression or perception of each other member distinct
enough so that he can, either at the time or in later
questioning, give some reaction to each of the others
as an individual person, even though it is only to
recall that the other person was present .169
A small group is distinguished from simply a "group" in that the
members (1) are in a face-to-face contact with each other, and
(2) are aware of each other as distinct individuals.

Groups

fitting this definition include all formal groups (e.g., the
conference committees in the United States Congress), semi-formal
groups (e.g., the Liberal Democratic party which is not part of
the organization of the Government of Japan but which in fact
has been the government of Japan, hence "the party-govemment"),
and informal groups (e.g., the factions which are well insti
tutionalized and, in essence, are self-interest-oriented mutual
aid elubsy constituting the core of the ruling LDP establishment,
and the occasional cross-factional factions). The concept of a "small
--------------------Michael S. Olmsted, The Small Group (New York:
House, 1959), P* 21.

169

Robert F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis
(Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Nesley Press, 1950)» P* 33*
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group” is particularly important in the Japanese type of a
consensual, politics in that the process of building a necessary
consensus takes place, as a rule, behind the scenes and through
a small group of intermediaries and group representatives.

Diffuse; When the nature of a policy issue is diffuse, it is
characterized by the absence of focal points of the issue thus
defying an easy definition of the issue and the relationships
between the issue and other related issues.

Consequently, such

a diffuse issue is characteristic of many equally plausible defi
nitions of its nature within a relatively limited circle of the
f

policymaking institution and the articulate opinions of the
press, academia, and the like.

Conspicuously absent in the

case of a diffuse issue is, unlike the “critical case” policymaking, a widespread controversy among the public frequently
involving mass demonstrations.

Likewise, a diffuse policy issue

is one which defies a clear policy objective toward a given policy
goal.

As pointed out earlier, a diffuse policy is characteristic

of a low degree of visibility and "valence."

Diffusion of Policymaking Power. The diffusion of policymaking
power within the political structure, as used in this study, is
characterized by the absence of a dominant policymaking group
capable of initiating and implementing policy aecisionsiwith a
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relatively high degree of policymaking latitude, through an
established, routine, and legitimate mode of the policymaking
process.

For example, in the system of a simple majoritarian

decision-making, the rule by a majority, when attained, is
accepted.

In the case of the Japanese policymaking process,

the pure and simple majority rule, be it a simple majority or
an absolute majority, is generally a practical impossibility
as well as a cultural taboo.

Because of the norm of consensus

decision-making prevalent in Japanese social relations and
because of the ubiquity of factions in the Japanese parties,
the consensus politics is as much a practical necessity as it
is a normative rule of the game.

A blatant defiance of the

practical and normative rule of the game, if successful, may
spell the possibility of an ex post facto sanction.

The case

of the former Prime Minister Kishi was an example of such a
sanction.

Positional (role player)* By .the term "positional role player"
(or "positional centrality"), as used in this study, ^

mean£

the formal institutional position of a role player such as the
position of prime minister, the president of the LDP, and the
chairman of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council.

This

concept is related to Allison's "where you stand [in government]
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depends on where you sit,

170

or Halperin’s idea of one seeing a

"somewhat different face of an issue

171

depending on where one

sits in government.

Functional. The term "functional," as used, for example,
in "functional centrality" and "functional effectiveness" in
this study, is particularly cognizant of the dynamic nature of
one's capability relative to his position.

It is to character

ize, specifically,the position of the prime minister in the LDPgovemment.

As Oran Young explains it, "functions concern the

consequences of patterns of action.

172

It is a dynamic concept.

One becomes the prime minister when he becomes the president of
the ruling LDP.

Because of the positional centrality in the

government, the prime ministership in the LDP-govemment implies
the functional centrality of the prime minister.

Likewise, the

ascendancy to the party presidency being a function of shifting
factional coalitions within the LDP, the party presidency repre
sents, at any given time, the functional centrality of the poli
tics of .the intraparty factional intrigues.

However, the

functional effectiveness of the prime minister in the LDPgovemment varies from one prime minister to another.
\nQ.
Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, on. cit., p. 176.
171
Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign
Policy, on. cit., p. 16.
172
Oran Young, Systems of Political Science, op. cit.,
p. 30.
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Such variations in the functional effectiveness of the prime
minister of the LDP-govemment depend on a number of variables
including, the personality of a particular prime minister, the
degree of the stability of a factional equilibrium within the
party at any given time, and the nature of a given important
foreign/security policy issue.

(

(•
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E.

Methodology
1.

Methodological Persuect ives» The method of analysis

employed for this study is a broad historical/developmental/
descriptive pattern analysis combined with a case application.
It is much similar to the manner in which Scalapino and Masumi
studied the characteristics of

Japanese parties and politics

and then applied their findings to the case of the crisis of MayJune i960, only to the extent necessary to confirm their thesis
and test their hypotheses.

I73

Both of the two critical variables selected for this

f

'

study-- the diffusion of policymaking power resulting from the
ubiquitous groupism and

consensus politics resulting from

the groupism on one hand, and the cultural norm of a consensus
decision-making deeply rooted in the tradition of the Japanese
social relations on the other—
political culture.

are a function of the Japanese

Political culture is, as Lucian Pye puts it,

the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which
give order and meaning to a political process and which
provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern
behavior in the political system. It encompasses both
the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity.
Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate
form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of
politics. A political culture is the product of both
j-— r

Scalapino and Masumi, Parties and Politics in
Contemporary Japan, 00. cit.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n p ro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

-

.69-

(
the collective history of a political system and the
life histories of the members of that system, and thus
it is rooted equally in public events and private experi
ences . '
Accordingly, the structural/behavioral characteristics of the
Japanese foreign policymaking process are the product of both
the collective history of the Japanese political system and the
life histories of the Japanese people themselves.

By definition,

therefore, the two variables selected for this study persist
through time in terms of a paradoxical combination of two con
tradictory and co-extensive variables.

/
V

The historical/developmental pattern analysis is believed
to be of particular utility as one considers elements of change
as well as continuity.

The term "culture," as conceived and used

in this study,is seen to imply, as Scalapino and Masumi put it,
the product of the attitudes and actions of various
human groups. Culture must encompass in some measure
the totality of the society, both the dominant and the
conflicting forces of value, organization, and behavior,
both the indigenous and the foreign elements that influ
ence a way of life.^75
■Within the parameters of the methodological perspectives as such,
this study focuses on the patterns of the structural/behavioral
characteristics of the Japanese foreign policymaking processes
_

_

.

Lucian Pye, "Political Culture," International Bncyclo
pedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 12, p. 218.
I75

Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., oreface, p. vi.
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relative to the two variables selcted for this study.

The

characteristics of the Japanese foreign policymaking process
are those which have persisted through time in spite of the
elements of change and the conflicting forces of value, or
ganization and behavior.

Accordingly, as a pattern analysis

this study deals mainly with the elements of continuity relative
to the structural and behavioral characteristics of the Japanese
foreign policymaking process under two different constitutions,
namely, the old imperial Meiji Constitution and the new demo
cratic constitution of 19^7 •

£

2.

Data Selection and Analysis.

The main interest as

well as the nature and scope of this particular study determine
the kind of data needed for the study and delimit how and to
what extent the data will be analyzed.

As noted earlier, in

terms of the two variables selected for this study— the dif
fusion of policymaking power and
study purports

consensus politics— this

to analyze the broad patterns of the

structural/behavioral characteristics of the Japanese foreign
policymaking process, and to apply the findings to the case of
the NPT policymaking process only to the extent necessary to
make the points of this study.

Accordingly, the data needed for this study can be
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grouped into three "basic categories:

first, literature on the

nature of the Japanese political culture relative to the two
cultural variables (groupism and consensus); second, writings
on the characteristics of the foreign policymaking processes
in prewar Japan under the old imperial (Meiji) constitution as
well as in postwar Japan under the new democratic constitution
of 19^7; and thirdly, accounts of the NPT policymaking process.

Among the existing literature, there is no single work
which focuses on the structural/behavioral characteristics of the
Japanese foreign policymaking process and relates them, typologically, to the NPT policymaking process.

However, there is a

vast amount of both primary and secondary sources of information
relevant to the research interest of this study.

These sources,

which are available in Japanese as well as in English, encompass
all three of the basic categories of the necessary data.

They

include numerous books, some of which are of a general textbook
variety and others more specialized, journal articles, memoirs,
magazine articles,'public documents, almanacs, and daily
newspapers.

As stated in the earlier comments on the nature and
scope of this study, it is obviously beyond the task of a single
study to be familiar with all these accounts of the three basic
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categories of variables involved.

Necessarily, as a broad

pattern analysis, the data selection for this study is limited
to highly representative relevant- works-on each topic.

Likewise,

the information provided by the selected sources are analyzed
only to the extent necessary for the basic objective of this
study.
One particular technique employed for this study is that
of a comparative data analysis.

Specifically, in an analysis of

the intra- and interelite relationships in contemporary Japan and
that of postwar Japan's security policymaking, this strategy is
to select two groups of representative views, opposed to each other,

(

on a given topic and to comparatively analyze the contending views.
For example, Chitoshi Yanaga

176

and Gerald Curtis

177

represent two

contending views on the role of big business in the Japanese
policymaking process in general.

Based on their respective

research, including extensive field research (surveys and inter
views), these two scholars, both of whom are eminently qualified
experts in the field, do not agree on the role of
in the Japanese policymaking process.
and Donald Hellmann

179

big business

Likewise, Martin Weinstein.

are diametrically opposed to each other in

175
Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, I908)•
Gerald L. Curtis, "Big Business and Political Influ
ence,” in Vogel (ed.), or>. cit., pp. 33-70.
4 iyQ

n

>

' Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy,
19^-7-1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) •
^79 Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Security and Postwar
Foreign Policy," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign
Policy of Modem Japan, op. cit., pp. 321-3^0.
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their views on how postwar Japan’s foreign/security policies
have been made.

By way of putting the contending views into a

proper comparative perspective,according to one’s own research
interest, a researcher can benefit much from these scholars’
observations based on their own empirical field research and
research interests.

As for the HIT case and related interissue questions,
no research has been conducted
study.

specific to the purpose of this

However, there are books and articles, as well as public

documents and newspaper articles, related to the thematic focus
of this study.

180
For example, John Endicott has written a book"

181
and an article
both of which are related to the research
interest of this study.

3asea on the author’s extensive field

research, Endicott's book is rich in empirical information and
is, therefore, extremely beneficial for a typological case
analysis such as this study.

1Qrt
John E. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option: Political
Technical, and Strategic Factors (New York: Praeger, 1975)•

('
\

^ John E. Endicott, "The 1975-76 Debate Over Ratifi
cation of the NPT in Japan," Asian Survey, vol. 17, no. 3
(March 1977), 275-292.
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C H A P T E R TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND"

A.

Introduction
The tradition of a political community is deeply rooted

in its political culture which is the product of both the col
lective history of the body politic and the life histories of the
particular people in it.

It is, therefore, difficult to determine

the origins of the tradition of a political culture in terms of
any one historic period, or one or two major events.

(
The "traditional past" from which "modem" Japan is
acknowledged to have emerged during the last hundred years is
2
usually identified with the Tokugawa period (1603-1868).
A
In view of the main objectives of this study, as well as
its nature and scope, as stated in the preceding chapter, the
following discussions are not a chronological account of each his
toric period or major events. Rather, what follows represents a
broad pattern analysis based on selected representative works on
the history of Japan in particular and the Japanese culture in
general.
2
John Whitney Hall, "The Nature of Traditional Society:
Japan," In Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), Political
Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19&J-), P- 1^»

-

-
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However, if the "tradition” of Japan is to have the particular
meaning which this study intends, "it must refer to a system of
institutions and values both peculiar to the past and somehow
comprising the enduring qualities of an historic Japanese culture.
It must refer, that is, to an abstraction which is both more and
[emphasis added] less than the attitudes and practices of the
Tokugawa period."^

To the extent that a cultural concept repre

sents the abstraction of the enduring qualities of the Japanese
culture, it is suggestive of the features peculiar, if not unique,
to the Japanese political culture.

z

Accordingly, in this chapter, as part of a study of the
structural and behavioral characteristics of the foreign policy
making process in contemporary Japan, these characteristics are
traced to their origins in the "traditional" past of Japan,
spanning a period of two millennia of recorded histories.

The history of Japan has been variously periodized by

Zj,
different writers.

In view of the specific research interest of

•^Ibid., p. 14.
4

See, for example, Theodore McNelly, on. cit., pp. 1-23;
and Frank Langdon, Politics in Japan, or. cit., pp. 11—71.
The periodization by these scholars, upon whose works the analysis
in this chapter heavily draws, will appear later in the chapter.
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this study, the "traditional past" of Japan is divided into two
broad historical periods:
1868—

first, Japan from antiquity to

from the beginning, which is shrouded in the cloud of a

mythology, to the end of the Tofcugawa Shogunate period; and
second, Japan under the imperial constitution (the Meiji Consti
tution) which represents the period of transition from tra
ditional Japan to a "new" "modem" Japan under the democratic
constitution of

19^ 7*

It has been noted that the diffusion of policymaking
power and Consensus politics, both of which are peculiar to the
Japanese foreign policymaking process, are part of legacies from
the "traditional past."

Accordingly, the first period is examined

in terms of the two critical variables:

(l) hierarchical tra

ditional social structure and attendant groupism; and (2) ;the collectivistic norm of group solidarity and harmony.

Before

examining the "traditional past" of Japan, it is in order to
clarify the meaning of the term "traditional" as opposed to the
term "modem," as both are used in this study.

Although the two terms, "traditional" and "modem," have
been used in numerous writings on such topics as "political
development" and "modernization,” there is no general agreement
among scholars as to what these two terms are supposed to mean,
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much less their respective conceptual utility.^

Implicitly,

the dichotomous concepts of "tradition" and. "modem" assume
polarities, positing "a zero-sum situation, in which transition
involves the movement from one pole to another.”^

In reality,

the two are coextensive on a continuum and are, at times, even
mutually reinforcing as in the case of the "purposive modemi-

n

zation"

in post-Meiji Restoration Japan.

The limited utility

of the dichotomous scheme notwithstanding, the following pattern
variables, relative to two “ideal types” of "traditional" and
"modem" societies, are given for a comparative conceptualization;

Traditional Society

M o d e m Society

ascriptive status
diffuse roles
particularistic values
collectivity orientation
affectivity

achievement status
specific roles
universalistic values
self orientation
affective neutrality

Bill and Hardgrave, for example, state: "modernity is a
chimera which haunts the social sciences. Endless debates occur
over the exact date or the decisive event or events which ushered
in modernity, and in the attempt to conceptualize its elusive
character, a plethora of definitions have been put forward," Bill
and Hardgrave, op. cit., Chapter II, "Modernization and Political
Development," especially, pp. 62-63.
6Ibid., p. 5b.
n

Ike, op. cit., p. 6.
g
Bill and Hardgrave, op. cit., p. 52; Langdon, pp. cit.,
p. 6.
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Ascriptive orientations are "based on such considerations
as ethnicity, religion, family ties, rank, "birth, and social
connections.

9

Decision-making .on the "basis of particular personal

obligations or local group ties is an example of the ascriptive
orientations.

10

Achievement orientations are based on merits and

relevant performance—

past, present, or prospective.^

Diffuse

orientations are undifferentiated such as "the assumption of
obligations of a very emotional, diffuse, and broad sort to another
12
person, group, or organization.”
The "specific roles"
restricted and specialized range of specific orientations.

refer to
13

The

particularistic-universalistic polarity "involves the distinction
between transcendent values and those determined by a situation or
relationship

in other words, whether everyone is to be judged by
Ilf
a common standard, as of law."
The universalistic orientations
imply decision-making on the basis of general or universal
9
'Bill and Hardgrave, oj>. cit., p. 52.
^Langdon, on. cit., p. 6.
11
Bill and Hardgrave, oj>. cit., p. 52.
^"^Langdon, o£. cit., p. 6.
13Bill and Hardgrave, o£. cit., p. 52Ity
Ibid. An interesting pattern variable comparison, relative
to "Traditional Society" versus "North American Society,” is given
in somewhat different ways in Brzezinski, op. cit.. p. 5* Reference
will be made later in this study to the comparative pattern
variables,as cited by Brzezinski, which originally appeared in
Herman Kahn (ed.), "Comments on Scope, Methodologies, and Format,"
Basic Public Policy Issues (Hudson Institute, January 1970), p. 8.
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principles, using a secular outlook, and confirming one's
obligations to a limited scope or specific roles.^

"Collective

versus self orientation is the problem of private against col
lective interest.

Affective means emotional while affective

neutrality means emotionally neutral.

17

In terms of organizational structure, groups, associations,
government agencies, and political systems are modern when there
is a high degree of functional differentiation and technical
specialization.

This permits larger and more extensive organi-

zations as the divisions within them become more specialized.

(

^Langdon, op. cit., p. 6.
16
Bill and Hardgrave, op. cit., p. 52.
17
Langdon, op. cit., p. 6.
Ibid., p. 7.

C
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3.

Japan from Antiquity to 1868: The Origins of the
Diffusion of Policymaking Power and Consensus Politics

It has "been pointed out that groupism and decision-making
through consensus are two mutually contradictory values and yet
they are coextensive in the Japanese foreign policymaking process.
In its traditional form, the groupism called for a vertical group
cohesion.

Each group consisted of the leader of the group and

his/her followers.

The maintenance of the group cohesion and

solidarity of each group was a function, variously, of the legiti
macy and capability of the group leader as well as the degree of
harmony within each group.

(
When applied to relations among several groups,
groupism meant that there existed the cohesion of a larger group,
to which the lesser groups belonged, as long as the dominant group
(or the larger group) was capable of retaining loyalties of the
subordinate groups (or component groups). When the dominant group
declined in its capability or lost its legitimacy, the leadership
of the dominant group and the intragroup harmony of the larger
group broke down.

The result was either the emergence of a new

dominant group;capable of dominating all other groups;or the
existence of many centers of group powers.

As will be discussed later in the study, Japanese
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groupism is different from the Western concept of ’’group.”
The Japanese concept of "group" is peculiarly particularistic
as compared to the Western concept of "group" which can be defined as
IQ
"pluralities of individuals."
The Japanese "group" is charac
teristically hierarchical and ascriptive.

Moreover, the Western

concept of "group," as in "interest group," is an attitudinal
concept.

For example, David Truman defines interest group as

"a shared-attitude group that makes certain claims upon other
20
groups in society.” However, the Japanese concept of "group"
is that of an affective orientation, rather than "a shared attitude"
relative to a specific issue or interest.

Likewise, the resultant

loyalty is to the group rather than to the issue or interest.
As one examines the characteristics of the social structure of tra
ditional Japan, the group character of Japanese society
becomes clear, and along with it, the Japanese concept of group.

1.

Tradition of Hierarchical Social Structure and Group

Politics. The most striking structural feature of the traditional
Japanese society is the hierarchical nature of the social structure.
168

— ■ ... -Michael Olmsted, on. cit., x>. 2i, supra, p. 63, footnote

20
David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 37.
*

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

-84 -

The origins of the structural characteristics can he found in
the

elaborate mythology of Japan—

the ancient Shinto cult and

the attendant belief in a simulated kinship.

In view of critical

roles which the primitive Shinto religion has played in the poli
tical development of Japan during the past two millennia, it calls
for an examination in some detail.

The origins of the Japanese people have not been traced
to the satisfaction, of scholars.

21

It appears that some original

people lived in Japan as early as five thousand years ago.

As a

specialist on Japan notes, "five thousand years ago, the Japanese

f(

Islands were inhabited by a rude people who made pottery such as
archeologists are now unearthing in the western suburbs of Tokyo."

22

Although the archeological remains are plentiful, there are many
"conflicting theories concerning the origins of the prehistoric
23

cultures and races of Japan.”

According to a Western historian whose accounts of the cultural
history of Japan seem to be particularly penetrating,

24

the Ainu,

who are believed to be of Caucasian origin, "were almost certainly
25

the original inhabitants of the Japanese islands,"

and they

21

Richard Storry, A History of Modem Japan (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, i960), p. 23.

(
v

^McNelly, on. cit., p. 1.
23Ibid.
^Storry, on. cit.
25rbid., pp. 23-24.
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"played their anonymous but important part in the history of
26
Japanese religions and social development."
persuasively

Others have argued

that "there is a strong oceanic or Malay

strain in the Japanese race, but until further evidence can be
27
discovered this theory must be regarded as no more than tentative,"
Whatever the origins of the earliest inhabitants of the Japanese
islands may be, Japan's East Asian connections can be inferred from
its elaborate mythology.

Moreover, profound cultural influx from

the Asian continent have been well established in the recorded .
histories of Japan.

28

In the absence of large-scale migration,

29

it appears that,

during the late paleolithic or mesolithic era, successive waves of
p£
Ibid., p. 2k. Storry notes: "it is clear, at any rate,
that before the arrival of what must have been successive waves of
immigrants Japan was inhabited by a race which now survives in
dwindling numbers in the northern island of Hokkaido. This is the
Ainu. Pure Ainu
and there are very few of them today— show many
points of difference from the Japanese. Their physiognomy, for
example, is not only hirsute but also markedly non-Mongolian. Their
large, round, sad eyes suggest a Caucasian origin. They have never
had a written language, and their religion is a form of animism. .
......
In their heyday they were great warriors. Certainly they
gave the Japanese a good deal of trouble, and it was many centuries
before they were effectively subdued. The derivation of many
Japanese place names, including that of Mount Fuji, can be found in
the Ainu language; and it is probable that certain Ainu superstitions
became incorporated in ancient Shinto beliefs. By the end of the
twentieth century the Ainu, as an identifiable race, are unlikely to
exist. But we should not forget that they were almost certainly the
original inhabitants of the Japanese islands," ibid.
27Ibid.
28Ibid., pp. 2.7-29.
29
Yanaga, o£. cit., p. 1.
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migration and cultural currents "began to reach the Japanese
archipelago mainly from the coast of East Asia, namely, Korea,
Manchuria, and China (see Map 1

on

p.80 ).

Once in Japan, the

migrant tribes apparently conquered the original inhabitants of
the Japanese islands and established a unified political community
which is now Japan.

30

Insulated geographically,

and unable to move further

eastward, "various ethnic groups and cultures piled up

31

in the

limited confines of the Japanese archipelago, thus providing
unique circumstances under which the formation of the characteristic
Japanese culture was able to take place.

As a Japanese scholar notes:

for the past two millennia Japanese national development
has taken place in a special setting that has conditioned
and shaped both events and institutions
culturally,
socially, politically, and economically. Insularity and
the absence of large-scale migration into the archipelago

30

’’Slightly larger than Britain, the Japanese islands stretch
along the east coast of Asia from 30 to 45 degrees north, about the
same latitude as the East Coast of the United States. ."........ .

The islands are situated at a considerable distance from the continent,
however. Unlike Britain which is only 20 miles from Europe, the large
island of Kyushu is a full 115 miles from Korea, the closest conti
nental point. In the past it took a perilous see voyage of 500 miles
to reach China, the most advanced and powerful of the Asian countries.
During the recorded history only the Mongol attempts at invasion in
the thirteenth century threatened the Japanese island. Although
superior in numbers and equipment, the Mongols were driven off with
the help of the 'divine winds,' the kamikaze. Japan truly seemed to
be a-charmed land with little to fear from abroad, until the middle
of the nineteenth century," Langdon, on. cit., pp. 12-13; Edwin 0.
Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia; The Great Tradition
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), PP* 539-40.
31

McNelly, on. cit., p. 1.
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in historical times have "been responsible for the
achievement of cultural homogeneity at an early date.
The heterogeneous ethnic origins of the Japanese have
been largely obliterated by thorough assimilation,
although some distinctive physical characteristics still
remain. So highly developed is the sense of national
solidarity that the people at times acted like one huge
family with the Emperor as its head [emphases added].32

As noted above, the primitive Shinto cult and the attendant
belief in a simulated kinship have had much to do with the Japanese
political development, including the kind of political culture
responsible for the sense of national solidarity.
In the bright autumn sunshine of a day in November 1$&0
some fifty thousand Japanese, all specially invited, were
gathered before a pavilion erected on the plaza, or great
open space, in front of the Imperial Palace in the heart
of Tokyo. In the pavilion, facing the multitude, were the
emperor and empress with members of their family. The
occasion was one of peculiar dynastic and national im
portance. For it was the commemoration of the 2,600th
anniversary of the founding of the empire, in 660 B.C.,
by Jimmu Tenno, the first emperor and direct ancestor of
the twentieth-century ruling house. 33
Scholars who studied the history of Japan were well aware that
there was "not the slightest valid historical evidence for the
32j.
tradition that the empire was formulated in 660 B.C.*
However,
until the end of the Pacific War any critical approach to the
national myths was apt to lead the unwary into the crime of lese
f 'SC
ma.jeste.
The question of the validity of a mythology notwith
standing, the hierarchical and collectivistic concept rooted in

/

3^Yanaga., op. cit., p. 1.
33gtorry, op. cit., p. 23-

^

3*Jrbid.
35ibid.
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the Shinto cult is of particular relevance to this study.

According to the mythology, the Emperor's ancestor
descended from Amaterasu (literally, "shining the universe"),
meaning the Sun-Goddess.
chronicles,

86

As recorded in the two great Japanese

the Ko.jiki and the Nihongi,

it was the grandson of the Sun-Goddess Amaterasu, a god
named Ninigi-no-Mikoto, who was commanded to rule the
"Central Land of Reed Plains" (Japan). The submission
of the inhabitants of Izumo having been obtained in
advance [for the location of Izumo, see Map 2 on p. 81],
Ninigi . . . . accompanied by other deities [emphases
added], descended upon Mount Takachiho in Kyushu. His
great-grandson was the first earthly emperor, always
known by his posthumous title, Jimmu Tenno [Emperor Jimmu].
He became emperor by virtue of his successful expedition
to the province of Yamato in central Japan.37

£
V

During the consolidation of the Yamato kingdom, the
imperial court published, in 712 A.D., the Ko.jiki (Record of
Ancient Matters) in Japanese, written with Chinese characters,
and, in 720 A.D., the Nihongi (Record of Japan) in Chinese. These
were compilations of orally transmitted legends concerning the Age
of the Gods and the founding of Japan by Jimmu Tenno, the first
Emperor of the Yamato dynasty. The two chronicles represented
part of a number of drives by the Imperial Clan to reiterate its
claim to descent from the Sun-Goddess and to eliminate falsifi
cation of genealogies by the provincial gentry claiming to noble
titles. McNelly, op. cit., p. 6; Storry, pp. cit., pp. 2^-25 , 28,

82

i

.

37
It appears that
there were perhaps two main streams of
migration from East Asiato Japan. One made its way to Izumo, the
modem Shimone Prefecture, and the other to the island of Kyushu.
Both regions are fairly close to Korea, and between them and Korea
there are one or more stepping stones. It appears that the
descendants of the Kyushu immigrants moved eastward up the Inland
Sea, subduing the original inhabitants along the way to the Yamato
province. Frequently, it is said, "the tribal leaders were women,
and when the land became unified, it had several
queens," McNelly,
cit., p. 1.
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Apparently, the prehistoric migrants from the coast
of Asia— Korea, Manchuria, and China^—

who had made their

way to Kyushu became the dominant tribal group.

It also appears

that the migrants of the dominant tribal group, who established
their capital in the province of Yamato (the area south of modem
Kyoto), "regarded themselves as descended from higher or superOQ
human beings whom "we may call 'gods' [kami].
The establishment
of their capital, it appears, took the form of the building of a
palace in which the chieftain of the dominant tribal clan, among
other lesser clans, "celebrated his conquest by ceremonies in
honor of his ancestress, the deity Amaterasu."

(

The shrine of the Sun-Goddess, built at that time, is still
in excellent condition today.

The building, though renewed every

twenty years, is thought to be in the original form.

41

The tra

dition still lingers on today not only culturally but also poli
tically.

Some of the most powerful LDP politicians are called

"traditionalists."

For example, during the NPT policymaking

process, members of some powerful LDP factions, such as the Tanaka.,
Fukuda, and Ishii factions, were all opposed to the treaty

■^Storry, op. cit., p. 24; Langdon, pp. cit., p. 15.
•^McNelly, pp. cit., p. 24. "The Japanese word, kami-often translated as 'god'
has a wide range of meaning, embracing
anything superior or powerful as well as divine," ibid.
40
Langdon, pp. cit., p. 1541
Ibid.
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ratification,.

These politicians were generally identified

with certain right-wing policy goals, including the establishment
of a greater defense capability of Japan, the support for the U.S.
alliance-, and the desire to realize the restoration of traditional
values of nationalism.

Two issues relative to the restoration of

the traditional values were (1) the absence of any legal base for
the continued use of the imperial era dating which has caused
concern among the right-wing LDP politicians; and (2) the bill
kz
calling for the nationalization of Yasukuni Shrine.

The hierarchical nature of the traditional society and
the collect ivistic norm of group solidarity and harmony were a
logical derivative of the primitive Shinto cult and simulated
kinship.

The primary deities were personifications of nature,

that is, the Sun-Goddess, Amaterasu. As Richard Storry puts it,
when the storm seems to triumph utterly the sun
recedes, and it is winter. Will the sun ever return
in strength? To simple people depending on the growing
of crops the question is the most fundamental they can
ask. A very natural answer
and one given in many
parts of the world even today— is that it is only by
ceremonies, amounting to ritual enticement, that the ^
sun can be restored and the coming of spring eroused.

^Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, op. cit., p. $0.
^Storry, op. cit., p. 27* After the introduction of
Buddhism, this cult, which is, in essence, a crude polytheism
worshipping the local Japanese gods, became known as "Shinto
("the way of the gods") in order to distinguish from Buddhism.
The name (Shinto ^iSL) is of Chinese origin but the faith has
always been regarded as indigenous to Japan. Storry, op. cit.
p. 27; Langdon, pp. cit., p. 15.
^Storry, op. cit., p. 27-
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The symbolism suggested by tracing the divine ancestry of the
Emperor to the Sun-Goddess, Amaterasu, was a hierarchy of
various local deities.

The Sun-Goddess, Amaterasu, was central

and superior to all other local deities from whom various clans
claimed to have descended.

Accordingly, the Emperor, the

chieftain of the Yamato clan, was superior to the chieftains of
all other clans by virtue of being a direct descendant of the
45
Sun-Goddess, Amaterasu.

The tribal group solidarity (the interclan harmony) was
suggested by a simulated kinship.

According to the primitive

f

Shinto cult, there was a hierarchical interlocking of various local

'

deities.

The ancestral deities of various clans were related,

.divinely, to the ancestral deity of the Emperor, the Sun-Goddess,
Amaterasu. Accordingly, all tribal chiefs were connected to the
Emperor and to one another,

46

and likewise, "the tribesmen s

families were distantly or divinely related to the leaders and to
47
one another.”

-'According to the traditional version, found mainly in
the Nihongi, "the first seventeen emperors, including Jimmu
Tenno, had an average age of a hundred. Accepting as correct the
order of sequence of the early emperors, as related in the
chronicles, we may not be grossly wrong if we place Jimmu Tenno
somewhere about the beginning of the Christian era. But it is
not until we reach the end of the fifth century A.D. that we are
on firm historical ground,” Storry, ibid., p. 28; Langdon, op.
ext., p. 15*
■
V •'

^Langdon, ibid.
47
Ibid. ; George B. Sanson, A History of Jauan to 1334
(Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 35*
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The primitive Japanese society was, as noted earlier,
a confederation of clans (u.ji). In accordance with the Shinto
cult, it was a hierarchically structured confederation of clans
under the Emperor.

By historic times (the fifth century A.D.),

various ethnic groups and cultures appear to have "been well
assimilated into one homogeneous people and culture under the
hQ
domination of the Yamato clan.
Clans were usually subdivided
into ‘branches and hereditary guilds which were normally attached
to the dans as workers.

Sometimes the guilds developed into

• independent clans, each with its own chieftain and ancestral
deity.

(

During the first five centuries or so of the kingdom,
the Yamato people had developed a viable political community,

hQ

with the imperial rule legitimated by the primitive Shinto cult
and the stability and harmony of the regime sustained by the
hierarchical social structure and the simulated kinship.
kingdom was apparently also active externally.

The

As early as

—

By this time, the greater part of Japan was inhabited by
a racially homogeneous people unified by a common language and
culture. The descendants of Jimmu Tenno had extended their
hegemony over most of Western Japan thus creating a polity that
was unified politically and homogeneous culturally. Langdon,
ibid., p. 14; George B. Sanson, Japan, A Short Cultural History
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1931)i P* 38.
^Storry, op. cit., p. 28.
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the first century A.B., it is said, some of the Japanese
chieftains sent missions to the Chinese Han court ’’where the
eastern barbarians were known as Wa [f^J,” meaning dwarfs.^
Long before the tribal kingdom of Yamato became a mostly unified
political community, Japan had even conducted a series of foreign
expeditions to kingdoms in the southern
sula.^

part of the Korean penin

By the fifth century, the Yamato kingdom had attained a

foothold in the southern part of Korea.

52

These external

activities had resulted in the opening of Japan's door to a vast
amount of cultural influx from the Asian continent:
entire communities of Koreans came to settle in Japan;
and they included skilled artisans, such as workers in
metals and experts in the culture of silkworms. By the
middle of the sixth century there were more than
100,000 Koreans, and Chinese from Manchuria, domiciled
in Japan. For the most part they were much better
educated— either in the literary sense or in their
knowledge of artistic or technical skills
than the
Japanese among whom they lived and with whom in course
of time they were to be assimilated. Their contri
bution to the cultural development of Japan can hardly
be overestimated. Their qualitative importance can be
gauged from the fact that by the opening of the eighth
century more than one-third of the noble families of
Japan claimed continental descent, Korean or Chinese.

^ McNelly, op. cit., p. 1. The Japanese tired of being
called Wa and referred to their country as "the land of the
rising sun,” as symbolized in their national flag, in Chinese
Jih-pen (S£), whence Japan, and in Japanese, Nippon, ibid., p. 3«
■■^It is said that an empress named Jingo led a military
expedition to Korea in the middle of the fourth century which was
probably the culmination of the Japanese raids on Korea during the
earliest period, Storry, op. cit., p. 28.
52

A famous Korean general, Yu-shin Kim, ended the Japanese
foothold when he unified the kingdoms in the southern part of the
peninsula in 5&2 A.D.
53

•^Storry, op. cit., p. 29-
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The most important of all cultural artifacts which Japan
received from continental Asia was probably the Chinese
character.

It provided the Japanese with a crosscultural medium,

thus facilitating the import of other cultural artifacts which
might otherwise have been difficult.

£&

Among these other cultural

artifacts were Buddhism and Confucianism.

Both were enthusi

astically disseminated in Japan with far-reaching implications
for Japan, culturally and politically.

It was the .case

especially with the ethical and political ideas of Confucianism.
It is in order, at this point, to briefly examine the situation in
Japan at the time Buddhism and Confucianism were introduced to the
kingdom of Yamato.

(
If the first five centuries of the Yamato kingdom repre
sented, in essence, the initial period of the consolidation of the
Yamato clan rule and a process of "nation-building” in m o d e m terms,
the sixth century marked the beginning of a pluralism in terms of
group politics.

Stated in another way, the pluralism in terms of

a group politics meant the beginning of the decline of a centralized
—

J The Japanese enthusiasm for the introduction to Japan of
various continental cultural artifacts is indicated by the fact
that they had managed to overcome difficulties involved in popu
larizing the Chinese character.
In their spoken forms.Chinese
and Japanese differ profoundly. Chinese is monosyllabic. The
syntax of one language has nothing in common with that of the
other. A great many years were to pass before the Chinese became
popularized.
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imperial rule.

As it were, the sixth century was the beginning

of a diarchy in which the Emperor was to reign but not rule,
while the reins of the central government moved from the hands
of one group to those of another, surrounding the throne.

By the sixth century A.D., the latent rivalry among some
powerful d a n groups had apparently intensified and was ripe for
an open confrontation.

The intergroup (or intraelite) conflict

around the throne was to become "a recurring theme throughout
nearly a.n Japanese history."*^ The issue of the introduction
of Buddhism to Japan
-

56

provided the feuding clans around the

Emperor with an opportunity for a confrontation with one another.
Two main clan groups in the power struggle on this occasion
were

the clan of liturgists and the Soga clan.

The clan of

liturgists, who practiced rituals in honor of the indigenous
deities, struggled to maintain their influence against the Soga
clan^ which favored the introduction and dissemination of Buddhism
in Japan.

It appears that the Soga clan, a powerful military

clan, had no particular religious reasons to espouse Buddhism
other than the secular motive for an interdan power struggle.

57

^Storry, op. cit., p. JO.
^During the sixth century, one of Yamato's Korean allies
sent, "by way of tribute to the Japanese monarch,” the "Three
Treasures" of Buddhism (Buddha, the Law, and the Priesthood),
McNelly, op. cit., p. 2.
■^Storry, op. cit., pp. 29-31; McNelly, op. cit., p. 6.
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V
Although Buddhism with its rich doctrines and elaborate
rituals tended to overshadow the native shrines with which the
CQ
local notables were connected,
there was no intrinsic conflict
between the two.

The primitive cult of Shinto emphasized the

rites of purification.
than moral.

It was more aesthetic and emotional

Compared to the sophisticated doctrines and elaborate

rituals of Buddhism, Shinto was simple.

It was "Buddhism that in

Japan has satisfied the not very persistent [Japanese] instinct
for theological and philosophical speculation.

59

Lacking any

intrinsic incompatibility, Buddhism never supplanted Shinto.
After the former was firmly established and widely disseminated,

C

there emerged a dualism in which most Japanese were both Buddhists
and Shintoists, as they are today.^
CO
D Langdon, op. cit., p. 17.
^Storry, op. cit., pp. 29-31*
^Viewed from the thematic focal point of this study,
the impact of Buddhism on the structural and behavioral features
of the traditional Japanese society is little except for its
indirect impact on the Japanese nationalism and Bushido ("The Way
of the Samurai Warrior"). The indirect impact of Buddhism as such
has been effected by three -great Buddhist sects in Japan: JodoShinshu, Nichiren, and Zen. The first two sects were more popular.
They “gave to Buddhist doctrine a particularly Japanese twist1*which
is somewhat nationalistic, Storry, ibid., p. bl. For example,
the Nichiren sect regards Japan as a divine land and the Sect's
'founder, Nichiren, the greatest Buddha whose ideas are destined to
lead the world, Langdon, op. cit., p. 121. Members of the Komeito
party today belong to this sect. 'The Zen sect has been identified
with the two supreme ideals of samurai: fidelity and an indif
ference to physical hardships. To the extent that the concept of
fidelity has fortified the samurai loyalty to their lords, one may
say that Buddhism too has contributed to the hierarchical social
structure of feudal Japan.
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After some brief setbacks, the Soga clan won the day.
Buddhism was to be disseminated, in Japan in full force, with
the imperial house leading the way.

A historian speculates:

"the advance of Buddhism would have been checked had not the
imperial family, after some wavering, decided to support the
Soga clan."^

Whether or not the imperial influence on the

matter was instrumental at that time remains a question.

As

the subsequent history tells it, what is certain is that the
emerging pluralism (dan group politics) tolled the beginning
of the end of the imperial rule in the kingdom of Yamato.
The Soga clan would soon be overthrown by another clan which,
^

in turn, would be destroyed by another clan

a recurrent

theme of group politics for the next 1300 years.

Unlike Buddhism, Confucianism had a great immediate
political appeal to the imperial house.

As noted earlier,

in the face of growing rivalry among the powerful clans
surrounding the throne, the imperial court was determined to
end it all and bring solidarity and harmony to the polity.
The ethical and political ideas of Confucianism appeared to .
be the answer to the problems.

Confucianism emphasized the

obligations of ruler and subject on the basis of the rigid

Storry, op. cit., p. 30*
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L

family relationships of superior and inferior:

children

toward parents, wife to husband, and younger, brother to elder.
This would restore the hierarchical integrity of the imperial
order.

The Confucian emphasis on group harmony would end the

feuding among the subjects (the clans around the throne).
Confucian idea of a functionally complex but

The

structurally

integrated imperial bureaucracy would permit the central imperial
control of even larger organizations.

The famous Regent, Crown Prince Shotoku Taishi, was the
first Japanese leader to encourage the implementation of the
Confucian ideas and institutions in a large-scale introduction of
foreign culture.

62

In 60k A.D., the Crown Prince composed his

famous "Seventeen-Article Constitution."

The Constitution,

composed in Chinese by Shotoku,who was a devout student of
Buddhism, was not an organic law of the kind with which we are
today accustomed.

Except for pious references to Buddhism,

it was a collection of Confucian exhortations.

Great emphasis

was placed on the need for harmony, for the subordination of

^Langdon, op. cit., p. 16; Storry, op. cit., p. 31;
McNelly, pp. cit., p. 2; Sanson, A History of Japan to 133^» op.
cit., pp. 50-53*
•^McNelly, op. cit., p. 2.
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of inferiors to superiors, and for diligence and harmony in
the administration of state affairs.

64

A centralized and

functionally complex bureaucracy, which was fashioned on the
Chinese model, was initiated in the sixth century.^

By the

end of the eighth century, when a child began to learn how to
read and write, he used the Confucian Classic of Filial Piety
which the Empress Koken commanded to be kept in every home.^
It is with an analysis of the fate of the Confucian insti
tutions in Japan that one finds part of the essence of those
aspects which are peculiar to the traditional past of Japan.

Daring the period of 645 A.D. to 1192 A.D., attemptswere made to initiate the Confucian institutions in Japan with
£)7
varying degrees of "dilution, and compromise;,"
which are
summarized as follows:

firstly, "the Confucian merit system

did not displace the Japanese traditions of hereditary privilege
_
Ibid^Langdon, op. cit., p. 17; Reischauer and Fairbank (1958
ed.), o£. cit., pp. 478-88.
^Langdon, op. cit., p. 17; Robert IT. Bellah, Tokugawa
Religion, The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan (Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press and the Falcon's Wing Press, 1957)» P- 87 cited
in Langdon, op. cit., p. 17*
67
'McNelly, 00. cit., pp. $-6.
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and divine right";

68

secondly, "the system of individual small

holders paying taxes to the imperial court gave way to a hier
archical feudal government";^9 thirdly, "dual government (diarchy)
in which the emperor ruled in name while clan leaders ruled in
fact became established principle";

70

and finally, "the central

administration was, for all practical purposes, gradually super71
seded by military barons."

One asks:

why?

First of all, the mythology-centered Emperor of Japan was
different from the concept of the Chinese Emperor.

"The old

Chinese concept of sovereignty held that the monarch enjoyed 'the
mandate of Heaven, ’ but only so long as he was virtuous [emphases

{

72

added]."

If the Emperor lacked virtue, rebellions against him

were justifiable, for he lost the heavenly mandate.
might be overthrown.

He, therefore,

Accordingly, in the history of China, there

was often well-accepted philosophical justification for a successful
__
,
Ibid., p. 10.
69Ibid.
7°Ibid.
71Ibid.
72

Storry, op. cit., p. 35* At the core of the Confucian
principles and rules (E ifzLa-fra), which govern human relations, was
the idea of mutuality of virtue. Group harmony was predicated upon a
reciprocal concept of mutual obligations: obedience to parents,
husband, and elder brother, for example; and virtuous to children,
wife, and younger brother. Applied to larger groups outside the
basic family group, the state, for example, it meant that the
subjects' obedience to the Emperor was a function of the letter’s
virtuousity.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n p ro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 101 -

(
rebellion.

Thus China was ruled by several dynasties.

But

in Japan, the Emperor did not earn his mandate from Heaven.

He

was the Heaven as the son of the Sun-Goddess, Amaterasu. By virtue
of the simulated kinship, it was natural for him to rule his subjects
with love and care. His virtue was never in question. Simply,
the question of the Emperor versus the subject never occurred.

The

polity was one "family" group which was hierarchically streamlined.
At the apex of the hierarchical structure, the Emperor was to rule
with his right to rule, which was not a mandate to rule but a divine
right to rule.

|

There have been countless instances of civil strife and
warfare throughout the history of Japan.
have met violent deaths.
the past two millennia.

In fact, some sovereigns

But there has been only one dynasty during
It was this unbroken line of the imperial

house which was being celebrated in that bright autumn sunshine
of a November day, in 19^0 A.D.^

The weight of the tradition was

such that the divine right of the Emperor could not and would not
be challenged.

Those sovereigns who met violent deaths were not the

victims of a challenge to the individual monarch, much less the
institution of the imperial rule.

Rather, the sovereigns met

their deaths at the hands of one clan group or anothe^ supporting

^Sunra, p. 87 .
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one imperial group against another.

Stated in another •way,

those unfortunate sovereigns, killed by one clan group or another,
were the victims of the perpetual group politics.

There has, in

fact, historically been "a taboo on conspiracies to abolish the
hereditary right— to provide the sovereign—

of the ancient

7Z1,

imperial house."'

Viewed from another perspective, logically, there has been
a mythological root of the diarchy in which the Emperor was to
reign but not rule.

Since the Emperor did not rule, he (or the

institution of the imperial rule) did not have to be destrciyed.
t
L

Mythology, stressing the descent from the sun goddess,
made the holder of the throne sacrosanct. Being
sacrosanct he was considered immaculate. But to be
really immaculate he had to be, politically speaking,
emasculated. For to exercise power involves action
that may or may not win approval. Passivity alone
avoids all criticism. Thus the monarchy was, and is,
regarded as being "above the clouds"
in other words
above the storm and stress of daily government.75

The Emperor was thus destined to be "a ceremonial head of
state more than he was an active executive."

76

This meant the

tendency for the decision-maker and active executive to act in
the name of the sovereign

(i.e., a diarchy) on one hand, and

74
Storry, on. cit., p. 357^Ibid.
76
' Langdon, o£. cit., p. 17.
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the inevitable struggle among groups (be it among clan groups
as was the case until

the Taisho era or between the civilian

groups and the military groups, which characterized the civilmilitary relations in Japan from the time of the Manchurian
"incident” in 193^ to Japan's surrender in 19^5) all competing
for the "executive" position, on the other.

In summary,
structure of

the Emperor-centered hierarchical, social

traditional Japan "expressed the group-centered

characteristic of Japan."

77

The group-centered character of the

Japanese political culture thus represents a traditional feature
^

of Japan which has persisted (and survived to this very day)
through the past 2000 years.

It was a political system which had,

in appearance, the rigidities of a personal absolutism while, in
fact, "the vital center of decision making has uniformly lain in
its collective or group character."7^

Another indicator of the hierarchically group-oriented
character (leader-follower emphasis) of the Japanese society can
be found in the difference between the Chinese Confucian concept
of group and the Japanese one.

In Japan, there was a much higher

77Ibid.
78

1 Sacalapino in Macridis (ed.), on. cit., p. 277.
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degree of hierarchical social structure than in China.

"In

China the Confucian hierarchical family was not only the model
79
of social organization hut the primary focus of loyalty."
In Japan, however, because of the tradition of a high degree of
vertical groupism, the primary focus of group loyalty was diffuse
in focus and broad in scope.

The diffuse focus meant the relative

nature of the focus of group loyalties which facilitated the
shifting of the level of group loyalties—

for example, from the

Emperor to the clan leade^ or from the central government to the
provincial government.

The broad scope of group loyalty implied

that "groups or leaders outside of the family retained their
80
primacy."
Accordingly, "loyalty to the feudal lord, and later

(

to the Emperor [after the Meiji Restoration] or nation, came
before family or self."

Stated in another way, "the highest

loyalty in Japan was political and not a barrier to political
centralization and social modernization as it was in China."

82

In this respect, Japanese groupism may appear, on the surface,
to be more universalistic than the family-centered parochial
notion of group in China.

79
'Langdon, on. cit., p. 21
80Ibid.
81Ibid.
82Ibid.
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However, in reality, the Japanese concept of group
or group loyalties is more particularistic than that of the
Chinese.

In Confucianism, the group loyalty and harmony pertain,

primarily to the basic family group.

Beyond the level of family,

the Confucian idea of group is universalistic and achievementoriented.

There is little, if any, ascriptive element in the

Chinese concept of the Emperor’s right to rule.

As noted earlier,

obedience to the Emperor is a function of the Emperor's objective
performance (or achievement) in the absence of which the "Heavenly
mandate" is revoked and the Emperor deposed.

£■

In Japan, where the entire society was hierarchically
structured, which was reinforced by the primitive belief in a
simulated kinship, the concept of group, group loyalty, and group
harmony was essentially ascriptive and emotional.

The leader-

follower (oyabun-kobun) concept was the basis of the hierarchical
traditional social structure and it has survived to this day,
as one witnesses in the Japanese political factions.

Because

the Japanese concept of group loyalty is political in nature,
as noted above, the level of the focus of group loyalties has
shifted from one level to another according to the political
situation at any given t i m e . ^

f ’
k

8^By the time the short-lived "Normal Constitutional Govern
ment" (1918-1932) began to function, the highest level of the
' group loyalties of the Japanese politicians was that of factions
below each political party. See, for example, Scalapino and

Masumi, op. cit., p. 19.
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By the time Confucianism was transplanted to Japanese
soilj certain features peculiar to traditional Japan had
already been firmly established.

A close look at the fate of

Confucianism in Japan reveals that some of the ethical and political
ideas of Confucianism were compatible with the Japanese tra
dition and others incompatible, hence either rejected or diluted.

The Confucian concept of group loyalty, for example,
was compatible with the Japanese tradition of group loyalty,
although the Japanese one .was more inclusive with the main thrust
upon levels higher than the basic family.

The overall impact

of Confucianism on the matter was to intensify and fortify the
^

native tradition of group loyalty as part of the hierarchical
nature of the social relations.

Many samurai (the feudal warrior

knights of Japan) would give up their life in order to exonerate
the name of a fallen daimyo (the feudal lords) and avenge the
lord's death at the expense of their own life.

Numerous kamikaze

(the "Divine ■Wind") pilots, including countless teenagers, would
dive to

their deaths in the name of their loyal services to

their Emperor and their motherland.

However, as noted above,

some of the Confucian ideas and institutions had to be either
rejected or diluted because of the native tradition.

0ne such

institution that was not to work in Japan was the Confucian
idea of an imperial bureaucracy.
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It has "been noted that in Japan, unlike in China, the
Emperor was weak more- often than not and had only formal power
to reign hut not to rule.

Thus, a centralized and functionally

complex new bureaucracy, which was initiated in Japan in the

84

sixth century,.

2-5

was headed by a weak Emperor.

was not to prevail.

As such, it

A functionally complex and structurally

integrated centralized bureaucracy^ under imperial control,
was incompatible with the Japanese groupism.

The hierarchical

nature of the Japanese social relations tended to support broad
central-local ties which were ascriptive in nature.

Such ties

tended to work against an imperial bureaucracy based on the
concept of a merit system.
(

The Japanese court could not afford

to antagonize the clan chieftains and local gentry whose privi
leges would be wiped out by the principle of the Confucian merit
system.

Moreover, there were many local aristocrats who were
actually the relatives of the court nobles and the imperial
house.

The able and ambitious younger sons of the court nobles,

as well as numerous imperial offspring,could not inherit very
high rank or title in the capital due to one reason or another,
including the right of primogeniture.

They were driven to seek

Oh
Reischauer and Fairbank (1958), on. cit., pp. 478-88;
Langdon, on. cit., p. 17.
i .

^Langdon, ibid.
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their fortune in the provinces where they later emerged as
the dominant feudal aristocracy when the central government
declined in strength.

Consequently, the bureaucratic reforms,

based on the Confucian merit system under the imperial control,
remained largely paper reforms.

"The high officials counted

on their aristocratic descent or court rank to qualify for
appointment even if they went through some examination ritual."

86

Apart from the Confucian contribution in terms of its emphasis
on group loyalty, which tended to fortify the ascriptive groupism
rather than the other way around, the ethical and political ideas
of Confucianism, in general, appear to have contributed little
^

to stemming the tide of the beginning of a pluralistic group
politics

a pluralism which would gravitate the center of poli

tical power away from the imperial house, and would set the
pattern of political change for centuries to come.

The seventh century marked the beginning of group
politics which, in turn, tolled the beginning of an end of
imperial rule.
have often

It has been stated that group loyalties in Japan
shifted from one level to another because the

Japanese group loyalties were political in nature.

Stated in

another way, as the center of political power shifted to each

r

.
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province, ‘beginning in the seventh century, the provinces
began to drift away from the center.

As the provinces drifted

away from the central government, group loyalties

gravitated

more and more to the provincial centers of power.

Paradoxically,

what precipitated this historical tide was a measure to consolidate
the central power in the hands of a clan which aspired to rule the
entire country in the name of the Emperor.

Thus, the seventh

century marked the beginning of a pluralism consisting of a
twofold dualism:

on one hand, it was the beginning of a diarchy

between the imperial house and a ruling clan at the "national"
level.

On the other hand, it marked the beginning of a dualism

between the central government and the provincial governments.

Following the interclan power struggle between the clan
of liturgists and the Soga clan, as noted earlier, the Soga
consolidated and increased their power after the death, in 621
A.D., of the Regent, Crown Prince Shotoku Taishi.

As the powerful

Soga clan not only seized the reins of the central government
but also threatened the imperial house itself, the Fujiwara clan,
led by Nakatomi-no-Kamatari (better recognized by his later
name, Fujiwara Kamatari), overthrew the Soga clan in 6^5 A.D. in
a violent palace coup.

Following the seizure of power, the

ruling Fujiwara clan inaugurated Taika ("Great Reform") in order
to "build up the imperial government and incidentally [emphasis
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added] to buttress"

the power of their own clan.

The overall objective of the Edict of Reform of 646
A.D.

88

was to strengthen the central control by the imperial

89
house in whose name the Fujiwara clan group was to rule. Among
various measures of centralization, which were taken in order to
achieve the overall objectives, of particular relevance to the
topic under discussion was the measure of land reform.

In

accordance with the motto of Confucian China, kodo komin
("public land, public people"), in theory, all lands belonged
to the central imperial government ("under the heaven there is
no land which is not the king’s vassal").

Accordingly, based on

the principle of "mouth-share field" (i.e., each household was
allotted land in proportion to the number of people in the
household), a large-scale land redistribution was effected.
The old taxes and forced labor were abolished.
muted taxes in kind (e.g., silk) was set up.

A system of com
The rate of the

tax in the form of rice on the land was established.
Q O

~

- n nr «-r i—

Storry, op. cit., p. 32.

88

Ryusaku Tsunoda, William Theodore de Bary, and Donald
Keene (comp.), Sources of Japanese Tradition (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1958)» P P * 74-76; McNelly, p p . cit., p. 4.
89
Sanson, Japan: A Short Cultural History, pp. cit.,
(rev. ed., 1943), p. 97 as cited in McNelly, pp. cit., p. 4.
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From the very beginning, there were certain groups
which were exempted from taxes.
free estates included:

These groups with the tax-

church groups (both Shinto shrines

which had "god fields" and Buddhist temples which had "temple
fields"); provincial and court officials who were granted taxfree manors as compensation for their services which became
hereditary; certain groups of "court favorites" upon whom
frequent imperial order would confer tax-exempt "gift lands";
and members of the prolific ruling clan group of the Fujiwara
families which received tax-exempt hereditary manors.

Added

to these, the imperial policy of encouraging the reclamation
of additional land by making it temporarily and then permanently
exempt from taxes facilitated further proliferation of the
tax-free manors.^
As more and more areas became tax exempt, the burden of
taxation on the non-tax-exempt small holders became progressively
great.

These subjects had to commend their lands to the tax-free

holders, thus evading their obligations to "the Son of Heaven."

91

There would soon be hierarchies of numerous land-holders as minor
nobles would often commend their lands, including those which
were commended to themselves, to great nobles.

As a result,

Storry, op. cit., p. 3 6 ; McNelly, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
^McNelly, ibid., p. 9*
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there emerged a structure of hierarchies of vassals-commendors and commendees.

It was the beginning of feudalism

in Japan; cementing the pattern of political change in terms of
one hierarchical clan group replacing another.

There were other factors which were responsible for the
emergence of a pluralism in Japan.

All of these factors, which

were topographical, administrative, and political, tended to
support the pluralistic group politics.

In a mountainous country,

local territorial ties are always powerful.

92

Moreover, it was

very difficult in those days for the imperial government to extend
an effective central control to all the provinces, especially those
which were distant from the capital.

Had Japan not been a group-

centered society, these factors would have tended to facilitate
localism.

Moreover, certain officials of the central government also
contributed to the rise of the provincial powers.

While many

lands of the non-tax-exempt holders were commended to the taxexempt neighbors, as noted above, the administrative control
(i.e^ the collection of taxes) over the remaining taxable lands
g2
Storry, op. cit., p. 36 .

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n p ro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 113 -

(

tended to shift to the provinces largely because of the
dereliction of duties on the part of the aristocrats in the
center.

When members of the court aristocracy were made governors

of provinces, they preferred to stay in the capital, enjoying
its sophisticated delights.

The real control of the province

concerned, therefore, was in the hands of the most vigorous clan
chieftain in each area through neglect or delegation.

Furthermore, the members of the prolific Fujiwara clan
group, who were given the tax-exempt estates in the provinces,
as noted earlier, became dissociated from the court society over

f'

the years.

Very often, they were indistinguishable from local

clansmen.

By virtue of their claim to noble family roots, they

tended to establish local centers of political power to which
local group loyalties gravitated.

Finally,

the local powers were also a functionof the

number of men under arms in each

area

The general

condition in each area became deteriorated in proportion to the
breakdown of law and order, resulting from the declining central
control.

As this happened, the importance of the number of men

tinder arms kept

in each province becameprogressively greater.

These men tinder

arms would later becomemembers of the privileged

warrior class, samurai.
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Following their ascendancy to power, the Fujiwara clan
controlled the imperial house through a system of regency and
intermarriage,

93

and ruled Japan until 1192 when the Minamoto

military government was formally established.

The immediate cause

of the demise of the Fujiwara family was a factional struggle
within the clan itself, over political appointments.

Competing factions of the Fujiwara clan enlisted, in the
latter part of the twelfth century, the support of the Minamoto and
the Taira, the two most powerful among various military clans which
had grown in strength by that time.

oZj,

Here was a classic example

93

The Fujiwara saw to it that Emperors abdicated very
soon after reaching their majority, so that a Fujiwara Regent
(Sesshs)[or Shlkken] would be the effective ruler on behalf of a
child Emperor. When the monarch became of age, the Regent would
become Civil Dictator (Kampaku), a title first assumed by Fujiwara
Mototsune, who had served as regent during the reign of YSzei (877884). The Emperor was required to marry a Fujiwara lady, so that
his offspring were quite as much the descendants of the Fujiwara
as they were of the Sun Goddess. When the youthful monarch abdi
cated, a Fujiwara Regent would again rule. Regents, Civil Dicta
tors, and Empresses all had to be chosen from among the Five Regent
Families of the Fujiwara clan. Thus, nearly every Emperor had a
Fujiwara mother, a Fujiwara grandfather, a Fujiwara uncle, a Fujiwara
Regent, and a Fujiwara wife. With the exception that child Emperors
later went out of fashion, the Fujiwara monopoly of high position
in the court continued until the Restoration of 1867," McNelly, op.
cit., p. 8.
^Storry, o p . cit., p. 37* In. the eleventh and twelfth
centuries, the court had to rely on the military barons to protect
the capital itself from armies of Buddhists, whose religious pro
cessions were actually expeditions to extort additional privileges
from the Fujiwara regents and Emperor. McNelly, op. cit., p. 9It was not infrequent that the armed followers of Buddhist temples
and Shinto shrines would brawl at the very gates of the Imperial
Palace. Storry, o p . cit., p. 37-

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 115

of what Samuel Finer describes, in his conceptual framework
of a military takeover of the civilian sector of political power,
95

in terms of the opportunity and level of intervention.
opportunity was provided at the highest level.

The

The intraclan

power struggle led to two bloody civil disturbances.

When these

were over, the Fujiwara discovered that power had fallen into the
hands of "their supposed subordinates, the military houses of
96
Minamoto and Taira."
This was the beginning of the military
control of the government in Japan.

It was the Taira clan, under Taira Kiyomori, which
controlled the imperial court and government at first.

97

Following

the death in 1181 of Taira Kiyomori, the destruction of the house
of the Taira family was formally accomplished by the Minamoto clan
in the great sea battle of Dannoura (in the Shimonoseki Straits)
in II85. Following the victory, Minamoto Yoritomo, the leader

^Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York:
1962)- og
Storry, pp. cit., p. 37*

Praeger,

^Ibid., p. 38* "Taira Kiyomori and his supporters were
the teeth and claws of a court faction that entirely overthrew its
rivals. The latter were beheaded, committed suicide, or were sent
into exile. It was the first occasion for over three hundred years
that political opponents were punished with death— a clear indi
cation that the military man was now in power. By intrigue, inter
marriage, and the threat of use of force Taira Kiyomori closed his
grip upon the central government, taking many important offices
into his own hands. The glory of the Fujiwara now faded for ever,”
ibid.
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of the Minamoto clan, received in 1192 from the Emperor (a boy
of thirteen) the title, S-ei-i Tai Shogun ("barbarian subduing
great general”) and set up his Bakufu (literally, "camp office"
or "tent office" meaning military government) at Kamakura.

Feudalism has been characterized as:
[the] social order in W. Europe from end of
Charlemagne's empire to rise of absolute monarchies.
Basic character was local, agricultural political
economy. Usual unit was manor— peasants, VILLEIN
and SERF, held land from lord of manor, the seigneur,
who gave protection and use of land in return for
personal services and dues. This was MANORIAL SYSTEM.
In ideal feudal society, ownership of all land was
vested in king. Under him was hierarchy of nobles,
highest holding from him directly, lesser ones from
them, and so on to seigneur, holding single manor.
.......... Basically system rested upon unsettled
conditions of time and a lord’s need for armed
warriors.98
According to the above characterization, the origin of
Japanese feudalism can be traced back to the land reform in
99
the seventh century as noted earlier. Through the subsequent
centuries, the gradual but steady formation of hierarchies of
vassals

commendors and commendees

had taken place, thus

paving the way for the feudalism of the Tokugawa period (16031868).

The Columbia Encyclopedia, Columbia University (comp,
and ed.), The Columbia Viking Desk Encyclopedia (2nd ed., New
York: The Viking Press, i960), vol. 1, p.~447.
^While Theodore McNelly periodizes, "feudalism, 11921868," McNelly, op. cit., p. 10, Frank Langdon includes the
same period as part of "The Traditional Political Order: A.D.
200-1868," Langdon, op. cit., p. 1^.
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Both the Kamakura period., which had lasted for about
150 years^and the Ashikaga period (1338-1573)» spanning a period
of some four hundred years, represent another period in the long
process of transition to the Tokugawa period.

Characteristic, of

this transitional period is a high degree of groupism, particularly
in the case of the Ashikaga period.

The Kamakura period was beset by group politics within
the Kamakura Bakufu on one hand, and between the Bakufu and the
imperial court, on the other.

In fact, there was a double dualism:

one between the imperial court and the Bakufu, and the other,
between the nominal Shogun and the real power, the Ho jo clan.

Unlike their illustrious founder of the Kamakura Bakufu,
Minamoto Yoritomo, Yoritomo's heirs generally lacked his force of
character.

With the death of the third Shogun, the actual power

of the Bakufu was passed to the Kojo family, Yoritomo's in-laws.
Yoritomo's widow, a commanding and able personality in her own
. ..
„ . 100
right, was a Hojo.

Thus thirteenth-century Japan presented a structure of
government inconceivably complicated to anyone observing
it from outside. For example, a situation arose where
the emperor was a puppet manipulated by a retired emperor
and his courtiers, the Fujiwara. They themselves, forming
the nominal government, were under the order of the agents
in the capital of the government of the Kamakura shogun
who in turn was a puppet of a Hojo regent.

^■^Storry, on. cit., p. 39*
1M
Ibid., pp. 30-40.
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The Ho jo clan ruled until they were destroyed, in 1333*
by Ashikaga Takuiji, a member of the Minamoto clan.

The demise

of the Hojo was first precipitated by a challenge to their power
from Emperor Go-Daigo, who was, in turn, betrayed by one of his
supporters, Ashikaga Takuiji.

In 1331* "the Hojo deposed the

Emperor, Go-Daigo, "a man of ability who had been making plans,

102
quietly, to secure the overthrow of the Bakufu."

Go-Daigo was

exiled, but two years, later, one of his commanders attacked
Kamakura and overran it with the help of defectors from the Hojo
clan.

^

One of these defectors was Ashikaga.

Emperor Go-Daigo did not enjoy the fruits of his success
against the Hojo clan very long.

There arose a succession war,

within the imperial house, between two competing imperial groups
respectively supported by different military groups.
there were two courts.
imperial groups.

For a time,

A civil war followed between the two

In the end, the rival group of Go-Daigo was

victorious.

One of Go-Daigo's supporters was the powerful Ashi

kaga group.

Ashikaga, who had already switched sides once when

he left the Hojo camp, betrayed Go-Daigo this time.

Having set

up another member of the imperial line on the throne, Ashikaga
had himself appointed Shogun thus marking the beginning of the

^ ^Ibid., p. 42; McNelly, on. cit., p. 11.
I
t

'
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Ashikaga period (1338-1573)•

Political instability resulting from the power struggle
in the capital was matched by growing unrest in the provinces.
The general ”conditions were so chaotic

such was the breakdown

of law and order— that only the fittest could survive.
houses were overthrown by mere bandit chiefs.

Great

Old names dis

appeared, and new names, new territorial lords sprang into
103
fame.” ^

It was "the age of the overthrow of the higher by the

iQZf.

lower.”

The Ashikaga period was marred by unremitting civil

wars as numerous groups, large and small, old and new, were all
f

fighting either to protect their fiefs or to gain more.

Thus

^

the period was, as it is called in the history of Japan, "the
age of the country at war” (Sengoku Jidai).

In the midst of the general breakdown of law and order,
the power of the Ashikaga scarcely went beyond their own immediate
domains.

Jesuit missionaries who entered Japan in the latter

part of the sixteenth century referred to the great feudal barons
as "kings" since "each seemed quite independent from any central
control either the court of the Emperor or the court of the
Shogun.”105

105Storry, on. cit., pp. 42-43.
10Zj,Ibid., p. 42.
105McNelly, op. cit., p. 11.
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In spite of the worst of the centrifugal aspect of the
Japanese groupism that was taking place during this period, the
tradition of the imperial institution somehow survived.

The

utter confusion throughout the country and abject poverty on the
part of the multitude, notwithstanding* the Ashikaga Shogun" lived
in great luxury while the imperial court was often in dire straits
financially.

One Emperor, it is said, was reduced to selling

specimens of his calligraphy on the streets of Kyoto.

"The

survival of the imperial court was indeed due merely to ancient
tradition that, come what may, there must always be an emperor of
107
the old imperial line."

Indeed, the old imperial line did not

only survive this period but also has continued through the sub
sequent centuries to this day.

The history of Japan from the Ashikaga period to the
beginning of the Tokugawa period in 1603 is one of transition
from many centered group politics to that of one group domination.
It took three great unifiers to complete the transition:

(1) Oda

Nobunaga (153^-82); (2) Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-98); and (3) Toku
gawa Ieyasu (15^2-I6l6). These great leaders were distinctly

106Storry, o£'. cit., p. ^3*

107ibid.
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different from one another.

108

However, from the folklore

about these illustrious historical figures, as well as the
history of the period involving them, one discerns the weight
of the tradition of hierarchical social relations and the
group character of traditional Japan.

By the time Oda Nobunaga met his untimely death at the
hands of one of his supporters, who was, in turn, quicky destroyed
by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, he, as a relatively young ruler of age
forty-nine, was extending his single and firm control over nearly
half of the entire provinces in the country.
^

power as such, Oda could not be a Shogun,

In spite of his

for By this time it was

an accepted tradition that only members of the Minamoto house
could hold that office and Oda was a Taira.

In spite of the utter

chaos of the Ashikaga era which had immediately preceded, the tra
dition lingered on among the aristocratic clans.

As for Toyotomi Hideyoshi, he was the son of a peasant
foot soldier, thus making him a unique exception to the

f .

The following quotation is illustrative of the dif
ferences among the three individuals as they have been related
in the folklore history of Japan: "their character
and methods differed. The quality of each is suggested by a wellknown Japanese story. The three men, it is said, were faced with a
bird that refused to sing. [Oda] Nobunaga's reaction was impulsive.
’I ’ll kill it,' he said, 'if it does not sing.' Then [Toyotomi]
Hideyoshi is supposed to have said:
'I'll force it to sing for me.1
But [Tokugawa] Ieyasu said: 'I shall wait until it does sing,"
Storry, o£. cit., p. B6.
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pattern of the elite social "background of the various group
leaders in

traditional Japan.

Not only was he humble by

birth but also he was adversely gifted with other factors of
comparative disadvantage:
almost a dwarf—

he was uniquely small in stature

and extremely ugly.

109

In spite of these

adverse qualities which might have caused him to be cynical,
if not hostile, toward the tradition of group-centered social
hierarchies,' Toyotomi not only stayed loyal to the tradition
but also strengthened it.

At the height of his power, which had even extended
^

110
to the Korean peninsula
after he unified the entire country,
Toyotomi was content with the title of kampaku (civil dictator)
in lieu of Shogun. He would have liked the title of Shogun,
"but this he could not be, save by adoption into the Ashikaga

111

or some other branch of the Minamoto house.”

Moreover,

he revitalized the hierarchical tradition.
It was during the ascendancy of [Toyotomi] Hideyoshi
that the line was drawn more firmly between' the samurai
class and the peasantry. Because he himself had emerged
109
Toyotomi was "described by the historian Murdon as
'a base-born monkey-faced adventurer,’” ibid., p. 48.
110
With the stated intent of eventually conquering China
in order to punish the usual arrogance of the Chinese, Toyotomi
sent expeditionary forces to Korea, which had refused to cooperate
with him, beginning in May 1592 with the initial troop strength
of some 250,000. After a six-year bloody campaign, the expedition
ended with Toyotomi's death. Ibid., pp. 50-52.
^Ibid., p. 53.
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from the peasantry [Toyotomi] Hideyoshi was, no
doubt on that account, all the more determined to
rebuild the structure of class that had broken down
to some extent during the civil strife of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He issued and
enforced decrees proclaiming that nobody under an
obligation to a superior could leave his employment
without his overlord's permission, that no samurai
could become a townsman, and that all peasants
should surrender their weapons to the government
[and only the samurai would be allowed to have them].
These measures would soon be perfected in the Tokugawa period.

It is in the Tokugawa period that one finds the near
perfection of the revitalization of the tradition of the hier
archical social structure, under a centralized control by one,
and one only, clan:
synonymous

the Tokugawa.

The interests of Japan were

with the interests of one group, the Tokugawa, which

would rule for the next 250 years until 1867-

The beginning of the Tokugawa period foretold the strength
of the group character of the Tokugawa clan rule.

When Toyotomi

Hideyoshi died in September 1598, his heir was his young son,
Hideyori.

In the council of guardians for the young boy, which

had been arranged by the boy's father before the latter's death,
Tokugawa was the most powerful.

However, Tokugawa Ieyasu's

position within the council was not unassailable.

True to the
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tradition of the hierarchical groupism, "it was in the nature
of things that there should be a trial of strength, sooner or
later, between him and the other prominent daimyo committed to
guardianship of the boy Hideyori."

113

The struggle for supremacy within the elite group would
soon end in favor of Tokugawa.

It was decided in the historical

battle at Sekigahara on October 21, 1600.

The battle would not

only essentially end the intraelite power struggle but also
establish the basic political framework of a centralized rule
by the Tokugawa clan.

All groups under the Tokugawa Shogun

would be classified into two categories:

one group that supported

Tokugawa at Sekigahara in 1600 and the other that opposed him.

The fundamental criterion of loyalty, which was based on
the group affiliation in this single battle (decisive as it was),
would be applied hereditarily to all descendants of the original
groups.

It was as if time had stopped since Sekigahara for the

next 250 years.

As it were, Tokugawa Japan was isolated from

the outside world on one hand, and all groups under the Shogun
were kept apart from one another, on the other. As a result of
this policy, it was as though time had stopped during most of the

113Ibid.t p. 58.
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Tokugawa period.

In the end, those descendants of the original

enemy of Tokugawa Ieyasu 250 years before, who had been permanently
designated "outside lords" (tozama dairoyo), would destroy the
last Tokugawa Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu.

The most powerful among

the "outside lords" (tozama dairoyo) were the two great south
western clans:

the Choshu and the Satsuma, the "Founding Fathers"

of Meiji Japan.

How the Tokugawa side won the decisive battle at Sekigahara
and how Tokugawa Ieyasu consolidated the foundation of the Tokugawa
regime render further clues to the nature of hierarchical
groupism in traditional Japan.

(
It has been noted that the group loyalties in traditional
Japan were political in nature, hence a function of the political
situation at any given time. v This tended to render the shifting
of loyalty from one group to another (by unit and by level) more
flexible than the Confucian concept of filial piety.

Stated in

another way, the traditional concept of group loyalty in Japan,
which was political in nature, tended to justify the shifting of
group loyalty, including betrayal, according to one’s judgment
of the political expediency at any given time. Thus, political
expediency relative to group loyalties was a Japanese version
of the Chinese concept of the "Heavenly mandate."
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Both tended to justify one's overthrow of his ruler or superior,
or one's shifting of his group affiliation.

In this respect, the

ruler (or the group leader), who relied on the ascriptive group
loyalties to a hierarchical group, was particularly vulnerable
to betrayal precisely because of his dependence on the personal
loyalties of his subjects* followers, or supporters.

One finds the foregoing pattern of the shifting of group
loyalties, including betrayal, in traditional Japan (a^d- also in
the factional politics of contemporary Japan). This was the case,
for example, when the Fujiwara house perished as. the ruler at the
|

hands of the two military houses (the Taira and the Minamoto);
which were "supposed" to be the Fujiwara's "subordinates," as
noted earlier.

To use Samuel Huntington's conceptual framework for civilmilitary relations, there was no "subjective civilian control"
by the Fujiwara house over the two military houses.

The Fujiwara

relied on the group loyalties of the military houses.
115

was there an "objective civilian control""

I ■
I

11A

Neither

over the military.

11h,
The"subjective civilian control" means that which is
achieved by maximization of civilian control over the military.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State; The Theory
and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York; Vintage
Books, 1957)i P» 80.
11*5
yk civilian control over the military by means ox
maximizing professionalism of the military. Ibid., pp. 83ff.
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The central organizing principle of each of the two military
groups was not one of "objective" military professionalism.

116

117
Rather, it was a subjective and ascriptive traditional family
concept of ie.

118

Accordingly, the unwitting invitation, which

was extended by the feuding factions within the Fujiwara house
to the two powerful military houses for help, was, in fact, an
invitation to a military take-over of the civilian political
power which terminated Fujiwara supremacy as a whole.

Apart from a direct political change from one d a n group
to another, instances of betrayal by a group (or individual),
which were instrumental in establishing the supremacy of another
dominant group, were not uncommon. As noted earlier, the defection
by the Ashikaga group from the Ho Jo group was instrumental in
establishing the supremacy of the imperial group under Emperor
Go-Daigo.

Likewise, the demise of the latter was, in turn, a

direct result of another defection:

Ashikaga's treason.

The

defection by a group of LDP politicians,involved in the intrigues
of intraparty factional politics, from the then Prime Minister,

11°Tbid., p. 8 3 .
117

As will be discussed later, the Japanese concept of
"family" is not necessarily confined to the blood-related family
kinship.
^®In Japanese, the term ie (1§< ), which is pronounced
"i" as in "inn" and "e" as in "egg" or "ye" as in "yes," means
sometimes the physical building of a house. It also means a
family which was traditionally perceived as a corporate unit.
This will be discussed later in the context of consensus decision
making.
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Kishi, was as instrumental in ending Kishi's political life
as was the massive popular protest against Kishi’s high-handed
parliamentary tactics.

Later, a similar defection by such

powerful factional leaders as Fukuda and Miki from the factional
coalition supportive of Prime Minister Tanaka (the "mainstream”
faction) would ensure the latter's downfall. There was such
a pattern which took place some 370 years earlier at Sekigahara
in 1600.

Two great combinations of territorial lords, one under
Tokugawa Ieyasu and the other under his chief rival, met at
Sekigahara.

Tokugawa was fairly confident of his victory in

advance, for he had come to a previous agreement with certain
of the daimyo among his opponents that they would change sides
at a critical point in the battle.

The traitors honored their

commitment to treason, and the battle was over.

119

The story of Tokugawa Ieyasu relative to the traditional
groupism has a peculiar quality.

He was a wise and complex man

with the mastery of both military tactics and statecraft.
was infinitely patient,

He

to "wait until a bird sings" for him

Storry, op. cit., p. p. 58*
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rather than killing it if it refuses to sing, as would Oda,
or trying hard to finally make it sing in Toyotomi's way.

120

At the same time, he was tough enough to murder his own wife
and son on suspicion of plotting against his erstwhile lord
Oda Nobunaga.

121

The way Tokugawa established the foundation

of the central rule by the Tokugawa house was typical of the
parochial and ascriptive aspects of groupism.

Following his decisive victory at Sekigahara, Tokugawa
Ieyasu had yet another task to perform:

the total eradication

of the Toyotomi house in order to ensure the perpetuation of the
Tokugawa group rule.

In 1616, Tokugawa attacked’Toyotomi Hide-

yoshi's son, Hideyori, and his loyal supporters in their great
fortress at Osaka.

At the end of a bitter siege,, in which

Tokugawa, as usual, resorted to treacherous cunning, Hideyori,
his mother, and their principal retainers committed suicide.
Shortly thereafter, Tokugawa snipped the bud of a potential

120

"Among the instructions that he is alleged to have
left to his successors is an exhortation to patience that deserves
quotation in full: 'The strong manly ones in life are those who
understand the meaning of the word Patience. Patience means
restraining one's inclinations. There are seven emotions, joy,
anger, anxiety, love, grief, fear, and hate, and if a man does not
give way to these he can be called patient. I am not as strong
as I might be, but I have long known and practiced patience. And
if my descendants wish to be as I am . . . they must study patience,
from Professor Sadler's translation of the legacy of Ieyasu in A.L.
Sadler, The Maker of Modem Janan. London (Allen & Unwin), 1937,
pp. 389-90," ibid., p. 60~
121Ibid., p. k3.
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future challenge to the Tokugawa house by murdering the only
other surviving Toyotomi:

an eight-year old boy, Kunimatsu,

the grandson of the late kampaku (civil dictator), Toyotomi
Hideyoshi.

Tokugawa Ieyasu, being descended in a direct line

from Minamoto Yoshiie,

122

knew full well that the fortunes of his own house,
the Minamoto, had in the past escaped ruin through
the clemenpy extended by Taira Kiyomori to the two
boys, Yoritomo and Yoshitsune. Conversely it was
known to Ieyasu, as to evexy Japanese who knew his
history, that by sparing the lives of his enemy's
children Kiyomori brought about in the end the
great defeat of the Taira clan.^23
However, Tokugawa Ieyasu chose to extend clemency to the countless
samurai who fought him at Sekigahara.

He simply gave them

the hereditary name, the tozama daimyo (the "outer lords”). As
noted earlier, the descedants of these samurai would destroy the
Tokugawa house two hundred and fifty years later.

The long process of political change, begun in the seventh
century, culminated in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868).

It was a

process of transformation, through centuries, from an early society,
which was just beginning to be regimented under an imperial rule,
to a society which was highly structured with rigid hierarchies of
vassals under one supreme feudal lord, the Shogun. Many of the
structural and behavioral features peculiar to the tradition of
Japan can be found in Tokugawa Japan.

It is for this reason

122Yoshiie was the great grandfather of Yoritomo, the
founder of the Kamakura Bakufu.
123
Storry, on. cit., p. 59*
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that, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Tokugawa
period (1603-1868) is usually regarded as the "traditional
past" from which modem Japan is acknowledged to have emerged
during the last hundred years.

Stated in another way, the

Japanese predilection for grouping and their custom of making
collective decisions through consensus can be traced to the
basic social structure and the collectivistic (cooperative and
harmonious) decision-making prevalent in the Tokugawa period.

For 250 years, Tokugawa Japan was isolated not only
externally but also, in an important way, internally.

The basic

.

objective of the Tokugawa regime was to preserve the static and

'

hierarchical society at any cost.

The status quo policy was

based on the assumption that social, economic, or political, as
well as foreign influences, were likely to be highly destabilizing.

12ty

Consequently, the Tokugawa regime pursued a policy of

isolating Japan from the outside world on one hand, and,
internally, discouraging active interactions among communities,
on the other.

In both of these objectives, the Tokugawa regime

was highly successful, thus creating a "utopian" feudal society
___
J.A.A. Stockwin, Jan an: Divided Politics in a Growth
Economy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975). P. 9; Langdon, op. cit.,

p. 23.
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which was not supposed to evolve.

125

The feudal ’’utopia" of Tokugawa Japan had remained
frozen long enough to establish, firmly, the foundation of
a twofold tradition peculiar to Japan:

firstly, the tradition

of a hierarchical grouping in terms of leader-follower (oyabunkobun) relationship; and secondly, the tradition of a cooperative
and harmonious

way of making decisions.

As revealed in the foregoing broad pattern analysis,
the tradition of a hierarchical groupism in Japan is as old as
its mythology. What sets the Tokugawa period apart from thepreceding periods is the "permanent" systematic institutional
ization of the traditional hierarchical social structure.

The tradition of a diarchy (the Emperor and the Shogun)
was kept intact.

The institution of the imperial rule was

•accepted by the Shogun for two main reasons:

(l) the legiti

mation of the supremacy of the Shogun among his peers (other
daimyo); and (2) the strengthening of the rigid and hierarchical
Tokugawa society.

125
R. Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation
of Sociological Analysis,” in Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosen
berg (eds.), Sociological Theory (3*^1 ed.; London: Macmillan,
1969)» PP* 222-40; Stockwin, on. cit., p. 9*
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Firstly, the Shogun (i.e., the first Shogun Tokugawa
Ieyasu) accepted the institution of a sovereign Emperor in
order to legitimize his own rule.

Following his victory at

Sekigahara, Tokugawa emerged as a super-daimyo (or the un
disputed primus inter pares) among the daimyo. Especially
during the first decade of the seventeenth century, Tokugawa
faced the problem of legitimating his rule even though he was
a super-daimyo, more equal among the equals.

126

The Shogun’s authority over his peers was justified
in the name of the Emperor whom he both controlled and served.'
According to Hayashi Razan, the Confucian advisor of Tokugawa
Ieyasu, the Shogun *s position was to be likened to that of the
Chinese Emperor:

the Japanese Shogun received a "trust" from

"Heaven" (the Japanese Emperor who was the "Heaven" by virtue
of being a direct descendant of Amaterasu, the Sun-Goddess)
to exercise his authority over the people of Japan in the
Emperor s name.

128

126
In the process of ascending to power, Tokugawa had
accepted each defeated daimyo as a vassal, "variously trusted
and confessing varying degrees of subordination," J. W. Hall,
op. cit., p. 25. However, until the very end of the regime,
the central-local power relationships were never completely
clear.
127Ibid., p. 16.
12S
John W. Hall, "The Confucian Teacher in Tokugawa
Japan," in David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (eds.), Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1959), P. 274.
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Secondly, the institution of a sovereign Emperor was
of particular importance not only to the Shogun but also to
those aristocratic houses close to the apex of the social and
political hierarchies in Tokugawa Japan.

"During this period

Japanese practice and Confucian theory merged to create a vision
of a hierarchy

of conditions or estate each bearing its own

relationship to the source of authority [emphases added].

12Q

Accordingly, it was assumed, theoretically that the
acceptance of the institutional authority of the sovereign
Emperor would be conducive to enforcing obedience and loyalty
I

to the source of each hierarchical authority in the entire social
structure.
If the Bakufu reveres the imperial house, then all
the feudal lords respect the Bakufu. If the feudal
lords will respect the Bakufu, the ministers and
officials will respect the feudal lords. Thus high
and low protect each other.^ 30

The establishment of the foundation of the twofold
tradition ("the legacies from the Tokugawa period"), as noted
above, was facilitated by the following three main factors:

■^J. W. Hall, 'The Nature of Traditional Society:
Japan,” o p . cit., p. 16.
13°Ibid., p. 17.
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first, the formal institutionalization of the hierarchical
social structure throughout the political community; second,
the status quo policy; and third, the growth of self-contained
rural villages and emergent behavioral patterns in the rural
areas.

Firstly, in the Tokugawa period, the traditional hier
archical social structure was formally and systematically
institutionalized throughout the country.

In the name of the

Emperor, first of all, there was the Shogun at the apex of the
entire political structure.

He had the ultimate power over

the entire administrative apparatus of the country by virtue
of the power of his own armies and those of his allies.

Under the Shogun, there were four main governmental
institutions:
(3) the

(l) the imperial court; (2) the shogunate;

myn domain; and (4) the religious houses.

131

■While the first and the last of these institutions involved
only a fraction of the population, the administration of the
government was the responsibility almost wholly of the military.
Of all the registered territory of Japan, over 98 per cent was

131Ibid.. p. 20.
132Ibid.
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administered by the military estate.

133

The only rulers

134-

whom most of the people knew were the Shogun and the daimyo.

The predominance of the samurai officials, who had
originally been organized into tight bands, which were united
by personal oath of allegiance, was a significant influence on
the concept of a leader-follower group and that of group loyalty
and solidarity.

133

Secondly, there were two consequences resulting
from the status quo policy of the Tokugawa regime:

first,

<

theemergence of politically discrete units throughout the entire

^

political community; and second, the emergence of numerous selfcontained and self-sufficient rural villages (mora). Both of
these factors tended to reinforce the traditional groupism.
Moreover, from the second, in particular, there emerged a mode
of decision-making:

consensus decison-making for group harmony

and solidarity.

133Ibid.
l3^Ibid., p. 21.

133

The Shogun had two groups of daimyo whom he trusted:
the daimyo, who belonged to various collateral branches of the
Tokugawa house were known as shimpan daimyo. They were assumed
to be absolutely loyal to the Shogun. The daimyo who had recog
nized Ieyasu as their overlord before Sekigahara were known as
fudai daimyo. They were trustworthy. Tozama daimyo have already
been mentioned.
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I
Although the Shoguns of the Tokugawa house directly
ruled nearly one-fourth of Japan as their feudal domain from
their castle in Edo (present Tokyo), the jurisdiction over the
rest of the country was in the hands of various feudal lords
below the Shogun. About one half of the country was ruled by
branch families of the Shoguns or other family retainers.
The remainder of the country, especially those large fiefs
which were in Choshu and Satsuma, was in the hands of the
tozama daimyo who were the defeated enemy at Sekigahara in
1600.

In view of the nature of a feudal society and the

attendant implications for group loyalty, this meant that,
"politically, Tokugawa society was divided into discrete corn137
partments,"
even though the entire country was, in theory,
under the Shogun's control.

The emergence of the numerous self-contained and selfsufficient rural villages was promoted directly by increased
autonomy on the part of the rural villages and, indirectly,
by the Tokugawa policy of discouraging interactions among
various communities.

Both of these factors, namely, the in

creased autonomy and the relative isolation of the rural

^■•^Langdon, o£. cit., p. 23.
Hall, op. cit., p. 24. The entire country was
divided into some 250 feudal principalities which were adminis
tered essentially tiy the samurai class, Ike, o p . cit., p. 5-
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I
communities from one another resulted from the Tokugawa policy
of freezing the highly stratified society as it was.

The rule by the Bakufu (the military government) meant
a dual function to be performed by the military;

the civil

administration as well as the military campaign (if need he).
The bureaucratization of the samurai class (or drawing them

into the "bureaucracy) meant drawing them away from their fiefs.
As the daimyo domain, as defined by shogunal grant, became a

unit of local administration, the territory of the domain came
under the direct rule of the daimyo.
^

As the samurai became

the Shogun's local civil administrators, the daimyo began to

draw their vassals to the center of their domains and oblige
them to live in the castle towns away from their fiefs.

138

Consequently, the actual administration of the peasant' villages
139
fell into the hands of the headman of each village.

The headman of each village was thus responsible for
the administration of his village.
intravillage cooperation, each
sufficient.

Through various means of

rural village became self-

This kind of self-contained and self-sufficient

^■^It will be recalled that the power of each province
was a function of the number of men under arms and that these
men under arms, protecting the land, would later become members
of the privileged warrior class, samurai. Supra, p. 113[

^^Hall, o£. cit., p. 23*
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rural village (mura) "existed nearly everywhere, divided
into groups of closely cooperating families of landowners
and cultivators, with only a few hereditary or indentured
family workers.

Finally, the indirect cause of the emergence of the
self-contained rural villages all over Japan during the
Tokugawa period appears to he the Tokugawa policy of keeping
"everything" static and "everyone" frozen.
Two aspects of this policy are relevant to the topic under
discussion:

first, the policy of an extensive surveillance;

and second, the policy of discouraging physical mobility.

The

policy, which was effected by the central

government in Tokugawa Japan, of putting the entire country
under a strict surveillance was apparently aimed at potential

insurgence, especially, by the tozama daimyo groups.

The

following accounts are self-explanatory:
all travellers entering and leaving Yedo were
scrutinized very strictly at barriers on the roads
. . . particularly watchful for " guns going in . .»
No marriages between daimyo families could take

Langdon, on. cit., p. 21.
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place except by permission of the shogun. Severe
restrictions were placed on the building of new
castles, and indeed on the repair of old ones. . .
. . ..
No daimyo was allowed to make a direct ap
proach to the emperor’s court at Kyoto, a city under
the control of a high Bakufu official; and no daimyo
was allowed to pass through Kyoto on his way to and
from Yedo. Finally, the Tokugawa government set up
and perfected a secret police system that was, it
must he admitted, a model of its kind; so much as
that one Japanese scholar has characterized the Toku
gawa regime as the prototype of the absolute police
state. Although the daimyo, more especially the
"outer lords," were granted virtual autonomy within
their territories, they were watched by the Bakufu,
through its network of agents, with nervous, un
wearying vigilance. 141

If the foregoing policy of safeguards and surveillance
was aimed at insurgence in general and rebellions by the tozama
daimyo in particular, the following policy was apparently aimed
to keep the entire society static:
travel was not easy, in spite of the well spaced
resting-places
the famous fifty-three stations of
the Tokaido— along the road and the many inns and
tea houses . . . . At intervals there were barriers.
All travellers had to pass through these between
sunrise and sunset. It was at these barriers that
officials and spies of the Bakufu were especially
active and thorough in their persequent curiosity
about everyone who was using the road; and the
usual penalty for making a detour, to avoid a bar
rier, was death. Furthermore, not many rivers were
bridged........ At one river, the Oigawa, even the
use of boats was prohibited. The ban was imposed
for strategic reasons, the policy of the shogunate
being to maintain a static society.142

141

/Storry, o£. cit., p. 69.
142
Ibid., p. 72.
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The policy of no-bridge-over-rivers (not even boat crossing
in the case of one river) would certainly encourage the growth
of self-contained and self-sufficient villages in any other
society.

Japan was no exception.

Before moving on to an analysis of the tradition of
collectivist norms in Japan, it is in order, at
this point, to put into

proper perspective the broad pattern

that emerges from the foregoing analysis.

As symbolized in the

ancient Shinto religion and as seen in the subsequent history
of political change in Japan,

traditional Japan was charac-

terized by groupism which was typically hierarchical in nature.
The symbolism to be derived from the primitive Shinto religion
was that the entire Yamato kingdom was an organic state com
prising one large "family" group (simulated kinship) which was
hierarchically structured

the supremacy of the Yamato clan,

hence of the Emperor, by virtue of being descended from Amaterasu
(the Sun-Goddess).

Insulated from external influences due to its geographi
cal location and the absence of large-scale migration into the
archipelago, Japan's political development

during the past two
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r
millennia

was shaped by hierarchical groupism.

As a result, so

highly developed was the sense of national solidarity that
the people have at times acted like one huge family with the
Emperor as its head.

Throughout the long process of political change in the
traditional period, beginning in the fifth century A.D., the
basic framework of
strengthened.

hierarchical groupism had gradually-been

As the reins of the central government were passed

from one power house to another, which might have meant a new
dynasty elsewhere, the Emperor's reign continued. Except for
p

the relatively short Ashikaga period (1338-1573)

^

the overthrow of the higher by the lower"

"the age of

the political com

munity in general remained hierarchically stratified.

Even in

the Ashikaga period, which was unique to the history of Japan,
the imperial throne remained intact.

With the Tokugawa Shogunate,

hierarchical groupism was "permanently" and formally insti
tutionalized.

Institutionalization of

traditional hierarchical groupism

had resulted in the emergence of numerous self-sufficient rural
villages (mura) throughout the country, and the predominance of the
samurai class. Both of these developments

tended to reinforce the
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tradition of

hierarchical groupism, intensifying vertical

stratification of the society at the local level, within
the overall theoretical political framework of a central control
by the Shogun. It is this "feudal Japan" which is commonly referred
to as the "traditional past" of modem Japan.

It was during the 250 years cf the rule by the feudal
samurai that the foundation of modem Japanese nationalism
emotional expression of group loyalty

an

was firmly established.

Prior to the Tokugawa period, there existed group loyalty which
was more ascriptive than affectively emotional.

In Tokugawa

Japan, "the lord to whom obedience was owed became the local
baron or knight rather than the Emperor."1^

Moreover, the sharpening of the focus of group loyalty
was even more intensified by a device called sankin kotai whereby
the Shogun controlled the samurai barons, especially, the tozama
daimyo. Under the system of sankin kotai, the barons, as a rule,
were compelled to spend every other year with their families in
Edo (present Tokyo), the seat of the Shogunate, and every other
year at their fiefs, leaving their families as hostages in Edo.
143
“lagdon, op. cit., p. 20.
144
Ibid., p. 23; McNeliy, on. cit., p. 12.
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As noted earlier, all travellers entering and leaving Edo
were scrutinized very strictly at barriers on the roads leading
into the city.

The guards were under orders to be particularly

watchful for "guns going in and women going out."

145

Aside from

problems of having to live away from his wife and family, a daimyo
had to cope with the regular journeys to and from Edo, to say
nothing of the expenses involved in attendance at the Shogun's
court and in the upkeep of an Edo residence, which imposed a
constant burden, .in time as well as finance, on the territorial

146
lord.

What follows is indicative of the tradition of

archical groupism and group loyalty:

hier

the story of the immortal

Shi.ju-shichi Shi ("The Forty-Seven Samurai").

It was during one of the occasions when the daimyo were
all in attendance at the Shogun's court for sank in kotai that
a daimyo named Kira had grossly insulted another daimyo^ Asano.
Kira (Kira Kosuke) was an old and very crafty daimyo from Edo
and was notorious for his wicked nature.

Asano (Asano Takumino

Kami) was a young and handsome daimyo from the countryside.

At

the gross personal insult which was a matter of "honor" to a
samurai, the young daimyo Asano was unable to withhold his anger.
He attempted to kill Kira on the spot.

Restrained by his fellow

^^Storry, cj>. cit., p. 68.

w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 145 -

(
daimyo, Asano managed only to inflict a cut on Kira’s forehead
with his sword.

14?

Having violated the Shogun's rule forbidding

any fight with swords in the Shogun's court’, Asano was condemned
to commit formal harakiri (suicide), which he did.

In accordance with the Japanese tradition of Bushido
("the Ways of Warriors’
,”

148

the ethics of the samurai) and the

Confucian ethics which laid down that "no man should allow the
unjust death of a father or of an immediate feudal superior to

149
go unavenged, ”

forty-seven samurai retainers of Lord Asano

avenged their lord’s death.

(

They were condemned to commit formal

harakiri (suicide), which they did and joined their lord Asano
in heaven.

The leader of the “Forty-Seven Loyal Samurai* was a

samurai,named Oishi Yoshio/and among Oishi's forty-six followers

150

was a very young samurai who happened to be Oishi's own son.

147

When the "Forty-Seven Loyal Samurai" stormed Kira's
residence on one wintry morning in heavy snow, Kira went into
hiding in his residence; disguised himself to hide his identity.
The cut on his forehead betrayed him. (according to numeours
stories about the Shiju-shichi Shi which the writer had read as
a beginning grade school boy).

148
The aspect of Bushido which applies to this tragedy is
not usually understood by Westerners. For example, Samuel
Huntington explains 3ushido as: ’’The values of Bushido were the
values of the warrior, the lover of violence for its own sake.
The sword was 'the soul of the samurai' and the 'symbol of
God,
Huntington, 0£. cit., p. 125.
^^Storxy, o£. cit., p. 80.
^ ° I n Sengaku-.ji (Temple Sengaku) in Tokyo, one finds
today the tombs of the father and son, along with those of the
other forty-five samurai, adjacent to that of their lord, Asano.
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The following is a Western historian's description of
this tragic episode of the forty-seven samurai's death, which
took place, of all times, during "he Genroku Jidai (the Age of
Genroku):
this is perhaps the most famous melodrama in Japanese
history and is still re-enacted on the Kahuki stage and
on the cinema and television screen. The full story,
even when stripped of the fictional accretions that have
grown up round it, is long and complicated. But its
gist can he told simply and in a few sentences. A daimyo
named Asano wounded . . . another lord named Kira . . . .
. . . . For this act Asano was condemned to commit formal
suicide, which he did. A number of his retainers decided
to avenge his death, which had taken place, of course, as
a result of the offensiveness of Kira................
.......... The execution of the plan was not easy, as
Kira was very much on his guard. But at last, early one
snowy morning in winter, Oishi and his followers . . . .
stormed Kira’s house in Yedo [Edo] and killed him. They
took his head to the temple where their dead lord Asano
had been laid to rest, and having presented Kira’s head
to lord Asano's tombstone they gave themselves up to the
authorities.151

From the viewpoint of law which was in effect then, the
forty-seven samurai were guilty of public disturbance, including
acts of murder, punishable by death.

Ironically, the episode

took place during a period when feudal 3ushido was in decline:
the Genroku Jidai (the Age of Genroku). It was a fairly short
period at the end of the seventeenth century.
the urban civilization of Yedo [Edo]

"During this age

what is now Tokyo

and

Osaka were unusually brilliant; and correspondingly there was,
so everybody said, a decline in the old samurai virtues of
hardihood, loyalty, and martial excellence."

152

What is

^^Storry, o£. cit., p. 79.
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significant is the fact that practically everyone in Edo,
including the Shogun himself, felt that the forty-seven samurai
ought to he pardoned.
For a long time the shogunal government could not
decide what action to take. Oishi and his men had
caused a breach of the peace and therefore deserved
to he punished. But they had shown themselves, in a
rather lax and pleasure-loving age, to he paragons
of private morality; for Gonfucian ethics laid down
that no man should allow the unjust death of a father
or of an immediate feudal superior to go unavenged.
The shogun, Tsunayoshi, felt that on the whole Oishi
and his followers ought to he pardoned. This indeed
was the opinion of most of the population of Yedo,
high and low alike. ^-53

However, according to the view of certain influential
scholars, the forty-seven samurai were given a sentence "which
would meet hoth the requirements of public law and order and
the real wishes of the loyal retainers themselves, who must
surely desire, having achieved their aim, to join their avenged
lord in the next world.”

The forty-seven samurai committed

harakiri. Their tombs,, adjacent to that of their Lord Asano,
in Sengakuji (Temple Sengaku) in Tokyo are still respectfully
visited by many thousands every year.

154

In relation to the Bushido code of ethics which was

153Ihid., p. 80
154Ihid.
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mentioned earlier, the two important cultural concepts involved
in the act of the forty-seven samurai are:
{%') and that of giri

the concept of on

The forty-seven samurai self-

invited the affective sense of two obligations, on and giri,
to themselves and paid the "debts" to their Lord Asano with their
lives. These two concepts are somewhat related to amae and sin
cerity which were mentioned by the Brookings scholars.

These

concepts will be discussed later.

During World War II, as mentioned earlier, many Japanese
pilots of the suicide planes, kamikaze, allegedly dived to their
deaths, shouting Tenno Heika Banzai ("Long Live His Majesty the
Emperor"). One can never be sure how many of them, including countless
teenagers, chose to die for the Emperor (or for Nippon, i.e., Japan)
following the example of the "Forty-Seven Loyal S a m u r a i . A s tra
dition goes, however, one thing is certain:

to the extent that there

were those who willingly put Japan (or the Emperor) above their own
life— doubtless there were many

the tradition of

hierarchical

groupism found its emotional and affective expression of group loyalty.
i55
~
Two particularly informative sources in this regard are:
Todai Senbotsu Gaksei Shuki Hensan Iinkai (comp.), Harukanaru Sangani (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1978); and Nihon Senbotsu
Gakusei Shuki Hensan Iinkai (comp.), Kike Wadatsumi no Koe (Tokyo:
Tokyo University Press, 1978). .The first one is a compilation of
diaries, the last letters, and the last wills which were written
by those Tokyo University students who died during the Pacific War.
The second, a sister edition of the first, compiles similar items
written by the Japanese students, in general, who died during the
war..
^ Ibid.
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2. Tradition of Collectivistic Norms; DecisionMaking; through Consensus.
It has been stated earlier in this study that groupism
and consensus politics are mutually contradictory but they coexit
in contemporary Japan.

First of all,

hierarchical groupism

permits few cross-cutting relationships, as in the Hindu caste
157
networks cutting across various villages. Stated in another
way,

vertical stratification is the organizing principle of the

hierarchical groupism.

In the ideal state of hierarchical group

ism, there is only one group which is hierarchically stratified
and everyone is a member of the group.

However, it is man’s nature, with its different passions and
values, that renders the ideal hierarchical groupism a practical
impossibility.

In reality, therefore,

hierarchical groupism

means the proliferation of several groups, independent of one
another, each hierarchically stratified in its internal structure:
the higher the degree of

hierarchical groupism, the higher

the degree of independence among several groups.

Since the concept of decision-making through consensus,
by definition, calls for intergroup harmony and cooperation, it

197

Stockwin, op. cit., p. 25; Chie Nakane, Japanese
Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 172.
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is a horizontal principle in its contemporary application.
Thus there is a fundamental theoretical contradiction between
hierarchical groupism and the normative concept of consensus.

In spite of James Madison's apprehension, for example,
about "factions,” based on human passion, the party system
came into being very early in the United States.

Lenin's prin

ciple of "democratic centralism" notwithstanding, the history of
political change in the Soviet Union has been one of a power struggle
among "factions."

Both in the United States and in the Soviet

Union, conflict of interests has been inevitable among "factions."
for they are intrinsic to different human passions and values.
However, in the former, the differences among various factions
have conventionally been determined (if not solved) by way of
majority rule.

In the latter, they have been "solved," as they

claim, "democratically"

a la Lenin’s democratic centralism,

according to the "will of the Soviet people.”

In neither poli

tical system does one find the presence of a relatively high
degree of two traditions (groupism and consensus) standing in con
tradiction to one another.

One wonders how the Japanese people have inherited the

f
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two "contradictory” traditions.

How did their ancestors put

these mutually incompatible ideas together and pass them- on
down to their posterity?

A close look at the origins of the

two traditions reveals that the concept of consensus came into
being, not in spite of, but because of

hierarchical groupism.

Stated in another way, in its origin, the collectivist
norm of decision-making through consensus was a principle which
was vertically applied to the vertical principle of
archical groupism.
with
f
I
v

hier

It was neither contradictory nor incompatible

hierarchical groupism.

strengthen the latter.

Rather, it was to preserve and

It is, therefore, necessary to ’’revisit"

briefly the nature and structure of

traditional hierarchical

groupism.

The origin of the tradition of decision-making through
consensus in Japan is twofold:

first, the native tradition of

an ascriptive hierarchical groupism which-was reinforced by the
imported Confucian emphases on group loyalty and filial piety;
and second, the structure and practices in the traditional
Japanese family system, ie.

It will be recalled that the symbolism to be derived
from the primitive Shinto religion was twofold:

first, the

C
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hierarchical supremacy of the Yamato clan, hence the Emperor,
being directly descended from Amaterasu, the Sun-Goddess,
central to other deities from whom all other clans claimed to
have descended; and second, the concept of an organic state in
which all component clans were hierarchically interlocked by way
of a simulated kinship.

Implicit in the concept of the organic

state was the homogeneity of all components in the kingdom.

The political development in traditional Japan was one
in which the tradition of

hierarchical groupism was not only

kept intact but also was strengthened.

By historic times (the

fifth century), various ethnic groups and cultures appear to have
been well assimilated into one homogeneous people and culture, as
noted earlier.

The geographic insularity and the absence of large-

scale migration provided the Japanese people with a unique setting
which shaped both events and institutions for two millennia-culturally, socially, politically, and economically. These events
and institutions had revolved typically around one principle:
the hierarchical social structure which was centered around ascriptive groups.

A system of work units (corporate groups), the structure
of which was typically hierarchical, had gradually but steadily
evolved through the centuries of political development.
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for example, in the primitive kingdom of Yamato, which was
a confederation of clans (u.ji), each clan was usually "sub
divided into branches, and hereditary guilds, which were
normally attached to the clans as workers."

The branch

and the guilds together constituted a hierarchically structured
corporate group in the primitive agrarian economy.

Because of the tradition of

hierarchical groupism,

which was ascriptive in nature, there was no horizontal cross
cutting development of the guilds as a class or peasant caste.
On the contrary, sometimes the guilds developed into other hier
archical groups by becoming independent clans themselves, each
with its own chieftain and ancestral deity.

159

This new unit

operated as an independent, hierarchically unified work unit,
and, in its internal relationships, mutually (between high and
low) dependent and cooperative.

Hierarchical groupism was formally institutionalized
in the decentralized feudalism of Tokugawa Japan. "During this
period Japanese practice and Confucian theory merged to create
a vision of a hierarchy of conditions or estates each bearing
its own relationship to the source of authority."

Accordingly,

^•^McNelly, o£. cit., p. 2.
^^J. ¥. Hall, on. cit., p. 16.
160X. .,
Ibid.
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under the sovereign, Japan was separated into five main strata:
the court nobility, the military nobility, the priesthood, the
peasantry, and the urban artisans and merchants.

161

However, in practice, the class structure

was rather less

formidably rigid than would appear at first sight. Though social
mobility was slight, it was not entirely non-existent.

It was not

infrequent that "wealthy and ambitious merchants achieved samurai
rank through adoption or marriage.

Conversely, impoverished

162
warriors were glad, sometimes, to enter the merchants class.”
Thus, in Tokugawa Japan, as before, there was no horizontal social
development in terms of class or caste.

Instead, there emerged

throughout the country numerous self-sufficient villages (mura),
as noted earlier.

The self-sufficient typical feudal village
certain numbers of families:

consisted of

the "founding” (main) families,

which were the landowners, and the "branch" families which were
the cultivators.

Each village was divided into groups of closely

cooperating families of these landowners and cultivators which
emphasized loyalty to the corporate group outside the immediate
family.

16b

Langdon,

ojd .

cit., p. 21.
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Although the founding families kept exclusive control
of water rights and access to village common land, they shared
these with their cooperative groups.

While the branch families

on the small holdings provided workers for the larger farm, the
main family loaned work animals and its expensive equipment to
the smaller units in its group.^^hus the feudal village con
sisted of hierarchically structured cooperative groups and their
modus operand! was essentially one of vertical mutual dependence
and cooperation rather than a horizontal system such as that of an
extended family as in China or India.

(

166

Accordingly, the families tended to be on a single house
hold basis, as a unit of the hierarchical cooperative group to
which it belonged.

When families of small holders were compelled,

because of poor harvests, to sell or give children as indentured
servants to large holders, ’’the servant families might eventually
be given their own holdings or even endowed as new branch families
A
in the cooperating group.”

One also finds in the structure and practices of the tra
ditional family, ie, the mutuality of dependence, obligations, and

165iwa.
166
Nakane, op. cit., p. 172.
"^Langdon, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
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I

I

cooperation between high (the head of the household, ie) and
low (members of the household).
It is often remarked that collectivist norms in
Japanese society are based on ways of thinking
derived from the Japanese family, and although
this is an oversimplification, since the family
itself has never manifested completely uniform
patterns throughout the country, it is certainly
important to understand some features of what may
be termed the 'traditional' family— a kind of
model which has been used in many 'quasi-family'
situations, and has wide political ramifi
cations.
Before examining the structure and practices in the traditional
family system, ie, it is in order to take a brief look at some
of the reasons why the traditional family has been central to
other institutions-- the "figurative extensions" of the ie.

In the first place, implicit in the symbolism of the
primitive Shinto religion was the notion of the basic family
group as the point of departure.

The state, as perceived in

Shinto, was an extended family group (i.e., simulated kinship),
not an aggregate of some aboriginals roaming around in the
wilderness.

Secondly, traditional Japan obviously had never passed
through a period of laissez-faire economics.

169

Even today,

^^Stockwin, on. cit., p. 22.
^^Ike, on. cit., p. 10.
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there is a hierarchical image (government and business) of
170
Japan which some call "Japan, Incorporated."

Consequently,
zen

"individualism as a creed has never taken root in Japan.',,171
"So far as the traditional system is concerned, it is not the
individual who is the focus of social importance, but the ie
to which he belongs."

172

Because of the long tradition of

hierarchical groupism, which is ascriptive in nature in terms
of a simulated kinship, behaviorally, group loyalty was always
focused on group(s) or individual(s) above the family, such as,
the feudal clan, the village woik unit, Lord Asano, or the
Emperor.

As one writer puts it,

feudal loyalty was a formative influence upon the
ethic of devoted service, so important in presentday Japan. In the feudal period, mutual personal
loyalty between leaders and followers among the
warrior class received major emphasis. An important
theme in literature and drama ever since, loyalty
has in modified form remained a central value.^73
What should be stressed here is the fact the group (s) or the
individual(s), on which group loyalty was focused, were perceived
in terms of "figurative extensions" of the basic family;'

170

"The notion that Japanese government and business work
so closely together that Japan resembles one large corporation is
a conception used differently by different authors. Sometimes it
describes big-business domination of the government decision
making process. Sometimes it describes business docility in the
face of government direction. Sometimes it describes collusion
between the two," Vogel in Vogel (ed.), o£. cit., p. xvi.
171
Ike, on. cit., p. 10.
172
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 22.
^^Langdon, on. cit., p. 19.
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as pointed out by Stockwin.

It was

17^

the nature of the agrarian society in traditional

Japan, which was hierarchically structured, that encouraged the
centrality of the family group.

The family, not the individual,

was the basic unit in the agrarian cooperative economy.

It was

175
the family head that represented his family in the village. It
was the each individual household to which the land was redistrib176
uted under the Edict of Reform in 6h6 A.D.

Thirdly, from an organizational point of view, the
f

tradition of

hierarchical groupism, which was formally

^

institutionalized in Tokugawa Japan, was another essential
reason for the centrality of each individual household, ie.
be

It will

recalled that the typical feudal village was organized on the

basis of mutually responsible units of closely cooperating groups
of independent single
3gle families,

177

under the leadership of a

-.178
’’founding family.'

Finally, the Confucian emphasis on the basic family as the
179
'
’primary focus of loyalty”
doubtless contributed to the

1ylf.

Stockwin, op. cit., p. 22.
175
<Eke, op. cit., p. 9 *
176
Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 7^-76.
177J.W. Hall, op. cit., p. 23.
17ft
Langdon, op. cit., p. 21.
l79Ibid.
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position of each single household family as the basic unit of
the traditional society.
tradition of

Because of the Japanese

hierarchical groupism, group loyalty was placed

on groups or individuals above the family. It should be stressed, how
ever, that it was done in terms of extension of the basic family group
loyalty to various "quasi-family” situations.

Just as the political system of a society is a field of
application of the general theory of social institutions of that
society,

180

the traditional Japanese family system, ie, reflected

the structural and behavioral characteristics of the society.
t

18*1

Accordingly, the structure of the traditonal family system, ie,
was characterized by

hierarchical groupism.

household was granted supreme respect.

The head of the

The ie was strongly male-

oriented and paternalistic with the bonds between father and son
being accorded the greatest symbolic and practical importance.

181

180
Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free
Press, 1951); Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory
(Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 19^9)> Part I, p. 40; David Easton,
The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, i960), pp. 52-89;
and Talcott Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," in Talcott
Parsons, Edward Shils, Kasper Naegele, and Jesse Pitts (eds.),
Theories of Society (New York: Free Press, 1961), P* 52.
■ift-i
An excellent summary of the Japanese traditional family
system, ie, is given in Stockwin, op. cit. Unless otherwise
specified, much of the discussion here draws heavily upon.Stockwin's
summary. There are numerous ether sources of information on the
traditional Japanese social institutions, including the family
system, which are listed in the selected bibliography at the end of
this study.
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Likewise, behaviorally, there was a strong tradition of
mutuality of loyalty and cooperation between the head of a
household and members of the household.

Because of the independent nature of each single
household as an integral part of a larger corporate group,
the perpetuation of each household, ie, was of supreme
importance.

It appears that such a preoccupation with the

most important principle of perpetuating the ie entailed
certain features peculiar to the ie system:

first, relatively

flexible rules of succession to the headship of each ie in order
r

to ensure its continuity which, in turn, enhanced the corporate
nature of each ie; and second, attendant collectivist norms
which governed group behavior in the internal relationships of
each corporate family group, the ie.

Firstly, direct kinship relations, though important, were
(still are) traditionally subordinated to the primary aim of as
suring the continuity of an ie.

As Stockwin puts it,

paradoxically, however, despite the great empahsis
placed upon the status of the head, of the household
and upon family continuity, succession is not neces
sarily patrilineal........... In order that continuity
of the ie be preserved, adoption of a non-blood successor
is quite common.

1ftP
Stockwin, op. cit., pp. 22-23*
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It was "this extension of patterns of family behavior to non
family situations’’^8^ that was easily applicable to "figurative
extensions” into "quasi-family" situations in Meiji Japan and in
contemporary Japan.

Secondly, the flexible rule of succession to the headship
of an ie by a non-blood-related person enhanced the corporate nature
of a household.

184

The corporate character of the traditional

family system, ie, in turn, entailed collectivist norms of the
mutuality of obligations and dependence and the inter-personal
cooperation and harmony.

f
It has been stated that culture is the product of the
attitudes and actions of various human groups encompassing, in

Igcsome measure, the totality of a society.

^

As such, it is the

product of life histories of the people in that society repre
senting their "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols
and values.

As noted above, the broad patterns of social structure,

183Ibid., p. 24.
184
Stockwin specifically calls the ie, "a corporate
group,” ibid.
jOf
Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. vi, supra, p. 69.
186
Sidney Verba, " Comparative Culture," in Lucian W.
Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political
Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 19&9)»
p. 513.
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which emerged from traditional Japan, were characterized by
the. mutual dependence— between high and low
archically stratified corporate groups:

on their hier

a collectivity.

The

dependence on a collectivity, as such, resulted in a tradition
of various psychological and cultural norms and orientation
known as "consensus,” "form versus substance," "on," "giri."
"amae,” "nin.jo," "oyabun-kobun." "sincerity," "haragei bar
gaining, " and "punctiliousness" (in language).

Precisely because these cultural variables are psycho
logical and cultural norms and orientation, they tend to defy
precise definitions or easy explanations.

Just as elusive,

and even frustrating, were their empirical manifestations as
•was amply evidenced in the Brookings study.

Accordingly, different scholars have offered different
descriptions and explanations of these cultural and psycho
logical variables.

Commenting on the normative nature of the

tradition of decision-making through consensus, for example,
Destler and his associates state:
this emphasis on consensus is, in part, a product of
Japanese values and expectations about how human
relations within groups should be maintained.-®7
4

Q rp

r -

—

^

Destler, op. cit., p. 101.
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Others see the tradition of consensus decision-making
as a product of objective factors of "crowded" environment.
example, Vera Dean states:

For

"Japanese manners and customs, even

the Japanese language, are permeated with elements, especially
sense of duty, formality, and politeness, that go with
crowding.

..188

Related to the above environmentally deterministic view,
the Brookings scholars note similar views, though broader in
scope:
students of Japanese culture sometimes stress the
impact of a crowded environment on social relation
ships: the existence of a large population on small
islands, secluded from the rest of the world, limited
until recently in geographic and social mobility even
within those islands, seem to have induced Japanese
to make special efforts to avoid friction and confron
tation among themselves, particularly within the groups
and communities where they would be spending their
entire lives.^89

Apart from the pragmatic interpretation of the tra
dition of consensus decision-making, Hosoya, for example, offers
an ideological interpretation.

According to Hosoya, it is a

method of reaching decisions which calls for a maximum possible
18ft
Vera M. Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western World,
A Mentor Book (New York: The New American Library of World
Literature, Inc., 1957), P* 115*
^^Destler, op. cit., p. 101, footnote 28.
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participation by members of a group in the group decisionmaking process.

1°0

It is a Japanese "mode of expression"

(hyogen keitai) of an "intraorganizational democracy" (soshikinai minshushugi)^ ^ and the ringisei^^ may be seen as an'ef
fective method and a procedure in the process of

consensus-

building.^^

While each of these interpretations may be accurate in
their respective context, one may still wonder as to why the
Japanese people have inherited the particular set of two tra
ditions

groupism and consensus decision-making

which appear

r
to be contradictory in their contemporary applications.

For example, there have been other people who lived in
a crowded condition, as in the slums in London following the
Industrial Revolution.

There still are people, for example, in

parts of the United States who are living under similarly crowded
circumstances, with not much apparent physical or social mobility.
One wonders as to how much these people have in common with the
traditional Japanese in terms of their way of life in general,
and their manners, sense of duty, formality, and politeness in
particular.

^■^Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki, op. cit., p. 18.
^ ^ Ibid.; Nakane, op. cit., p. 145.
1

^ ^Sunra, p. 36 , footnote 117 •
^•^Hosoya, op. cit., p. 18; Craig in Vogel (ed.), on. cit.,
pp. 22 ff.
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Decision-making through consensus is a psychological
and cultural orientation in Japan.

It represents the Japanese

desire to avoid friction and confrontation in their inter
personal relations within and among groups.

One asks:

then do the Japanese people tend to be cliquish—

why

a predi

lection for belonging to hierarchical (leader-follower) groups
which tend to be independent of one another?

The answer to

this question must be found in the dominant structural and
behavioral patterns in their collective life histories.

Superficial similarities and apparent equivalency
notwithstanding, each culture offers certain dominant pattern
variables.

For example, the North American culture is said

to have the following dominant pattern varibales as compared
to those of the typical traditional society:

Traditional Society

194

North American Society

Personal dignity and worth

Worship of success

Family cohesion and loyalty

Cult of the practical and
efficient

Social hierarchy and status
Spiritual and emotional
experiences

Narrow utilitarianism
lentification of
c quality
Identification
with quantity

194

From two charts identifying the principal charac
teristics and values of the traditional society and of the
North American society, appearing in Herman Kahn (ed.), "Com
ments on Scope, Methodologies, and Format," Basic Policy Issue
(Hudson Institute, January 1970)> P« 8,as cited in Brzezinski,
op. cit., p. 5*
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Traditional Society
Emotional and poetic ex
pressiveness
Propriety and decency
Dignified acceptance of
fate (or God's will)
Tangible and meaningful
possessions
Scorn for manual labor

166

North American Society
Addiction to sheer action
Fascination with the trivial
(technical)
Work for work's sake
Superb dynamism
Unprecedented diffusion of
skills
Genius for organization acid
teamwork
Organizationally flexible and
geographically mobile
Ingenuity, initiative, re
sponsibility and dedication
Rational utilitarianism

Needless to say, one finds in the North American
society some, if not all, of the pattern variables which are
attributed to the traditional society, and vice versa.

195
^

What should be stressed here is that, in their empirical ap
plications, these cultural characteristics and values can and
often do make differences, in terms of their meaning or the
degree of emphasis, according to the respective life history
of each society.

— Brzezinski notes: "it is really striking the
extent to which the Japanese combine both columns," Brzezinski,
ibid.
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Accordingly, it is in the dominant patterns of
traditional Japanese social relations and their social insti
tutions that one must seek the answer to the question:

why does a

set of two mutually contradictory traditions— hierarchical
groupism and collect ivistic consensus norm— co-exist?

On one hand,

hierarchical groupism, which had

permeated the-social structure of traditional Japan for two
millennia, has become part of the Japanese way of life.

Thus,

the Japanese predilection for belonging to group(s) is as much
part of their way of life as it may be (as often is the case)
F

due to practical necessity.

Because the traditional social structure was based on
hierarchical corporate groups, each group tended to be inde
pendent of one another horizontally.

As Stockwin states:

"there is plenty of evidence that it is the surviving vigour
of group consciousness, and the tendency for groups to remain

196
jealously independent of each other.”

On the other hand, the traditional interpersonal
relations were characterized by the collective mutuality of

^■^Stockwin, on. cit., p. 26.
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dependence, obligations, and loyalty between leaders and
followers.

The tradition of

collectivism and attendant

group norms has resulted in the kind of psychological and
cultural norms and orientation

mentioned earlier.

All

of these cultural attributes revolve around one thing:
collectivism, not individualism.

The collectivity can be

the individual single household, the ie, a Tokugawa village
work unit (the "founding” family and the "branch" families),
or a fief (such as.Lord Asano and his samurai retainers).

The Japanese tradition of decision-making through
^

consensus, therefore, reflects their tradition of collectiv
ism.

As such, it is as much a traditional orientation (or

a way of life) as it is a norm, both psychologically and
attitudinally.

An important aspect of the traditional mutual
(vertically between leaders and followers) dependence upon
a collectivity was a preference for the reaching of decisions
by the method of consensus.

197

It was a psychological prefer

ence for group harmony as well as a pragmatic approach to
making decisions in order to preserve corporate units as a

197Ibid., p. 27-

c
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closely cooperating collectivity.

198

As noted earlier, the traditional family system, the
ie, 'Has an individual and independent household which was a
corporate group in nature, as were other social institutions.
Each ie was an integral part of a vertically interlocked larger
group.

Consequently, the perpetuation of each household, the

ie, was of supreme importance.

This "being the case, the tra

ditional approach to making all decisions through consensus
would appear to be preferable either to an arbitrary way of
making decisions which are imposed from above or to reaching
f
L

decisions by a "simplistic” majority.

As Stockwin states:

the alternative method, of accepting the view of a
majority against that of a minority, tends to be
disliked on the grounds that it leaves some members
of the group dissatisfied and is therefore potenti
ally disruptive. It is also felt to expose the
individual to an uncomfortable assertion of his
actual views, whereas the final responsibility for
a decision should be collective. The practice of

198
' In this sense, the unwritten norm and. attitude ox
the traditional approach to making decisions through consensus
are clearly different from the American practice of H. A.
Simon's "referral and clearance system," Craig in Vogel (ed,),
op. cit., p. 24. Obviously, it also differs from what Donald
Matthews calls "the Folkways of the United States Senate,"
Donald R. Matthews, "The Folkways of the United States Senate:
Conforming to Group Norms and Legislative Effectivenss," in
S. Sidney Ulmer (ed.), Introductory Readings in Political
Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1961), pp. 94-104.
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consensus-decision-making, on the other hand,
involves a process of the adjustment of initi
ally differing views, so that everyone having a
part in the decision can in the end subscribe
to it knowing that his views have been taken
into account. This has vital implications for
practically all facets of government in Japan. ^-99

r

199

Stockwin, op. cit., p. 27*
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C.

Diffusion of Policymaking Power and Consensus Politics
under the Mei.ii Constitution

Group politics opens the chapter in the history of
Japan which is covered in the following broad pattern analysis:
from the ’’Meiji Restoration” (1868) to Japan’s defeat in World
War II (19^5)•

There had been many trends and e v e n t s , w h i c h had
been brewing over the long Tokugawa period for eventual poli
tical change.

In the final analysis, however, it was a group

of ’’children” of the samurai, whom the founder of the Tokugawa
Shogunate, Ieyasu, defeated some 250 years before at Sekigahara,
that overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868:

the samurai

clan elite of the four south-western fiefs— GhSshn, Satsuma,
Tosa, and Hizen.

The period under the imperial Meiji Constitution of
I889 (effective I890) represents a period of centralized poli
tical control in the long alternating process of centralization

^®®It is difficult to determine what particular trends
or events were the decisive factors which had enabled the south
western samurai counterelite to successfully overthrow the Toku
gawa Shogunate in 1868. Both internal and external factors all
had interacted with each other rather closely. For an in
sightful account of these factors leading up to the Meiji Resto
ration, see, for example, Storry, on. cit.
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and decentralization of political control.

201

However, paradoxically, because of the ways in which
political power was "constitutionally" centralized in the
hands of the "restored" Emperor, it is in this period that
one finds a high degree of group politics, hence the dif
fusion of policymaking power.

In spite of the high degree

of diffusion of policymaking power, it is also in this period
that one notices strong evidence of the tradition of consenual
decision-making,

^

Based on a broad structural and behavioral pattern

analysis, one discerns the following three main features peculiar
to the Japanese policymaking process under the imperial consti
tution:

(1) the rise of modem Japanese nationalism; (2) group

politics in the name of a hierarchical collectivism; and (3) dif
fusion of polipymaking power and consensus politics.

Firstly, the nature of the Meiji Restoration was one of

201
From a degree of centralization achieved in the Kamakura
period (generally, 1192-1338) to the Ashikaga period (1338-1573)>
"the age of the country at war,” to the partial unification under
Oda Nobunaga (153^-82) which was completed by Toyotomi HideyOshi
(1536-98), and to the decentralized feudal period of Tokugawa
Japan (1603-1868).

('
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emotional nationalistic "revolution” as much as it was a
group-centered political "revolution"—

a revolution from

above which was staged by a group of old ruling elite.

To

the extent that it was a "nationalistic revolution," the Meiji
Restoration marked the beginning of m o d e m Japanese nationalism.

There is no universally acceptable definition of
"nation" or "nationalism," as illustrated in various works on
the topic.

202

However, if, by "nationalism," one means an

affective ideology which "refers to a ’state mind,' a psycho
logical condition in which one's supreme loyalty is associated
^

i

with the n a t i o n , t h e n the Meiji Restoration marks the
beginning of m o d e m Japanese nationalism, although there had
existed elements of modernity in Japan long before the Meiji
B
4.
*204Restoration.

S ’hese include: Karl W.
Social Communication: An Inquiry
ality (2d ed.; Cambridge, Mass.:
The Idea of Nationalism: A Study
(New York: Macmillan, 19440; and
Nationalism (New Brunswick, N.J.:

Deutsch, Nationalism and
into the Foundations of Nation
M.I.T. Press, 1966); Hans Kohn,
in Its Origins and Background
Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of
Rutgers University Press, 1954).

^•^Reo M. Christenson, et al., Ideologies and Modem Poli
tics (2d ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1975)» P- 24.
204
The roots of modernity in Japan "go back prior to the
opening of Japan to large-scale Western influence," Ike, op. cit.,
p. 5* One may find the embryo of a formative nationalism of Japan
in the latter part of the sixteenth century (1570's), some three
centuries before the coming of Commodore Perry to Japan in 1853*
See, for example, McNelly, op. cit, pp. 10-12 and Ike, op. cit.,
p. 5. For the level of modernity in Tokugawa Japan, see, for
example, Ward and Rustow, pp. cit., passim.
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At the end of a long period of isolation, "when Commodore
Perry's demands of 1853 were translated into Japanese and sent
to all the feudal lords, they produced a profound shock, equiv
alent to the Japanese feeling when the Emperor announced Japan's
surrender in 19^5

At first, the feudal daimyo lords and their samurai
retainers were all shocked to realize the weakness of their
country which was unable to reject Perry's demands. Then they
became incensed by the failure of the Bakufu (the Shogunate) to
withstand the foreign pressure.

Thus, the vital issue of nation

al defense, as now, became a key issue in the internal struggle
for power which had been growing for some time.

At the same

time, the whole affair set the tone of the nature of the Meiji
t, +
+•
206
Restoration.

The Meiji leaders' initial nationalist stance was
expressed in the slogan, "Sonno Joi" ("Revere the Emperor and
Expel the Barbarians”).

Later, when the futility of trying to

rid the country of foreign influences without the material
means of doing so became apparent, they decided to strengthen
their country by embracing the method of the very enemy whom they

205
"Xangdon, on. cit., p. 25*
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 12.
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had sought to reject at first, hence a new slogan:

"Fukoku

Kyghei” (literally, "Enrich the Nation and Strengthen the
Army," meaning a strong nation with a powerful military).
As Ike states:
the point that ought to he stressed is that the
samurai elite which came to power responded
strongly to the external stimulus. They made the
adverse comparison between the state of their
nation and that of the great Western powers. As
a result, they were determined to catch up with the
West in order to achieve equality with the great
powers. What followed was a program of purposive
modernization directly from above by a political
elite drawn mainly from the old samurai class,
and later by a bureaucracy chosen on the basis of
achievement

Secondly, the most striking feature of the period
from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to Japan’s defeat in 19^5
was that the tradition of diarchy in Japan was not only
followed but even strengthened.

As noted earlier, the chapter

on this period in the history of Japan began with group
politics.

Later, as a direct result of the constitutional

centralization of political power in the hands of the Emperor,
who was not expected to rule, there were many groups all
acting in the name of the Emperor.

^^Ike, op. cit., p. 6.
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The samurai elite group from the four south-western
"outer lords" fiefs (Choshu, Satsuma, Tosa, and Hizen), which
overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate, was called kinno shishi
(meaning noble samurai loyal to the Emperor). They acted in
the name of the Emperor.

Stated in another way, they acted

for the hierarchical national group collectivity.
sized the link with the past:

They empha

they were merely "restoring" the

imperial institution to its rightful place.

203

As noted earlier, it is difficult to determine the real
motive(s) of the kinno shishi who became the Meiji leaders,
following their successful coup which overthrew the Shogunate.
It will be recalled that the Shogunate accepted the imperial insti
tution in order to legitimizeits own authority on the principle
of a "mandate to rule" derived from the Emperor, the "Son of
Heaven."

As it were, there had been no break in the imperial

line in Tokugawa Japan.

The Meiji Restoration was another

political revolution which made the Emperor an absolute ruler
constitutionally.

In practice, it was the clan elite group

that ruled while the Emperor reigned as in Tokugawa Japan.
2qq
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 11.
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Thirdly, the fundamental political framework, within
which political development took place in Meiji Japan, was a
curious combination of Japanese mind and Western form.

The

Meiji leaders’overall national objective was equality with the
great powers.

They decided to achieve this objective while

not only retaining but strengthening their traditional values.

Consequently, the ultimate and absolute power was
vested, constitutionally, in the sovereign Emperor.

All

subjects (i.e., the Meiji policymaking elite groups) were to
serve the Emperor who was, in practice, not expected to rule.
Characteristically, the Constitution was either silent or
ambiguous about hierarchies of authority responsible for making
policy decisions within the constitutional framework of
imperial absolutism.

The absence of hierarchies of authority at the highest
national level, immediately below the sovereign, meant the
existence of several policymaking groups all "equally” serving
the Emperor.

As one takes a close look at the structural and

behavioral characteristics of the policymaking process under
the imperial constitution, there are two peculiar features
both of which were the product of the curious combination of
Japanese mind and Western form:

a high degree of diffusion
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of policymaking power and the persistence of the tradition
of consensus politics.

In pursuit of the dual policy of Fukoku Kyohei (strong
nation and powerful military), as noted above, the Meiji elite
decided that Japan should have at least the form of a modem
Western-type state.

While the essential aspects of the Japanese

tradition were not only preserved but strengthened, the Meiji
leaders took many "revolutionary” steps to modernize Japan.

The Meiji Constitution paid its highest tribute to
f

imperial absolutism.

In theory, therefore, the Emperor was

the ultimate decision-maker at the apex of the policymaking
structure.

Immediately below the Emperor, there were several

groups competing for policymaking power.

These included the

Emperor's personal advisors, the Privy Council, the Imperial
Diet, the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet at the top
of the imperial administrative bureaucracy, and the military.

In addition to the Emperor's personal advisors, most
of the policymaking groups had direct access to the Emperor,
for each group was conducting the business of government in
the name of the Emperor.

It meant that the span of control
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"by the Emperor was extremely broad like a pyramid which is
almost flat.

However, the Emperor was not expected to rule.

If he

were to rule personally, the enormous span of control would
make his personal political control a practical impossibility.
As it were, he did not rule, but merely reigned.

The Emperor

had seldom, if ever, participated personally in the actual policyr209
making process.
There was no serious thought on the part of
the framers of the Meiji Constitution of having the Emperor
coordinate policymaking personally.

210

When the Meiji leaders overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate,
they emphasized their link with the past, as noted earlier, and
subsequently "restored"

imperial absolutism.

211

In practical

terms, however, they used the Emperor as the supreme symbol of
nationhood, an instrument of legitimacy of the new regime assuming
a centralized power in the name of the Emperor.

As the supreme

symbol of the nation at the apex of the new regime, the Emperor
was not only the ultimate justification for the centralized power
but also a powerful support for disciplinary purposes for their
bold and adventurous reform programs.

f-

212

^^Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki, on. cit., p. 1.
210
Scalapino in Macridis, on. cit., p. 278.
211
Stockwin, op. civ-., p. 11.
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Accordingly, the Emperor had seldom exercised his
constitutional powers as the ultimate voice in the process
of policymalting.

This was the pattern of the Emperor's role

throughout the period of imperial Japan under the Meiji Con
stitution.

The Emperor's functions were largely limited,

on one hand, to expressing his own views in a circuitous and
indirect manner on a given policy issue, and to giving
ceremonial ex post facto sanctions to policy decisions which
were presented to him, on the other.

213

During one of the gozen kaigi (imperial conferences)

(

prior to Japan's surrender in 19^5» the Emperor (Showa) made
clear his own personal decision to surrender by accepting the
Potsdam Declaration.

The Emperor's decision to surrender was

doubtless a critical factor in Japan's final decision to accept
214
the Potsdam Declaration. However, this historical episode was
an extremely rare exception.

As a rule, almost all decisions

were already made before they reached the imperial conferences,
and the Emperor gave his ex post facto sanctions to thosei
decisions.

Especially from the Taisho era on, even on such

213Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki, on. cit., p. 1.
21^Ibid.
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critical issues as war and alliance, the Emperor had seldom
performed his substantive constitutional functions.

215

Characterizing the foreign policymaking system under
the imperial constitution, Hosoya states:
there existed a system which had neither political
leadership necessary to decide on specific policy
objectives and to select rational.means to achieve
such policy objectives, nor any decision-maker at
the top equipped with sufficient ability to coordinate
and integrate pluralistic (or multidimensional)("tagenteki") ideas within the government. I have been calling
this type of a system a "truncated pyramid system."2l6

The "truncated pyramid system” encouraged groupism.

[

Since most of the policymaking groups had direct access to the
Emperor and acted in his name, each group was theoretically
equal participant

in the policymaking process.

Opposition to

a decision reached in the name of the Emperor would imply dis
obedience to the Emperor which was unthinkable.

This was, in

essence, what the kokutai (national polity) was all about.

The concept of the kokutai inevitably implied two things:
groupism and consensus.

Individuals and groups with differing

views tended to submerge beneath the surface of consensus and
form factions.

As Stockwin puts it, "the emperor ’cult,’ which

they assiduously promoted as a means to national discipline,

I

215Ibid.
Ibid. (the translation of the original text in Japanese
is this writer's own).
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also tended to force overt criticism and opposition under
the surface, where it was more likely to ‘become immersed in
factional intrigue.”^ ’'7

Moreover, as already noted earlier, the Meiji Con
stitution was a means to have a Western-type institution in
form while retaining the Japanese "mind," that is, the tra
ditional values.

Accordingly, the constitution, which was

superimposed on the concept of kokutai (national polity),
218
contained ”a number of uncertainties and anomalies."

The Constitution was either silent or ambiguous on
some important aspects of intergroup policymaking power
relations.

For example, there was no reference in the Con

stitution to the term "cabinet," nor was there any provision
for the cabinet members' responsibility to the Diet.

There was

no provision that the cabinet members had to be Diet members.

219

These uncertainites and ambiguities were justified in terms
of the concept of a "transcendental cabinet"— that is, above
party, and loyalty to the nation and to the Emperor.

220

Stockwin, on. cit., pp. 17-18.
^®Ibid., p. 15; McNelly, op. cit., p. 16. Prince Ito,
a leading author of the Constitution specifically rejected the
doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility as derogating from
imperial sovereignty.
^^Stockwin, 0£. cit., p. 15*
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The concept of "transcendental cabinets," as opposed
to "responsible cabinets," was typically reflective of
traditional collectivistic thinking.

As such, it was a prin221
cipal characteristic of the Meiji Constitution. Its impli

cation was

executive irresponsibility which was, as it were,

contrary to the tradition of a hierarchical collectivism, hence
diffusion of policymaking power.

The only means with which the Diet could attempt to
exert influence on the irresponsible cabinet was through budgetary
control.
/

However, the government had a countermeasure:

article

71 of the Constitution, which reads:
when the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget,
or when the Budget has not been brought into actual
existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget
of the preceding year

Article 71 of the Constitution soon became irrelevant
when the government budget drastically increased due to the SinoJapanese War (189*^-1895) and. the Russo-Japanese War (190^-1905).
As a result, there ensued a deadlock between the government and
the Diet.

However, the government leaders had successfully

broken the deadlock by a series of deals with Diet members and

McNelly, og. cit., p. 17*
,•

Stockwin, o£. cit., p. 16; George Akita, Fomidaticns of
Constitutional Government in Modem Janan, 1868-1900 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967;* PP- 76-89.
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leading party men, which gave them an entree into the councils
of government.

This marked the beginning of a "normal con

stitutional government" which was, as will be discussed later,
characterized by a higher degree of diffusion of policymaking
power.

Reference has been made to the existence of several
centers of policymaking power.

The diffusion of policymaking

power was not limited to diffusion among the groups, but it was
pervasive within groups as well.

Following the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate, by
1880the intraelite power struggle had intensified among the new
elite groups from the four south-western fiefs.

Emerging vic

toriously from the power struggle, the Choshu and Satsuma group
formed the core of the Meiji oligarchy and those from Tosa and
Hizen assumed the role of a counterelite thus marking the
beginning of party politics in Japan.

As Scalapino and Masumi

stated,
in the initial stage, the parties may be considered
a part of the protest movement, an element in the
opposition to the new Meiji government and many of
its trends. This was an elitist protest. Almost
all of the participants in the party movement came
from the ex-samurai class; they had been members of
the feudal aristocracy. In considerable measure, it
was a sectional protest. The first parties were
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composed of the men from Tosa and Hizen, two
ex-fiefdoms that had helped to promote the re
storation and whose representatives had sub
sequently participated in the new government,
but who had found the supremacy of the men from
Choshu and Satsuma unpalatable.^3
As the Sat-Cho elite groups later joined the party politics,
especially with Ito Hirobumi assuming in 1900 the presidency
of the Seiyukai party, what may be called "party-government"
politics began in Japan.

At the apex of the Meiji leadership, the Sat-Cho
oligarchy formed the coterie of the personal advisors for the
Emperor.

As noted earlier, there never was any serious thought,

r

'

on the part of the authors of the Constitution, of having the
Emperor actually rule.

Therefore, in practice, the Emperor's

‘
functions were performed by a small group of his personal
224
225
advisors t which was an "extraconsitutional group."

Ultimately, the small group of the Emperor's personal
advisors became central to the Japanese policymaking process.
This group, which was an institution "without a vestige of legal
226
recognition or responsibility,”

was the key factor in the

-^Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
224
Scalapino in Macridis, on. cit., p. 2?8; Destler, op.
cit., p. 49.
^■^McNelly, op. cit., p. 18.
226
"
Scalapino in Macridis, op. cit., p. 278.
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preservation of

hierarchical collectivity, the kokutai

(national polity). Every basic policy matter was placed
before this informal and unofficial group of the Emperor's
personal advisors who had come to be known as the genro (elder
statesmen).

Their approval of a major policy decision was a

requisite to action.

Even the dally affairs of the state

frequently engaged their attention.

Until the close of. World

War I, with rare exceptions, the fountainhead of Japanese foreign
policy was this group.

227

As in all other groups, internally, the genro also
f

manifested

ubiquitous groupism.

than seven at any given time,

228

Agreements among them, less

were not always easy.

"There

were deep personal and political cleavages in this [group], as
in other Japanese groups."

229

With a single exception, the

genro were drawn from the Choshu and Satsuma clans who had engineered the Meiji Restoration.

230

These elder statesmen saw

to it that the premiership altered between the samurai aristocracy of the two clans from which they themselves came.

230

In essence, therefore, the Meiji clan oligarchy, which ruled in

^^Ibid., pp. 278-279; Langdon, on. cit., p. 3 6 .
Scalapino in Macridis, on. cit., pp. 278-279; Stockwin,
op. cit., p. 18.
229
^Scalapino in Macridis, op. cit., p. 279*
^■^McNelly, on. cit., p. 18.
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the name of the Emperor, was hierarchical group politics
similar to the pre-Meiji patterns.

231

The genro1s factional politics was not limited to the
appointment of the prime ministers.
every "branch of government.

232

They had proteges in

Taken as a whole, the per

vasive protege system tended to create groups within a group.
The intragroup-groupism was rampant within the military, as in the
civilian sector of the government, which was "the most poli233
tical army in the world."

Huntington.states:

there was the affiliation of the military with the
powerful .western clans of Japan, the Choshu and the
Satsuma........ Down to 1922 virtually all the
high officers of the services were drawn from one
or the other of these two clans. Since the rivalry
between the two pervaded the government generally,
this tended to draw the military into politics, but
it also afforded each service to secure basis of
political support and leadership.^3^

^ Thus we find that "between 1885 and 1918, every
Prime Minister was drawn from either one or the other of the
two western clans except for Okuma Shigenobu (of Hizen),"
McNelly, op. cit., p. 18. This was the beginning of politi
cization of the bureaucracy which was later followed by bu
reaucratization of the major parties. Both of these phe
nomena of group politics can be found in the LDP. See, for
example, Scalapino and Masumi, op cit., p. 18.
2^2Scalapino in Macridis, op. cit., pp. 278-279*
2^^Huritirigton, op. cit., p. 126.
2~^'lbid., p. 135*

(
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The genro politics was not the only cause of the dif
fusion of policymaking power among groups in general, and.
within groups in particular.

Both the tradition of -a collectiv-

istic approach to decision-making and the Meiji Constitution
played a critical role in the high degree of the diffusion of
policymaking power under the imperial constitution.

Hosoya characterizes the foreign policymaking system
under the imperial constitution in terms of three distinctive
features:

first, a "truncated pyramid system"; second, the

powerful position of the military; and third, the "pulling

(

power" (keninryoku)of the middle echelon military and civilian bureaucrats.

235

Based on this characterization, Hosoya

offers a comparative observation of the role played by the
Japanese middle echelon bureaucrats (both civilian and mili
tary) and roles played by their American couterparts.

According to Hosoya, the Japanese tradition of col
lective decision-making tends to render the role played by
the Japanese middle echelon bureaucrats relatively more impor
tant than that which is played by their American count er, 236
parts.

•^Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki, on. cit., pp. 1-4.
The "middle echelon: ranged in ranks from section chief (kacho)
(Majors in the Army and Commanders in the Navy and up) to bu
reau chief (kyokucho) in the civilian sector, and Major-Generals
and Rear Admirals in the military bureaucracy, Hosoya, ibid.

236ibid.
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As empirical evidence

of the critically important roles

played by the Japanese middle echelon bureaucrats, Hosoya cites
such important foreign policy decision-making cases as the
Russo-Japanese War, the Siberia intervention, the Manchurian
"incident,” the Tripartite Military Alliance formation, and the
decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

In each of these critical cases,

the middle echelon military bureaucrats were important participants in the policymaking process.

237

237

Chihiro Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy
Decision-Making System in Japan,” World Politics, vol. 26, no. 3
(April 197*0» 353-3^9• Hosoya offers several reasons for the
relative importance of the Japanese middle echelon bureaucrats

(

(both civilian and military).

He states:

"I would hazard several

answers. The first may be found in the development of political
modernization. As I have argued, ’m o d e m states tend to magnify the
institution which copes with foreign affairs and to expand its
specialized organizations . . . and this leads to an increased
number of levels in the decision-making hierarchy. . . . In other
words, decentralization is a characteristic of the decision-making
structure of m o d e m states,'"quoting his own article, "Retrogression
in Japan's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process,” in James W.
Morley (ed.), Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1971), pp. 93-9*4-. Hosoya continues, "this charac
teristic requires, in turn, a greater effort on the part of m o d e m
states to coordinate the views and interests of specialized agencies
of the government and to integrate their activities," Hosoya, ibid.,
pp. 362- 363. As a general explanation, others have offered a similar
view. See, for example, Peter M. Blau and Marshall W. Meyer,
Bureaucracy in M o d e m Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House,

1971) and Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1977)* This explanation is, however, less convincing
than Hosoya's other explanations of the phenomena, namely, in terms
of the cultural variable of consensus. For one thing, one wonders if
the Imperial Army in the 1930's was similar to the kind of the modem
military where a progressive "democratization" takes place as noted
by Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political
Portrait (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, i960).
f

I
\
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Stressing the relatively higher degree of the dif
fusion of policymaking in Japan than in the United States,
Hosoya comments:
undoubtedly, there are . . . cases where the middle
echelon played an important role in the process of
foreign policy decision-making of the United States.
However, its influence seems to have been more limited
in strength and scope than that of the middle echelon
of the Japanese bureaucracy, particularly in the case
of the military [in prewar Japan]. In the American
case, no examples can be found where strong pressure
was exerted on top echelon leaders by the middle echelon
as a group [italics in the original].238

The diffusion of policymaking power notwithstanding,
the tradition of consensus politics persisted.
rejects the so-called ’’robot theory" of

Thus, Hosoya

foreign policy

making in prewar Jpan which was first espoused by Maruyama
Masao

239

and expanded later by Robert Butow.

240

According

to Hosoya,
the ranking members of the military services and the
civilian members of the Cabinet were neither robots
nor rubber stamps; they did exert some influence on
their subordinates, rejecting their proposals and

238
-^Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy
Decison-Making System in Japan,” in World Politics, op. cit.,

p. 3^1• p O Q
^ Ibid.,
is that of Craig
"overestimation"
Vogel, o£. cit.,

p. 362 . A view milder than the- "robot theory"
who believes that there is the tendency of
of the role played by the "juniors,” Craig in
pp. 25-26.

^ ^Hosoya in World Politics, 00. cit., p. 3^2.
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revising their plans. The process was one of inter
action between the higher ranks and the middle
echelon; in other words, decision games were carried
on between these participants. I would argue, how
ever, that those at the middle echelon levels were
more Influential (for instance, in inflaming the
Mikoshi parade), and those at the top were vulnerable
to initiative and pressures from below, than was true
of their American counterparts.241

241

(
^

'

Ibid. The two views that Hosoya is specifically
arguing against are that "the men who held supreme power in Japan
in fact were, mere robots manipulated by their subordinates, who
in turn were being manipulated by officers serving overseas and
by the right-wing ronin and ruffians associated with the military,"
on one hand, and that "Japan........ was a country in which
puppet politics had reached a high state of development .........
.......
Theranking members of the military services were robots
of their subordinates .......... The civilian members of the
Cabinet were the robots of the military— especially of the
nucleus group.......... The Emperor himself, through no fault
of his own, was the robot of the government . . . a prisoner of
the circumstances into which he was b o m . . . the nation was the
robot of the throne," on the other. These robot theories— the
former being that of Masao Maruyama and the latter that of Robert
Butow, who expanded the "robot theory," Robert J. C. Butow, To.jo
and the Coming of the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 308---appear to ignore the tradition in Japan of the
mutually (between the higher and the lower) dependent and closely
cooperative hierarchical groupism.
Regarding Mikoshi, Hosoya notes: "the Far Eastern Deuartment of
of the British Foreign Office has provided us with a penetrating
observation on the decision-making process of prewar Japan, likening
it to the Japanese custom of carrying Mikoshi: 'A sight very familiar
to travellers through the country district is the carrying in
procession of a light wooden shrine (Mikoshi). The shrine has long
poles at either side by which it is borne on the shoulders of excited
youths. The general direction is not in doubt but the speed and
manner of progressing is the result of thrusts from one side and
counterthrusts and restraints from the other: backs and fills:
sometimes it stays poised and stationary: sometimes it lands the
entire party in a ditch. But the bearers all know where they are
going and sooner or later that is where they take the shrine.' The
report, however, neglects to mention that usually a 'cheering party'
accompanies the Mikoshi to direct the whole procession and to inflame
the high spirits of the bearers," Hosoya, ibid., p. 35?-
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A similar pattern of the absence of hierarchy, which
was typical of the "truncated pyramid system," can be seen in
the constitutional position of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis
his cabinet members.

The Prime Minister was, in a nutshell,

242
"little more than 'the highest among the equals’"
without
authority to dismiss a dissident member of his cabinet.

When

a serious difference of opinion developed among important poli
tical groups within the government circle, the Prime Minister
243
"lacked even the competence to arbitrate " J such differences
of opinion.

"Its leaderlessness was- indicated in a continued

state of non-decision [on a given policy matter]...At times, the
(f

Prime Minister was a reluctant follower of a policy thrust

L

244
upon him by a powerful actor such as the military."

Thus, both the rule by the genro group, which was beset
by factional politics within itself and responsible for factional
politics among groups under it, and the Constitution promoted
group politics throughout the political structure.

The "trun

cated pyramid system" (i.e., leaderlessness) was, in turn,
beset by the need of consensus because of the concept of kokutai
(national polity).

224>2Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki, op. cit., p. 1.
243-,
Ibid.
^I b i d .
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The state of leaderlessness ("truncated pyramid system")
became

worse with the passing of the genro rule-

Extra

constitutional as it was, the genro's role was one of inte
gration and coordination among groups.

The death in 1922 of the powerful genro, General Yamagata
Aritomo, who together with Ito Hirobumi had been the core of the
genro o ligar ch y ,m ar k ed the end of the era of the genro rule.
No group came forth with the kind of integrative capability the
ggn-m had.^^

There ensued a political chaos (or vacuum) stemming

from a high degree of groupism which characterized the period of
1918 to 1932 ("the constitutional era")

The "constitutional era,” which is called by some "the
2^8
normal constitutional government,"
was rather chaotic than
normal because of excessive group politics.

There was, on one

hand, a constant executive suppression of the Diet politicians
and, on the other hand, the politicians, preoccupied with their
personal and factional interests, were derelict in their

^^McNelly, op. cit., p. 18.
^^Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., pp. 278-279*
^^McNelly, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
2h8
Ibid., p. 19*
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parliamentary duty.

2bg
y

Foreign policy decisions, made in the cabinet or by
government party circles, were subjected not only to legitimate
attacks in the Diet but also to executive sabotage by the ranks
of the subordinate bureaucracy and to angry challenges by the
military.

The two (major conservative) party system, which had
originally emerged as a result of the split within the ruling
oligarchy,
^

250

had remained throughout the period."an artifici-

251
ality, sustained by the strong feudalistic flavor.”
Parties were faction-ridden, in the manner of all Japanese
organizations,2*^2

and essentially closed organizations2^

without a vital link with citizenry.

25^

As Scalapino and Masumi point out in their important
study of the parties and politics in Japan, "the most important
aspect of this picture, however, is that factional interests
2b9

Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., pp. 13» 17-19*

25°Ibid., p. 12.
251Ibid., p. 172^2Ibid., pp. 1^-15, n. 5 and "DP* 18-20.

253rbid.
2^ I b i d ., p. 20.
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tend to take precedence over party interests and, one is
2*5*5

tempted to say, over the public interest as well.”

The parties had never attained more than a quasi
supremacy before they began to fade away.

As Stockwin puts

one weakness which the political parties continued
to manifest to their very great cost was the con
siderable venality of party politicians. Their
propensity for entering into advantageous "deals”
with outsiders, and their consequent liability to
being "bought,” made it particularly difficult for
the parties to maintain cohesion or internal unity
of purpose. It is probable that this was related
to the group norm [emphasis added] of Japanese
society.......... At the same time, it was un
doubtedly related to the ambiguities inherent in
the Constitution itself. According to that docu
ment, sovereignty resided in the emperor, but the
emperor did not rule personally, and it was not
clear who was [italics in the original text].256

As the parties began to fade away, the military moved
from verbal challenges to an open defiance in the midst of an
unstable political equilibrium.
period since 1928

The Japanese society in the

was "a classic example of a government divided

257
against itself.”

_
avery policymaking group appeared to be

pulling and hauling in different directions.

255Ibid., p. 19.

r

2^Stockwin, op. cit., p. 17.
257
^ Scalapino in Macridis, op. cit., p. 279-
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Important segments of the military operated, both in
the field and at home, in such a manner as to scorn the govern
ment.

Conspiratorial cooperation, in terms of factional poli

tics throughout the political structure, was the source of sub
stantial support which the military received from within the
bureaucracy and from certain party politicians as well.

Every branch of government was riddled with dissension.
Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself, for example,
various groups maneuvered for position.
anarchy prevailed,"

(

"Conditions close to

with a rapid turnover of cabinets, much

corruption, and jockeying for power throughout the government. 259

What may be described as an unstable systemic equi
librium began to be transformed into a stable systemic disequi
librium beginning with the Manchurian "Incident"
as it was called—

in September 1931*

"Manshu Jihen,'

This "incident” was the

beginning of the chaotic period of a "dual government," with the
civilian and the military arms each pursuing uncoordinated though
not always unrelated strategies.2^

258Tbid.
^^Stackwin, op. cit., p. 18.
26°Ibid., p. 21.
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. Consensus decision-making was, as noted earlier,
"a Japanese mode of expression" of an "intraorganizational
democracy."

It meant that participants in group decision

making processes were equal.

However, in the "dual government

system," which had continued until Japan's defeat in World War
II, the military was more equal than equal among the groups
in the policymaking process.

Relative to the unequal power relations in the dual
government system, two questions arise:

(1) what factors

had contributed to the military ascendancy?

and (2) what •

factors had prevented the military from taking over the imperial
government altogether?

Answers to the above questions may be found in' the inter
face of

modem Japanese nationalism and the concept of koku-

tai (national polity) on one hand, and the two traditions of
hierarchical groupism and consensus politics, on the other.

Reference has already been made to the nationalistic
nature of the Meiji Restoration.

Through one of the most ef

fective "purposive modernization" programs in history, Japan had
industrialized itself rather rapidly.

Japan's decisive victory

in both wars against its two neighboring giants

the Sino-

Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05—
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bore testimony to the rapid growth and expansion of this
nascent nationalism.

The victory was a testimony to Japan's industrial might
and the Bushido patriotism.

One is almost tempted to look for

a parallelism in what appears to be a complete cycle of history
between Perry's visit to Edo Bay (Tokyo Bay) in 1853

the

battleship Missouri at Tokyo Bay almost a century later, in
19^5-

Both visits by the American battleships were followed by

an enormously rapid economic growth and industrialization.

One

also recalls that some of the powerful LDP politicians, who were
adamantly opposed to the NPT ratification, were called the "tra
ditionalists ."

On both occasions of an economic "miracle,"

the Japanese

tradition of collectivistic groupism was the basis for such an
achievement.

On both occasions, the government directed, assisted,

and coordinated the economic achievement.

The subsequent "ex-

261
pansive nationalism”
and the attendant military ascendancy were
a function of the concept of kokutai and the industrial growth of
Japan.

Intrinsic to the concept of kokutai, based on State Shinto

Christenson, opt. cit., pp. 25 ff.
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and Bushido, was the notion that Japan was destined to expand
externally

its messianic mission being to illuminate the universe

with Amaterasu (the Sun-Goddess). As the world depression bore
particularly hard on the Japanese peasantry, the traditional
rural area provided fertile soil for a right-wing radical
nationalism which, in turn, radicalized important middle echelon
segments of the Imperial Army.

262

Given the delicate balance of power in the political
structure, there .was the spread of a radical nationalism at the
grass-roots level while the politicians were preoccupied with

(

self-interests and factional politics.

It was not difficult for

the balance to tip in favor of the military group.

The other question as to why the military did not take
over the imperial government altogether can be explained in terms
also of kokutai (hierarchical groupism) and the tradition of collectivistic norm, consensus.

Much of the general preconditions for a military takeover

2£*The Army had recruited a high proportion of its young
officers from farming areas. Thus, the ultranationalist agi
tation spread easily within the Imperial Army in particular and
the military in general. See, for example, Stockwin, op. cit.,
p. 19.
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of the civilian political power, as provided in various conceptual frameworks in the literature,
Imperial Army takeover of the government.

was ripe for the
However, the mili

tary had remained, though dominant, one of the policymaking
groups within the institutional framework until 19^5»

The

reason for this can "be found in the very nature of kokutai and
in the tradition of collectivism.

According to the concept of kokutai collectivism, all
subjects of the Emperor were equal and were to serve the Emperor
and the nation.
^

Accordingly, the Japanese military was, from

the very beginning, an integral part of the -foreign policymaking
process, with direct access to the throne.

Consequently, the question of what Huntington calls

26t

"subjective civilian control"
of the military never arose.

to maximize civilian control

Likewise, the idea of "objective

civilian control" of the military by maximizing military professionalism

had never occurred in Japan, hence, as noted

263 See, for example, John J. Johnson, The Military in the
Underdeveloped Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962);
David Lemer and Richard Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The
Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force,” World Politics, 13 (October 1$60),
19_4 4 ; Edwon Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, I960); Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's Liberation
(Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955); Samuel E. Finer,
The Man on Horseback (New York: Alfred A. Praeger, 1962); and Samuel
Huntington, op. cit.

^

'

^^Huntington, op. cit., p. 83-
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earlier, "the most political army in the world."

Accordingly, throughout the period of the dual govern
ment (between the military groups and the civilian groups),
the tradition of collectivisitic norm of consensus decision
making had prevailed.

For example, Hosoya states:

failure to reach consensus among civilian and military
leaders often prevented the government from making
vital decisions, keeping it in a state of indecision.
A good example of such a continuing state of indecision
because of the failure to generate a consensus may be
found in the case of the military alliance with Nazi
Germany in 1939* In spite of more than seventy meetings
of the Five-Minister Conference between January and
August 1939, the Hiranuma Cabinet could find no way of
accomodating the views of the Army on one hand and
of the Navy and the Foreign Office on the other;
it therefore simply procrastinated in dealing with
the Germans. 266
Even in a crisis situation, the consensus decision-making norm appears
to have played its role.

To quote Hosoya again,

even when facing crisis decisions, Japan seems to have
taken more than one would usually expect under such
circumstances. One example will suffice. At the
sudden outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet
Union in June 19^1, Japan's leaders took more than
ten days to decide on a proper response, merely
because of the problem of building consensus between
the civil and m b r a n c h e s and between top and
middle echelons.
In his discussion of the future of Japanese civil-military relations,

265rbid., p. 126.
?66
Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy DecisionMaking System in Janan," op. cit., p. 3&5■

(

267™

*
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Huntington underscores the probable prevalence and persistence of
the tradition of the consensus norm which would preclude Japanese
military professionalism as follows:
The pattern of sustained military involvement in politics
ended with the destruction of the Japanese officer corps
in 1 9 ^ 5 .......... Starting with a tabula rasa, Japan,
in a sense, possesses an unusual freedom in creating
new military institutions. An awareness among Japanese
leaders of the political character of the old officer
corps and its disastrous consequences could lead to
an insistence upon the absolute abstention of the new
one from politics. On the other hand, . . . . the
absence of a professional military tradition . . . .
The odds would appear to favor the emergence in Japan
of a system of civil-military relations differing in
appearance but not in essentials from that which prevailed
prior to 19^5 (emphases added).£00

(

f ■

■

26a

Huntington, op. cit., pp. I38-I39.
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CHAPTER THREE
DIFFUSION OF POLICYMAKING POWER AND CONSENSUS POLITICS
IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

Following Japan's defeat in World War II, the Japanese
empire was to be dissolved according to the terms of the Yalta
and Potsdam agreements.

Action was to be taken to insure that

Japan never again would become a world menace, or a world
power.

1

Numerous democratic reforms
economic

political, social, and

were imposed by the American Occupation authority.

The most important feature of the political reforms relevant
to this study was the dissolution of the imperial institutions

2

based on the concept of kokutai. Although the monarch survived

Scalapino in Macridis, on. cit., p. 281.
2
—
"The mystique [italics in the original] surrounding
the emperor was soon dissipated, in part as a result of pressure
from SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers] and in part
by the emperor’s own wish. He was willing to abdicate in favour
of his elder son, for he felt acutely that he should accept re
sponsibility for the war...... But in 19^5 his advisers urged
that the emperor at least defer any intention to abidicate,
because they feared for the monarchy's very survival should the
emperor retire, for this would imply that the fortunes of the
imperial house were indissolubly linked with those of the now
generally despised Supreme Command," Storry, o£. cit., p. 247.
- 203 -
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the defeat, the Emperor

ceased to be the ultimate ruler

even in form (i.e., constitutionally).
constitution of 1947*

The new democratic

provided for popular sovereignty.

This chapter represents,not a systematic description
of the Japanese foreign policymaking system under the new
constitution, but a brief analysis of the foreign policymaking process in terms of the following:

first, groupism

and resultant diffusion of policymaking power in the poli
tical structure; and second, the position and role of the
LDP Prime Minister in the policymaking process relative to
^

consensus politics.

Following a brief review of legacies

from the past, the nature of factionalism, which is ubiqui
tous in the Japanese parties (especially the LDP), will be
examined.

Finally, each of the policymaking institutions

and majors actors involved in the policymaking process will
be examined also in terms of the diffusion of policymaking
power and consensus politics.

O
•'In January 1946, the Emperor issued a rescript
renouncing, formally, any claims to a divine or semi-divine
status, ibid., p. 248.

r '
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A.

Legacies from the Past
One aspect of the Japanese social institutions,

among others, is the enduring and pervasive group'norm
of consensus decision-making.

Scholars such as Vogel, Curtis,

and Craig have dealt with the problem of clarification of the
”conceptual content” (gainen naiyo) of the concept of consensus.^

According to Vogel and Curtis, in particular, the recog
nition of the desirability of decision-making through consensus
is not unique to the Japanese, as noted earlier.

For example,

these scholars point out that the "clearance system," which has
^

long been in existence in the United States bureaucratic circles,
is similar to the consensus-building procedures practiced in
Japan (i.e., ringisei and nemawashi)P

However, as Hosoya argued, the high degree of emphasis
placed on consensus in the Japanese tradition of decision-making
appears to be peculiar to the Japanese.^ Examples of such emphasis
on consensus abound to support this impression.

The sudden

announcement by President Nixon of his plan to visit Peking
in 1971, as Hosoya points out, was a major foreign policy decision
-

Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki, on. cit., p. 17.
^Ibid., pp. 17-18, 20; Vogel, op. cit., pp. xvii-xviii;
Craig in Vogel, ibid., pp. 22-24.
i

^Hosoya, ibid.
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reversing its previous policy completely.

7

206

Despite the magnitude

of the policy reversal, the decision appeared to have been made
either by completely bypassing the procedural formality of con
sensus-building, as practiced in the United States, or by
agreement among an extremely limited number of policymakers within
g
the innermost circle of policymaking.
In Japan,
policy deci
sion-making of this magnitude, implemented without consensus
procedure,would be extremely rare if it would ever occur at all.

An overt defiance of the traditional collectivistic norm
of consensus takes its toll as in the case of Kishi's fate in
^

the wake of the i960 crisis.
tary supremacy in government,

Even during the period of

mili

collective decision-making

had survived at least in form, if not in substance as well.

For example, from January to August 1939 > the Hiranurca
Cabinet had held over seventy "Five Minister" intraministerial
conferences attempting to reach an agreement, through consensus,
on the question of the Axis Tripartite Military Alliance.

This

is "a typical example of the emphasis placed on consensus in
pursuit of a decision and is characteristic of the Japanese

7Ibid.
8-r-u- j

Ibid.

('
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policymaking process, a situation rather uncommon in the United

Q
States."

In Hosoya's view, the characteristics of the Japanese

policymaking process should he found in the relative emphasis
placed on the importance of collective decision-making, rather

o
than in its conceptual uniqueness.

According to Seisabro Sato, as quoted by Hosoya, the Japanese
concept of consensus is predicated on the premise that the "component
particles" (kosei hunshi) of a group, participating in the group decision-

10

making, are "homogeneous" (doshitsuteki)..

Majority

decision-making

is based on the assumption that the "participants" ( sankasha) are
"heterogeneous” (ishitsu), hence no anticipation of a perfect agreement
among them in their "judgment" (handan). On the other hand, the "full
harmony "(or "unanimity”) (m^n jo it chi) or "consensus" are a method which
is based upon the premise that the "participants” is homogeneous, hence
expectations of a "successful conclusion" (shusoku) of their judgment
(handan)

8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10
Ibid., p. 20, n. 26; Seisaburo Sato, efc al., "Nihon kindaika bunseki,'
Chuo Koron (March 1976), pp. 62-66.
11Ibid.
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What Sato describes as the "homogeneous component
particles" and "participants" in the group decision-making
are the corporate concepts deeply rooted in the traditional

12

family system, the ie.

According to Hosoya, the consensus

decision-making is Nihon-gata (the Japanese model) which is
synonymous

with the "Ie mode" (ie gata)

There are five aspects of the Japanese political culture
that one may include in the legacies of the traditional collectivistic social structure and group norm of consensus decision
making:

first, the tradition of subordinating individual to group

second, the Japanese preference for paternalism; third, horizontal
and vertical consensus politics; fourth, emphasis on '"form" (or
"face"); and fifth,'broker-type leadership.

Firstly, one of the legacies from the past is the tradition
of subordinating individual to group, be it family, village, work
gang, business firm, or government agency.

As Ike notes:

subordination implies that an individual's norm will be
congruent with those of the group, that he will work for
the good of his group, and that he will be loyal to it.
By contrast, modernity suggests a more autonomous person.
This does not mean that he is antisocial, but rather that
he thinks for himself, that he makes "rational” choices
amonff alternative courses of social action, that he is not
compulsively submissive to political authority

12
Hosoya, op. cit., pp. 17-18;
Change and the Individual (Princeton:
1970;, passim.

Kazuo Tsurumi, Social
Princeton University Press,

^^Hosoya, on. cit., p. 18.
14
Ike, op. cit., p. 13.
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As noted in passing earlier, individualism as a creed
has never taken a root in Japan.

"Actually, indi

vidualism has had a negative connotation in Japan; it has con
noted such undesirable traits as nihilism, selfish egotism, and
anti-social behavior.”^

Secondly, the Japanese tradition of hierarchical groupism
has resulted in their preference of paternalism.

It has been .

stated that the hierarchical groupism was characterized by the
mutually cooperative collectivism, between the father and the son
of an ie or between the leader and the follower of a village work

(

unit.

In a survey of workers' attitudes towards their supervisors,
the following questions were asked:

16

let us assume that there are two types of section chiefs;
if you were to work under one of them which one [of the
following] would you prefer?
1.

He does not make unreasonable demands that violate
work rules, but he does not look after you in
matters that do not pertain to your work.

2.

Sometimes he makes unreasonable demands that violate
work rules, but he looks after you even in matters
that have nothing to do with your work.

^ Ibid., p. 10.
l6Ibid., p. 14.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 210 -

(

Ike reports that "more than 70 percent of those questioned
preferred the supervisors who, although a hard taskmaster, was
willing to look after one's personal and other non-work-related
needs."

17

Characteristic of the Japanese attitudes toward the

affective leader-follower relationships is the fact that
response to this question has varied little over the
fifteen-year span covered by the surveys. Equally
interesting, the response is remarkably uniform,
whether the person giving the answer is young or old,
uneducated or educated, worker or professional. In
short, age, education, and occupation, which are im
portant variables when it comes to other questions,
appear to have little effect.18

Another study that probed attitudes of both American
and Japanese industrial workers is also indicative of the Japanese
preference for paternalism.

The question was:

"when a worker

wishes to marry, I think his (her) superior should:

19

Table 1
Reply
1.
2.
3Ur.

Help select a possible mate and.
serve as a go-between.......... ...

U.S.

Japan

2#

&

Offer personal advice to the
worker if requested............ ...
Merely present a small gift from
the company ................... ..

70%
9%

Not be involved in such a
personal matter ............... .

W
%

Ibid.
19

Ibid., pp. 14— 15. Source: Arthur Whitehall, Jr.,
and Shin-ichi Takezawa, The Other Worker (Honolulu: EastWest Center Press, 19&8), p. 171*
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Thirdly, the tradition of collectivistic norms of
consensus decision-making means hoth vertical as well as hori
zontal consensus in its contemporary application.

This, in

turn, has meant, on one hand, a time-consuming process of reaching
consensus among groups and, on the other hand, the emergence of
a broker-type leadership which is discussed below.

Fourthly, the collect ivistic norm of consensus decision
making, by definition, calls for emphasis on form rather than
substance.

As Testier and his associates remarked:

In Japan, officials and politicians pay considerably
greater respect to formal jurisdictions than do their
American counterparts. To bypass those with formal
responsibility for all or part of an issue is to humi
liate them, whether they be subordinates [emphasis
added] or superiors or those in other offices. So
formal prerogatives are carefully observed, even while
active informal networks make it possible to move issues
forward. If due respect is paid to an official’s posi
tion, he may well not insist on exercising his sub
stantive prerogatives.^

The importance of the induced voluntarism entails also
intricate refinements of small group interaction usually behind
the scene.

This is necessary because each decision finally

reached is, in theory, the result of a consensus of the group
concerned for the sake of group harmony,i.e., collectivism.

20

Destler, op. cit., p. llA.
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The process of the intricate refinement of small group
interaction behind the scene is usually time-consuming.
Moreover, in the process of reaching consensus the nature of
the final decision is hammered out among groups concerned and
the quality of the final decision is usually the result of
compromise among the groups, hence eclectic in nature. In
reference to the image of an absolutism in prewar Japan,
Scalapino remarks:
in all likelihood, it is only because these things
were true that the outward signs of rigid hierarchy
and absolutism were so well maintained into the
modem era.21

Commenting on the importance of form and status resulting
from the need of a surface harmony, Scalapino states:
giving extraordinary attention to form and status was
often wearisome and prolonged, but every care had to
be taken to make concessions and consensus possible
with a minimum of violence to the position and prestige
of those involved.22
Because of the importance of "form” (or "face"), "necessarily,
equals were wary of confronting each other in person until the
formula for consensus seemed assured, and inferiors develeoped,
to a fine art, all forms of subtle pressures and persuasive
devices, so that successful superiors paid homage to those in
21

Scalapino in Kacridis, on. cit., p. 278.
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the course of final action."

23

The Japanese preoccupation with collectivism in general,
and emphasis on surface harmony (or avoidance of an open con
frontation) in particular, explain their reluctance to say a
direct "No**in dealings with other individuals or nations.

The

Brookings scholars comment:
Packard cites one moderately important case: "When
Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda visited Washington
in September 1971» he held a press conference at which
he was asked whether Japan would support the U.S. posi
tion on China at the United Nations General Assembly
meeting that fall. His answer was 'not for the time
being.' The interpreter missed the nuance of 'for the
time being* and rendered the answer as a flat 'No' in
English. Newspapers across the U.S. played the story
as if Japan had harshly rebuked the United States. Later,
it turned out that Japan did support the United States
position at the U.N.2^

Finally, the tradition of mutual dependence and co
operation has resulted in a broker-type leadership in Japan.
Commenting on the mutuality of dependence between leaders
and followers, Hosoya states:
in Japanese society it is esential for the leaders of
organizations to make a maximum effort to obtain the
views of their constituents (even if only for ap
pearance's sake), to save face, and to maintain harmo
nious relationships, Japanese society may be charac
terized as one where a system of mutual reliance is

^ Ib id .; also, Scalapino and Masumi, on. cit., p. 6.
2h
Destler, op. cit., p. 120, n. 51*
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dominant; the higher-echelon lean on their sub
ordinates and vice versa. It is a system of mutual
reliance, which places emphasis on the interrelation
ship of groups within the Japanese decision-making
process, rather than a system of the ’’rule of the
higher by the lower (gekoku.jo). The Japanese are
likely to feel secure and stable in this state of
mutual reliance, as demonstrated by their predis
position to stick together and to conform. Consensus
building tends to be important in the decision-making
process of this type of society. 25
Because of the culturally sanctioned collectivist ic norm in
general, and the practical mutuality of reliance in particular,
the leadership tends to be one of a broker-type as will be
discussed later.

It is within the parameter of these five main legacies
from the past that one finds structural and behavioral features
peculiar to the Japanese political culture in general and their
foreign policymaking process in particular.

There are numerous "figurative extensions" of the tra
ditional family system, ie, in Japan.

In the economic sector,

for example, as Nakane points out, "the piety and loyalty shown
by Japanese dependents towards the father was in the nature of
that shown to the leader of a kind of economic corporate group,
26
but combined with family sentiment."
25
Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy DecisionMaking System in Japan,” o£. cit., p. 366.
2^Nakane, o£. cit., p. 21; Stockwin, on. cit., p. 24.
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The familial (or quasi-family) sentiment is essentially
a logical result of two factors:

permanent employment and

paternalistic policy of the firms.

”In a situation in which

an employee has a lifetime commitment to a firm, he tends to
27
develop loyalty to the company.”

Moreover, extensive fringe

benefits such as semi-annual bonuses, family allowances, and
other paternalistic extras (e.g., company-owned housing and
company-owned resorts) all tend to cement the loyalty of the
work force to the firm.

28

The tradition of the independent corporate groupism has
caused the Japanese to be cliquish.

Thus one finds groupings

of all kinds in almost all segments of the society, including
the political parties, the bureaucracy, the military (until 19^5 )»
big business,

the labor market, academia, and even

numerous schools of flower arrangement, wrestling, and karate.

Various suffixes are used to indicate different groups,
such as ha (clique; faction), batsu (almost synonymous with ha,
meaning clique; faction), habatsu (tautologically, ha and batsu
mutually reinforcing), keiretsu (literally, column linkage,

^Ike, o£. cit., p. ^7.
28
Somewhat paradoxically, this pattern is especially
tenacious in some of the largest and most powerful firms whose
internal organization is necessarily bureaucratic and impersonal.
Employees in such firms tend to identify the prestige of the firm
with their own, and attempt to retain their privilege by demon
strating their loyalty to their firm.
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f

f

meaning organization linkage), and kai (literally, "meeting,"
which is commonly translated into English as "society").
Finally, the term "batsu" (meaning "clique"), as noted above,
can be used alone rather than combined with ha.

The name of a place, the surname of the leader of a
political party faction, the name of a university, and the like
are used as prefixes to identify various groupings, often rather
loosely.

Examples of such prefixes, used in combination with

ha (faction, clique) in order to identify various factions in
the parties, are "Miki-ha" (the LDP faction under Takeo Miki)
and*Tanaka-ha " the LDP faction under Kakuei Tanaka.

In order to identify the majority group and the minority
group in intraparty factional politics of a given party, be it
the LDP or the JSP, terms such as "shu-ryu-ha” (literally, the
"main-current-faction,” meaning the coalition of factions which
is in the majority within the party) and "han-shu-ryu-ha"
(literally, the "anti-main-current-faction," meaning the minority
group of factions within the party which may or may not be
united as a coalition) are used.

Labels for various groupings other than the political
factions include:

"gaku-batsu” (the academic clique),

batsu" (the factions within the military until

19^-5)»
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29

"zai-batsu" (the financial clique).

Somewhat similar to

the American usage of the term, "the Ivy-Leaguer," but more
specifically, the Japanese often use such term as "Todai-ha"
(the elite Tokyo University clique). Finally, there is the
extended family clique (keibatsu) which implies that the family
status yiegara) and pedigree (kenami) are "necessary qualifi
cations for membership in high society and for achieving a posi
tion of prestige and influence in business and politics, even in
academic life."

30

The list could go on almost endlessly.

If the numerous groupings, as described with various
^

suffixes and prefixes, indicate the tradition, of groupism, the
psychological and cultural norms and orientation of the Japanese
people represent the tradition of collectivistic hierarchical
groupism.

The origin of the collect ivistic norm of consensus

decision-making and the attendant emphasis on "form" has already
been discussed.

It has also been noted that the punctiliousness of the
Japanese language also indicates their emphasis on (or their

^Eleanor M. Hadley, Antitrust in Japan (Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1970), p. 20. Hadley defines "zaibatsu” as a
family dominated complex of corporation displaying unified
business strategy arising primarily out of an ownership base,"
(■

• 30
^ Yanaga, op. cit., p. 15•
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psychological orientation for) collectivistic group harmony.
Other cultural variables, as noted earlier, are also related
to the tradition of collectivitic hierarchical groupism one way
or another.

While a full discussion of various concepts, relative
to the psychological and cultural norms and orientation of the
Japanese people^ falls outside the scope of this study, it is
in order to briefly note the interactional direction of each of
the norms and orientation, relative to the tradition of hier
archical groupism and collect ivistic group harmony, loyalty,
|

and solidarity.

First of all,
concept.

the concept of "on” (•/§') is a hierarchical

In its direction,

vis-a-vis the superior.
debtedness.

it is a feeling felt by the inferior

It is a feeling of

self-incurred in

For example, a son feels "on" vis-a-vis his parents.

A student feels "on” vis-a-vis his mentor.

Samurai Oishi Yoshio

and his forty-six followers felt (self-incurred) so much "on”
vis-a-vis their late Lord Asano that they decided to repay part
of the "on" with their life.

It is not an externally imposed

"obligation' but a self-imposed sense of

gratitude,

love,

and

—

/.
I

Precisely because these concepts are cultural and psychological norms and orientation, there are many explanations given
by Westerners which
miss.
the conceptual essence.
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devotion.

It is an affectively and emotionally hierarchical

concept which is related, usually, to one's immediate parents,
elder brothers and sisters, teachers, benevolent neighbors,
generous landlords, and such feudal lords as Asano. It does not
make one debtor to entities,beyond one's immediate circle

of

contacts, such as the Emperor, much less "the ages and the world."

32

What one feels (and is told to have), in the tradition of
Japan (also in China and Korea as well) vis-a-vis the Emperor
is not "on" but "chu-sei"

or "chu-gi" ($'

both of

which mean, "loyal duty” (obligations), a notion which is not
^

necessarily self-incurred but a product of political socialization.
In summary, the concept of "on" is very personal and affective.
At times, it is deeply emotional.

The son of a good family is

supposed to have this concept vis-a-vis his parents, teachers,
and even fellow men who, in the course of his life, has done good
to him.

Expressions of feeling in English, which are similar to
the concept of "on," would be the following:
32

1

Cf. "Since every Japanese conceives himself as a 'debtor
to the ages and the world," "on can be received from the emperor,
one’s parents, one's lord, one's teacher, and from all the contacts
in the course of one's life," Stockwin, op. cit., pp. 25-26;
Benedict, op. cit., p. 116.
(
{

..
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1.. "Now that I am raising my
I did not realize when I
must have gone through a
way they did. They were
a lot. I miss them."

own children, I realize what
was a child. % Mom and Dad.
lot in order to raise me the
good parents. They loved me

2.

A college professor to his students: "as I look hack
now, I am a blessed person to have had my share of
good teachers. There are two graduate professors of
mine from whom I have learned what a good educator who
cares for his students is like . . . .
They do not
know how much I appreciate what they have done for me
. . . but I will not forget these two paragons of . .
. . a good educator and a good man . . . as long as I
live.”

3«

An auto mechanic to a customer who admires his expertise:
"you say I am a good mechanic? You have not met a
really good one. This big brother of mine, Jack, who
passed away about five years ago .. . . Jack and I used
to argue a lot . . . but he was a good brother . . .
Everything I know about cars, I owe it to Jack. I wish
I were half as good a mechanic as he was. See, I am now
teaching Jack's two teenage boys everything I know so that
they can make their living . . . After all, you see, I
owe it to my brother. I miss my brother. I wish he was
around . . . I don't think I would argue with him . .

Like the concept of "on," the concept of "amae" is also a
hierarchical concept.

In its behavioral direction, it is also from

bottom to top (i.e., the inferior toward the superior).

In its

verbal form, amaeru, it means "to depend and presume upon another's
benevolence," as explained by Takeo Doi.^
another person.

However, it is not just

A junior "amaeru" vis-a-vis his senior.

An inferior

(such as children, students, rank-and-file members of a labor union,
and the like) "amaeru" vis-a-vis his superior (such as parents,
teachers, elder brothers, elder sisters, union boss, and the like).
It is a latent assumption or behavioral expression of

a desire to

33
L. Takeo Doi, "Amae: A Key Concept for Understanding
Japanese Personality Structure," in Robert J. Smith and Richard
K . Beardsley (eds.), Japanese Culture: Its Development and Charac
teristics (Chicago: Aldine, 1962), pp. I32-I39.
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depend on one's superior.

It is a "dependent collectivism"

which is an aspect of "group orientation in Japan.

35

3/j.

However,

it is not related to any objective group dependence relationship,
as in the case of one group of an auto factory assembly line
depending on another group to finish its part.

Rather, it is

an affectively hierarchical group concept which is psychological
in nature.

Because it is hierarchical in nature, the concept of amaeru
does not apply to a superior vis-a-vis an inferior.

For example,

an older brother does not amaeru vis-a-vis his "kid" brother, even
f

^

if the former was a janitor and the latter the chairman of the
board of directors of a large corporation.

Expressions that may be analogous to the notion of amaeru
would include the following hypothetical conversation in the United
States between the father (the "patriarch" of the "clan") of a
New England multi-millionaire family and his surviving oldest
son:
. The father to the son: "Hey, JACK, I see you bought a
new bike." With an affectionate humorous "sarcasm,"
the proud father says to his young dashing son: "you
have only two bikes now, don’t you?"
The son, who happens to be the President of the United
States, shoots right back, straight-faced: "why NOT,
Dad, you just have to make some more money so I can
afford to buy my new bikes. That's all."
■^Stockwin, op. cit., p. 27;
--35
^Stockwin, ibid.

Tsurumi, on. cit., pp. 91-92.
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In a good American family, as this "hypothetical" New
England family undoubtedly is, a son, President or not,
dares not "shoot" right back at the patriarch of the clan.
In this hypothetical conversation, the father was as proud
of his son and humorous as the son was respectful of his father
just as humorous as his father.

The son did only amaeru vis-4-vis

his father when he "commanded" the multi-millionaire patriarch
to make some more money so he could buy more new bikes.

The concept of amae being a psychologically affective
dependence attitude, it can easily be "figuratively" extended to
.

other similar situations.

'

national alliance system in which one partner feels it is a junior
partner in the alliance.

One of these situations is an inter-

If that is the case, real or imagined,

the junior partner may tend to amaeru vis-a-vis the senior (or
superior) partner in the alliance.

In Japan, as the Brookings scholars note, "the psychology
of the junior partner [vis-a-vis the United States] still prevails."

Especially in view of its tradition of affectively

hierarchical collectivism (as an "alliance groupism" is, as seen
by the Japanese), it is not difficult for Japan to amaeru vis-avis its senior partner in the alliance.

The amae, in the eyes

_
,

Destler, op. cit., p. 2.
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f
of the American negotiators, represented the Japanese
insensitivity to the fair principle of reciprocity, bordering
on egotism and irresponsibility.

37

Likewise, the concept of oyabun-kobun (parent statuschild status) is another cultural orientation which is rooted
in the tradition of hierarchical groupism.

As Yanaga explains

this concept:

g
L
^

there is no more basic interpersonal relationship
in Japanese society than oyabun-kobun, a legacy of
feudalism based on a Confucian concept. In its many
forms it constitutes the mainspring of Japanese beha
vior and provides a sense of loyalty and obligation
outside the familial framework. Mentor-protege, sen.ior-junior, superior-subordinate, master-apprentice,
teacher-student, and many other relationships all
come under this rubric. In the political sphere it
is best exemplified in the relationship between the
party's faction leader and his followers.38
Analogous to the Japanese oyabun-kobun relationship
would be that which existed between the late Richard Daley and
his "men" in the Chicago machine-politics.

It is in this sense

that the ovabun-kobuq concept is not unique to Japan.

Rather,

what is peculiar to Japan is its pervaslvenss in social relations.

Unlike the concepts of on, amae, and oyabun-kobun, which
/
39-\
are all vertical (i.e., hierarchical concepts ) orientation,

•^Destler, op. cit., p. 109.
oO
Yanaga, op. cit., p. 13.
39

One possible exception is the concept of on which can
be applied to one's friends or neighbors. However, in its origin^
it was predominantly a vertical concept.
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the concepts of giri (^C5^) and nin.jo (A 4 d) are both con
ceptually multidirectional in human relations.

Like on, the

concept of giri (a feeling of obligation) is self-incurred
rather than other-directed.

It is analogous to the notion of

doing what is right (what one ought to do not because someone
tells you to do but because . . .) as in "we really ought to
go and see Auntie Mabel when we are in London.

She is a bit of

40
bore, but she will be upset if we don't.”

Another example

a

of giri would be the hypothetical auto mechanic who said to his
customer, as mentioned earlier, "see, I am now teaching'Jack1s
two teenage boys everything I know so.-that they can make living.
f

41

. . . see, I owe it to' my brother. ”

This mechanic felt on

vis-a-vis his late brother who taught him so much.

It was,

therefore, his giri (self-incurred sense of obligation) to
help the late brother’s sons.

The concept of nin.jo (k4%), literally "human feeling,"
is also multi-directional in human relations.

It is relative

to "humane" human feeling which is applicable to all directions,
both vertically and horizontally.

The following three

^R . P. Dore, City Life in Japan; A Study of a Tokyo
Ward (London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1958)> p. 254;
Stockwin, o£. cit., p. 26.
h,1

Supra, p. 220.
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hypothetical statements are symbolic of the concept of nin.jo:
1.

Boh to his buddy Joe: "this little old lady around
the block . . . poor lady . . . She does not have
any children or relatives . . . She is living alone.
Somehow I got stuck with her. I take her to church
every Sunday . . . and bring her home to her little
apartment. I even take her around shopping . . . .
Well, what can I say? She will be helpless if I
don't help her. She is 80 and half-blind.”

2.

A judge said: "to lose his position was a punishment
enough for this man. He has had enough. He is hereby
pardoned for the crime he has committed............
The philosophy of punishment does not hate the man
but the act . . .."

3«

A mother to her 6-year-old son at Thanksgiving time:
"Jack, we have two turkeys. After we bought one,
Uncle Bob brought us another. Your friend Bill and
his mom . . . probably cannot afford a turkey . . . .
would you take this one over to Bill's house?"
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B.

Groupism and Diffusion of Policymaking Power;

Factionalism

Studies on the foreign policymaking process in postwar
Japan abound.

ho

The following discussion is limited in scope

and nature to two aspects of the foreign policymaking process in
contemporary Japan that are relevant to the objectives of this
particular study:
reflective of

(1) the structural and behavioral features
historic groupism^characteristic of all Japanese

52

These include: Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process
and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement
(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 195?)5 Scalapino and
Masumi, op. cit.; Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic
Politics, op. cit.; Haruhiro Fukui, Jiyuminshuto to Seisaku Kettei
[The Liberal Democratic Party and PolicymakingJ (Tokyo: Fukumura
Shuppan, 19&9); H. Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal
Democrats and Policy-Making (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1970); Japanese International Relations Association (ed.),
Okinawa Henkan Kosho no Seiji Katei [The Political Process of
Okinawa Reversion Negotiations] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1975)5 Frank
Langson, "Japan's Foreign Policy-Making Process," in Young C. Kim
(ed.), Japan in World Politics (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
Asian Studies, 1972); F. Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver:
British Columbia University Press, 19730> Ch. 2, pp. 7-21; Chihiro
Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making
System in Japan," World Politics, vol. XXVI, no. 3 (April 197^)1
PP* 353-369; C.-Hosoya and Joji Watanuki (eds.), Taigai Seisaku
Kettei Katei no Nichibei Hikaku [Foreign Policy Decision-Making
Processes in Japan and the United States: A Comparison] (Tokyo:
Tokyo University Press, 1977); Fukui, "Tanaka Goes to Peking:
A Case Study in Foreign Policymaking," in Pempel (ed.),op. cit.;
and I.M. Destler, et al., op. cit., Ch. 3*
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social relations and the attendant diffusion of foreign policymaking power within the political structure; and (2) the positional
and functional centrality of the LDP prime minister's role in the
foreign policymaking process, especially on important
foreign policy questions.

It has.teen pointed out that under the old Meiji Constitution
the vital center of policymaking was characterized "by the intricate
refinement

of small group interaction, the great importance of

induced voluntarism for consensus, the generally eclectic quality
of final agreements, and the absence of a Fuhrer even in the mili-

43

tarist period.

The "national genius for groun decision or avoidance of a
44
clear-cut decision," as noted by Langdon, has also been manifested
in the structure and dynamics of the foreign policymaking process
of contemporary Japan.

Noting the immobilized nature of the

decision-making institutions and the passively reactive nature of
final agreements among various participants, especially in postwar
Japan's security policymaking process, Hellmann comments:
[The] Japanese decision-making institutions have
inhibited and continue to inhibit rapid, flexible

Scalapino and Masumi, on. cit., p. 20.
Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy, on. cit., p. 5*
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responses; they have produced reactive, not active,
policies. The incapacity for hold leadership, the
extremely politicized nature of the policy-making
process, and the lack of a partisan consensus on
security matters assure that Japanese policies will
he largely a product of the tangled weh of domestic
political forces. ^5
The security question, which has heen pivotal in postwar Japanese
46
foreign policy, has heen the most divisive issue in Japanese politics
for three reasons:

(l) a polarization of the party politics resulting

from the long continuous domination since 1955 hy the LDP of the
47. x
Japanese political scene; (2) the widespread pacifist sentiment
48
among the public,following Japan’s defeat in World War II; and
(3) the nature of the Japanese political parties in general, and the
LDP in particular.

These three interrelated factors together have

constituted the single most important internal constraints on
Japanese security policymaking.

A close look at the nature and the inner workings of the
ruling LDP establishment reveals that the party is in fact a loose
federation of factions which characterize the fragmented structural
diffusion of policymaking power within the party.

The structural

55------------Hellmann in Scalapino (ed.),. on. cit., p. 32946
•Ibid., n. 321.
47
See, for example, Destler, et al., on. cit., pp. 59-60,
'The Effect of Polarization.”
48
,
.
See, for example, Hellmann in Scalapino (ed.J, 0£. cit.,
pp. 322-325, "A New Japanese Diplomatic Tradition."
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and behavioral characteristics peculiar to

Japanese party

politics in contemporary Japan, as in prewar Japan, are essentially
the result of the diffusion of policymaking power within the polistructure.

As Hellmann puts it,
the fragmented structure of the LDP— a style of
authority that requires at least tacit consensus among
all the responsible participants involved in policymaking (in this case the party faction leaders)—
and the extreme degree to which intraparty politics
has been involved in all major foreign policy moves
of immobilism in conservative

Because the factions within the party are the basic units
of the Japanese party politics, as Scalapino and Masumi note,
the real processes of negotiations, compromise, and
decision making take place within [italics in the
original] each "federation” as the various parties
ceaselessly maneuver in their quest for power. It is
here that the volatile and unexpected aspects of
Japanese politics exist. It is at this level that
decisions vital to the continuity or fall of one admin
istration, questions of a new election, and similar
issues are determined................The periodic
crises and upheavals produce an atmosphere of excitement
that obscures in some degree the lack of basic policy
shifts and the minimal degree of mass participation.-

The importance in Japan of both the tradition of consensus
politics and

factional politics was most dramatically revealed

259 "
Ibid., p. 330.
50
Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 80. A similar obser
vation is also offered by Hans H. Baerwald, Japan's Parliament;
An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 197^)»
pp. 46-47•
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during the May-June i960 crisis over the revision of the United
States-Japan Security Treaty.

The crisis was touched off "by

then Prime Minister Xishi who had his bill, revising the treaty,
rammed through the Diet (House) against a determined resistance
from the Opposition parties.

The coup de grace, which was dealt

upon Kishi's political life, was probably the revolt within his
own LDP by the intraparty minority group.

Kishi had almost no

consultation with these fellow LDP politicians on the issue.

51

"The greatest mass movement in Japan's political history,"
52
as Scalapino and Masumi describe the crisis, was a genuine mass
protest, not against the treaty revision per se, but against the
V

Prime Minister's blatant defiance of the culturally sanctioned
consensus norm in the name of majoritarianism.

53

The crisis, in

turn, provided other factions within the LDP with a golden op
portunity to rebel against the Prime Minister for their own fac
tional interests, thus ending Kishi's political life.
follows is a*examination of

What

Japanese factionalism which is

pervasive in the parties as in all other Japanese organizations.

for example, Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., Ch. V.,
pp. 125-153; Langdon, pp. cit., pp. 7-21; Weinstein, op. cit.,
Ch. V, pp. 87-103; George Packard, III, Protest in Tokyo
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, I966); and Destler, pp.
cit., pp. 12-23.
“52
J Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 125•
See,

|

*^For a variety of views on the i960 crisis, there are
other sources of information available including: Edwin 0.
Reischauer, "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," Foreign Affairs,
XXXIX, no. 1 (October i960), pp. 11-26.
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Factionalism

in Japan has "been treated systematicalCh
ly by many scholars, journalists, and others."^ Factionalism
in Japanese party politics is as old as parties themselves.
It will he recalled that the party politics in Japan
began as the result of a factional split among the ruling elite
oligarchs of the Meiji Restoration, "^and the early parties
—
These include: Tsuneo Watanabe, TSshu to Seito:
Sono Riidashipuu no KenkyQ [Party Leaders and Political Parties:
A Study of Their Leadership] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1961); T. Watanabe,
Habatsu [Factions] (Tokyo: KobundS, 1953); Takeshi Hatakeyama,
Habatsu no Naimaku: Nihon no Seiji K5z5 [The Inner Workings of
Factions: The Political Structure of Japan] (Tokyo: Rippu ShobS,
1975). Among other works related to the topic are: Hans H.
Baerwald, "Tento-Mura: At the Making of a Cabinet" [The TentVillage: At the Making of a Cabinet] in Lucian W. Bye (ed.),
Cases in Comparative Politics: Asia (Boston: Little, Brown,
1970), pp. 58-80; George 0. Totten and Tamio Kawakami, ’The
Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics,” Pacific Affairs,
vol. XXXVIII, no. 2 (Summer 19&5)t 109-122; Michael Leiserson,
"Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation
Based on the Theory of Games," American Political Science Review,
vol. LXII, no. 3 (September 1968), 770-87; Haruhiro Fukui, Party
in Power, op. cit., Ch. 5» PP* 107-1%; H. Fukui, Jiyuminshuto to
Seisaku Kettei, ou. cit., Ch. V, pp. 127-175; and Scalapino and
Masumi, op. cit., Ch. HI, 'The Internal Composition of Japanese
Parties,” pp. 54-81, and Ch. V, 'The Crisis of May-June, I960: A
Case Study," pp. 125-153* An excellent account of factional
politics involved in the election of an LDP prime minister is
Nathaniel Thayer, 'The Election of a Japanese Prime Minister,"
Asian Survey, vol. IX, no. 7 (July 1969), 477-497* A penetrating
analysis of factionalism related to election campaigning and the
electoral system in Japan is Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning
Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971)* For
factionalism in the Japan Socialist party (JSP), see, for example,
J.A.A. Stockwin, "Faction and Ideology in Postwar Japanese Social
ism," Papers on Modern Jauan 1965 (Canberra: Australian National
University Pressm 1965). The major dailies and almanacs (Nenkar.)
are also a good source of the genealogy of each faction and the
factional groupings of the Japanese politicians.
^Scalapino and Masumi, o p . cit., pp. 11-14.
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in the Meiji era are characterized
sectional cleavages.

56

cry

strong

Before the short-lived period of a

"normal constitutional government” (1918-1932) was over in
prewar Japan, factions were so ubiquitous as to prompt an
observer to declare "we have factions in Japan, but no parties."

5'

Even after the prewar parties had withered away following the
Manchurian incident, the Imperial Rule Association (Taisei
Yokusankai), established in 19&) to replace the parties as an
advisory organization to the emperor, was faction-ridden in the
manner of all Japanese organizations. ^

The primary unit of Japanese politics, as of Japanese
society, was the leader-follower group

the ha or faction.

The ha is "derivative from the basic character of Japanese social
relationships

59
deeply rooted in the traditional model of the

family system, ie, as discussed earlier in the paper.

"Whether

the modem faction is called a 'feudal remnant' or given some
other designation, it must be accorded major importance [emphases

60
addded]."

56Ibid., p. 12.
57Ibid., p. 18.
^ I b i d ., p. 20.
Ibid., p. 18.
60
Ibid.
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There axe certain cultural peculiarities in the
Japanese words habatsu and ha."both of which are commonly trans
lated into English as "faction.” There is something of a missing
link lost in the transliteration. it is this missing link that
is peculiar to the political culture of Japan, including the
Japanese predilection for groupism and consensus politics.
Stockwin notes:
One should use the translation ’faction’ with caution
hecause of the connotations it has acquired in Western
(particid.arly Anglo-Saxon) political thought since
Madison. A classic definition of 'faction' by Harold
Lasswell holds that factions are ephemeral, lack perma
nent organization, tend to concentrate on a single
issue and are in 'agreement with the larger group on ^
essentials, while differing on details of application.’
This is in line with a negative evaluation of factional
activity as self-seeking and disruptive of a larger,
principled, unity .^3
These Western notions of faction in general and the definition
of faction, as given
6k
Japanese case."

c ry

Lasswell, are "hard to apply to the

The Japanese factions, based on the pattern of leaderfollower social relations in their society at large, are, by and

^Citing Clinton Rossiter (ed.)f The Federalist Parers
(New York: Mentor, 1961), pp. 77-8^, Stockwin, on. cit., p. 31•
^^arold D. Lasswell, "Faction,” Encyclopedia of
Social Sciences, 1931» vol. 5, PP- ^9-51> Stockwin, ibid.
-^Stockwin, ibid.; Lasswell, ibid.
Sk
Stockwin, ibid.
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large, well institutionalized semi-permanent organizations,^
rather than an ephemeral ad hoc association,lacking permanency.

66

In addition to the cultural origin, the leader-follower factional
groupings are adapted to various practical needs for self-interests
on the part of the leaders as well as the followers as will "be
discussed below.' Nor are these factions in "agreement with the
larger group on essentials, while differing on details of application."
They are essentially mutual aid clubs with a mutuality of needs and
obligations on the part of both the leaders and the followers.
Rather than being a part of the larger political organization,
these factions are prior to the larger organization.

In a way,

the factions are not component subsystems of a larger system bound
^

by rules of that system. Rather, each faction is a semi-autonomous
system unto itself^ operating within the confines of self-serving
systemic parametric variables insofar as the larger system serves
the self-interests of the core system, i.e. faction.

It is in

this sense that one can speak of the ruling LDP as a loose
"federation” of factions held in a
any given time.

state of

equilibrium at

The -stability or instability of the equilibrium

^As will be noted later in the paper, this leader-follower
relationship is also different from the social sciences concept of
"charismatic leadership" or "charisma."

66

As Destler and his associates put it, the factions are
"well established, formally organized groups of Diet members,"
"each headed by a senior LDP leader," Destler, et al., op. cit.,
p. 51.

('
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of the LDP is a function of constantly shifting intraparty
factional alliances or coalitions.

To dip briefly further into the reasons for the existence
of factions, there are a few empirically discernible variables
accounting for their sustained existence.

First of all, the

ubiquitous factionalism in Japan is closely related to the nature
of the Japanese political parties.
made to the factional beginning of

Reference has already been
party politics in Japan.

Despite its long history, the nature of the Japanese party politics
represents legacies of its past, even today.

The parties remain,

as Scalapino and Masumi note, "essentially closed societies, .

(

mutual aid organizations of politicians in the manner of exclusive
clubs . . . more of a product of Japanese ’feudalism' than of the

68

modem West.”

First introduced to Japan in the period around 1872, the
idea of political parties on the Western model marked the beginning
69
of "the great historic problem of modem Japanese politics”
in terms of "the high degree of separation between those formal

^In his”Toshu to Seito, "op. cit., pp. 96-98, Watanabe
offers, for example, four major reasons for the existence of factions,
as noted try Ike, op pit., p. 82. These are (l) political funds;
(2) the nature and form of the electoral system; (3) political
advancement; and (4) certain historical factors. Most writings on
the topic do not deviate significantly from these four variables
that acggunt for the existence of factions.
Scalapino and Masumi, pp. cit., p. 5*

(•

69Ibid.
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political institutions borrowed from the West, together with the
set of ideas that accompanied them, and the much broader social
institutions bred from within Japanese society, together with the
set of ideas that accompanied these."

70

While the latter forces

have been influenced and affected by Westernism, especially the
large-scale Occupation reforms imposed upon Japan following its
defeat in World War II, "a deeply rooted indigenous base spelled out
the fundamental difference between them and such overseas imports
as the National Diet and the political parties."

71

Without a vital link between parties and citizenry, there has been
no real mass participation in the political organizations, the

(

Japanese parties have remained to this day largely personal
groupings of politicians interested in personal advancement through
reciprocal mutual aid mechanisms which are factions.

72

It is in

this sense that Japan is "an open society made of closed components."

73

The LDP in particular, and the Japanese parties in

general, are not one of the devotee parties according to Duverger's
nh.
classification.
The LDP, as a closed exclusive club of mutual

' Ibid.
71_
( xbid.
^Destler, et al., op. cit., -pp. 51-52; Scalapino and
Masumi, op. cit., pp. 19, 5^73Tbid., p. 8k.
7^iaurice Duverger, Political Parties; Their Organization
and Activity in the Modem State (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
195*0, PP. 64-70.
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aid, with a limited formal membership, is more like a cadre
party but one attempting to be a mass party for a larger
membership cutting across social-class lines.

As a closed exclusive club of mutual aid, a faction is
created try "the desire on the part of an ambitious politician
to become one of the party leaders" plus "the wish on the part
of followers to share in money and offices."^ A faction thus
consists of a leader and a certain number of followers.

7&

The leader needs a solid group of supporters to enhance his
political power in general and, especially, in his quest for the
prime ministership or other senior cabinet positions.

Toward

his followers, the leader has the responsibility to provide
campaign funds, positions, and other assistance.

A sense Of

loyalty develops between the leader and the followers.

This

factional loyalty tends to become, more often than not, the
primary loyalty greater than that given the federation or any
external group.

Thus factional strife, which is continuous,

7-5uce, pp. cit., p. 83.
76
' Usually somewhere between twenty and fifty. Ike notes:
"The number is important: If a leader has too few followers, he
is weak: but if he has too many, he may not be able to provide the
material and other benefits he must give to his followers in return
for loyal support," Ike, ibid. Citing Hiker's minimum winning
coalition in William H. Hiker, The Theory of Political Coalitions
(New Haven: Yale University Press, lytz), pp. 32-46, Fukui notes
that ideally the most desirous size of a faction would be the
number of members that equals one half of the number of entire
LDP presidential vote plus one. However, Fukui also notes:
"In reality, a grouu of an ideal size as such is not formed as a
single facoion due to constraints of funds and difficulties of
internal control. [Consequently,] as has been noted, there are
many centers of lesser groups," H. Fukui, Jiyuminshuto to Seisaku
Kettei,’
*pp. cit., p. 162 (the translation is this writer's own).
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becomes the central source of political instability,

77

while,

as a rule, the "factional interest tends to take precedence
over party interest and, one is tempted to say, over the
rp Q

public interest as well."

Perhaps the single most important compelling practical
reason, for the viability and persistence of factionalism is
the politicians' needs for campaign funds.

The question of

political funds is, in turn, closely related to the nature of the
parties, on one hand, and, and to the electoral system in Japan,
on the other.

As noted earlier, the ruling LDP is essentially a closed
exclusive mutual aid club.

Organizationally,

has sometimes been likened to an inverted pyramid.

the LDP

It has a large

central organization with the elected Diet members forming the
real heart of the party organization and control, without corresponding support bases at the local level.

80

In the absence

of effective local party organizations, which are capable of
mobilizing voters, the LDP politicians (also the JCP politicians
as well) have to resort to some substitute machinery.

81

77
''Scalapino and Masumi, pp. cit., p. 77*

78Ibid., p. 19.
7^Ibid., p. 5^*
8^Ike, op. cit., p. 100.
Ibid.
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substitute machinery at first involved linking up directly or
indirectly through intermediaries, such as prefectural assemblymen
with the local notables who control a certain number of votes.
As the effectiveness of this method

of vote-getting began to

decline due largely to a continued demographic shift toward urban
centers in proportion to the rapid rate of Japan's industrialization,
the politicians were forced to resort to .a personal "support group*'
(Koenkai) mainly made up of "relatives, friends, classmates,
business associates and the like, plus their friends and relatives.’^

i
These people, together, constitute the base of one's personal

83.
.jiban (literally, "the base," or "the foundation"), or"constituency
support."
(

______________________

82

As Stockwin notes, the kSenkai (personal support group)
is a rather formal manifestation of each individual politician's
.jiban, p e m a l base, that is, constituency base. As such, it is
an associational organization with regular meetings and engages
in extensive political activities in support of the candidate who
organized it, Stockwin, op. cit., p. 103; also see Ike, op. cit.,
p. 100.

j
(

^'Scalapino and Masumi, pp. cit., p. 103. The term .jiban
is commonly used for two different meanings, one general, the other
specific. On the one hand, it implies generally "constituency"
or support base. But it is also used in a more specific sense to
indicate the personal "bailiwick" of an individual candidate,
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 103; Junichi Kyogoku and Nobutaka Ike,
Urban-Rural Differences in Voting Behavior in Postwar Japan
("Stanford University Political Science Series," No. 66),
reprinted from Proceedings of the Department of Social Sciences,
College of General Education, University of Tokyo, 1959)» as cited
in Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. I03. Other works on the
Japanese election in general, and the .jiban, especially, the
koenkai, are Gerald Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style,
op. cit., especially pp, 126-178; Nathaniel Thayer, How the
Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
19®9)» PP* 87-110; and Soma Masao, Nihon no Senkyo [Japanese
Elections] (Tokyo: Ushio Shuppansha, 19?0).
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As Thayer and others have pointed out, these personal
machineries of individual politicians are elaborate and
substantial funds are needed to run them.

84

Even though

the

LDP has partially succeeded in centralizing the provision of
Or
party funds
through
Kokumin Kyokai (The People's Associ»

ation;,

86

the cost which personal electoral campaigning in

Japan requires is so prohibitive that few individuals have
the personal resources to meet the need.

For this need, the

politicians turn to their faction leaders who have the means to
raise such funds.

As Fukui puts it, "the LDP faction leaders

continue to maintain political associations (as defined in the
Political Funds Regulation Law) which are largely independent of

f

the formal party organization.

These are their personal fund

raising machines, although they are ostensibly factional organi87
zations.”

Moreover, because of the nature of the party and the
pervasive factionalism within the party, the personal supporters'
organizations at the district and local levels are basically

88

competitive with the regular party branch,

which, in turn,

^Thayer, 'The Election of a Japanese Prime Minister,'
op. cit., p. 479*
8^Fukui, Party in Power, on. cit., pp. 150-151.
86Ibid.
8?Ibid., p. 15388
Scalapino and Masumi, on. cit., p. 85.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 241 -

reinforces factionalism.®^
regulations,
costly.

go

Despite elaborate election

Japanese elections continue to be extremely

As long as this is the case, the raison d ’etre of the

pervasive factionalism remains viable.

Even if elections were

financed publicly, it is unlikely that factionalism would disappear.
One of the reasons for the-probable continuity of factionalism
lies in the nature of the electoral system which fosters
intense intraparty competitiveness.

Unlike single-member constituencies, which tend to favor the
majority party, or the proportional representation system which
is conducive to the growth of minor parties, the Japanese multi
member electoral district system is one in which each district, except
the Amami Islands

district, elects three, four, or five repre

sentatives, with nearly twice-that number of candidates running.^1
Since only, the top three to five candidates can be elected, this
system means, in practice, that the LDP candidates, for example,
find themselves competing with fellow LDP candidates.

Aside from

the strategic dilemma this system poses for the party as a
whole, each LDP candidate is forced to resort to his personal
means of campaign support.

Each competing candidate thus needs

—

An excellent account of this aspect is Curtis, Election
Campaigning Japanese Style, op. cit.
^Chitoshi Yanaga, Japanese People and Politics (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 195»), PP* 2&6-290» Ministry of Home Affairs,
Election System (Tokyo: Local Autonomy College, Ministry of Home
Affairs, 1970).
Ike, op. cit., p. 104.
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the support of a leader in winning the party endorsement of
his candidacy, in securing the necessary campaign funds, and for
92
other election help.

Elections are thus an intense inter-

factional competition which explains why "men from the same
district are virtually never in the same faction.”

In addition to these principal reasons, there are other
important reasons why politicians join factions.
prime minister forms his Cabinet,
factional political considerations.

When the LDP

foremost in his mind are
94

These factional con

siderations may range from rewarding those factions which
supported him in his successful LDP presidential election campaign,
hence prime ministership,

95

to mending fences with the opposing

factional coalitions in order to maintain a stable intraparty
equilibrium or to solidify his position within the party.
Regardless of a particular prime minister's personal strategy.

92

Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 52.

^ Ike, op. cit., p. 105.
94
Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 61; Langdon, Politics in
Japan, o£. cit., p. 143.
^ Under the new Constitution of 1947, the Diet as the
highest organ of state power elects the Prime Minister and the
Emperor "appoints" the Prime Minister as designated by the '
Diet (Constitution, Article 6). This meant that as long as the
LDP maintained a majority in the Diet the party presidency
carried with it the prime ministership as well. It is theoreti
cally possible for the opposing LDP factional coalition to
coalesce with the Opposition parties against the LDP president.
However, because of the polarized nature of the party politics
this has not happened.
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for

intraparty factional politics, his decisions are based

on a slate of claims or recommendations from each faction leader
for specific offices or positions.

This, in turn, means that

the road, open to an LDP politician lies ’’almost exclusively
96
through membership of a faction.”

Factionalism, by definition, is a centripetal force if
one looks at each faction as a unit, but at the same time; it is
the source of a powerful centrifugal force causing the diffusion
of policymaking power within the party as a whole.

A close look

at the nature of factions reveals that, once formed, factions
tend to become semi-formal institutionalized political organi
zations; with a high degree of stability and permanency, usually
until the factional leader's retirement or death.

97

Aside from

such cultural norms as giri and on, as discussed earlier in the
paper, there are practical reasons as well that account for the
relatively stable internal relationship of a faction.

It has been

pointed out that the road open to an LDP politician lies almost
exclusively through the membership of a faction.

Since the factions

themselves for the most part operate a seniority system in
96

Stockwin, op. cit., p. 107 .

97

Ike, op. cit., p. 82. The proliferation of factions,
the birth of a new faction, and factional realignments often result
from the death or retirement of a factional leader. As Ike notes,
when the leader of a faction dies or retires, the faction may be
transferred to one of the leader’s lieutenants. However, there
may or may not be consensus among the factxon members as to who
should be the new leader. Some members may.be enticed to join
other factions or form a new faction of their own. This happened
when Yoshida retired.
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determining who of their members shall be put forward to the
98
prime minister as a candidate for office, it is generally
advantageous for a politician to build his seniority within a
given faction.

99

Since the basic reasons for the existence of factions
are personal interests on the part of the followers as well as
the leaders, a leader's personality type or career background is
not essentially
faction.

a determinant in forming and sustaining a

Nor is the ideological position or the specific policy

stand of a leader on a given issue the criterion of the factional
100
grouping as a mutual aid society. As Ike notes, ”a faction does
not represent a commitment to a political program or a set of

101
issues [emphasis added]."

Stockwin also points out that

"a misconception held by foreign observers about LDP factions is
-------- 98----------------

Stockwin, loc. cit.
99

It should be noted, however, that the rank order in which
members are entitled to cabinet appointments is not entirely a
function of seniority. Rather, it is frequently determined by
other factors such as the number of times a man has been elected,
his career background, and the tangible and intangible benefits
a man has brought to the faction leader (ike, op. cit., p. 82).
The fact that junior members of a faction often attain Cabinet
office seems to reflect the predilections (and perhaps abilities)
of the faction leaders themselves (Stockwin, on. cit., p. 107).
Also, the allocation of various Cabinet posts depends on the kind
of Cabinet a prime minister feels he can handle at any particular
time (ibid.).
^^Th e ideal type of a leader is discussed later in the
Paper.
■^Ike, on. cit., p. 83.
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that they are primarily "bodies serving to promote a set of
policies or a distinct ideological approach.

"While this is

102

true to an extent of factions in the Japan Socialist Party

the relationship "between LDP factions and policy is more
103
tenuous.”
Although factions are sometimes identified with
substantive policy orientations, as pointed out by Destler and
104
his associates,
ideological pr policy differences among
factions are more often than not differences among the leaders
of various factions rather than between the rank-and-file members
105
of factions. Langdon maintains that "differences in policy or
ideology among the factions of the Liberal Democratic party are
IB2--------------

Although the discussion focuses more on the ruling
LDP factions, factionalism is not unique to the LDP. The Op
position parties, especially the Japan Socialist party (JSP)
and the Japan Communist party, too have long been beset by
factionalism. In fact, Stockwin points out that factionalism
has been one of the three most important factors that have
characterized the history of the JSP, namely, (l) legacy of the
party's past experience; (2) factionalism; and (3) relationship
with trade unionism (Stockwin, on. cit., pp. 147ff.) (Also see
George 0. Totten, HI, The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar
Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
stockwin, op. cit., p. 111.
104

For example, in 1975» Deputy Prime Minister Takeo
Fukuda’s faction was generally considered conservative, whereas
the faction under Prime Minister Takeo Kiki was identified with
its leader's progressive, reformist position, Destler, at al.,
op. cit., p. 51 • An insightful characterization of Miki’s
position in the LDP is Hatakeyama’s observation of Miki as a
"left-handed one-point pitcher" within the predominantly rightwing conservative mainstream of the LDP, Eatakeyama, op. cit.,
p - 23f e

Stockwin, op. cit., p. 111.
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not great enough to prevent collaboration between leaders of
106
the faction at the ideological extremes."
Taken as a whole,
the LDP is a diffuse political organization and its leaders
have proved to be flexible.

The essentially pluralistic

character of the LDP defies a neat characterization of various
groups w?thin the party except by way of its basic units, that
is, factions which are the very source of the diffusion of policy
making power.

Frequently, factional alliances and cleavages within the
LDP have been identified by the press and others in terms of

(

"ex-bureaucrats" ("ex-official") versus "pure politicians” (or
,
107
"professional politician") groupings.
It is true that certain
factions, such as Miki's, had many fewer former bureaucratic members
than did, for example, Sato's and Fukuda's factions. While this
classification or characterization may serve a general journalistic
classificatory purpose, it does not imply any meaningful unity or
cohesion of groups so classified.

First of all, as Scalapino

----- jgg----------"In contrast," as Langdon points out, "among the
Socialists ideological differences frequently split the party, and
rival coalitions of factions often dispute violently over policies
and doctrine," Langdon, Politics in Japan, op. cit., p. 143.
However, even here, the diffusion of ideological groupings takes
place by the emergence of new factional coalitions cutting across
old ideological dusputes and, Stockwin notes that "the [.Socialist]
factions seem to have shaken off ideological restraints and to
have become similar to conservative factions," Langdon, ibid.;
Stockwin, "Faction and Ideology in Postwar Japanese Socialism,"
op. cit., p. 49.
■^Scalapino and Masumi. on. cit.r pp. 5b-58, Stockwin, op.
cit., p. 112.
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and Masumi point out, each faction is "itself a mixture in this
respect, and other considerations, especially the private deals

for personal power were of greater importance in establishing interfactional alliances."

108
Secondly, members of the same party origin

may differ on specific policy matters.

For example, Yasuhiro

Nakasone and Takeo Miki were both members of the old Progressive
Party which had been hostile to Yoshida's Liberals.

1097 However,

the two men differed, at least at first, on the question of Japan's
ratification of the NFT( as will be discussed later.

Other criteria such as keiretsu (marriage ties) and
business background, both of which have often been assumed to
contribute to behavioral unity or cohesion of

£

those who are so

related through marriages or belong to the same occupational group,
are also more pluralistic and empirically diffused than have been
assumed. As. Langdon, Craig, and others have pointed out, the
keiretsu does not necessarily imply the group unity or cohesion
of those who are so related,while it may indicate the inter
connectedness of various "elite" members of the Japanese society.
For example, ‘the president of one major firm was related through
marriage to both Miki and Sato, but he was active in raising funds

j_08

109

i

"

"

Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 59Stockwin, op. cit., p. 112.

■

(
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for "both Kono and Sato, but not for Miki.

The view that

the LDP is essentially the "party of Big Business" has recently
been severely challenged.

111
First of all, the administrative

guidance of business is not the same as the fusion of the two.
It is true that many senior civil servants ("officials") find
their second career in big business in Japan.

However, unlike

in the United States, the"exchange"of personnel in Japan is one
way traffic from government to business, amakudari (descend from heaven),
but not in the other direction.

While it may indicate, among

others, the tradition of executive supremacy in Japan, it does
not necessarily imply oneness of the two.

The "Japan

Incorporated” approach was the only way for the national survival
and economic growth of Japan, following its defeat in World War II.
It does not necessarily negate various pluralistic elements of
policy differences between the government-party (LDP) and
big business, nor does it imply the absence of pluralistic elements
within the business community as will be discussed later in this
study.

The fact that the LDP has been anything but dogmatic,
112
as pointed out by Destler and his Brookings associates, may be

ITT) Langdon,

Politics in Japan, op. cit., p. 148;
Craig in Vogel (ed.), pp. cit., passim; and Curtis in Vogel (ed.),
Ibid., passim.
ill---j^2 Curtis, ibid.
Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 51•
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as much due to

LDP factionalism as it may he due to the

tradition of consensus politics in the political culture of
Japan.

Factionalism is thus the single most important cause

of the diffusion of policymaking power within the political
structure.

Factionalism, by definition, implies pluralism.

The LDP, as a loose "federation” of factions, is thus a diffuse
political organization whose internal cohesion is a function of
the state of an equilibrium at any given time, as noted earlier.

The fact that a faction is essentially a closed exclusive
mutual aid club and that a faction does not represent a commitment
to a political program or a set of policy issues
C

has further

implications for the diffusion of policymaking power in two
important ways:

(l) A continuous factional strife and shifting

factional coalitions; and (2) the proliferation of cross-factional
factions.

Since the basic raison d'etre of factions is self-interest,
each faction is constantly engaged in the maximisation of its
factional interests/ by way of constant interfactional political
maneuvering.

The battle is to solidify the strength of each

faction and to expand its power by increasing its members or by
holding together a winning coalition of factions.
are usually some floating or unattached votes

Since there

in the arena

for the winning factional coalition and some individuals are
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more easily bought or won away, the interfactional political
maneuvering is continuous and intense.

113

To the extent that

each faction is a semi-permanent exclusive mutual aid club,
with a degree of personal loyalty and the mutuality of obligation,
the interfactional political arena is one which is characterized
by cleavages, alliances, and treachery which account for ever
shifting factional coalitions.

It is because of this fluidity

that "no one can be certain of the exact strengths of the various
11^
factions at any given time."
Nowhere are the interfactional
competition and intrigues more intense than in the battle for
115
the party presidency which carries with it the prime ministership.

(

This contest for the LDP presidency "tends to perpetuate
116
factionalism as a major element within LDP politics."
Since the
party is divided into factions, the successful LDP presidential
candidate must win and maintain the support of a majority factional
coalition.

No sooner is one battle over than preparations ;for

117
the next round of the contest begin.

113

^Scalapino and Masumi, on. cit., pp. 57~58.

lli5Ibid., p. 58.

11*5An excellent account of this aspect of the intra-LDP

(
I,.

politics is Thayer,’The Election of a Japanese Prime Minister,”
pp. cit.
— VTA
^ “Stockwin, pp. cit., p. 107.
’The present general rule is to hold such a conference,
every three years; they were held every two years up to 1972. rn
special circumstances like the forced resignation or Tanaka in 197^»
ad hoc procedures are followed. In that particular case, an LDP
elder stateman— Etsusaburo Shiina— negotiated with major faction
leaders and gained consensus support for Takeo Miki, who was then
chosen without opposition by the party's Diet members. More
typically, however, the selection is openly contested and the xprmal
intraparty ballot is crucial.” Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 01,
footnote 9-
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If the procedure and the politics involved in the selection
of an LDP prime minister represents the diffusion of policymaking
power among the various "king-makers" (factions) within the LDP,
the "basic raison d'etre of factions implies the proliferation of
factions other than the "basic factions.

It has been pointed out

that a faction does not represent a commitment to an ideological
line or a specific set of policies.

Not even the support given

to a successful party presidential candidate by the winning coalition
of factions(the "Main Current" or "Mainstream" factions) represents
a commitment "try these factions to the prime minister's policies
118
or program. The designations of factions as the "Main Current"
and the "Anti-Main Current" lie simply in their support or nonsupport
119
of a particular candidate for the party presidency.

It follows from the fact that the basic factions are prior
to ideological or policy commitments that separate groups can, and
often do, emerge along various ideological and policy lines.
These extrafactional groups, which Fukui calls "intra-party interest
120
groups,"
are more often than not cross- or transfactional in
118
See, for example, Thayer, "The Election of a Japanese
Prime Minister," op. cit.
Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 59*
Fukui, Party in Power, op. cit., p. 107-

i

(
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nature,pursuing particular political interests or policy goals.
Fukui' explains these groups as follows:
Some of these groups have "been interested in promoting
the interests of particular external groups, usually
in the form of facilitating special legislation and.
appropriation of public funds, and therefore may be
regarded as intraparty interest groups. Typical of
such groups have been, for example, those formed
over the issues of ex-servicemen’s pensions, the
payment of reward to former landowners, and the medical
insurance administration. Some have been related to
external groups only marginally and operated as inde
pendent and self-contained intra-party groups to
promote particular causes or policies. These may be
regarded as policy groups, typical of which have been
the Soshirikai, the Asian Affairs Study Group, and the
Afro-Asian Affairs Study Group. Much rarer have been
regionally-based groups, such as the Kanto MHRs’ Associ
ation, which represent one of the oldest forms of Intraparty grouping in the history of Japanese parties.*21
Needless to say,

these crossfactional factions serve only to

reinforce the already complex factional equation thus causing
further diffusion of policymaking power within the political
.

,

structure.

122

121
Fukui, Party in Power, on. cit.. p. 107. A detailed
discussion of these groups can be found in Chapters 8 and 9» ibid.
122
An example of two typical rival groups of this nature
on the same foreign policy issue regarding China between 19&5 an<i
1972 were the Asian Affairs Study Group and the Asian-African
Affairs (or Afro-Asian Affairs) Study Group respectively repre
senting the right-wing and the left-wing position. The former
appeared to be strong during the Sato administration among the
factions commonly regarded as ’’right-wing” such as those of Fukuda
and Sato. Stockwin, on. cit., p. 112. Examples of other policyoriented groups are the Seirankai, the Soshinkai mentioned above,
the Shishikai, and the Shoshikai. Stockwin, ibid., pp. 112; and
Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, op. cit.,pp. 6 and ^9* These
groups will be discussed later in the context of the politics of
the NTT ratification.
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As Fukui points out, factions may not "be as fashionable
and powerful as they used to be under such powerful leaders as
123
Ono, Kono, and Ikeda.
However, as Fukui also points out,
virtually all attempts by the LDP leadership to abolish the LDP
124
factionalism have resulted in failure.
In the final analysis,
factional political considerations govern almost all major aspects
of

intraparty politics, including the composition of the major

policymaking organs of the LDP and the election of LDP prime
ministers. Most importantly, as Fukui notes, factionalism is the
most decisive determinant in the process of policymaking,especially
on ’’special” policy issues that are controversial inside and outside
the party circle.

125

One final question* in the context of- factionalism, relative
to its contribution to the diffusion of policymaking power, pertains
to the implications of factionalism for consensus politics which,
in turn, characterizes the type of leadership, the style of the
foreign policymaking behavior, and the nature of final policy
outputs themselves.

Fukui, Jiyuminshuto to Seisaku Kettei, o£. cit., p. 17-l 124

Ibid., p. 170.

125 Ibid., p. 172.
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Factionalism in Japan has been described in terms of both
negative and positive roles it plays in

Japanese politics.
A

As has been discussed earlier, the ultimate raison d'etre of
a faction is self-interest.

The most important aspect of

factional politics is, as Scalapino and Masumi note, ’‘that factional
interest tends to take precedence over party interest and, one is
126
tempted to say, over the public interest as well.”
Echoing
a similar view, Fukui observes that "what may be regarded as the
negative effect [of factionalism] is, first of all, the fact that
factional considerations exert decisive influences not only on
intraparfcy [appointments] but also on appointments for public offices

12?

of the government."

(

Consequently, as Ike points out, the existence

of factions is often decried by journalists and obervers; "even
professional politicians have urged their abolition from time to
128
129
time, but to no avail,"
as noted also by Fukui. For example,
Langdon notes, "both Prime Ministers Ikeda and Sato announced the
intention of picking ministers on the basis of ability and not
factional membership, but these two qualifications have continued
to be curiously in harmony.
125

Failure to recognize a deserving faction

.Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 19.

127

Fukui, Jiyuminshuto to Setsaku Kettei,
(the translation is my own:).

op.

cit., p . 164

128 Ike,
TT
-x , p. 83.
D,
op. cit.

129

Fukui, loc. cit., supra, footnote 82 of this section.
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might lead to its defection and "bring fatal consequences for the
Prime Minister or his faction in the next presidential contest
130
n
within the party.’
Stockwin also has this to say:
For many observers (including sections of the Japanese
press) factions are seen as having a hearing on the
'health' of Japanese politics. Do they not, for
instance, result in the over-emphasis of narrow and
selfish personal interest within the Party? Are they
not associated with a considerable degree of corruption?
Do they not make achievement of Cabinet and Party office
excessively dependent on an inter-factional bargaining
process which takes insufficient account of merit or
suitability for office? Do they not produce instability
and policy paralysis?^
In brief, factionalism has been characterized as impeding intraparty
democracy, unity,

132

133
and stability.

On the other hand, these pernicious effects notwithstanding,
Ike, for example, maintains that "its consequences are not entirely
13^
135
negative”' in that factions facilitate intraparty communication,"
and Japanese politics would be, as Baerwald maintains, far less open
136
than it is without factions.
Moreover, in terms of a "checks and

3 Langdon, Politics in Japan, on. cit., p. 1^3.
131
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 106.
132
Ike, on. cit., p. 83*
133
Scalapino and Masumi, on. cit., np. 79-80.
13^
“*■
Ike, op. cit., p. 83.
135------- --Fukui, Party in Power, op. cit., p. 137» is quoted as
saying: "Whereas a meeting of four hundred members would no doubt
make it rather difficult for each to.eynress, his views freely, and
for a-TT to come to agreement on sreciiiC problems, a relatively
small group of a few dozen members may find it much easier to satisfy
such needs," Ike, op. cit., p. 83.
Baerwald, "Tento-Mura: At the Making of a Cabinet," ojd. cit.,
p. 83.
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blance" role of factionalism, others have pointed out that
"factionalism is a pluralistic element within the LHP, and
makes it more difficult for a prime minister to act in an auto13?
cratic manner.”

Still others have likened the factional poli

tics to bargaining processes among various parties in a multiparty system with a coalition government, such as those in
Fourth Republic France, postwar Italy, or the Weimar Republic.

138

Seen in this manner, the factional politics in. Japan in general,
and that in the LHP in particular, would not appear to be unique
to Japan.

What malces the factionalism peculiar to Japan, however,
(

is a combination of various factors which have been discussed
in the paper:

first, the ubiquity of factions; second, their

nature being essentially a personal mutual aid club for selfinterest that is closed and exclusive; third, the extent of
factional practices; fourth, the Japanese ways of reaching
agreements through pervasive factionalism; fifth,
the style of leadership; and sixth, the generally eclectic
quality of their final agreements because of

consensus

decision-making.

Because of the foregoing factors, there has never been
a de Gaulle in
('

Japanese party politics.

To this point,

the discussion of this section now turns.
^^Totten and Kawakami, on. cit., pp. 109-22*
1 QP
' "
rr" ” n
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 106.
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V.

It is in order to note at the very outset that-some
aspects of the.Japanese style of political leadership/ and aspects
related to it, -are not peculiar to Japan.

Describing the slow changes

in democratic party leadership, Robert Micheles wrote, in 1915s
The democratic method of election has its own peculiar
loyalty. As fas as individual details are concerned
it is incalculable, and yet on general lines we can
count upon its activity with more certainty than upon
the policy of princes. Through all democracy there
runs a current of slow-moving traditions, for the
ideas of the masses change only step by step and by
gentle gradat ions.39
Commenting on the general constraints placed upon democratic
party leadership, Richard Rose has this to say:
Studying party leadership is almost as difficult as
exercising it. This is because party leaders have
strengths and limitations resulting from a variety
of governmental, party, sociological, and psychological
pressures.

(

As one compares these remarks with the style of

Japanese

political leadership and its slowness, as described by
141
Scalapino and Hellmann,
among others, there may appear to be
some similarities.

However, a close look at the Japanese political

leadership reveals certain peculiarities that appear to be unique

155

Robert Micheles, Political Parties: A Sociological
Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem-Democracy (New
York: The Free Press, 1962), "The Stability of Leadership,”
pp. 122-123.
140
Richard Rose, "Complexities of Party Leadership," in
Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), Comparative politics:
Notes and Readings (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Iress, iyc4J,
p. 259, an abridged version of Rose's article originally appearing
in Parliamentary Affairs (Summer 19&3), 257-73*
^

Supra, p. 3*
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to Japan.

Having defined the ideal leader of a Japanese faction

as "one possessing- seniority, the personality, and skill required
to bring divergent elements together, and access to funds
....

capable in effecting compromises, achieving consensus-’
—
142

in these respects, a man adept at political tactics and strategy,”
Scalapino and Masumi note:
In themselves, these qualities are not basically •
different from those sought in British or American
leadership. As societies move toward modernity and
mass orientation, the broad requirements of leadership
take on an increasingly similar pattern and permit ap
proximately the same range of choices. Cultural
differences, however, to this point have continued to
provide vital distinctions both in certain specific
qualities, and in general behavior patterns:[emphases
addedJ.143

(

The following three features appear to be peculiar to
Japan:

firstly, unlike the observation by Micheles that "the

democracy has an inherent preference for the authoritarian
144
solution of important questions,”
the patterns of
postwar
Japanese foreign policymaking processes have been, as in prewar
Japan, characterized by the policymakers' propensity to avoid
an authoritarian solution, or at least an image thereof, to
important "politically” controversial questions, domestic or
foreign.

Frequent "little" political "crises” in the Diet are

142 Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 18, footnote 7«
l2j3 Ibid.
144 Micheles, op. cit., p. 342.

C
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the testimony that in Japan the -concept of the iron law
of oligarchy is in less than a hospitable climate of opinion,
even though the LDP has dominated the political scene over the
past quarter of a century like a standing committee of Japan.
Neither

"mechanistic” majoritarianism nor the "iron law

of oligarchy" can he an undisputed doctrine in Japan.

Secondly, reference has already been made to the mutuality
of obligations on the part of the leader and the followers of a
faction which is a mutual aid club.

This fact implies that the

followers are not necessarily submissive to their faction leader.
According to Rose,
leaders, whether party bureaucrats or parliamen
tarians, will inevitably develop vested interests
different from rank-and-file members due to their
high position in the party organization. Rank-andfile members will, inevitably and collectively,
lack power in the organization; furthermore, psycho
logical feelings of gratitude and deference will tend
to make them submissive .1^5

It is true that the Japanese factional leaders' interests are

345
Rose, op. cit., p. 239*
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c
different from those of the rank-and-file members.

Due to their

seniority and the political "clout" available to them such as
their connection with sources of political funds, the leaders’
objectives are higher than those of the rank-and-file members.
It is less obvious, however, that the rank-and-file members are
.submissive to their leader.

The ever-present possibility of
«•

treachery in the process of an intense and continuous inter
factional maneuvering would appear to give the rank-and-file
members of a faction a sense of mutuality, if not loyalty,
rather than submissiveness vis-a-vis their faction leader.

146

(
Finally, related to the above two factors, there are
certain distinctive features peculiar to the political leadership
in Japan. These features stem from the Japanese cultural tradition
governing their social relations, as has been discussed earlier,
on the one hand, and the practical necessity for compromise
on the other.

It has already been pointed out that the tradition

146
Fukui's account of internal schism within various
factions underscores the fluidity of internal relations within
each basic faction even though, as stated previously, each major
faction enjoys a degree of permanency and stability. Fukui,
Jiyuminshuto to Seaisaku Kettei, o£. cit., p. 171.
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of consensus politics tends to avoid open debate's, direct
confrontation, and
majoritarian principle.

final decision-making through a simple
The typical leader is, therefore, "a

person with good connections for raising funds, skilled in
behind-the-scene [emphases added] political maneuvering, and
loyal [emphasis added] to his superiors and benevolent [emphasis
added] to his followers.”
quality is

147

Also important in the leadership

that of "sincerity” and character in a broad

148
sense.
.As Scalapino and Masumi point out, a strong type of
leader, as was Kishi, is not an ideal leader in Japan.
. . .
But there is also the strong type ofleader who does in fact dominate the scene because
of person'al qualities such as those mentioned in the
paragraph above. Many of these are "bosses” in
somewhat the traditional American Tammany Hall sense,
although they do not display oratorial talents or
manifest publicly a colorful, extroverted personality
in the manner of a James Curley or ”Big Bill” Thompson—
in Japan, such qualities would not be political assets.
The strong, silent man whose finess is discerned in
the results that flow from actions taken in private ^ 9
is much closer, to the Japanese ideal .[emphases added].
Consequently, "one of the striking characteristics of these
leaders [the ideal type] is that although they hold elective
office, they are singularly lacking in charismatic qualities. .
....... [Thus] Japan has never produced a Churchill, a de Gaulle,
or a Kennedy, a man with magnetism and great popular appeal,"

150

Ike, op. cit., p. 84; Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit.,
pp. 18-20.
Ibid., p. 18; Destler, pp. cit., pp. 108-109
149
■Ibid., p. 19Ike, pp. cit., p. 84.
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much less a Fuhrer.

Some leaders are, in fact, chosen for their

weakness, not their strength, in favor of a stable factional
equilibrium.

Their tendency to be bland or neutral enables them

to serve as mediators or caretakers while stronger men around them
counterbalance each other without being unduly threatened by a
central figure.

Titular leadership is, therefore, not necessarily

to be equated with power in Japan.

151

One of the most recent

examples of this type of leader in the period covered by the temporal
domain of this study was Prime Minister Takeo Miki who had skillfully
. 152
steered his NPT bill through the Diet in 1976.

As Fukui points out, factional politics is a decisive domestic
constraint especially on ’’special” controversial foreign policy
q u e s t i o n s T h e Kishi example shows, according to Destler
and others,.-LDP factional politics are never very far below
the surface in Japanese foreign policymaking on publicly controversial
152j.
issues.
Factionalism alters the process of making and implementing
a particular foreign policy.

In some cases, new policy initiatives and
155
commitments are brought to the surface because of factionalism.

For example, the i960 Treaty crisis was due partially to
LDP factional politics.

151
.^Scalapino

intra-

As Scalapino and Masumi put it,

Masumi, on. cit., p. 19-

See, for example, Hatakeyama, on. cit., pp. 232 ff.
153
^ 2j.Fukui, Jiyuminshuto to Seisaku Kettei, pp. cit., p. 172.
Destler, et al., op. cit., pp 62-63.
155iW d.
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at no time during the crisis did the majority party
act in united fashion. The anti-Main Current factions
(Miki-Matsumura, Ishihashi, and K5no) openly denounced
Kishi's tactics, and helped in a variety of ways to
strengthen the anti-Kishi front. Even the so-called
middle factions (ikeda, Ono, and Ishii) although sup
porting the party and the treaty, directed some
criticism against Kishi and Sato for their "highhanded
tactics." Thus, within the Liberal Democratic party,
the factions of Kishi and his brother, Sat5 Eisaku,
tended to become isolated. This, perhaps more than
any other single factor, made Kishi's resignation
inevitable .-5»
Eager to capture the party presidency, the LDP presidential
candidates have tended, on occasion^

to capitalize on foreign

policy issues without a long-term policy planning, and then
proceed incrementally.

In the LDP presidential election of 1964,

for example,
one of the candidates, Eisaku Sato, chose to speak
out boldly on the issue of Okinawa reversion as a
means of distinguishing his platform from those of
his opponents, but, as characteristic of political
gambits, with no particular strategy for fullfilling
his promise. Although Sato lost the election to
Ikeda, he did come to office four months later when
illness forced Ikeda's resignation. He renewed his
pledge to pursue the matter of Okinawa reversion with
American leaders. Sato had picked up the issue almost
casually, but as premier he became increasingly
attached to it emotionally as well as politically, and
the final Japanese position on the terms of reversion
bore the stamp of his personality.*57
Likewise, Kakuei Tanaka"used the China issue to his advantage in
1972 by lining up weaker faction leaders in favor of a thorough
going China policy shift against the more cautious stance of the

Scalanino and Masumi, on. cit., p. 141.
157
,
Destler, et al., pp. cit., p. 26.
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i^8
other major contender, Takeo Pukuda."
Tanaka took action
on. this issue after he reached power. .

In summary, the role of factionalism in the Japanese
foreign policymaking process appears to be rather significant.
Although the United States-Japan Security Treaty was eventually
revised, the last-minute cancellation of President Eisenhower's
planned visit to Tokyo and the subsequent downfall of Kishi were em
barrassing to both Tokyo and Washington.

One also notices that, as in the case of the Sato and Tanaka
campaigns, foreign policy issues are closely related to
LDP factional politics.

intra-

Although he took advantage of the wide

spread support for normalization of diplomatic relations with
China during his campaign, Tanaka was cautious once he was elected
in 19?2.

He acted only after there had been a massive movement of

opinion against Sato's previous policies on the matter (doubtless
\ 159
the "Nixon Shock" helped create such a climate of opinion;.

Because of the factional politics, which is closely inter
twined with Japanese foreign policymaking, the type of foreign
policymaking leadership has been affected.

''Compelling

158Ibid., pp. 62-63.
159
^Stockwin, op. cit., p. II3 .
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problems are unlikely to be solved through bold, .innovative,
and veturesome political leadership."

Rather, the foreign

policymaking process of Japan will continue to be dominated
by "bureaucratic-factional-politics,

161

transpiring mainly

in private and in response to external pressure (i.e., incre•v 162
mental foreign policy muddle;.

Thus, 0ne may conclude that

the Japanese factionalism is responsible, more than anything
else, for the characteristic

of the Japanese foreign policy-

making process which is:
[a] diffuse « • . 'immobilist' process of compromise
and consensus that has characterized all past poli
tical [italics in the original] decisions regarding
foreign affairs.1^3
r

1 Ike, op. cit., p. 8^.
161
Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki, op. cit., p. 15.
^^Hellmann, "Japan:
Policy," pp. cit., p. 8.

Its Domestic Politics and Foreign

163Ibid., p. 7.
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C.

Grounism and Diffusion of Policymaking Power in the Political
Structure

What follows represents, as noted earlier, an examination
of the Japanese political structure in terms of the diffusion of
policymaking power.

It is not a systematic description

of either the formal institutions of political leadership or the
major actors involved in the Japanese foreign policymaking process.

1.

Formal Institutions of Political Leadership.
(a)

Diet. According to the doctrine of popular sovereignty,

the National Diet under the new 1947 Constitution is the highest
organ of state power and the sole law-making authority of the State
(Article 41).

The Diet is patterned after the British system.

Accordingly, the fundamental features governing relationships Between
the Emperor, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the bureaucracy
are highly reminiscent of the British arrangements, although some
164-

aspects, such as the Diet committee systems, are American-oriented.

The Diet is composed of two houses:

the House of Repre

sentatives and the House of Councillors, both popularly elected.

Of the two, the former is more important.

Although the term

164
Ike, op. cit., p. 73*
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of office is four years, it is often dissolved before the term
is completed in which casea new election must be held within
forty days.

According to the original belief, the House of Councillors
was to be a "stabilizing force” which would show "sound judgment,"
should the lower house run to extremes, by way of checking and
restraining the lower house.
tions;

This belief was based on two assump

first, the belief that those elected from the nation at

large would be individuals who had distinguished themselves in
their various professions thus giving the weight of their prestige to
Diet deliberations; and second, the assumption that the upper house
members as such would be above

partisan politics.

166

However, candidates for the upper chamber needed partisan
connections, such as religious groups and labor organizations, on
the national scale in their bid for

public office.

In addition,

the House of Councillors does play a definite role in the legis
lative process by way of stalling certain bills which has tended
to make it difficult in reality for the upper house members to

* ^Ibid.; Destler, op. cit., p. 50*
166
Ike, op. cit., pp. 28-29; Destler, op. c.jt., p. 50*
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^

stay above the ever-present inter- and intraparty factional poli
tics.

The role of the upper house becomes crucial especially

because of the rigidity of the parliamentary schedule. The original
belief notwithstanding, the politicization of the upper house has
thus become the rule rather than

the exceptions.

Taken as a whole, however, the constitutional position'of
the upper house is .inferior to that of the lower house.

'The con

stitutional inferiority of the House of Councillors is manifest in
the restricted nature of its power to reject or delay the passage
168
of legislation originating in the House of Representatives.”

^

In the case of ordinary bills, the House of Representatives
can override the upper house rejection or amendments, if any, with
a two-thirds majority of the members present.

On such important

matters as the designation of a Prime Minister, budget, and treaties,
concurrence by the House of Councillors is not necessary provided
that th^ lower house approves the given bill at least one month prior
to the end of the particular legislative session.

As will be noted

later, this was a factor to consider in Prime Minister Miki's drive
for the passage of his HIT bill.

l67Ibid., p. 29 168
Stockwin, on. cit., p. 75*

('
1
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The length of the Diet session is important for various
reasons..

First,

Article

68 of

the Diet Law, based on

the concept of "non-continuity of session," stipulates that "any
matter not decided during a session shall not be carried over to
the following session," except that in certain instances the
Diet committees can continue their deliberations into the ad
journment.

Matters so entrusted to them can then be carried into

the next session.

Second, for a variety of reasons, which may be

political or administrative depending on the nature of a given bill,
the Government is usually under strong pressure to complete its
legislative program by the end of a given session (extensions in-

68 of

f

eluded).

^

Law, the Government is usually under pressure in terms of the parlia

Stated in another way, because of Article

the Diet

mentary timetable versus certain number of important bills which
require legislative action.

The pressure upon the Government becomes greater when there
is

powerful intraparty opposition within the LDP to an important

bill.

On one hand, there is the principle of "non-continuity of

session" which means the Government must carry its bill through the
Diet, in spite of the intraparty opposition; within a given time
frame.

On the other hand, the Government needs time to negotiate

with the opposition in view of the non-support from segments of
its own party.

As will be discussed later, the NPT bill was one

of such bills finding itself in a predicament.
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The length of the Diet session becomes even more important
due to the fact that -it is the Steering Committee of each House,
not the plenary session, that decides the order in which legislation
is to he discussed.

169

Precisely because it is within committees

that the real consensus politics takes place, it means that the
Opposition can apply its delaying tactics to any legislative
program it opposes, especially in the Steering Committee.

Membership of the standing committees and special committees
is allocated in proportion to party strength in the House, with the
Steering Committee being the arbiter (Article 46, the Diet Law).
Article 25 of the Diet Law provides that the chairman of the Standing
Committee be formally elected from the committee membership by a vote
of the plenary session.

However, in practice, they are selected by

the speaker according to the distribution of party strength in each
committee.

As Stockwin remarks, one gets the impression that "the

170
principle here is one of 'winner take all.’"

However, Baerwald

has a different view.

169
The American influence on the structure of the Diet is
manifest in its system of standing and special committees. As in
the United States Congress, the bulk of the actual legislative work
is done at the committee level. All bills, whether initiated by
individual Diet members, by the Cabinet, or referred from the other
House, are first sent straight to each appropriate committee. These
committees have the power to "kill” any bill referred to them with
the exception of bills referred from the other House. If, within
seven days of a committee decision to "kill" a bill, twenty or more
members of the House should demand the release of the bill, it is
released and must be submitted to the plenary session.

170

Stockwin, pp. pit., p. 256,
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Baerwald quotes a Diet chairman as saying:

"the affairs

*

1 *7l

of committees are governed by a board of directors (ri.ji kai).”

The ri.ji (directors) are appointed in each committee, and the Opposition parties obtain some of these positions.

172

According to

Baerwald, the directors meet privately "prior to an open committee
,.173
session.”
'^

As in all Japanese organizations, the nature of decisionmaking in the Diet is private rather than open.

Compared to the

plenary sessions, the committee sessions are "private,” and within
this private system there still exists another “private” layer, a
subsystem of decision-making, i.e., ri.ji kai. Baerwald states:
they meet privately prior to an open committee
session,...... In the past, the Foreign Affairs
Committee had also held executive sessions for the
entire committee. This practice, however, was dis
continued after the December 1972 House of Representative
election, during which the Communists increased their
strength in the Diet and began urging that the executive
sessions be discontinued, because , they alleged, such
sessions had allowed private "deals" to be made between
the majority LDP and the minority opposition parties.*74

Even though the Diet is legally the "sole law-making
authority of the State," the role of the Diet in legislative
functions is relatively insignificant .compared to that which is

171 Baerwald in Scalapino, op. cit., p. 40, quoting Kimura
Toshio, Chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs
Committee, as of December, 1973*
172
,
Ibra.
l73Ibid.
1’% b i d -
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played by the executive branch.

Bills may be sponsored by private

members in either House, but most bills are proposed, by the Cabinet
as in the case of the British Parliament.

As Ike puts it:

"that

it [the Diet] participates in the legislative process is not to
be denied; . . . .

it is difficult [however] to be more precise than

175
that.” ^ Even the relatively few bills sponsored ty individual Diet
members frequently originate in a government branch which has in the
past been successful in finding a Diet member prepared to pilot a
piece of legislation through the Diet.

Many of the reasons for the executive supremacy

Japan are

the same as for other democracies and will be discussed later.
In Japan, however, the LDP domination of the Diet and the Cabinet
for more than a period of two decades has made this tendency even
more pronounced.

In theory, the Diet was to oversee all actions of

the Cabinet; to control the purse-strings of the State; to ratify
treaties;and to designate the Prime Minister.

These provisions,

however, have been academic because of the party-govemment, i.e.,
176
the LDP domination of both the Diet and the Cabinet.

However, the long LDP domination of the Japanese political
scene has not rendered the Opposition completely powerless.
_
Ike, op. cit., p. 27.
176

.

Stockwin, o£. cit., p. 75-
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opposition parties have several avenues whereby they can embarrass or
harrass the LDP-govemment, and even block the passage of an LDPgovemment sponsored bill.

Major sources of the opposition

"tools" of obstructionism are:

(l) the structure of the LHP;

(2) parliamentary maneuvering; and (3) extraprocedural and extraparliamentary factors.

First of all, one of the major sources of the Opposition
strengths in the parliamentary arena is, ironically, the LDP estab
lishment itself.

The LDP, as will be discussed later, is a

loose federation of factions.

LDP solidarity is a function of

that among the intraparty factions and that within each of the functions.
As Scalapino and Masumi point out, the chemistry of the intra-LDP
factional equilibrium is mercurial.

177

At best, it is an unstable

equilibrium.

Some of the recent examples of the erosion of the LDP solidarity
include: first, the desertion in 197^ from the "main-current" (or
"mainstream") coalition, supporting Prime Minister Tanaka, by the
leaders of the two powerful factions in the coalition, namely, Miki
and Fukuda; and second, the abstention in 197^ "by 88 LDP members in
the ratification vote on the China aviation agreement.
erosion of

A similar

party solidarity was one of the key factors in the

------ 177--------------------------'Scalapino and Masumi, on. cit., pp. 5*4—65.

,,
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politics of the NPT ratification.

The declining trend in the

relative and absolute parliamentary strength of the LDP may, in
the future, further increase the leverageof the Opposition on •
one hand, and aggrandize the relative power of theDiet vis-a-vis
the executive branch, on the other.

Secondly, even though its relative power in legislative
functions is less than that of the executive branch in reality,
the Diet in general, and the Opposition parties in particular, can
exert significant influence on the foreign policymaking through
normal procedures.

Foremost among the parliamentary procedural

"tools" for the Opposition parties is their constitutional right
to "conduct investigations in relation to government, and may demand
the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of
records” (Article 62).

The gruelling interpellation of the Prime

Minister and any of his Cabinet members as weil as the sharp
questioning of any government members can take place in the plenary
sessions and in committee sessions.

Not having shared, nor having much hope of sharing, the
power to rule with the LDP, the Opposition parties have developed
over the years the mentality and the habit of using these questionand-answer sessions as a

forum of obstructionism for the sake of

obstructionism.
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V

The committee of-each House, particularly the lower
house standing committees on budget and foreign affairs where
debates of national significance take place, have been the most
important forum for parliamentary debates.

As in the United

States, these Diet committees are empowered to hold public
hearings.

It is for this reason that the Opposition parties use

these committee sessions to attack and embarrass the Government,
178
at times, simply to gain publicity. '

The propensity on the part of the Opposition parties in
favor of obstructionism and publicity is matched by the incli
nation on the part of the Government to be overly cautious, to be
^

ambiguous, and even to cover up.

As Destler and his associates

point out,
[the Japanese] ministers tend to respond by speaking
cautiously. And their tendency toward caution in
action is reinforced as well. Indeed, almost any step
taken in U.S.-Japanese relations is colored by concern
about and anticipation of Diet reaction and interpol
ation, and how it will be reported in the press.

An equally powerful ''tool" at the disposal of the Opposition
parties in terms of the parliamentary maneuvering has been the
rigidity of the Diet timetable^ as noted earlier.
178
179

Even though

Stockwin. on. cit., p. 80.
'
--Destler, on. cit., p. 66.

C
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the LDP controls the Steering Committee of each House which
decides the order in which legislation is to he discussed, the
Opposition parties can resort to several techniques in order to
frustrate the passage of a particular bill.

If the end of a session is approaching, they can attempt
to delay by filibustering some contentious- piece of legislation.
If, on the other hand, the Government assumes an intransigent
position, the Opposition may decide to boycott the remainder of
the session, thus forcing the Government to face two alternative
courses of action neither one of which the Government would prefer
/

if it can help it

the Government can abandon the bill or -ram

the bill through unilaterally, as did Kishi in 1960.

In view of the social norm in the Japanese culture in which
a high premium is placed on consensus, as past experiences have
proven}

the latter course of action carries with it "the danger

of precipitating a serious political crisis, with the Government
standing accused of having 'broken consensus,' or of having exercised the tyranny of the majority.'"

180

fOQ
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 77*
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■While it is difficult to determine whether this kind of
accusation represents primarily a genuine cultural norm or pri
marily an Opposition strategy, taking advantage of the cultural
milieu, the point is that the LDP-govemment fears just
that kind of accusation.

In any event, the general climate of

opinion in the political culture tends to inhibit any overt
behavior in violation of the traditional norm of consensus.

The

press, for example, has generally proved to be sympathetic to the
Opposition position on a given controversial issue as will be
noted later.

Since the Government does not usually want to abandon a
legislative program just as it does not want to be accused of having
"broken consensus,” nor does it want to be accused of having exer
cised the "tyranny of the majority," it may modify the contentious
piece of legislation

to accomodate the demands of the dp

position.

The processes: of modification of legislative programs or
accomodation (or attempting to accomodate) of the opposition demands
are necessarily slow, and their net result if successful, is an
^electic policy output.
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Depending on the degree of concession to be made by each actor in
the process, the process of consensus building in terms of modifi-.
cation and accomodation can run into an impasse resulting in in
decision or nondecision.

Thirdly, the Opposition has extraprocedural and extraparlia
mentary avenues whereby they can exert direct or indirect influences
on the legislative process, including foreign policymaking.

The

Opposition members are not noted for their politeness, decorum, and
strict adherence to the rules of procedure.
deliberately

Frequently

they make

so much noise with their calls and shouts,

that it is virtually impossible to hear a Prime Minister's speech in
the chamber.

On

rare occasion, violence has broken out with

the Opposition members trying to physically prevent the speaker from
taking his seat, or taking their case to the street in order to drama
tize the issue.

To all this, the publicity-shy Government is vul-

181
nerable, especially on controversial issues. Reischauer states:
even when politicians do not fear for the votes that
sustain them, they may be influenced in their actions
by public clamor and direct political action. Foreign
policy has normally been the area in which the ruling
Liberal Democratic party felt itself most vulnerable to
attack through determined obstructionism by the opposition
parties in the Diet, popular demonstrations in the street
of Tokyo (which like all the major cities leans in its
sympathies toward the opposition), and criticism by the mass
media, which as metropolitan phenomena tend to share in the
leftward lean of the city populations. There can be little
doubt that both direct and indirect popular pressure on
Diet politicians have been constraining influences on
Japanese foreign policy, helping to account for its seeming
timidity and admitted "low posture." 182

1ftl

Destler, op. cit., p.

1ft?

66.

Reischauer in Scalapino,

op. cit., "Introduction," p. xv.
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In view of the foregoing constraints, the success of a
Prime Minister's legislative programs depends both upon
how well he can build consensus within his own LDP and
upon

how much cooperation he can obtain from the op

position, especially when the intra-LDP consensus is either
minimal or precarious.

The necessity of consensus within the LDP and compromise
with the Opposition has resulted in frequently time-consuming,
behind-the-scenes private negotiations involving a small group of
representatives of the major actors involved in a given policy
making.

These extensive consultations and negotiations take place

before a bill is finally submitted to the Diet, involving

c

primarily the LDP Diet members.

Because of the need for accomo

dating the Opposition demands, it has become

a general preference

to extend these "prior consultations and negotiations" to the Op-

183
position members. The ri.ji kai system in various committees was an
example of such consultations and negotiations conducted "behindthe scenes" among a small group of representatives.
Because of the intensive consultations and negotiations
conducted prior to the stage of formal voting for decision-making,
when bills reach the formal decision stage, "debates—

though

heated, tend to have more ceremonial than substantive signifi
cance."^^

183-'Destler, op. cit., p. 65.
1 8 V ..
I oid.
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(b) Prime Minister. Unlike the Meiji Constitution, the
democratic constitution of t$&7 provides the position of the Prime
Minister with impressive legal authority.
the head of his Cabinet.
his Cabinet.

The Prime Minister is

He can appoint or dismiss any member of

He represents the Cabinet, submits bills, reports

on general ^national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet
Moreover, the Prime Minister, along with his Cabinet members,
controls and supervises various administrative branches.

186

The Cabinet, in addition to various general administrative
187
functions, manages foreign affairs and concludes treaties*
As

(

McNelly points out, the supremacy of the Prime Minister in the
Cabinet is further emphasized by the constitutional requirement
that the entire Cabinet must resign if the post of Prime Minister
falls vacant.

188
Thus, the Prime Minister xs clearly the central

figure in the government.

Institutionally, as Fukui notes, "the

Cabinet is a formal institution entirely separate and independent
from the party.

The Cabinet represents the executive power, as

18^Ibid., p. 50.
186
Article 72 of the Constitution■
187
Article 73 of the Constitution.
188
Article 70 of the Constitution7 McNelly, on. cit., p. 78.
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opposed to the legislative power exercised by the Diet and
therefore shared by the party.

189

However, the actual power

of a Prime Minister is a function of various political factors.
Under the new constitution, the Prime Minister is "designated
from among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet,"

190

rather than by the genro or .jushin as under the imperial con
stitution.

As noted earlier, the LDP presidency is synonymous with
the LLP-govemment's premiership.

(

In terms of his actual position

in the executive branch, the Prime Minister of Japan is "quite
191
clearly the most visible figure" in the Japanese government. Thus,
the Prime Minister appears to be more powerful and capable
than he actually is.

For example, the appearance of then Prime Mini

ster Sato's capability in the Japanese foreign policymaking process
was the cause of President Nixon's overestimation of Sato’s capa
bility and his subsequent misunderstanding of. Sato even in terms
of the latter’s personal integrity.

what Nixon did not know was

the fact that, unlike his own capability in the American foreign
policymaking process, Sato's actual capability in the foreign policy
making process of Japan was a function of

LDP factional politics.

189
Fukui, Party in Power, on. cit., p. 93*
^^McNelly, op. cit., p. 78.
191
Ike, o£. cit., p. 25.
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The. Prime Minister's Cabinet members are really a coalition
of factions.

Unlike the "American Cabinet members who are the

"President's Men,"

the Japanese Cabinet members are not the'Trime

Minister's Men," even though the Prime Minister appoints
them.

Every politician wants a cabinet post, even if for only a
short time because of the prestige it gives him.

Moreover, the

cabinet status usually enhances one's ability to get votes in the
next election.

192

Consequently, "more and more the Diet is being

used by the politicians as a mere stepping-stone to Cabinet posts
and, hopefully, to the premiership."

193

(
It has been noted that factional leaders' ultimate as well
as immediate goal is the premiership.

If he were to win the majority

of votes at the LDP convention, a faction leader must promise tangible
rewards such as

Cabinet posts to other faction leaders who either

take the posts for themselves or designate certain members of their
factions for the posts.

Consequently, the composition of a Prime

Minister's Cabinet reflects his strategy of a factional balancing for
political "I.O.U.'s"for the maintenance of his "main-current" coa.lition, as well as for the next LDP convention.

192Ibid.
^^lanaga, op. cit., p. 8.
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The system tends to encourage every Prime Minister to make
maximum use of the coveted cabinet posts for his political advan
tages.

In fact, every Prime Minister has exercised his power to

organize his Cabinet by reshuffling the Cabinet almost annually.

igZi

Needless to say, the nature of the factional character of a
cabinet is heterogeneous, resulting in a vertical (between the Prime
Minister and his Cabinet members) diffusion of policymaking power
within a cabinet itself.

The desertion, as noted earlier, by Miki

and Fukuda, from the "main-current’’ coalition of Tanaka is a good
indicator of the stability of LDP intraparty coalitions in various
states of equilibrium.

(
The diffusion of policymaking power within

Japanese

cabinets appear to become more accentuated on important "non-routine"
("political") issues, as noted earlier.
on important policy issues

To compound the matter,

additional elements of factional poli

tics come into play through the emergence of one or two suprafactional
(or interfactional) factions along

ideological lines of one

kind or another.

Crucial as they are, the factional constraints (the "basic"
institutionalized factions and the "supra" factions) are not the

/'

'*'^Ike, on. cit., p. 25;

McNelly, op. cit., p. £&.
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only major constraints on the Prime Minister's policymaking
power.

As noted earlier, there are \arious ways in which the Op

position can and often does frustrate and harrass a Prime Minister's
foreign policy.

In addition, as also noted earlier, the role played

hy the mass media is significant in creating the general climate of
opinion in the "body politic.

Moreover, as is the case with his

counterparts elsewhere, the Japanese chief executive is also subject
to intragovemmental bureaucratic "pulling and hauling," which is
characteristic of any bureaucratic politics.

In spite of all the constraints upon him, the Japanese Prime
Minister (in the LDP-govemment) is functionally and positionally
central to
reasons:

Japanese politics and the government for two major

first, his function as president of the LDP; and second,

his position as the chief executive of the Government of Japan.

Firstly, unstable as it may be, the winning' coalition of LDP
factions causes thi president of the party to be functionally central
to the party at any given time.

As the chief representative of his

party, it is his function to coordinate and integrate various factions
within his own coalition and those in the "anti-main-current" group.
Because of the fragmented nature of the "federation” of factions,
there is no one other than the party president
who is supposed to play the integrative role.
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(

Secondly, the institutional position of premiership as the
chief executive of the Government of Japan causes a Prime Minister
to he positionally central to all other political groups, regardless
of the precarious nature of his position.

The positonal centrality

of a. Japanese Prime Minister has been accentuated, by the ’’linkage"
between domestic and foreign issues.

195

Various post-W.W.II developments and practices in the manage
ment of international affairs have tended to render the position of
prime minister more visible and his role more central.

Hosoya states:

various events in the international environment are
easily related to the domestic politics of individual
nations. Conversely, domestic political phenomena can
easily have international significance. The develop
ment of such a situation, where the demarcation between
the international and the national politics has become
blurred, makes it difficult to exclusively entrust the
Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry with the manage
ment of foreign policy matters. As observed in the active
uses of "summit diplomacy,"there have been produced many
situations which require the Prime Minister’s leadership.
Related to this factor [is the fact that] the foreign
policy issues themselves have increased in complexity and
variability. This, in turn, has entailed the variability
and the complexity of the number and role of various actors
[involved] in the foreign policymaking process.^96

-'The idea of "linkage” is expressed in various- works,
for example, R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and
International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1966); and Jonathan Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behavior and Linkage
Politics (New York: David McKay, 1973T^^Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki, op. cit., p. 5 (the trans
lation is this writer's own).
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'In the case of Japan/ with the tradition of groupism, this
meant further diffusion of policymaking power and an increase
in the positional centrality of the Prime Minister.
As Hosoya states:
accordingly, the problem of the allocation of roles
and policymaking power among various actors has become
complex. Therefore, it should be pointed out, the'
need of a Prime Minister’s ability to integrate and
coordinate [these various roles and actors] has multi
plied. 197

The increased centrality of his role notwithstanding, the
policymaking power of an LDP Prime Minister remains a function of
complex factional-bureaucratic-political factors as noted earlier.
The image of a typical LDP-Prime Minister may thus be described as
follows:

he is the chief executive sitting at the apex of a vast

and powerful administrative bureaucracy beset by

on-going bureau

cratic infighting; he is.the first minister presiding over what
the Brookings scholars call the "ceremonial" cabinet meetings,
198
which are convened routinely. His success in the formulation and
implementation of important foreign policies depends on how well
he can build a minimum consensus in the foreign policymaking process,
including the Opposition parties; and he is a man sensitive to the
mass media, various interest group demands, the general climate of
opinion, and various external factors such as international events,
general trends in international developments, and overt and
l97Ibid.
^^Destler, op. cit., p. 66.
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•
covert pressures, as well as threats.

A typically prudent and cautious Prime Minister, such as
Sato or Miki, would not only be cautious in his intra- and inter
party dealings but also cultivate channels of accomodation
different views on issues.

of

His style would essentially be that

of a broker-type consensus builder, rather than that of a charis
matic leader taking charge of a

matter in his hands.

Accordingly, the entire policymaking process is a tediously
time consuming one of consensus building, and the final policy output
(

is eclectic in nature,
made in the process.

reflecting concessions and accomodations

In the absence of a bold leadership, therefore,

foreign policymaking in Japan has been passively reactive, as noted
by Scalapino^^ and Hellmann,^^

among others.

Reference has already been made to a small group of the
Prime Minister's close associates and advisors who assist the Prime
Minister as he plays his positionally and functionally central role
in the foreign policymaking process.

Relative to the positional

and functional centrality of the Prime Minister's role, especially
when important ("political") issues are involved, it is in order at
this juncture to ask the following three questions. First , what are
199
~ ~~
77Scalapino in Macridis, on. cit., pp. 277-278.
^^Hellmann, Japan: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy,
on cit., p. i .
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the reasons for the existence of the small group?

Second, who

are the Prime Minister's close associates and advisors?

Third,

how is the existence of such a small group relevant to this study?

The existence of the small group around the Prime
Minister assisting him on important ("political") policy matters
is a logical result of the nature of the Japanese cabinet on one
hand, and the paucity of the Prime Minister's staff, on the other.
As noted earlier, the composition of an LHP Prime Minister's Cabinet
is a function of the intraparty factional politics in general, and
the Prime Minister's personal strategy for the factional politics
in particular.

Accordingly, the membership and the functioning of a Prime
Minister's Cabinet is an integral part of

intraparty factional

politics. Therefore, the routinely convened cabinet meetings are,
in essence, little more than "ceremonial" in nature, as noted above.
Stated in another way, an LDP Prime Minister does not have his own
policymaking "inner circle" in his Cabinet.

In spite of the nature of the cabinet, there is nothing
available to an LD? Prime Minister that is even nearly comparable
to, for example, what an American president has:

the
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"institutionalized presidency" based on a "White House staff of
several hundred and an executive office (EXOP) staff numbering
several thousand.

In Japan, neither the Constitution nor the

'Cabinet Law provides for anything remotely like the American
#Presidential assistant for national security affairs or his sup
porting staff of foreign policy professionals, operating outside
of and above departmental bailiwicks.

201

It is the vacuum created

by the paucity of major staff officials that the small group of
the Prime Minister's close associates fills.

Secondly, as noted earlier, the small group of individuals,
who assist the Prime Minister in making and implementing important
("political," that is "non-routine") policies, includes:

the

Prime Minister's chief Cabinet Secretary, the Foreign Minister,
senior Foreign Office bureaucrats such as the Vice Foreign Minister,
bureau chiefs, councillors, and section chiefs, and some non-bureau
crat ic individuals on an ad hoc basis.
includes influential LDP politicians.

Generally, this last group
On occasion, depending on

the nature of a given policy issue,

some journalists,

academicians, and even members of the Opposition parties in the Diet
may also be included in this group.

202

2Q2 Destler, on. cit., pp. 66-67.
Fukui, "Okinawa Reversion," 0£. cit., p. 98.
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Among

staff officials available to the Cabinet, other

than the ministries, the most important to the Prime Minister is the
chief Cabinet Secretary.
hundred officials and a

The Cabinet Secretariat has about two
1 number of private secretaries on detail

from the ministries in order to assist the Prime Minister in parti
cular issue areas.

The Cabinet Secretariat is principally concerned with prepa
rations of matters for Cabinet discussions, policy research, and
coordination among different ministries.

The chief Cabinet Secretary

is "always a most powerful figure within the Government, and a close
confidant of the prime minister, acting as Cabinet spokesman on many
issues, and as a channel of communication with both Government and
Opposition parties."2^

The chief Cabinet Secretary chairs the conference of Permanent
Vice Ministers (jimu Jikan Kaigi), the highest career civil servants.
Although it has no status in law, the Conference meets regularly to
smooth over

interagency differences.

'When an issue is so

controversial that no administrative compromise is likely it is sent
straight to the Cabinet for a political decision completely bypassing
the Vice Ministers’ conference.

The chief Cabinet Secretary and his deputy are the only senior

20^Thayer, op. cit., pp. 186-18?; Stockwin, op. cit., p. 121.
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political aides whose allegiance is mainly to the Prime Minister.

Thirdly, the existence of a small group of the Prime
Minister's close associates and the way they function are closely
related to the tradition of consensus politics and the attendant
style of policymaking leadership as well as the informal "‘behindthe-scenes" approach to building consensus.

Both the centrality

of the Prime Minister's role in the foreign policymaking process
on important questions and the ad hoc nature of the small decision
making group around the Prime Minister tend to be conducive to
the personal, less rigid, and informal small group approach to
reaching consensus on a given policy issue, for it is this small
nucleus of individuals who engage in the behind-tne-scene r. --otiations, accomodations, and concessions attempting to build consensus
on a given foreign policy issue before a bill is submitted to the
Diet.

(
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Major Actors in the Policymaking Process.
(a) The Liberal Democratic Party Establishment.

Since the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in
1955» when two major conservative parties, the Liberal Party and
the Democratic Party, were amalgamated, the LDP has held until
recently absolute majorities in both Houses, and has generally 204
been able to maintain party discipline in parliamentary voting.
As pointed out earlier in the paper, the LDP has thus been able
to continuously capture the premiership.

.

The LDP government has

prevailed on legislation against the Opposition parties when it
comes to be voted on.

The stable one party domination of the Japanese poli
tical scene for over two decades makes it difficult to classify
the Japanese party system.

Some call it a *'one-and-a-half party

system" because the Opposition has not
power

since 1955*

been able to come to

However, as Ike points out, the label is

misleading since there are actually five political parties in
Japan.

205

In terras of the numbers of

system is a "multiparty system."

parties, the Japanese party

However, this characterization

is also misleading because one party has consistently controlled

204
Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 53-

205
Ike, on. cit., p. 76.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

-

- 293 -

(

the government without having to share power in a coalition
government.

Ike suggests that "perhaps the clearest way to

describe the Japanese situation is to call it a "one-party206
dominant system."
As KcNelly describes the Japanese situation,
in Japan, . . . the legislature does not
govern, nor does the Cabinet. The Liberal
Democratic Party governs. Liberal Democrats
in the Cabinet propose legislation, and
Liberal Democrats in the Diet pass it. The
checks are the anti-mainstream factions within
the Liberal Democratic Party, the Socialist
Party, the press, public opinion, organized
»
labor, and the student movement.207
The LDP is, in essence, a. loose federation of factions,as noted
elsewhere in the paper, or shifting coalitions of factions.

(

"It is an uneasy and unstable coalition of more than half a
203
dozen factions headed by ambitious bosses."
Factionalism,
more than anything else, has been responsible for a high degree
of diffusion of policymaking power within the ruling conservative
LDP establishment as well as in the Opposition parties.

The raison d'etre and the role of the factions are both
self-serving and self-perpetuating.

The LDP as a party, Yanaga

points out, lacks grass-roots organizational support indispensable

206“

207
208

.:---

Ibid.

'McNelly, op. -cit., p. 113Yanaga, op. cit., p. ?•

C
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to democratic operation.

20Q
"The party is run by a small group of

leaders in the national headquarters "too preoccupied with the
internal power struggle and their political ambition to broaden
210
the party's base."
Over the years, the party has grown rigidly
conservative and "too much beholden to a particular set of outside
211
interests."

The pervasive factionalism is manifest in the very
nature of the role and power of the LDP.

The party's power

"accrues from its role as organizer of the government and manager
of elections and the legislative process, and in the exercise of
212
its function as a social appeaser."
The factional considerations
are reflected in the organizational structure and membership of the
LDP as well as in its electioneering and its Cabinet composition
as noted earlier.

All these have contributed to xne diffusion of

policymaking power within the political structure.
\

In the foreign policymaking process of Japan, Hellmann
notes, "the factionally fragmented nature of the LDP, together
with the culturally sanctioned need for consensus in reaching all
213
decisions" has ensured and "will [continue to] ensure broker-type

209-_7 .--ibid*

210

Stockwin, on. cit., n. 97.
211 Ibid.
TW*
2^2Yanaga, loc. cit
21^Hellmann, Japan:
Policy, op. cit., p. 1.

Its Domestic Politics and Foreign
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political leaders and a foreign policy noted for its passive and
responsive character."

214

The factionally fragmented nature of the LDP has made
the policymaking through consensus as much a practical political
imperative as it may be a culturally sanctioned norm.

The practical

needs for policymaking through consensus have resulted in what
Hellmann describes as

”an Alice in Wonderland" of the process

of the Japanese foreign policymaking.^Reference has been made
to the philosophy and mode of reaching consensus according to the
corporate group norm deeply rooted in the traditional family ie
system.

(

In the internal debates on international affairs in the

21&
"diffuse process of foreign policy formulation” of Japan,
"policy discussions within the LDP conservative coalition have
transpired mainly in private and in response to external pressures,
and they have been colored by intraparty factional consideration"
217
[emphases, added]
As pointed out earlier, the consensus decision
making is, according to Hosoya, a mode of expression of an "intraorganizational democracy."

As it applies to the foreign policy

making process, it is not without certain dysfunctional aspects
as Hellmann points out.

The "foreign policy muddle," characteristic

214 :—

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 8.

216 7Ibid.,
37
~
p. ,
1.

217

Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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of the Japanese foreign policymaking process and the nature

218

of the final policy output, is the result of the Japanese
bureaucratic-factional-political process as it moves along
incrementally with numerous centripetal and centrifugal forces
"pulling and hauling”

in every direction.

It is with this in

mind that a brief sketch of the organizational structure and the
institutional behavior is given below as they relate to the
dynamics of the Japanese foreign policymaking process.

219

There are two conspicuous features of the LDP policymaking
mechanism:

(1) factionally fragmented structure of its formal

organization; and (2) factionally oriented formal and informal

(

institutional behavior.

Together, these two interrelated features

constitute a dominant characteristic of the foreign policymaking
process in Japan under the LDP-govemment:

Diffusion of policy

making power within the political structure.

Almost all of the Diet members affiliated with the LDP
belong to one or more factional groupings.

On the face of it,

ZTo-----

Ibid., pp. 8ff.

219

The structure and dynamics of the LDP policymaking
system have been comprehensively treated by various scholars.
These include Fukui, Party in Power, op. cit.; Hellmann, Japanese
Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics, op. cit.; Thayer, pp. cit.;
and Langer, op. cit.« Unless otherwise specified, the following
discussions draw heavily upon Fukui's Party in Power, op. cit.
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the LD? has the appearance of a mass party with its local
branches in over 88 percent of all cities, toms, and villages

220

throughout the country,

each of -which has an organizational

structure closely resembling the headquarters, at least super
ficially. ^^However, as Fukui notes, the local branches are
largely dominated by the incumbent Diet members or the former
0

Diet members.

In the national headquarters, all official party

organs and positions are controlled by the LDP members of the Diet.
Fukui views this factor as one of the "two particularly conspicuous

222
aspects" of the LDP's formal organizational framework.

Since

all the LD? Diet members belong to the intraparty factions and
factional coalitions, the LDP Diet members' control of the
national headquarters and the parliamentary contingent’s control
over the local branches mean that the LDP throughout Japan is,

223

in fact, an extension of the intraparty factionalism.

In addition to

ubiquitous factionalism, the multipli

cation and fragmentation of its organizational units compound the
problem of the diffusion of policymaking power within the LDP.
In addition to its permanent organizational components, there
are numerous special investigation committees which are

220

Fukui, Party in Power, ibid., p. 81.
221 , .,
222 1
Ibid., pp. 81-82.
See, for example, Gerald Curtis, Election Camnaigning
Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971)•
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formed, on an ad hoc basis within the LDP.
Because these
committees are the forum where the politics of interest groups
takes place'among various pressure groups, the government minis
tries, and the politicians, their impact on the entire policymaking
process in terms of the diffusion of policymaking power is
significant.

The system of "Leaders' Meetings" is another example

of the organizational multiplication and fragmentation.

This

system is based on the assumption that the LDP president is the
most powerful within the party.

In theory, this is fine, but not

in practice, for the reasons that have already been discussed:
the LDP president's latitude for the

integrative functions within

the party is a function of the degree of diffusion of policymaking
power within the party in the first place.

There are four categories of the organizational units at
the LDP national headquarters.

To follow Fukui's classification,

these are (l)"the executive"; (2) "the decision-making"; (3) "the
225
parliamentary"; and (4) "other organs."

For the purpose of this

particular study, the first two categories can be briefly noted.
As defined in the LDP constitution, the first category "comprises
the office of the part;/ president, vice-president, secretarygeneral, deputy secretaries-general, three bureaux, and four

^Z^The LDP Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) plays an
"informal but indispensable part" in the party policy decision
making process. It has fifteen Divisions into which its work can
be subdivided and has "an infinite number of 'Special Investi
gation Committees,"' ibid., p. 83.
22jIbid., pp. 82ff.
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226
functional committees."

Officially, the second category of the

decision-making organs is only three in number:

(1.) the party

conference; (2) the Assembly of the Members of Both Houses of the
Diet; and (3) the executive council.

In terms of the actual

process of the policymaking, however, the PARC belongs to this
category for reasons that are noted below.
The Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC): An analysis of the
LD? policymaking mechanism must begin with the PARC.

Almost all

important bills or policy plans normally go to the PARC first.
'Once formally approved by the PARC, they are sent to the executive
council for its final decision, and then to either the party con
ference or the Assembly of the Members of Both Houses of the Diet.
^

In theory, these two organs can overrule the policy recommendation
from the executive council, but in practice they ’’never'’ do so
as noted by Fukui.

22?

One is tempted to guess the reasons for this.

In view of the nature of the long and cautious process of consensus
building and the composition of each policymaking unit within the
party as well as the executive council, by the time an important
bill or policy plan reaches the highest level in the entire process
it is more often than not a pro forma step rather than for substantive
debates.

More than likely, the policy recommendation is indicative

226 Ibid., p. 82.
227 Ibid., p. 83.

r
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of a working majority of the party members supporting it as
the "will of party," or, perhaps "the will of the dominant
factional coalition" within the LDP.

Having successfully

passed the scrutiny at the highest level within the party,
228
the bill goes either directly to the Diet Policy Committee '
or to the Cabinet for final approval.

229

As the main frontline forum to deal with specific
policy issues, the PARC is important for the purpose of this
study.

The PARC is important for two reasons:

(l) the crucial

place it occupies in the entire‘policymaking process; and (2)
its structure.

(

One characteristic of the PARC is the multi

plicity and fragmentation of its organizational units and sub
units as noted above.

The PARC consists of a Deliberation Com

mission and fifteen divisions as its permanent organizational
components.

230

Each of these primary components is subdivided

into subunits which are, in turn, further subdivided.
This multiplicity of the organizational units has tended to
spread the LDP politicians too thinly among divisions, committees,

Ibid., p. 89 .
Thayer, op. c i t ., pp. 210-211; Endicott, Japan's Nuclear
Option, op. cit., p. 53*
230
Fukui, Party in Power, op. cit., p. 83.
229

(
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and their subunits,and turn the PARC committees into an
arena of sectional interest politics among various special
interest groups, the LDP politicians, and the bureaucracy.
According to the rules of the party, each Diet member must belong
to at least one but not more than two PARC divisions at any time.
Ke may choose freely among the fifteen of the divisions. The
participation in the special investigation committees is voluntary,
and there is no limitation on the number of such committees one
may belong to simultaneously.

This free choice of their affili

ation with the divisions and special- committees has tended to
make the LDP politicians "faithful collaborators and agents of
231
particular sections of the bureaucracy and of interest groups.”
Moreover, the selection and appointment of the vice-chairmen and
the members of the Deliberation Commission by the higher part;/
organ has introduced elements of factionalism in their composition.*"
All this has added to the diffusion of the policymaking power
within the party.

Fukui makes an interesting observation:

1-Jhen a conflict

of opinion develops between a PABC division or its special com
mittee, which is closely linked to an interest group or to a
ministry, and the Deliberation Commission which tends to be
under factional pressure but relatively impervious to interest
231------

Ibid., p. 89.
232--Ibid.
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group pressure, the Sxecutive Council is usually found to

233

stand with the former

the ministry concerned.

in favor of the interest group or
In view of the ubiquity of the intra-

LDP factions and factional coalitions and the very composition
of the Council reflective of the LDP factional politicsr
however, this phenomenon does not alter the fact of the ever
pervasive factional political consideration.
the factionalism, especially

Moreover,

LDP factionalism, is closely

related to the need of political funds on the part of the LD?
politicians.
of the reason

As noted earlier, the financial need is part
why a politician belongs to a faction.

Close

alliance and links between an influential politician and a
powerful interest group, especially

big business, are an

integral part of the LD? factional politics, r.ot an extrafactional phenomenon.

By the same token, the politicisation

of the bureaucracy and the bureaucratization of

politics

together have facilitated a close cooperation between the
bureaucrats and the LDP politicians.

The bureaucratic-

political collusion in general, and the bureaucratization of
the LDP in particular, in turn, have added another dimension
to

LDP factional politics,as manifest in such labels as

the "pure politicians" and the "ex-bureaucrats."

Taken as

a whole, these phenomena explain, in part, the popularity of
the triumvirate elite model for Japan, as noted earlier, on the

233Ibid., p.

91.
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one hand, and the "bureaucratic-factional-political" model,

2
as noted by Hosoya, on the other. ^
The Executive Council. For all practical purposes, the Executive
Council is just another layer of

intraparty factional politics.

Organizationally, the Council is where the LDP policy decisions
axe made final official party decisions.

In terms of the

intraparty factional politics, however, the Executive Council
is in essence an extension of the PARC Deliberation Commission.
Superficially, according to the LDP constitution, at least half
of the council members were to be elected on a regional basis in
proportion to the number of the members of the House of Repre
sentatives from each of the nine regions.

In reality, as Fukui

points out, this regionalism (or a geographical representation) is
235
"entirely nominal"
for the simple reason that these poli
ticians never act as regional representatives when voting on
specific policy issues in the Executive Council.

Rather, they

vote according to their respective intraparty primary factions
under each factional leader to whom they belong.

Whether or

not the geographical factionalism would have been less divisive
an influence on the policymaking process is an academic question*

■

535

Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.),
pp. 1A-15*

ojd.

cit.,

235 FuTruij Party in Power, op. cit., p. 90*
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The Leaders' Meeting. According to the definition given in
the LDP consitution, the "Leaders' Meeting" is "an ad hoc group
consisting of the heads of various party organs and other members
specifically nominated by the president" and its function is to
ensure coordination and cooperation among- these heads of the
party organs and other selected members.

236

Stated in another

way, the role of the "Leaders' Meeting" is one of coordination
and integration of various views within the party.-* The insti
tutional significance of the existence of this informal and
237
ad hoc device ^

is not so much what the party constitution says

as what it does not say.

As noted earlier, the powers and the

functions of the party president include just the kind of inte^

grative roles.

In view of the primacy of factional interests

in the intraparty politics, the raison d 'etre of the Leaders'
Meeting is the anticipation that the party president will be
unable to perform his constitutional functions without an
additional informal device designed to accomodate differences
among factions and special interest groups.

Stated in another

way, the Leaders’ Meeting, a collective institutional process
of the accomodation of differences of interests, was super
imposed upon the constitutional competence and authority of
the party president who is just another partisan politician.

2 3 Ibid., p. 93*
007
"Ibid., pp. 93-94.

C
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(b)

Bureaucracy.

The following discussion of

the Japanese bureaucracy is limited in scope and nature
to those aspects which are reflective of the Japanese
predilection for groupism and the subsequent diffusion of
policymaking power within the body politic.

It is difficult to determine even qualitatively,
much less quantitatively, the exact nature and extent of
the relative policymalting power of the Japanese bureaucracy
as a whole in the foreign policymaking process of Japan.

238

Studies of the national bureaucracy and bureaucrats
of Japan and related works abound. These include Akira
Kubota, Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, I969); Robert K. Spaulding,
Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 196?); Kideo Shimizu, "Tokyo
Daigaku Hogakubu" [Faculty of Law, Tokyo University], Tembo,
no. 76 (April 1965); Kazuo Imai, Kanryo, Sono Seitai to
Naimaku [Bureaucrats, Their Mode of Life and Inner Workings],
(Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1953); Marshall Dimock, The
Japanese Technocracy (New York: Ualker/Weatherhill, 19^5);
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, Political Reori
entation of Japan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, l9^9)»~Kiyoshi Tsuji, "Decision-Making in the Japanese
Government: A Study of Ringisei,” in Robert E. Ward (ed.),
Political Development in Modem Japan (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968). The most relevant works for the
purpose of this particular study include: Albert M. Craig,
"Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Government Bureau
cracy," in Vogel (ed.), o p . cit.; Karuhiro Fukui, "Policy
making in the Japanese Foreign Ministry," in Robert A.
Scalapino (ed.), op. cit.;
Destler, et al., o p . cit.,
pp. 68-88; and Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.), op.
cit., pp. 4-8, 10-14.This study draws heavily upon these
works,"especially the insightful analysis by Craig.

r
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As pointed out earlier in the paper, "if we look on
decision-making as a process, with the actual' decision
the product of a series of inputs by competitive forces,
we then look not for some single decisive influence but
239
rather for a structure of decision."
It was also pointed
out that "structlore" is understood

as the "pattern of action
240
and resultant institutions of the system themselves."
The
question of the relative policymaking power of the Japanese
bureaucracy is, therefore, part of the larger question
pertaining to

Japanese policymaking process as a whole.

Conversely, the structural and behavioral characteristics of
the Japanese foreign policymaking process are a function, in
part, of the structure and behavior of the Japanese bureau
cracy.

Accordingly, it is in order to examine briefly some

salient aspects of the structure and behavior of the Japanese
bureaucracy relative to various roles it plays in the policy
making process.

Observers of the Japanese scene do not agree on
the extent to which the bureaucracy exerts its influence
on the foreign poli-"
notes,

• ..ug process in Japan.

As Fukui

one finds'W

ne pole"those who view the bureau241
crats’ role as "central, dominant, and growing," while at
230---- --^Passin in Vogel (ed.), oo. cit., p. 253.
Oran Young, 0£. cit., p. 3°.
Fukui in Scalapino (ed.), op. cit., p. 3-
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the other, there are those who view the bureaucrats' role
242
as either marginal or being replaced by politicians.
243
Expressing their reservation about Hellmann's view of the
declining role of the Japanese bureaucrats, Destler and his
associates state:
It is true that no contemporary Japanese career
bureaucracy has power approaching that of the
prewar military services, and party politicians
are infinitely more powerful. Yet bureaucratic
influence in Japan is considerably greater than
Hellmann's language implies. This is due in
part to the weakness in political leadership
institutions, but even more to the sheer volume
and complexity of international transactions.
The power-dwarfing of the Japanese bureaucracy
emphasized by Hellmann seems to have been the
exception rather than the rule.^

(

2^2 ibid., n. 2; Ikeda Masaaki, "Hippo Katei no Mondai ten," in Ashibe Nobuyoshi (ed.),
Gendai no Rfppo (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 19&7), pp. 272-283,
and Misawa Shigeo, "Seisaku Kettei Katei no Gaikan," in
Nihon Seiji Gakkai (ed.), Gendai Nihon no SeitS to Kanryo
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 19&7), PP* 14-18.
243
Donald Hellmann maintains that "the peace
agreement of 1956 marked the passing of an era. Unlike
the pre-war period the Japanese Foreign Office proved
incapable of directly competing with the ruling party in the
making of policy. As intended in the 1947 Constitution the
Prime Minister and his party were in control
the old gave
wav to the new, the politician replaced the bureaucrats."
Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics,
op. cit., p. 141 cited by Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 69.

244

,

Destler, et al., ibid., pp. 69-70, citing Shigeo
Misawa, "An Outline of the Policy-Making Process in Japan,"
in Hiroshi Itoh (ed. and trans.), Japanese Politics. An
Inside 'view: Readings from Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1973), PP* 12-48.

r
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The aggrandizement of

bureaucratic power is a uni

versal trend in all complex m o d e m societies where the traditional
demarcation between politics and administration has necessarily
become blurred.

In Japan, too, the key ministerial bureaucracies

are, as Reischauer points out, "the original drafters' of most

••

245

•

policies and legislation". . . . and represent "the
institutional
ne i

246
memory and continuity of the Japanese government.'

However, there are certain structural and behavioral
features that are peculiar to the Japanese bureaucracy..

'While

they may not be entirely unique to the Japanese bureaucracy, these
features are reflective of the ubiquitous groupism as are almost

(

all other Japanese institutions and organizations.

First and

foremost, the Japanese bureaucracy as a whole has been essentially
a closed community, insulated from the rest of the policymaking
role players, on the one hand, and has exerted significant influ
ence on the business community as well as the LDP establishment,
on the other.

The centripetal nature, and, at the same time, the

centrifugal role of the Japanese bureaucracy stem in part from
legacies of the past and the anatomy and pathology of the
Japanese political process under the LDP domination.

245

Reischauer in Scalapino (ed.), on- cit., Introduction,

p. xi.

246

Ibid.
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The closed nature of the Japanese bureaucracy is
largely a function of the traditional practice of recruitment
of the higher civil servants in Japan. ' Unlike in the United
States, for example, where a significant role is played by the

247
!,in-and-outers"

in the foreign policymaking process, a lateral

entry to the Japanese administrative bureaucracy is virtually
unheard of.

Aside from the political ministers and the

relatively insignificant parliamentary vice-ministers, the top

248

positions in the ministries are filled by career officials.

In addition to a prewar tradition of bureaucratic
neutrality, the insularity of the bureaucracy has been further
reinforced by the long and continuous domination by the LDP
over the Japanese political scene.

Moreover, the LDP politicians,

at the apex of the administrative bureaucracy, have tended to be
a rather stable grouping, drawn from among the senior LDP Diet

249
members

within the parametric factional political considerations.

These political masters of the bureaucracy have, over the years,
effectively shielded the bureaucracy from "political winds" of
Opposition inroads into the bureaucracy.

Furthermore, the insularity of the Japanese bureaucracy

247
?48

Destler, et al., on. ciz., p. 72.
Ibid., pp. 72-73-

249

7Ibid., p. 73.
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has been a function of the LDP intraparty factional politics.
As has been pointed out, the intraparty factional politics
has tended to encourage various prime ministers to reshuffle
their cabinets often.

As a result, a typical Cabinet member

would not stay on his job long enough to develop his own
expertise in the ministerial field.

The combined net effects

of this factor together with the resources, the expertise,
and the centrality of information available to the adminis
trative bureaucracy, have been the insularity of the
Japanese bureaucracy and the aggrandizement of its influence
on the foreign policymaking process.

(

Based on their detailed studies of three major postwar
cases involving the U.S.-Japanese bilateral relations, Destler
and his Brookings associates note that "a glance at the postwar
course of U.S.-Japanese relations reveals the pervasive influ
ence of career officials and permanent bureaucratic insti251
tutions."
For example, in the case of the Okinawa reversion,
the Foreign Office, as the sole agency capable of interpreting
the revolving U.S. position, played a substantial role during
the critical I966-I968 period.

Likewise, in the controversy

over the textile issue between the United States and Japan,
25S---------Fukui notes that "the meeting of the Cabinets have
traditionally been nominal for the single reason that its
members, i.e. the ministers, are too busy signing documents.
Every draft bill is thoroughly examined, however, by the
[administrative] vice-minister's conferences befpre it is_
allowed to reach the floor of the Diet.” Fukui, rarty in Power,
00. cit., pp. 89-90*
Destler, et al., on. cit., p. 65.
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the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(Mm)

bureaucrats had repeatedly prevailed over the political

leaders of the LDF.

The Japanese resistance to the American

demands for quotas owed much to the stubbornness of the KITI
bureaucrats operating in a domestic political climate of a
strong opposition to such quotas and to the limited leverage of
a Prime Minister seeking to win acquiescence to Japanese con-

.

252

cessions.

There are other factors which have contributed to the
prestige, power, and the closed nature of the Japanese bureau
cracy as a separate entity.

Japan's administrative bureaucracy

was the only institutional remnant of prewar Japan emerging from
the defeat of World War II not only unscathed but also with
vastly increased prestige and power.

The bureaucracy was an

indispensable substructure of the Allied military occupation
and played a key role in bringing about a speedy economic
recovery which was followed by an unprecedented industrial
growth.

These factors added to the traditional prestige and

253

power of the Japanese bureaucracy.

Some of the institutional advantages which the Japanese
bureaucracy enjoys are shared by its counterparts in other

252 Ibid., p. 48, 69.
yanaga, op. cit., p. 95*
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inductrial democracies, while others are due largely to
the peculiar features of the Japanese political culture.
First of all, the sheer size of the bureaucratic institutions
tends to put the bureaucracy, as in other countries, beyond the
254
reach of an effective control by the politicians.
The sheer #
size automatically limits the politicians' ability to control
255
all that goes on.
To the extent that top leaders (and
subordinates rfesponsive to their interests) cannot ride herd
on numerous decisions and actions, they must, in practice,
. yield to the bureaucracy over which they reign but cannot com-

256

pletely rule.

fv

Moreover, for a range of services and skills, the govern
ment leaders must depend on the bureaucracy even on those issues
which they can personally oversee.

These vital services and

skills include (l) information about current issues; (2) the
broader political and economic variables which affect decisions
on these issues; (3) expertise and experience in dealing with
these issues; and (4) communication process and channels
linking their own to foreign governments.

"254

Since the leaders

Destler, et al., on. cit., p. 71.

255 Ibid..
256 Ibid.
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. do’not have' these- resources of their own and cannot go elsewhere
for them, they must go to the "bureaucrats. When they do, "they
tend to see the facts of issues as bureaucrats see them, and
their policy decisions will tend to reflect bureaucratic pre257
ferences."
Furthermore, somewhat analogous to Robert Michels’

258
"iron law of oligarchy,"

in all policymaking situations, the

bureaucrats, representing the national interests as well as their
own bureaucratic interests, possess a, certain standard policyinfluencing role and authority
regulation, or custom.

whether established by law,

The Japanese bureaucrats perform their
'

259

functions welly especially in following established procedures.
The political leaders are aware of this aspect of the bureauf
L

cratic power and those who disregard it do so at their own

260
peril.

In addition to these built-in institutional advantages,
the Japanese bureaucracy enjoys the tradition of executive
supremacy and social prestige as an elite organization which
tends to set it apart as a distinct grouping.

257------

Ibid., also Fukui in Scalapino (ed.), on. cit., p. h.

Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological
Study ox the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem Democracy (New
York! Free Press, 1962), Part VI, Ch. 2, pp. 3^2-35°*
259
Particularly instructive for this aspect of the Japanese
bureaucratic behavior is Craig’s article in Vogel (ed.), on. cit.
260
Destler, et al., on. cit., p. ?1.
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Japan’s tradition of executive supremacy is, as Yanaga •
261
points out, one of nearly two hundred years' standing. Despite the
Occupation reform, the bureaucracy continues to attract the cream of
the crop and the career bureaucrats continue to enjoy the traditional prestige.

262

The bureaucracy of Japan is a purer example

•of a closed bureaucratic organization compared to, for example,
the State Department of the United States.

The only "gate" to

this elite organization is at the bottom level and the gate is
extremely narrow because of

extremely keen competition.

The

professional group of young people who enter the bureaucracy is
socially considered

(

and considers itself— an elite.

In the Tokugawa era (1600-1868), the bureaucrats were the
ranking-samurai. After the Heiji Restoration, "the govern
ment officials were, perhaps more than the army, the legitimate
heirs of the samurai." They were honored and were regarded as
the officials of the Emperor as reflected in such slogans as
kanson mimpi (officials honored, people despised) or in the
Japanese term for officials, kanri (i.e. the officials of the
Emperor), Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 8.
2^2
Wrr" "
The role of the civil servants was redefined in the 19^7
Constitution as kokumin no koboku (the "servants of the people").
Yet many of the best graduates of the Tokyo University, Japan's
Harvard University, continue to join the bureaucracyreflecting
the element of continuity. The only element ofchange in the
bureaucratic prestige is, as Destler and his associates point
out, the military bureaucrats in contemporary Japan. The low
esteem of the military is perhaps reflective of the Japanese
reaction to their wartime experience. Destler, et al., op. cit.,
p. 72. Pointing out the bureaucratic nature of the Japanese
society, Craig states: "Another aspect of the society of bureau
crats, if not of bureaucratic society, is marriage...........
Everyone is aware of marriage ties. The foreigner in Japan is
always struck by how small and interconnected the Japanese
establishment is. Businessmen and bankers went to the same uni
versities as the higher officials. The majority of students at
these universities are b o m outside of the magic circle of power, but
after graduating and entering an office they tend to marry the_
daughters of the elite of the previous generation. The establish
ment almost appears to perpetuate itself by matrilineal adoption."
Craig in Vogel (ed.), op. cit., p. 15, fn. 16.
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The closed nature of the Japanese "bureaucracy as a
separate and elite organization is accentuated "by what Craig

263
calls "dysfunctional" internal behavioral characteristics of
the Japanese bureaucracy.

These features, which stem from

26k
ubiquitous groupism in
perpetuate

Japanese social relations, tend to

‘groupism on the one hand, and axe closely related

to the bureaucratic inroads into the world of business and poli
tics on the other.

As Craig puts it, "Japanese officials.are

Japanese and bring with them into bureaucracy patterns of
265
behavior characteristic of their society," "and these behavior .
553

(

Craig notes the existence, in addition to the "formal
system," i.e. laws, ordinances, and regulations, of an "informal
system" within the bureaucracy characteristic of the Japanese
social relations in general and of the process of consensus
building in particular as discussed earlier in the paper.
According to Craig, the dysfunctional aspects of the government
bureaucracy consist of (1) vertical personal ties, and (2) the
solidarity of the office. The dysfunction associated with the
informal system of vertical (superior officials and subordinates)
personal ties is "cliquism," and the dysfunction associated with
the other informal system of "the solidarity of the office"
(centripetal force of the collective group norm tradition of the
ie) is that which gives rise to interoffice jealousies and struggle
over jurisdiction." Craig in Vogel (ed.), ibid., p. 11.

26k

Noting the existence of sharp cleavages within the bureau
cracy, for example, between the elite of career officials, who
have passed the special higher examination, and lower-level
bureaucrats, Craig states that "distinguishing between these two
levels enables one to resolve many contradictory statements about
Japanese bureaucracy. I arrive at a bimodal view: of exceedingly
able men directing the work of the central ministries, but much
less able men in the offices of local government; of graduates
from the two or three best universities versus those from . . .."
Ibid., p. 5* Fukui too notes similar cleavages within the bureau
cracy, for example, between the "younger generation" and "the
older generation" [based on his interview with an official in
the American Affairs Bureau, Oct. 19» 19?2, Fukui in Scalapino (ed.),
op. cit., p. 31] 2-nd. between "the wartimers" and "the postwar
timers" [based on his interview with an official in the Economic
Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office, Jan. 31» 1972, ibid.].
Craig in Vogel, op. cit., p. 11,
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patterns affect the institutional behavior of the bureau
cracy .

First of all, the elite services of the Japanese bureau
cracy lack a structured performance evaluation system.

As a

general rule, the elite civil servants are promoted on a non
competitive "class" group basis.

Unlike

the United States

Foreign Service, for example, where "those judged as best are
promoted more rapidly earlier in their career than are their
peers . . . . the elite services of the Gaimusho are promoted
automatically, with each "class" group entering the service
together raised in rank simultaneously Lemphasis addedJ," 266
as long as one does not "rock-the-boat," i.e. kotonakare shugi
.267
("don’t-rock-the-boat").

Moreover, "there is an unwritten rule in the bureaucracy
that university graduates who entered in any given year cannot
serve under men who entered at the same time or later.
bureaucracy is pyramidal

Since

the number of posts at each higher

255---------Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 7^*

267

,

x

Craig in Vogel (ed.;, op. cit., p. 29; also Yanaga,
op. cit., p. 99*
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rank decreases— this rule means that those of each class passed

268
over for promotion must be retired."

Most of the elite civil

servants reach the position of section chief simultaneously,
and afs retired or sloughed off to high positions in prefectural
governments.

But even those few who become bureau chief or

vice-minister, the highest post in the system, are. usually ••
retired in their early or middle fifties.

It is, therefore,

usual that the senior bureaucrats begin their second career
in politics or in business.

Politically ambitious bureaucrats

tend to establish connections, as Yajiaga points out, with influ
ential faction leaders, not only to strengthen their positions
but also to cultivate relations that can be used to further
(
^

269
their political careers.
Likewise, these elite bureaucrats
often receive their rewards for loyal services after retirement.
Some become the•directors of corporations, receiving fees con
siderably greater than their former salaries.
result

The net

of these second careers of the elite civil servants

is the bureaucratization of

business and

the LDP,

creating new (or joining the existing) policymaking groups of
"ex-bureaucrats."
268------------

Craig in Vogel (ed.), on. cit., pp. 6-?, 14.

269

Yanaga, op. cit., p. 102. Yanaga points out that
the bureaucrats-politicians relationships are a two-way flow.
The political leaders, on their part, also have cultivated sup
porters within the bureaucracy, as did Prime Ministers Ikeda
and Sato. Yanaga, ibid.

C
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Given the traditional prestige and power, the
esprit de' corps, and the competence of this elite "bureau
cracy, standing in juxtaposition to the weakness in the LDP
leadership and the LDP leaders’ dependence on the bureaucracy,
it is . tempting

to exaggerate the policymaking role of the
*•

bureaucracy as a whole.

First of all, it should be noted

that the institutional behavioral patterns of the Japanese
bureaucracy, discussed above, inhibit creativity and bold
policy initiatives.

Under the existing "automatic 'escalation'

system, a civil servant is assured of promotion to the level
of bureau director simply by serving tine, provided he plays

270
the game wisely and commits no really serious 'blunder^'"
In the absence of an overall planning and policymaking staff
function, the unwillingness on the part of a civil servant to
make ^ickv decisions and assume responsibility finds such

271
methods of decision-making as the ringisei or the tsumiageshiki,
both of which tend to be slow and blur the focus of responsi
bility, most suitable to his need.

As Yanaga puts it, "by

long standing practice, responsibility is diffused or divided

272
in a way that makes it virtually impossible to pinpoint."

Moreover, it should be noted that the bureaucracy is
constitutionally subordinate to the Diet in the first place.
Major initiatives for change tend to grow out of the interests

270
1

Ibid., p. 99.

(3~ "The piling-up method" which progresses step by step
through appropriate channels until the completed decision reaches
the vice-minister at the top. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
272 Ibid., p. 99.
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and actions of senior political figures, and major issues
can "be resolved only when political leaders settle on a
273
particular resolution or, at minimum, acquiesce in it.
As Craig puts it, "Weber said that above every bureaucracy
is a political system that sets the goals.
true in both Japan and the United States:

This is clearly
the Diet and

Congress pass laws; the respective administrators see that
274
the laws are carried out.” As discussed earlier in the
paper, when a given issue is routine and noncontroversial,
and most decisions in the bureaucracy are, the process of
decision-making is relatively simple.

It is essentially a

continuation of the status quo, or involves marginal and
incremental change of the status quo largely carrying out
the laws already passed.

The decisions (or nondecisions)

may well be made ”bureaucratically,, mainly by the bureau
crats, with little intervention from politicians or interest
groups, according to the existing rules or precedents already
established.

In this case, the pattern of decision-making

^Destler, et al., on. cit., p. 69.
274
/
\
Craig in Vogel (ed.), op. cit., p. 17.
273 ’"pke actual enforcement or implementation of the
provision is often handled bv prefectural governments. For
examnle, agricultural extension services, which in the
United States would.be,handled by local' offices of the feder
al government, are in Japan delegated by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry to the prefectures. This was the
Japanese prewar practice, and it continued even after the
Occupation reforms. Central government control over pre
fectural exnenditures permits a very tight rein on the way
in which the delegated authority will be carried out.
Decisions regarding the interpretation of laws, for example,
are geferred back to the concerned ministry," Craig, ioia.,
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2?6
within the bureaucracy nay be one of the ringisei or the
277
tsuniageshiki system. When an issue is nonroutine and
extraordinary, or as a routine ordinary issue becomes contro
versial, the political leaders' role increases generally in
proportion to the decrease in the bureaucrats' role, as
pointed out earlier.278
leadership is a function of

Since the LDP politicalintraparty factional politics,

a- working consensus among these f^tions becomes imperative
in the diffusion of policymaking power within the political
structure.

As Hosoya puts it, the "disruptive impact" on

the policymaking process cf the diffusion of policymaking

(

power makes a"rational management of policymaking" a dif2?9
f icult task. ’Then the policymaking involves "politicized '
issues, including factional considerations, the political
leaders use additional sources of information and policy
advice other than the administrative bureaucrats concerned.
As noted earlier, these additional sources of information
may be members of the Opposition, academicians, and scholars.
If political considerations so dictate, the politicians can
2^5---------Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.), on. cit., p. 7•
2^Ianaga, on. cit., pp. 99-100.

278Hosoya
,
in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.), op. cit., pp. 7-8.
2? W .
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and iron tine to time do act against the bureaucrats'

pOrt
explicit recommendations.

On the other hand, the bureaucrats

can and do prevail, from time to time, over the political
leaders as did the HIT I for a period in the case of textile
controversy with the United States.

Iven in this case,

one wonders if it represented the institutional supremacy
of the KITI, much less the bureaucracy as a whole, in the
policymaking process.

The.political "clout” which the rUTI

was able to exercise in the contrversy was a function of the
general "political" climate of public opinion.

The reason

for the relative weakness of the Foreign Ministry as compared
to the KITI is not due to more or less prestige but because
it has fewer ties with influential organisations like big
281
business.
In this context of the relative policymaking
power of the bureaucrats and the political leaders, Craig notes:
can one, then, not go a step further and argue
that the bureaucracy has been permitted to
maintain its substantial autonomy and powers
because of its willingness to act for the LDP?
This question can be examined in terms of where
the initiative comes from when a bill is drafted.
Is it from the bureaucracy, from the party by way
of the divisions of the Party Affairs Research
Council, or from the commissions made up of
businessmen, professors, Diet members, and retired
bureaucrats? The answer varies. For a politically
neutral matter— a law intended to aid the imple
mentation of other laws— the initiative may come
wholly from within the bureaucracy. For a polical sensitive matter, such as the violence in

Fukui in Scalapino (.ed.j, or. cit., p. 4.
231

Daniel Okimoto, or. cit., p. 322.
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the universities during the late sixties, the
LDP will define the general sense of what is to
be done, and the Central Educational Commission
will provide specific policy guidelines. Since
neither organization has an adequate staff, the
Ministry of Education will draft the actual bill.
In this situation the politicians feel that they
are in control and axe using the bureaucracy to
handle the technical details. They are confident
that the product will be what they desire. The
bureaucrats feel that their input into party
policy is greater than party influence on their
drafts. Each side appears satisfied with the
relationship. If there is delusion, it is on the
side of the bureaucracy, which feels that its
autonomy and powers are nroperly its own and the
result of its ability. 282

In the final analysis, the administrative bureaucracy
is, as Hosoya maintains, one of the three main "pillars'’

(

supporting the Prime Minister in the foreign policymaking
process of Japan.

283

On important foreign policy issues,

the role of the political leadership is greater than that of
the bureaucracy in terms of the basic policy decisions and
policy initiatives.

It is inconceivable that any major

foreign policy decision can originate from the administrative
bureaucracy.

In any event, foreign or domestic, on "poli

tically” important issues, a working consensus among the
major factions within the LDP is imperative in the current
political structure of Japan.

252 -------------

.

More specifically, because of

.

Craig in Vogel (ed.), 0I). cit., p. 20.
283
*"~
,
.
Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.;, on. cit.,
pp. 5-6.
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the positional and functional centrality of the Prime

.

Minister within the formal institutions of political leadership
in general, and within the LDP in particular, it is the Prime
Minister, aided by a small group of his close associates, from
whom major policy initiatives originate#
*

(c ) Big Business.

Reference has been made to the

. widely shared "theory” of a triumvirate ruling power elite in
Japan consisting‘of the LDP establishment, the bureaucracy,
28k
and
big ousiness.
The specific objective of my discussion
of this topic, which has been comprehensively treated by others,
is to consider whether or not

big business is an integral

part of the Japanese ruling elite in the context of the dif
fusion of power and the politics of consensus relevant to the
285
overall interest of this study. As Fukui points out, implicit
and explicit assumptions of the power elite model include, among
others, (1) the coherent nature of

big business as a group;

(2) the assumed omnipotence of the big business group; (3) the
career mobility of big businessmen in government as a member
555

See, for example, Fukui in Pempel (ed.), o£. cit.,
"Studies in Policymaking: A Review of the Literature," pp.
22-59; Hosova in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.), op. cit., up. 5-7,
3-jlO, 15; Misawa ohigeo, "Taigai Seisakulto " ihor. Zalxai
[Foreign Policy and Japanese Big BusinessJ, ibid., pp. 175-211;
Ogata Sadako, "Nihon no Taigaiseisaku Kettei Katei to Zaikai,"
[Japanese, Foreign Policymaking Process and Big Business], laid.,
PP- 213-2^2; ana her art icle,,in..English, "The Business Gommunitv
and Japanese Foreign Policy, m Scalapino (ed.;, oo. cit., p. 17
Eugene Kaplan, on. cit.; and Yanaga, op. cit.
Fukui, loc. cit.
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of the tripartite^ power elite; (4)
coordination;, and (5)

-

informal elite

big business as the only major

source of political funds for the LDP politicians.

One of

the relatively recent writings on the Japanese big business
286
by Gerald Curtis challenges directly all of these assumptions.
In his summation, Curtis states that ’’the ruling elite model
of Japanese politics has had to make a number of false
assumptions about the organizational unity of the business
community, its unanimity of views on specific issues, and its
involvement in a broad range of governmental decisions.

. 287

Noting the paucity of empirical studies of decision-making in
contemporary Japan, Curtis declares that "it may be hypothesized
that such studies would show what they have shown in the United
States that different groups participate in the decision-making
288
process depending on the issues involved [emphases added]!*
23o

Curtis in Vogel (ed.), op. cit., pp. 30-70. His
blistering attack on the power elite model is made by way of
presenting his views as opposed to those of Yanaga primarily.
It is extremely instructive to note a direct clash of views
between Curtis, a leading Japan specialist whose publications
include Election Campaigning Japanese Style, a penetrating
analysis of the Japanese electoral system, process, and behavior,
op. cit., on the one hand, and Yanaga, the author of a widely
read work on the Japanese big business, Big Business in Japanese
Politics, op. cit., and Eugene J. Kaplan, Japan, The GovemmentBusiness Relationship, A Guide for the American Businessmen
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, February 1972),
on tha
pOnother.
Curtis, op. cit., p. 68.

288

Ibid. Curtis notes: "One recent study of the budgetmaking process in Japan, for instance, argues that the business
community exercises no significant role in determining how
financial resources of the government are allocated." See John
Campbell, "Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics" (Ph.D. Disser
tation, Columbia University, 1973), ibid., p. 68, fn. 70* The
same study also appears in Vogel (ed.j, op. cit., pp. 71-100.
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What follows is an extensive summary of Curtis'
arguments against the assumptions of the power elite model
about

Japanese big business.

An extensive summary of

Curtis' arguments as such is not only warranted but also
necessary for two reasons.

First:

Both Curtis and Yanaga

are eminently qualified specialists in the field.

Their

respective studies were based on"extensive field research
.including numerous interviews in Japan.

However, these two

scholars have come up with diametrically opposed views on
.

*

*

•

Japanese big business in terms of the power elite thesis, the
latter expounding the power elitist views

and

the former

representing, perhaps, the most potent critique of the model.
^

>

To the knowledge of this writer, there have not been too many
scholarly writings against the model.

In any event, the question

of the structure of power in Japan itself is not part of the
immediate interests of this study.

Inasmuch as the thesis of

this study is related indirectly to the power elitist model,
a careful summary of this leading scholar's critique of the
model serves the purpose of this study adequately.
Secondly, if the simplistic power elite view of the

cohesive

ruling triumvirate is empirically valid, then the question of the
diffusion of power and the politics of consensus in Japan is
less significant than the thesis of this study implies.
the extent that Curtis' arguments are valid, the role of

f
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the concept of consensus among different participants on
different issues in the foreign policymaking process of Japan
becomes more meaningful.

It should be noted that not all the

points made by Curtis are supportive of the meaningful role
of the consensus norm, however, as will be noted below.

(1) The assumption of the coherent nature of
as a group.

big business

Curtis points out, that the

Japanese term, zaikai, commonly used in the place of "big
business" in English, has many meanings and the term is"shrouded
'289
in considerable conceptual confusion" without a generally
agreed upon definition.

(

290

Although literally it means

the "financial world," it refers to the entire business com
munity and at the same time it also refers to something more
291
specific than the entire business community.
Curtis says it
"might be defined as the group of major industrial and financial
leaders who spend a significant portion of their time in activi
ties that relate to the economy in general and the society at
large, generally through active participation in one or more

292
of the four major economic organizations."

Curtis adds:

Professor Yanaga. defines zaikai rather dramatically,
and I believe inaccurately, as follows: "In journal
istic usage it more often than not refers to the

"289
290

Curtis, op. cit., p. 33*
Ibid., p. 37.

291 Ibid., p. 38.
292
Ibid., p. 39.
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leaders of big business, particularly to leaders
who have the support of the powerful economic
organizations— -the closed circle of organizationbased, power-wielding activists. . . . Zaikai also
denotes the place where the craving for political
power is openly expressed and gratified— that
hypothetical arena in which big business influences
the government, or even society as a whole. Most
frequently identified with the term zaikai are the
top executives of four big-rbusiness organizations
. . . and executives of the Japan- Industrial
Club whose board of directors consists of the pre
sidents of the key organizations and the elder
statemen of business, industry, and finance.”293
Not all leaders of large industries, however, are considered
zaikai members (zaikai.iin) while some of the leading members are
294
not leaders of major industries.
Yanaga, who maintains that
“zaikai's power of life and death over governments has been

(

dramatically demonstrated time and again . . . and the prime
ministers days are numbered if his policies or methods do no
longer meet with its approval," however, notes:
Zaikai, however, is by no means a monolithic
structure . . . . The diversity of attitudes, motives,
and interest that characterize zaikai has made the
cooperation of the larger key organizations indis
pensable in achieving consensus and in presenting a
united front on issues and problems [emphasis
added].”29-5
Moreover, Curtis points out, unlike in European countries where
the historical development of economic organizations similar to
that in Japan has taken place, the development of economic
organizations in Japan has been, and still is, characterized

29^ Ibid., p. 38, footnote 28.
294'Ibid., p. 38.
295 Ibid.
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by a clear separation between economic organizations that
represent big business and those that represent small and
296
medium-sized- enterprises.
There is no organization in Japan ‘

which represents the entire business community but there axe
several organizations representing different elements within
it.

In fact, as Curtis puts it,
the history of development of economic organizations
in Japan is first of all the inability', despite the
effort, to create one comprehensive economic organi
zation. In a rather ironic comment on the view
that the Japanese economic community is a united
force, the authors of Keidanren’s history of economic
organizations in Japan asked in dismay, "Is the
constant cycle of splintering and reunification and
splintering again the inescapable fate of Japan's
economic organisations?[emphasis added]."297

(

Finally, Curtis reminds us that the structure and purpose of
the newly created economic organizations were a function of
the peculiar situation of the postwar reorganization of prewar
institutions when the country was in a state of physical collapse,
economic chaos, and a special revolution being guided by an alien
298
occupation force. 7

(2)

The assumed omnipotence of the big business.

Curtis

not.es that "it is one thing to argue that zaikai has been a
potent force in Japanese politics.

It is another to argue, as

296 Ibid., p. 53.
297 Ibid., p. 5^.
298 Ibid.
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so many do, that zaikai has 'life and death' power over'the
government.

299

It is, as he puts it, the "myth of zaikai omnip

otence" and''such a position ignores those occasions when zaikai
has been unable to have its way.

Instances of zaikai's inability

to control the LDP presidential election, for instance, are as
evident as instances where zaikai has allegedly, manipulated the
election. *^°$urt is mentions Tanaka’s success in the LDP presidential
election as a particularly strong challenge to the thesis of zaikai
omnipotence .^^ointing out the "advantages'' of the power-elite
approach to the study of politics, Curtis states:

(

No amount of evidence can -disprove that an elite
rules, and . . . even the lack of evidence can be
used to support the theory. Evidence contradicting
the model is dismissed either as related to issues
^C2
with which the business elite is not really concerned,
or as further proof of big business skill in concealing
its infamous role— further substantiation that big
business, indeed, is the invisible hand manipulating
politicians and politics .3°^
However, one wonders if Curtis' observation on this point is

299
77 Ibid.. p. 39.
3®°ibid. Curtis lists the instances of the Zaikai inability.
301
Ibid., p. 40. Curtis points out that "Tanaka won the
election in spite of big business, and not because of it. Even
if, by election day, many zaikai members supported Tanaka, or
more commonly, adopted an attitude of "equal distance" (tSkyori)
from Tanaka and Fukuda, this was because they had realized the
futility of continued support for Fukuda and net because they had
changed their minds about whom they would like to see succeed
Prime Minister Sato." Ibid. Moreover, Curtis points out that the
resignation of Prime Minister Tanaka in December 1974 was not due
to zaikai pressure as argued by some observers. Tanaka had by
then become a major liability to the LDP and it was the party,and
not the big business, that removed Tanaka. Ibid., footnote 20.
A criticism often made of Robert Dahl's study.of New Haven,
Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961;, ibia., p. 41.
Ibid.
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valid in the context of the Japanese political culture.
A specific instance that comes to one's mind is the i960
304
crisis which has been studied by Scalapino and Masumi in the
context of the Japanese political culture in general and the
. role of the consensus norm in particular.

What role did the

big business elite play, if any, to cause it or to try* to
prevent the crisis?

(3) The assumption of the big businessmen's career mobility.
Curtis points out that those who tend to support this assumption
fail to differentiate two different periods:
period and post-party-merger period.
V

pre-party-merger

Before the unification in

1955 of the two conservative parties resulting in the creation
of the LDP, the political scene in Japan was fluid with govern
mental processes not yet well institutionalized, including
patterns of recruitment into government services.

Curtis points

out that it was in this pre-party-merger period when the big
businessmen appeared to be represented fairly well in the Diet
and in the government services such as ambassadorship.

However,

as he puts it,
it is crucial to distinguish between patterns
prevalent in the pre-party-merger period and those
that have since prevailed. Unfortunately, this
distinction is often not made, and some recent
305

Scalauino and Masumi, on. cit. , pp. 125-153*

('
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publications have continued to present the
erroneous view that big business is represented
in considerable numbers in the Diet and in the
government.-^ One recent study, based on data
mainly from 1953 and 1954, maintains that "nearly
one-third of the Japanese House of Representatives. ,
is made up of businessmen and former businessmen"
and that "big. business is formally represented in ^07
the government by Cabinet Ministers of its choice.".
Using more recent data, we discover that businessmen
account for no more than 15 percent of lower-house
members in the LDP. Business rank only third in
representation in the LDP Diet delegation, well
behind former bureaucrats, who comprise about 30
percent of the Diet delegation, and professional
politicians, who account for 24 percent .3°°
As a further challenge to the tendency to view the "business"

people as one group, Curtis notes that "it is important to
distinguish in the case of Japan between 'nationally’ oriented

(

and

‘locally’ oriented politicians."

309
He points out that the

businessmen who make up 15 percent of the LDP Diet contingent
include representatives of big business and owners of small
countryside stores.

If a distinction is made between the two

groups, the number of zaikai representatives in politics becomes
considerably smaller.
by the author:

Moreover, the following points are made

(a) No prime minister in postwar Japan comes

305

"These include the Yanaga book, the U.S. Department of
Commerce study, and the revised edition of Hugh Borron's Japan s
M o d e m Centum (New York: Ronald Press, 1970), PP* 504-505* The
last two books rely on the Yanaga study for their data." Curtis,
in Vogel (ed.), op. cit .", p. 41,'footnote 25.
Ibid., p. 41, footnote 26; Yanaga, op. cit., p. 27.
^ ^ Ibid., footnote 28; Jiyu, May 1968, pp. 36-37*
308Ibid., p. 41.

309

Ibid.; Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style, op.
cit., p. 3*
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310
(b) no LDP faction
311
leader comes from a career in big business; (c) in the post-

with a career background in big business;

party-merger period, unlike, for example, in the United States,
every regular ambassadorial appointment is made from among
312
career foreign ministry officials; and (d) business partici
pation in other appointive semi-governmental functions such
as the numerous advisory commissions "does not represent career
mobility......... they are for the most part consultative,
not decision-making or administrative organs."

(4)

313

The assumption of the informal elite coordination:

Implicitly or explicitly, "important in power elite theory,
particularly as developed by C. Wright Kills, is the assumption
that informal, social ties among elite groups reinforce a common
value consensus, provide opportunities for arriving at policy
agreement, and account

for the ease with which certain groups
314
can walk through the corridors of power."
Curtis admits that

3^0 Curtis in Vogel (ed.), on. cit., p. 42.
Ibid. It is noted that at the Cabinet level businessmen
do appear stronger. Even there, the ex-bureaucrats have the best
chance for appointment, businessmen second, and the "professional"
(or "pure") politicians third.
312 Ibid., p. 43.
313
Ibid., pp. 43-44. The major mobility between business
and government is amakudari (descending from heaven), i.e. from
government to business. Ibid., p. 43.
Ibid., pp. 45-46.

C. Wright Mills, on. cit.
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"informal contact between top political and business leaders
obviously plays a part in structuring business-govemment
.31.5
communication.
But, at the same time, what he stresses is
the fact that "available evidence does not suggest that informal
elite coordination, is as crucial a mechanism for enabling
business to exercise a major political role as many writers
316
contend." He states:
When this elitist approach is applied to Japan, the
result is a picture of an intimate, conflict-free
family of politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen
working together to steer the course of government
policies. Geisha houses in Akasaka and Shimbashi
become the power centers where an elite meets over
sake to determine Japan's future. School and marriage ties become the glue that holds members of
the ruling class together.-' '

I

However, Curtis contends, empirically it is not the picture
in Japan.

Some of the salient points made by Curtis as a

direct challenge to the power elitist assumption of a close,
informal coordination include the following:

(a) The appearance of the interconnectedness of the
"small world" of elite, as noted earlier in the paper citing
Craig, is due to a relative geogrpahic concentration of the
elite groups in Tokyo.

This, Curtis maintains, has been

changing in recent years "for a number of reasons, one of which
-’5X5---------Curtis in Vogel (ed.), on. cit., t>. 46.
316
Ibid.
31?
* Ibid.
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is simply the development of the ’bullet' trains."

313

(h) The emphasis placed by some on the importance of
gakubatsu (school ties) and keibatsu (marriage ties) is less
justifiable than one is led to believe.

Curtis states:

-While the importance Japanese attach -to school
ties is obvious, their impact on political life
is not easily determined and their integrating
role should not be oversimplified. Many class
mates are political enemies and not all businessmen
and politicians who graduated from the same class
at Todai become bosom friends. 319
•

Although he notes that "the study of keibatsu (marriage ties)
is very popular in Japan "and that "one can easily "find a
genealogy chart on virtually every businessman and politician,"

320

Curtis points out that "the progeny of the alliances cannot
{
1

inherit positions of power in Japan"
variables may lead one to believe.

321
as these affective

He argues that not having

had a strong tradition of a closed ruling class, nepotism is
of minor importance in Japan and that "Sato Eisaku and Miki
Takeo are relatives, but one would have a difficult time explaining
why that is politically important."
(c)

322

While some of the above arguments offered by Curtis

may be debatable, his stronger argument is his observation of the
"315
"
Ibid.
3l9Ibid.
32°Ibid., P. 4?.
321Ibid., p. 49.
322Ibid., P. 47.
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^

institutionalization of the clubs of the prime minister and
other top political leaders where they join with business
leaders on a regular basis for informal discussion.

"It is

clear that Japan does have some unique mechanism for facili
tating informal elite contact . . . .

most conspicuous are

• '323

the clubs of the prime minister....... "

These club meetings

which used to be, and still are to some extent, private and
off the record (and usually held in the exotic setting of an
Akasaka geisha house) have increasingly become institutional
ized and today they are "organizations" rather than intimate
and informal club meetings.

Curtis notes that this was partic

ularly true during Sato’s long tenure.

Clubs were "once truly

324
informal groups of politicians and close business supporters,
but today they are institutionalized organizations.

325

While these points made by Curtis appear to be effective
arguments against the oversimplified and exaggerated power-elite
assumptions about the Japanese big business as part of the

J

Ibid.

324

Ibid. Curtis was accurate when he said "if the close
personal ties between political and business leaders were eroded
during the Sato administration, they probably will be weakened
even further during the Tanaka administration," as the subsequent
events and political climate surrounding the fall of Tanaka and
the rise of "Mr. Clean" (Miki) witnessed the relationship between
the prime ministers and the businessmen.

325
Ibid.
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ruling triumvirate elite group, the following remarks by
Curtis are less convincing:
Leaving aside the weakening personal ties, there is
something essentially fanciful in the view that
informal clubs play an important decision-making role,
or more generally, that informal ..elite coordination
is a crucially important feature of Japanese politics.
Most decisions in complex societies, after all, are
bureaucratic decisions and are handled through formal
bureaucratic institutions. To assume that political
and business leaders informally make decisions on
issues is to deny the bureaucratization and complexity
of the decision-making process[emphasis added].326
Firstly, that "most decisions in complex societies, after all,
are bureaucratic decisions" is an accurate generalization insofar
as routine nonpolitical issues are concerned.

However, when an

issue becomes controversial or political in nature from the
beginning, the bureaucratic model does not suffice as discussed
earlier in the paper.

Moreover, because of the factional nature

of the LDP, as is true with all other parties, what Hosoya calls the
"bureaucratic-factional-politics" model is probably more reflective
327
of the realities when controversial issues are involved.
Furthermore, as Curtis himself emphasizes, "particular cultural
traits become the key for explaining why informal communication
328
is so particularly significant in Japan."
Because of the
Japanese predilection for consensus decision-making, it is unlikely

32
327
328

P- ^9.
Hosoya in Hosoya and Watanuki (eds.), op. cit., p. 15*
'
Curtis in Vogel (ed.), 00. cit., p. 46.
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that the informal behind-the-scene elite coordination and
negotiation on important political policy issues will be
replaced by formal open debates and a simple majority decision
making altogether.

Again, the i 960 crisis is a reminder that

a policymaker who defies the peculiar cultural traits of Japan
altogether does so at his own peril.

(5 )

‘Bis business as the only major source of political

fluids for the LDP politicians:

For the triumvirate ruling

elite model to be empirically valid,

big business must be

almost, if not completely, the only major source of political
funds for the LDP politicians over whom the big business can
1

exert intimate influence through the means of the "purse
strings.” That is not the case according to Curtis.

In the first place, Curtis points out, the extensive
financing (including the illegal ones) of political activities
of

political parties and politicians has become an integral

part of various political systems and it is not unique to Japan.
By implication, what Curtis is saying is that it is no justifi
cation for the inclusion of the big business in the ruling
elite group.

The author's second point pertains to the

329Ibid., p. 51 .

r
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discretionary power of

big business as a whole.

Curtis

maintains that "the lack of a moderate opposition party with
the potential for taking over power serves to weaken the
credibility of any business threat to withhold funds from the
330
LDP." Since there is nowhere.else for
big business to go
•

••

with their political contributions, the LDP can take

, big

business support for granted, hence there is no need for a
watertight reciprocal alliance between the two according to the
logic of this observation.

However, this argument by Curtis

is less convincing when one considers the nature of the LDI>
which is a loose federation of half a dozen small "parties”
(factions) and the raison d'etre of these fact ions, part of which
t

is funding.

The third point raised by Curtis pertains to the indirect
nature of the ties between the individual LDP politicians and
the big business.

The individual LDP candidates receive political

funds from their respective faction leaders who, in turn, obtain
political contributions from

big business.

the individual LDP politicians and
indirect in nature.

The ties between

big business are, therefore,

331

33°Ibid., p. 51.
333Ibid., p. 52.
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The fourth point of Curtis' arguments is that the
LDP politicians do not depend on one source of political
support.

As a general rule, they depend on local support as

well as the "backing of their faction leaders.

Moreover, a "new

role" is "being played "fey wealthy "businessmen who are not part
of the "big business establishment. These independently wealthy
businessmen are not active in Keidanren or accepted as part of
the big business community, but many of them jiave intimate ties
with the LDP politicians.33^

The fifth and final point is the trend away from efforts
to coordinate business contributions and an increase in the
development of ties between individual factions and particular
business conglomerates.333

To sum it all up, as Curtis puts it, "the Japanese
political leadership and the bureaucracy have shared a common
33ZJ,

perception of issues and have worked to serve business interests,"
following the defeat in World War II.
business was good for the country.
defeat.

big

Japan lay in the ashes of

Physically collapsed, economic recovery was a matter

of national survival.

332

What was good for

There was a national consensus on this

1^ .

333 ibid.
33I}.
J
Ibid., p. 69. Curtis feels that the contribution of
Marxist writings to an understanding of postwar Japanese poli
tics has been to emphasize this point.
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point even though there was an articulate "body of opinion
on the left that did not share this consensus.

However,

changes in both domestic and foreign factors following Japan’s
miraculous economic recovery, and a sustained economic growth
and industrial expansion have rendered the notion of "what is
good for

big business is good for the country" increasingly

irrelevant.

The internal pressures for improving the quality

of life rather than simply expanding the size of the economy and
*

the external demands on this third most powerful economy for
greater and faster liberalization and for "orderly marketing"
represent part of numerous competing demands which make the
notion of "Japan Incorporated” irrelevant.
is breaking

d o w n .

The"consensus

"335

335 Ibid.
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(d)

Opposition Parties.

It was pointed out earlier

in the paper that the Opposition parties under the LDP domina
tion do constitute part of the institutional checks in the body
politic thus adding

to the diffusion of policymaking power

within the political structure.

As Destler and his associates

ptt it, "standing outside the ruling establishment, sharing
neither the LDP's involvement nor their consensus about policy
are other political actors who represent many millions of
337
Japanese."
These include the opposition parties, labor unions,
large segments of the intellectual community, and the press.
Along with the Japanese bureaucracy, and big business which have
formed the core of the ruling triumvirate with the LDP, these
actors outside the ruling circle constitute the domestic
determinants of the Japanese foreign policy.

Their existence

and behavior in the foreign policymaking process of Japan do
condition and characterize its style.

Having never been able to win more than one third of
the seats in the Diet, with everpresent problems of their own
intra- and interopposition unity and cohesion as the Opposition,
and without any hope of sharing power in the government (at
least until recently), the performance of the Japanese Opposition
335

Unless otherwise specified, I draw heavily upon the
excellent analytical review of the Japanese foreign policymaking
actors by Destler, et al., op. cit. for this section.
337Ibid., p. 33-
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has generally been modest without- making any major poli
tical impact'.

They have not initiated nor have they carried

through any major foreign policy decisions.

More or less

permanently out of power, with factional strife endemic,
especially -within the two major opposition parties, the
Japan Socialist Party (jSP)’and the Japan Communist Party
(JCP), the Opposition forces have been largely a fragmented,
demoralized, and frustrated force rather than a loyal op
position as a viable alternative to the LDP.

The resulting

polarization between the party in power and the Opposition
has tended to make the relationship between the two one of
confrontation rather than consultation.

(

338

Since the San Francisco peace treaty of 1951» both
the Opposition parties and the mass media have been deeply
absorbed in international affairs.

As Hellmann notes, the

Opposition left has either clung rigidly to such abstract
moral positions as an undifferentiated commitment to peace and
anti-Americanism or it has used specific issues to further its own
339
political progress.

333

Stockwin, op. cit., p. 1^3*
339
Hellmann, Japan: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign
Policy, on. cit., p. 9*
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V

Reasons for the poor Opposition performance and their
irresponsible mood are many.

Some of the "blame belongs to the

Opposition itself while others are beyond its control.

Firstly, the

two major Opposition parties, the JSP and the JGP, have been beset byconstant intraparty factional problems.

Moreover, political

rivalry and ideological differences-between them have lessened
their effectiveness as the Opposition as a whole; secondly, the
LDP government's policies for economic recovery and growth for
national survival followed by an unprecedented sustained indi
vidual prosperity during the 1950's

much of the 1960’s

tended to render the abstract"and rigid Opposition stance a matter
of political irrelevancy; thirdly, the tenacity of groupism deeply
^

rooted in the tradition of the Japanese social relations, in terms
of small group consciousness, has tended to retard the spread of
the Opposition ideologies, especially those of the JSP and the
3^0
JCP; and finally, the LDP’s own performance has been a major
factor to frustrate any serious attempt by the Opposition to be
a viable force in the body politic.

Because of the LDP’s continued

electoral successes, the Opposition has always been outnumbered
on the Diet committees.

Moreover, in spite of the pervasive intraparty

factionalism, the LDP leadership has managed to successfully

3h0

Stockwin, on. cit., p. Ib4.

('
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close ranks and avoid defections on the one hand,

341

and maintain

strict voting discipline on the floor of the House on the other.
Furthermore, the LDP-govemment has maintained, sophisticated
and effective channels of communication with, and has given
preferential treatment to, .

big business and

agriculture

both of which have been their two major sources of strengths,
the former with funds, and the latter votes.

342

Despite their modest performance in legislation and
their irresponsible mood resulting from the polarization vis-avis the party in power, the Opposition as a whole is far from
being insignificant.

(

In recent years their parliamentary

strength has been increasing in proportion to
LDP strength,
of

especially in the upper house.

steadily declinin
While an analysis

party politics itself falls outside the scope of this

particular study, it should be noted that this changing picture
of the power relations in the Diet was part of the domestic
context

of policymaking for the politics of the treaty (KPT)

ratification.

In the lower house election of i960 the LDP

gained 58 percent of the vote and 63 percent of the seats; in
1972, it won 47 percent of the vote and 53 percent of the seats.
The 1974 upper house election saw the LDP win just 42 percent

■^Ibid., p. 144.

^ 2ibid.
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of the .vote, and its majority was reduced to a hare 127 out
343
of 251 seats, or 50*59 percent of the seats.

The Opposition has been a significant determinant
of

Japanese foreign policymaking in several0 ways.
"

In the

first place, the very existence of the Opposition is, as noted
earlier in the paper, an important factor in terms of the dif
fusion of policymaking power.

For example, ever since the

formation of the LDP in 1955» the Opposition forces have always
had enough votes in the lower house to frustrate any attempt to
amend the Constitution.

Some of the ways in which'the opposition

parties can and do harrass, embarrass, and even frustrate the

f

LDP-govemment *s legislative programs have already been noted
in the paper.

The long LDP domination of the political scene

notwithstanding, the Opposition has never been eliminated as a
force.

One of the major reasons for the continued existence of

the Opposition is the multimember electoral district system in
Japan.

The system gives the Opposition parties greater oppor

tunities than winner-take-all, single-member districts like those
in the United States, where a party with 40 percent of the vote
would generally prevail over several smaller rival parties,
unless these latter could coalesce behind a single candidate.
y;j

Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 53*
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Reference has heen made to the fact that the LDP's
organizational basis is faction.

This is manifest in its

electoral behavior as it is in other areas of its
behavior.

political

Given the nature of the multimember electoral

district system, the factional nature of

Japanese politics

in general, and the LDP intraparty factional politics in
particular, becomes even more accentuated in their electoral
3*)4
. process. Because of the electoral system, it is not.unusual
that an LDP candidate must compete with fellow LDP politicians
officially recommended by the Party.

In any event, all parties

have a finite segment of the electorate for which to compete.
s

Stockwin notes, "when that segment has been fully exploited

^

by a party, it is difficult for the party to progress any
further, and, losing the momentum of its appeal, it is likely

3^5
to begin to decline."
This explains in part the LDP's steady
erosion of its electoral strength and also the relative decline

3hS
of the JSP among the Opposition forces in recent y e a r s . L a c k i n g a
3W
fresh look of the JCP's deradicalized and "close to the
WT

-------

See, for example, Gerald Curtis, Election Campaigning

Japanese Style,

ojd .

cit.

3^5 Stockwin, o£. cit., p. 161.
The JSP’s indulgence in extremist polemics far removed
from the concern of the average voter, constant factional strife
and problems related to it wizhin the party, and, like the LDP,
their narrow support basis organized around individual JSP poli
ticians have all contributed to their relative decline. See,
for example, Allan B. Cole, et al., Socialist Parties in Postwar
Japan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).
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pockettook" image, or the Komeito's early organizational
3^8
innovation in terms of proselytism, both the LDP and the
JSP may have reached a plateau.

In general, the growing strength

of the Opposition

forces as a whole owes much to the rapid urbanization of Japan
and the subsequent growth of the trade union movement which
has remained the single most important source of
- Opposition
•
*
support. Moreover, the urbanization of Japan meant a gradual
replacement of the rural patterns of deference to the established
authority of the LDP-govemment by more articulate and critical
urban attitudes which. are;as Reischauer puts it, almost a uniy±o
versa! metropolitan phenomenon.

Other factors which have given either opportunities or
ammunition to the Opposition critics of the LDP-govemment were
such policy predicaments as the economic crisis in the early
1970's, which was brought on by skyrocketing energy costs,
a double-digit inflation, and the urban sprawl resulting from
an unchecked rapid economic growth of the fifties and sixties.

See, for example, James W. White, The Sokagakkai and
Mass Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) and
James A. Dator, S5ka Gakkai, Builders of the Third Civilisation
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 19^9)•
Reischauer in Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign Policy of
Modem Japan, op. cit., Introduction, p. xv.
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Efforts to reverse the environmental damage tended to
produce strain in the government-business coalition just
as the minimal real economic growth in the seventies halted,
at least temporarily, the steady rise in economic well-being
350
which has contributed much to the LDP's public support.
Various charges of high-level corruption and "money poli
tics," the most dramatic of which drove Prime Minister Tanaka
from power in December, i97^» further damaged the LDP's image.
The net result of all this were

strained LDP-business ties

on the one hand, making businessmen reluctant to supply poli
tical funds, and the political need for the LDP politicians
to demonstrate publicly that they are not simply captives of

(

big business interests.351

As previously noted, the role of the Opposition in
the foreign policymaking process in contemporary Japan has
largely been one of obstructionism as an expression of their
frustration.

352
A deep fusion between the LDP-govemment and

the Opposition has been a pervasive feature of the postwar
Japanese foreign policymaking process.

The Opposition has

questioned the very foundation of the LDP-govemment's

~35o

Destler, et al, op. cit., p. 5^*

351 m t

352

Stockwin, o£. cit., p. 1^5.
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pro-U.S. foreign policy

in general, and the U.S.-

Japanese security system in particular.

The Cabinet members,

as well as the Prime Minister, have regularly been subjected
to particularly sharp and pointed interpellations from the Op
position Diet members the principal aim of which is, as noted
A
earlier, simply to embarrass and harrass the government. •
The Japanese security system based on the U.S.-Japanese
security system has been a particular source of domestic divi
siveness.

In order to minimize public discussions of security

and foreign policy issues, the LDP-government’s policy has been
to avoid confrontation with the Opposition while the Opposition
has actively sought public airing of these issues, mounting
public campaigns against certain specific government policies
in and out of the Diet.

The Japanese press has been instrumental

in making the Opposition strategy as such effective by reporting
to the public all the heated debates on controversial issues
which are often headlined. 352s Destler and his Brookings
associates have reported, because of the nature of the Japanese
political culture which favors consensus decision-making, the
Opposition seeks the publicity of a controversial issue just as
the LDP-govemment tries to avoid publicity for the same reason.
For once an issue becomes controversial in public, it is

Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 55*
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difficult for the government to overrule uhe Opposition
for fear of being accused of

35^
"tyranny of majority."

This explains the i960 crisis which was in fact not so much
a protest against the revision of the U.S.-Japanese
Security Treaty as it was against the blatant violation by
Prime Minister Kishi of the culturally sanctioned norm of
355
consensus decision-making.
For the same reasons, fifteen
years later, another LDP Prime Minister, Miki, would do his
90

best not to make a*'public issue" out of his MPT bill, as will
be discussed Jbelow:

In addition to the interpellations, the Opposition

(

has other parliamentary and extraparliamentary means of
obstructionsim as noted earlier.

These range from filibustering

or boycotting the Diet sessions, physical obstruction in terms
of drowning shouts causing the speech of a committee chairman
to be inaudible, fist fights, and preventing committee
chairmen physically from taking their seats, to large scale
street demonstrations with the cooperation of the labor unions,
the students, and the general public.

As noted earlier in the

paper, because of the rigidity of the parliamentary time-table
the Opposition techniques of filibustering or boycotting the
Diet sessions have become an important weapon in their
obstructionism.

Although the LDP-govemment has by and large

35$------Ibid., pp. 55-56.
355--Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., chapter V.; and
Packard, o p . cit.
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been able to have its way with its legislative programs,
on occasion

it has had to make minor concessions as the
9
•
price for bringing the Opposition back into the Diet sessions.
••>**
A case in point was, the situation
in which Prime Minister Miki found the' fate of his NPT bill
in*1975 and 1976.

(
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(e) Labor Unions. Just' as the.major political
parties are characterized by a paradoxical combination of
centripetal and centrifugal forces as loosely federated groups
of many "small group conscious," cliquish, single interest
oriented factions or shifting coalitions of factions, so are
the Japanese labor unions.

As Ike points out. labor in Japan
•
.
356 •
"does not speak as one voice and act as one unit." The

relatively higher degree of the fragmentation of labor in
Japan stems from an unusual feature of

organized labor in

Japan.

The peculiar feature is the "preponderant position
357
occupied by ’enterprise unions" in Japan.
Reference has

been made

above to the existence of numerous

figurative extensions of the traditional family system, ie.
The permanent employment system, which remains the norm in
much of Japanese industry, is one of these figurative extensions
of the traditional family concept

and most of the union members
358
consist of such permanent employees.
Because
enterprise

unionism tends to develop its members' first loyalty to their

j 356 "

'

r

Ike, o£. cit., p. 46.

357 Ibid., p. 47.
3-5® a firm will hire staff for the most part from schoolor college-leavers in the expectation of retaining them perma
nently or semi-permanently," as noted by Stockwin, o£. cit.,
p : 145. The firm is a quasi-family group. An employee's job
security, welfare, and status in the society are synonymous
with the growth and prestige of his firm. Thus the employee
tends to develop his first loyalty to his firm.

p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 353 -

respective firms, the system tends to fragment organized
labor as a whole. Thus labor disputes leading to strike action
undertaken by a radical union leadership group sometimes pre
cipitate the formation of a "second union" which is prepared
to come to an understanding with management in the interest
of preserving the viability of the firm and thus the jobs of
the employees.^^

In the same manner in which the parties, especially
the LDP, remain essentially an entity of cliquish and closed
system of politicians, organized labor as a whole
essentially represents one "class," that is, "labor " as
opposed to "business" as another.

In both of these "classes,"

one finds a trace of traditionalism.As Scalapino and Masumi
note, "the politics of Japanese business has never been truly
the politics of liberalism.

The Japanese business class has

not been conditioned to place primary emphasis upon limited
360
government, individual rights, and safeguards for the- minority.'
"Nor has the politics of Japanese labor been truly the politics
of liberalism.

The Japanese labor class—

accurately, the labor leadership?

should one say more

has not been conditioned

to accept parliamentarism as the final arbiter of political
issues, or to accept the philosophy that the majority also

359
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 146.
<3^0
Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 78.
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has rights, including the right to govern."

361

Thus, there

is"some relation between the non-liberalism of both [business

362

and labor] and the closed party*system" in Japan.

Although

this picture has been changing somewhat in recent years, the
fact remains that the burgeoning socioeconomic revolution
that has been spreading across the nation is largely outside
the closed-circuit factionally fragmented national political
structure

between the ruling :.LDP establishment and the Op

position on the one hand, and between business and labor on
the other.

Consequently, what the LDP is to business, the
Opposition is to the labor unions.

Although the labor unions,

like the business organizations, "often articulate their
demands through regular government channels (relevant divisions
. 363
and bureaus of the ministries;,” for political solutions to
their demands they often turn to the Opposition parties.
Just as most Japanese Opposition parties and intellectuals
question xhe very basis of the Japanese foreign policy of an
alliance with the United States, none of the major labor unions
364
have supported the ruling LDP and its foreign policy.^
35T

Ibid., p. 78.

362

Ibid.
363 Destler, et al., on. cit., p. 5 6 .
364
Ibid.
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The largest of the Japanese labor unions, the
General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Nihon R5do.Kumiai
_

.

.,365

Sohyo Kaigi or Sohyoj,

serves as the power base for the JSP.

Some of the Sohyo's affiliates also cooperate with the JCP.
S5hyo has been the most radical and most active of all the
♦•

labor organizations opposing the policy' of alliance with the
United States.

Pursuing both political and economic objectives

at the national level, it has consistently opposed the entry
of American nuclear warships into Japanese harbors, American
, military action in Southeast Asia, and the- strengthening of
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

Along with other labor

unionists, it played a key role in the massive demonstrations

(

in i960 against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security
Treaty and President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to Tokyo.
Almost every year, it launches, along with other labor unions,
a "spring offensive" to seek wage increases, as well as better
fringe benefits such as more holidays, increased severance
pay, compensation insurance for injuries, and so on.
^

j—^

366

m

S5hy5 was founded in 1950 with the support and encourage
ment of the Occupation which was then interested in purging the
labor movement of Communist leadership. With some 4.3 million
members, as of June 1973 (Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 56),
roughly 38 percent of the national total is composed predomi
nantly of employees of the public service and government instru
mentalities, who for various reasons tend to be more radically
oriented than workers in private industry. Stockwin, op. cit.,
pp. 146-14?.
Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 56; Ike, op. cit., p. 49.
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The second largest union grouping, the Japanese
Confederation of Labor (Zen Nihon Rodo SodSmei, or Domei),
is much more moderate than Sohyo,

It officially supports the

DSP and seeks to improve the economic position of labor
by working within the capitalist system.

367
The third major

group is the Liaison Conference of Neutral Labor Unions
(Churitsu Rodokumiai Renraku Kaigi or Churitsuroren) which is
not affiliated with any particular political party but usually
works with the S5hyo and the D5mei for advancing common labor
objectives including an annual wage hike.

The affiliation of the Sohyo with the JSP is another
element of the diffusion of policymaking power within the {

Japanese political structure.

Even though its relative strength

among the Opposition forces has been on the decline, the JSP
remains the main Opposition party and the only one to have
significant ".links" with the electorate outside the major
cities and towns, in terms of the Opposition representation in
369
the Diet. The close affiliation between this main Opposition
party and the S5hy5, the largest labor union and the most
active and the most radical labor interest group, has important
implications for the continued polarization between the Op
position and the LDP on the one hand, and the diffusion of

"367-----

Ike, op. cit., p.

,

Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 5°.

Destler, et al., ibid.
stockwin, op. cit., p. 1^?.
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policymaking power within the body politic on the other.

Despite the shift in recent years of its electoral
strength to the rural SXGeLS in proportion to the JGP's gain
in the metropolitan areas, the JSP remains dependent upon
the essentially "metropolitan.”

radical labor union, Sohyo,

for electoral support, political funds, and even personnel
for elective offices at various levels, local, prefectural,
370
and national.
Between the pervasive factionalism carried
over from the past, which makes the task of updating party
policy difficult, and its dependence on the radical labor
union, the JSP finds itself in a vicious circle.

(

Stockwin

states:
In general, therefore, the JSP seems chronically
unable to escape from a vicious circle. The
leadership is beholden to sectional extremists
whose views are too radical to have much
electoral appeal, but at the same time pervasive
factionalism within the Party has made the
task of updating party policy very difficult.
The JSP thus gives-an impression of extreme
conservatism which helps it even less than the
ritual radicalism of many of its policy pro
nouncements. 37*
The socialist conservatism of the JSP and its dependence on
the radical Sohyo imply elements of rigidity in the anatomy
and pathology of this main Opposition party in Japan which
contribute to the diffusion of policymaking power within
the political structure.
370
371

Ike, op. cit., p. 51.
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 156.
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(f)

Academia and Intellectuals. While a full dis

cussion of the academia and intellectuals in the political
processes of Japan on its own merits falls outside the scope
•

•

of this study, the following, based on some of the existing

*

analyses of this important group of actors in the Japanese
,
foreign policymaking process, is a brief look at the con
tribution they make to the diffusion.of policymaking power
within the political structure.

By virtue of being intellectuals, including those
in a.cademia, these people exert direct and indirect
influences on the foreign policymaking process.
case elsewhere in the Far East, in Japan
command social deference and are influential.

As is the

the literati
As Herbert Passin

points out, "Japanese intellectuals have always had great
moral authority.

The gakusha (scholars),the sensei (teachers),

the bunka.jin (men of culture), the chishiki.jin (men of knowledge)
are listened to. Their presence graces the occasion and validates
372
the cause." For example, a 1971-1972 survey of leadership
opinion indicated that the intellectuals were the top choice
of the respondents as

those who should be involved in the

y^2---- ----Herbert rissin, "Intellectuals in the Decision-Making
Process," in Vogel (ed.), or. cit., p. 283.

('
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establishment of national goals.373

The roles played by any specific segment of the
intellectuals, much less

intellectuals as a whole, in a

given decision-making process is difficult to determine.
"If we look on decision-making as a process, with the actual
decision the product of a series of inputs by competitive
forces, we then look not for some single decisive influence
37^
but rather for a structure of decision."
If we define the
term "structure" as "the pattern-of action . .
as noted
•375
earlier in the paper, then the role that the Japanese
intellectuals, including the academicians, play in the foreign
376
policymaking process can be characterized as "oppositional."
373-----"36 percent of the responses to the question,'who
should be mainly involved in the establishment of national
goals?' referred to intellectuals in one form or another
(mass .communications, think tanks, intellectuals and men of
culture, religious organizations, and academia) as against
27 percent that referred to the established political insti
tutions (Diet, cabinets, LDP, and local government), and 13
percent that referred to anti-establishment organizations
(opposition parties the student movement, and labor unions),"
ibid., pp. 282-283, citing Tanaka Yasumasa, Koyama Kenichi,
and Yasuda Jumei, "Nihon no Kokka mokuhyo ni kansuru chSsa— —
KisS shukei h5koku [Research on Japan's National Goals
Report
of Preliminary Compilation), miroeo (Tokyo: Kokka HokuhyO
Kenkyu_Project Team, June 1973)» Table 1:1, p. 19.
Passin in Vogel (ed.),“op. cit., p. 258.
375

Oran Young, on. cit., p. 30.
Passin in Vogel (ed.), on. cit., p. 260.
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As Destler and his associate note, the government
and

academia in Japan have been for the most part mutually

exclusive communities.

THfe professional bureaucrats, who see

themselves as their society's elite, seldom bring in the
academicians for

short-term service.

They do practically

all policy research and planning try themselves for the govern
ment.

The. academic community,for its part, is reluctant to

maintain close relations with the government, "especially
scholars in the social sciences." ^ h e r e are two major
historical reasons:

Firstly, since the Keiji era the liberal

tradition of the Japanese intellectuals has tended to oppose
conservative policies of government; and secondly, the older
scholars' sense of guilt over their collaboration with the govern
ment, which had

eventually brought about the war and suppression

of thought,, tends to make them shy away from association with
the government.

The net result of the intellectuals' desire

for independent thinking, the tradition of their predilection
for liberal opposition, and the sense of guilt on the part of
the older academicians is the "oppositional" characteristic
of the intellectuals as a whole.

This characteristic of the

Japanese intellectuals has been reinforced by the polarized
378
Japanese political system and the close relationship which

377 Destler, et al., oja. cit., PP. 56-57*
378 Ibid., p. 57-
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exists between the intellectual community and the generally
oppositional mass media, especially the press.

379

The JSP and

the JCP are in fact the creation of the Japanese intellectuals
who generally constitute the core of these parties as a whole
and the leadership of various factions within the party.
Because of the social respect

380

and deference they command and

*
their historical predilection for liberal causes, the Japanese
intellectuals as a whole have their share of
tribution to

significant con

groupism of Japan and the subsequent diffusion

of policymaking power in the foreign policymaking process of
Japan.

(g)

The Press. R e f e r e n c e has been made to the fact

that the Japanese press, in a sense, collaborates with the
Opposition parties by giving the Opposition a maximum amount
of publicity they seek

against the Government's wishes.

The

press has historically almost always been on the Opposition

•^Passin in Vogel (ed.), op. cit., p. 120.
•^T h e i r journals, organs, and magazines, which are
among the first-class intellectual publications in Japan include:
Shakaishugi, Akahata, and Shokun.

•^Discussions of the role of the Japanese press include:
Destler, op. cit., pp. 57-59; Passin in Vogel, op. cit., pp« 251283; Nathaniel Thayer, "Competition and Confirmity: An Inquiry
into the Structure of Japanese Newspapers," in Vogel, op. cit.,
pp. 283-303; Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Poli
tics, op. cit., pp. 105-109; "Japanese Press Today,” Japan Tines,
November 1, 1959; "Japanese Newspaper and Magazines," Japan
Report, VI (January 15» i960), pp. 4-8; Hessei Tiltman, '"Fourth
Estate'in Japan," Asahi Evening News, October 4, 1958; and Edward
P. Whittemore, The Press in Japan Today . . . A Case Study (Colum
bia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1961).
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side.
a

As Passin notes, the Japanese journalism has

tradition

that

is important in connection with

the political role of the Japanese intellectuals discussed.
above.

It is

strongly oppositional.

Since its

inception in the Meiji period, it has been, except in the
period of militarist control in the 1930s» almost always
on the opposition side.

Although the national press

x

professes a strict neutrality with regard to parties, its
general thrust has been against the party in power.

382

Thus, the role of the press since 1955 has been to check,
in the words of an observer, "the government's Pisa-like
383
leanings toward America."
As Hellmann notes, "the media

(

of mass communication, especially the press, constitute
the main channels linking the decision-makers and the public.

The oppositional stand of the press is reinforced
also by

its

tradition of individualized journalism.

The

newspapers carry, as do almost all intellectual magazines,
many signed articles and frequently invite outside intel
lectual contributors.

It is a mutually reinforcing

oQO
D ‘'Passin in Vogel (ed.), op. cit., p. 260.
-^•^Yukio Matsuyama, "Japanese Press and Japan's
Foreign Policy," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 26,
no. 2 (1972), p. 1535 also see Tiltman, op. cit.
384Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic
Politics, on. cit., p. 105-
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mechanism of oppositional forces of the--independentthinking and generally anti-establisment intellectuals
and the traditionally oppositinal press.

The role of the press in the foreign policymaking
process is^significant in many ways.

It "influences

policy-making through its sometimes conflicting roles of
purveyor of information (including many leaks), vocal
critics of government, and confidant of politicians and
386
senior officials."
The media provide the policymakers
"with a day-to-day image of public interest in each issue
by reporting overt actions and statements concerning

f

policy and by evaluating individual questions in editorials
38?
and special commentary."
The policymakers, in turn, use
the press to disseminate information and publicize their
own views.

This two-way flow of communication via the

press normally "constitutes almost the entire public policy
388
dialogue."
At the same time, the press is in a sense the
maker of the general political climate of the nation by
what and how it reports to the public and by way of the
3E3--------Passin notes that the leading Japanese intellectuals
have newspaper outlets that are normally not available to .
their counterparts, for examnle, in the United Spates, Passin
in Vogel (ed.j, op. cit., p.'260.
Destler, et al., op. cit., pp. 57-58.
Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic
Politics, on. cit., p. 105*
333 Ibid.
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extent to which the public opinion cones to be identified
339

with press reports and editorials.

As Hellmann puts it,

the press, is "able to condition the nature of public response
to particular issues through the kind of coverage accorded
them.

By establishing the focus of attention, the press

indirectly determines how the public will participate in
390

the policy-formulation process. ’

■Another major aspect of the role- of the press inthe foreign policymaking process is the interaction between
the journalists on the one hand and the politicians and
senior bureaucrats on the other.

There are two ways in which

the press exerts influence directly upon various partici
pants in the foreign policymaking process such as the Diet
politicians of all the political parties, members of the
Government from the Prime Minister down to the senior
bureaucrats, and key staff members of these policymakers
and senior civil servants.

Firstly, the press is often the

main source of information

ranging from official and semi

official information to gossips and rumors.

Since only a

limited number of top-ranking Japanese politicians and
bureaucrats have access to confidential and newsworthy

"339-----

Destler, et al., op. cit., n. 58.

390

Ibid.
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information and "stories," which are channeled through
the Foreign Office, for most LDP members and the zaikai
(big business) people the main source of information on
what is heppening outside the country is the press.
Secondly, the journalists play the role of informal
advisors to various policymakers during the course of
pervasive behind-the-scene informal policymaking processes,
which, as Yanaga points out, take place in the form of
391
the ubiquitous "teahouse politics" or parties in Ginza.

The political culture of Japan which encourages
groupism and policymaking through consensus with ‘its
implications for the ways in which the Japanese reach policy
decisions thus finds a relatively higher degree of political
involvement (or partisan involvement) of the press in the
entire foreign policymaking process.

While the political

(or the partisan) involvement of the press in the public
policymaking process of a political system itself is not
unique to Japan, the combined net effect of these dynamics
of the role of the Japanese press in the foreign policymaking
process tends to reinforce the phenomenon of the diffusion
of policymaking power within the political structure.
■-

This is called in the press circle yomawari
(literally, evening rounds) during which newsmen engage in
informal nightchats with various important policymakers
or their key staff members over tea or sake. See, for
example, Destler, et al., op. cit., p. 58; and Yanaga,
on. cit., p. 11.
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CHAPTER FOUR
V

JAPAN'S RATIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY:
A CASE STUDY OF
THE DIFFUSION OF POLICYMAKING POWER AND CONSENSUS POLITICS
»

■

-

It was pointed out in the beginning chapter that the
question of the NET ratification presented the Japanese policy
makers with a peculiar case.

As the first concrete postwar nuclear

issue upon which Japan had to make a hard policy decision, the NPT
issue and attendant interissue problems were uniquely diffuse and
complex in nature.

Stated in another way, the case of

NPT

policymaking was neither "routine" nor "critical" in nature, as
defined earlier.

(
The specific purpose of this chapter is to examine broadly
how the structural and behavioral characteristics

diffusion of

policymaking power and consensus politics— were manifest in the
policymaking process specific to the diffuse NPT issue.

More spec

ifically, this chapter deals with two basic dimensions relative to
the NPT policymaking process:

(1) the issue dimension; and (2) the

actor dimension.

The issue dimension deals with the nature of the NPT issue,
as it appeared to the Japanese policymakers.

One asks:

why was

the NPT issue so diffuse and complex to the Japanese policymakers?
-

366

-
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This question calls for an examination of two broad contextual
factors:

first, the origins and basic framework of postwar Japan's

defense policy in general and its nuclear'policy in particular, as
both of them relate to the NPT issue; and second, the nature of the
NPT issue itself, as perceived by the Japanese policymakers, and the
external context of the NPT policymaking.

The actor dimension pertains to internal factors:

how did

various actors react to the NPT issue? If there was wide
difference of opinion (as there was) among the policymakers
over the NPT issue, who, in the final analysis, was responsible
for Japan's ratification of the treaty?

1

(
A.

2

Basic Framework of Postwar Japan's Foreign/Security Policy
A proper typological analysis of a case such as the NPT

policymaking requires identification of the basic framework and
the past pattern of postwar Japan's foreign/security policymaking,
including critical variables that have shaped the substance of such
policies as well as the structure and dynamics of the policymaking
process.

Questions one may ask include:

(1) what were the basic

-

In view of the scope and nature
systematic chronological description of
is outside the interest of the analysis
the same as Scalapino and Masumi did in
i960 crisis), the case analysis in this

of this case analysis, a
who did what, when, and why
made in this chapter. Much
their case analysis (the
chapter is broad and brief.

f '

Three terms, "security," "defense," and "strategic policy"
are used broadly and almost interchangeably in this study. See,

(

for example, Weinstein, op. cit., p. 28.
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principles underlying postwar Japan's security policies?

(2) what
(3) what

are the basic assumptions underlying the security policies?
is involved in the domestic political process?

-

More specifically,

what are the limits it imposes on the adoption of certain substantive
policies,such as nuclear armament,.and on the flexibility with which
the leaders can respond to international crisis?

(4)

what has been

the nature of the external environment and its influence on postwar
Japan's foreign/security policies?

and finally, (5) who are the

central role players in.malting and implementing important (or poli
tically controversial) foreign/security policies?

1.

The Origins and Basic Principles of Postwar Japan's Defense
Policy.

The single most important determinant of the principles
of postwar Japan's security policies was the United States.

The

United States' strategic guarantee for Japan's security (the
American "nuclear umbrella") was and still is crucial in deter
mining postwar Japan's strategic security policies.

Scholars and defense specialists do not agree on the
nature and principles of postwar Japan's foreign/security policies.
Nor do they agree on the manner in which the Japanese foreign/
security policymakers operate.
opposed views on these questions.

Broadly, there have been two
One of them may be called,

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

- 369 -

for want of a better description, a teleological view of postwar
Japan's foreign/security policies.-^

The general thrust of this

view is that postwar Japan's foreign/security policies have been
4
"calculated responses to the realities of world politics."
For example, the Japanese strategic specialists who hold this view
presuppose that their policymakers have selected and will continue
to select the "appropriate policy for the external realities and •
given set of values.”^

According to Langdon, Japan has been con

sistent in pursuit of their three national policy objectives:

6
"prosperity, security, and international recognition." He explains:
because of the Japanese people’s disillusionment with
imperialism and an awareness of the fears of other countries
of a revival of Japanese militarism, the government leaders
of Japan scrupulously have avoided vainglorious ambitions
and they have followed largely non-military and non
interventionist policies. Instead, they have relied upon
peaceful means of trade and economic aid to win both
influence and recognition.?

\his view is, Hellmann points out, widely held by both
Japanese strategic specialists and Western (primarily American)
writers on the subject. See, for example, Kiichi Saeki, "Japan's
Security in a Multipolar World," paper presented at a Brookings
Institution Conference, "The United States and Japan in Asia," .
Racine, Wisconsin, January 4-5, 1975* Examples of the Western
studies that have concentrated on the domestic scene include:
Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) and. John Welfield,
Japan and Nuclear China, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense,
No. 9 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970).
Others that have mainly dealt with external determinants include
Robert E. Osgood, The Weary and the Wapy: U«S. and Japanese
Security Policies in Transition (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Uni
versity Press, 1972), Hellmann in Scalapino (ed.), o p . cit., P* 328,
footnotes 14 and 15. Of these, particularly relevant to the
origins, basic conceptions, and assumptions of postwar Japan's
foreign/security policies is Weinstein's work which is discussed
more in the following.
^Hellmann in Scalapino (ed.), ibid.
^Ibid, citing Kiichi Saeki, op. cit.
6Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy, op. cit., preface, p. xi.

^ Ibid., p. 2.
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■Weinstein's took represents one of the most forceful
arguments of this view.

According to Weinstein, the leaders of

Japan in the years immediately following World War II knew what
foreign/security policies Japan ought to follow.

They had a clear

understanding of Japan's defense requirements from the beginning.
They were aware of Japan's need "to cope with the universal problem
of finding a way to survive as a state in the nuclear age and with
the virtually universal problem of adjusting to radical changes in
*

g

their international power and status."

They were keenly aware of

various.problems Japan faced in terms of geopolitical security
policies.

They were "unusually quick to perceive the bipolar pattern

of military power which has characterized Far Eastern international

(

relations since World War II."

9

They understood both opportunities

and perils of this situation. "While a United States-Soviet rivalry
in the Far East offered them an opportunity to reestablish Japan as
a viable political entity, this rivalry also posed the menace of
cataclysmic war, a war in which Japan itself was likely to become

10

a battleground."

The Japanese leaders chose first to concentrate

on making Japan "an ally of the United States, and then to devote
themselves to rendering the alliance as unprovocative and inoffensive
as possible to the Soviet Union.

The result has been that, since

regaining its sovereignty at the San Francisco Peace Conference in
1951» Japan has enjoyed a relatively high degree of security at an

— g----- -----------Weinstein, on. cit., Introduction, pp. 1-2.
9 Ibid., p. 2.
10
Ibid.
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,11
extremely low cost."

Weinstein disputes the view,among the

supporters as well as the critics of this policy, -hat it has been a
"derivative of United States Far Eastern Security Policy—

that the

Japanese Government has had few if any ideas of its own on how Japan
ought to be protected, and has trailed along in the wake of the

'

.

i?

United States in foreign and defense affairs."

•
As a case in point,

Weinstein stresses the fact that Japan has on occasion failed to
flolly meet the requirements of American policy.

That was the case,

he points out, especially in Japan’s persistent reluctance on
rearmaments and a larger role in maintaining regional security. ..
Weinstein arguesi
this tendency to resist American policy has not been explained
in terms of the Government's understanding of Japanese
defense requirements. It has instead been attributed to
Japan’s Peace Constitution, and to the strong pacifist pressure
of public opinion which has been kept focus ea on the Govern
ment by the Opposition parties and by elements of the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party .............
In brief, the Japanese
Government's defense policy is seen as being essentially passive
an effort to hold in balance, on the one hand, American
demands for bases, rearmament, and a larger role in regional
security; and, on the other hand, the deep seated pacifist,
neutralist, antinuclear feelings of the Japanese people.
.......
I do not agree with these views.-3
His

theme is forcefully presented throughout his work on postwar

Japan's defense policy from 19^7 to 1968.

With ample supporting

evidence, the author attempts to show consistency in postwar Japan's
foreign/security policies supportive of his main theme.

H

Ibid
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V

According to Weinstein, the architect of postwar Japan's
foreign/security policy is former Prime Minister Shigeru Y o s h i d a . ^
Yoshida's "basic conception and principles of postwar Japan's foreign/
security policy were subsequently embodied in a 1947 memorandum from
then Foreign Minister Hitoshi Ashida to the United States G o vem-

15
ment.

"Since 1948, Japan has been ruled by a succession of Con-

servative prime ministers and cabinets . . . .

these men have all

acted in accordance with the basic assumptions and policy proposals
in the Ashida memorandum."

16

As Hellmann notes, this teleological

view is "seemingly supported by the remarkable success of Japan in
gaining international status and at minimal cost, while ostensibly
adhering to humanitarian and pacifist principles."
^

17

The other view, however, stresses the fact that postwar
Japan's foreign/security policies have simply been a function of
both external and internal determinants.

This view gives little

significance to what the Japanese policymakers thought Japan's
policies ought to be or how Japan ought to be protected.

Hellmann,

for example, regards postwar Japan's foreign/security policies
simply as a function of "one dimensional" bilateral relations

iA

Ibid., Chapter 2, passim; Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida
Memoirs, trans. Yoshida Kenichi (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962);
Yoshida Shigeru, Kaiso Junen (Tokyo: Shin Shio Sha, 1957)» II^Weinstein, op. cit., pp. 24-28, 31> 39-40.
16Ibid., p. 41.

17

'Hellmann in Scalapino (ed.), on. cit., p. 328.

(
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between Japan and the United States.

In Hellmann's words:

Since 19^5 > Japan has been either a country occupied by
American troops or a defense satellite under a hegemonial
alliance arrangement that has ultimately treated Japanese
• security interests as identical with those of the United
States. The explicit ties on defense matters have been
reinforced both by the cultivation of extensive bilateral
economic and political relations, and by the shrill
anti-American campaigns of the Japanese Left ‘which have
served to narrow the focus of the foreign-policy debate » ^g
t o ......... concern over relations with the United States.
Arguing against the teleological view of postwar Japan's foreign/
security policies, Hellmann states:
A main thrust of my argument is to severely qualify the
notion that security policy of Japan (or any nation) is
fully, or even primarily, the result of calculated choice.
Situational factors, both domestic and international,
severely limit the options open to decision-makers and
thus make any analysis of the policy dialogue based on
assumptions of. a full, equal range of alternatives an
incomplete and misleading guide to basic influences
shaping a nation's role in the world.^9
Linking the situational view to the manner in which the Japanese
policymakers make their foreign/security policies, Hellmann
continues,
this is particularly true in postwar Japan, where Japanese
decision-making institutions have inhibited and continue to
inhibit rapid, flexible responses; they have produced
reactive, not active, policies. The incapacity for bold
leadership, the extremely politicized nature of the policy
making process, and the lack of a partisan consensus on
security matters assure that Japanese policies will be
largely a product of the tangled web of domestic political
forces.20

1£tbid., pp. 321-322.
1% b i d ., p. 3292QEbid.

f
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The primacy of internal factors in postwar'Japan’s (for that
matter, prewar Japan's also) foreign/security policymaking process is
underscored in the following remarks also by Hellmann:
In considering the development of Japan's security
policies, domestic political influences and the external
environment must be scrupulously distinguished and seperately evaluated. Normally, a nation's strategy reflects
a dynamic balance between internal and international con
siderations, but in Japan this relationship has been
disrupted. Prolonged withdrawal from all power politics
and the peculiar 'features of the new diplomatic tradition
have led to a perspective that is, to.an extraordinary
extent, derived from politics and ideals unique to
£1
conditions within [italics in the original] the country.
Because of the one dimensional origins of postwar Japan's foreign/
security policies and because of the separation of external and
internal factors, the Japanese foreign/security policies have
remained essentially unchanged and are unlikely to change.
Likewise, Hellmann argues, as a result of the tangled web of domestic
political forces the foreign policymaking process of Japan has
largely remained immobilized.

Underlying the continuity of the

Japanese foreign/security policies are the fundamental assumptions
"that the United States would remain deeply engaged militarily in
the region, both on nuclear and conventional levels; that there was
and would continue to be a basic identity of Japanese and American
security interests; and that the economic and political dimensions
of policy could be effectively separated from security matters."

21Ibid., p. 328.
22

Ibid., pp. 322-323.

(.
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Much as they may appear to he opposed to each other,

f

V

from the viewpoint of this study these two views are mutually as
supportive as they are reinforcing.

In the absence of express

reasons to change, the basic assumptions underlying the principles
of postwar Japan's foreign/security policies have remained unchanged.
As the result of its defeat in World War II and the subsequent
23
Occupation, Japan became a highly "penetrated political system. " J
"Despite the tendency to treat domestic and foreign policy as
different in kind, in the case of Japan major foreign policy
decisions are also major domestic ones.

Usually the same leaders

and groups are involved as in more purely domestic ones."

24

Since

1955* Japan has been under the conservative LDP politicians' rule.

(

To the extent that postwar Japan's foreign/security policies appear
to be teleological, as they do,
political power in Japan.

it is due to the continuity of

Weinstein's arguments that very early

in the postsurrender years the leaders of Japan knew what the best
security policy would be for Japan are supported by empirical
referents.

As he addressed the Eighty-Ninth Imperial Parliament

on January 28, 1946, the former Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro

23

Frank C. Langdon, "Japan's Foreign Policy-Making Process,"
in Young C. Kim (ed.), Japan in World Politics (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Asian Studies, 1972), p . 1; f o r t h e concept of the
"penetrated political system," Woliram F. Hanrieder, West German
Foreign Policy 1949-19o3» International Pressure ana Donresti'C"
Response (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 230; and
James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in
R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International
Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Pressm 1966), p.
Langdon in Kim, loc. cit

(
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made the first postsurrender reference to a national security
concept for Japan:
In the long run . . . rifles and swords can no longer
prevail . . . .
What grasps people’s minds and functions
as a gyrocompass for domestic and international politics
will he . . . the power of moral justice and the spirit
of rationalism. ^5
As Weinstein argues, postwar Japan’s foreign/security policies
do reveal elements of continuity.

Over two and a half decades

after Kijuro's remarks, another Japanese leader stated that Japan
desires "to achieve the status of a leading power without the
necessity for nuclear arms and without any large-scale armament."

26

Many policy decisions have been prompted more by short-term considerations of expediency than by any long-term plan.

27

Therefore,

it may be an exaggeration to say that postwar Japan's foreign/
security policies have been teleological.
trends they are clear enough."

"Nevertheless, as

28

On the other hand, empirical facts are equally supportive of
Hellmann's arguments.

Yoshida's basic conception of postwar Japan's

security policy and its principles squarely rest on the US-Japanese
Security Treaty.

It has been the United States' strategic security

shields which have insulated Japan from .the realities of international
power politics.
—

The polarity and the longstanding controversy within
—

Makato Momoi, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies,"
in Scalapino (ed.), op. cit., p* 341. citing Naikaku Kanbo (ed.),
Naikaku goridaijin BflzetsarShu [A Collection of Prime Ministers
SpeechesJ (Tokyo: Government of Japan, Sorifu Shuppan Kyokum 1965) j
p. 410. ,
Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda's remarks, Langson, op. cit.,
P'

00Ibid.
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 221.
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Japan over security issues (the American alliance) point to the
one dimensionality of postwar Japan's foreign/security policies.
Moreover, to the extent that foreign/security issues are
intertwined'with the."tangled web" of

domestic factional poli

tics, it is an indication of the primacy of internal factors in the
case of the Japanese foreign policymaking process.
The case of Prime Minister Kafcuei Tanaka's trip to Peking
and subsequent normalization of diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China in 1972 is a good example supportive
of Hellmann's arguments.

On one hand, what precipitated this first

major diplomatic move on the part of Japan was the change
policy toward China.

in U.S.

On the other hand, internally, Tanaka's

China policy was a direct function of intra-LDP factional politics.
More specifically, Tanaka took advantage of a massive movement of
opinion against Prime Minister Sato's previous policies toward the
People's Republic of China.

2.

Postwar Japan's Nuclear Policy.
The pattern that has emerged from the evolution of postwar

Japan's defense/nuclear policies is characterized by the following
three major factors:

(l) to totally rely on the

umbrella" as Japan's strategic deterrent

American

nuclear

against external attacks;

(2) to adhere to the "three non-nuclear principles" (hikaku San
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f

J

29

.gensoku); and (3) to keep Japan's nuclear options open.

These

three factors represent both the active and reactive nature of postwar
Japan's security policy.

At the same time, they are squarely based

on the basic assumptions relative to the principles of postwar Japan's
security policy.

The dependence upon

United States strategic

nuclear deterrents is reflective of the passive and reactive nature of
its nuclear policy while

Japanese insistence upon leaving its

nuclear option open is active in nature.

The declared policy of

adhering to the "three non-nuclear principles" is both active and
*
•
*
reactive in nature. To the extent that Tokyo has-adhered to these
principles it is active.

On the other hand, in view of the widespread

"nuclear allergy" in Japan and the
/
^

•

opposition parties, the Govern-

ment of Japan has'had few, if any, alternative nuclear policies.
As noted previously, the origins of postwar Japan's nuclear policy
can be traced back to former Prime Minister Yoshida's basic con-

30 Until President Nixon's statement

ception of Japan's security.-'

at Guam in 19&9» which redefined the United States role in the
31
western regions of the Pacific,^ the Japanese feeling of efficacy
of the American "nuclear umbrella" had remained unshaken.

32

Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, op. cit., p. 45; Langdon
in Kim (ed.), op. cit., p. 7» Japan, Gaimusho, Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo,
No. 12 (October 19^8), Shiryo, p. 4.
Yoshida, Kaiso Junen, op. _cit., II, pp. 111-112.
^ Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970)> pp. 55-80.
Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy, op. pit., p. 137! also
Japan, Sori Fu, Nihon no Anzen o Hamoru ni wa
Anzen Hosho ni
Tsaite no Seifu no Kangaekata (June 1969)5 P- 20.

(
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As with their policy of the American alliance, the Japanese
governments since Yoshida have been consistent in upholding a non
nuclear official policy.

The success!/e governments have maintained

the policy of adhering to the "three-non-nuclear-principles."
Externally, it would appear to he the most rational policy both
economically and strategically.

Because of the Unit'ed'States

33
strategic deterrents which protect Japan,
it is unnecessary for
Japan to build up an expensive nuclear weapons system.

Moreover, a

nuclear Japan might cause fears and suspicions about a revival of
military Japan.

Japan can ill afford possible alienation and economic

repercussions that may result from such fears and suspicions in view
of its extensive dependence upon foreign raw materials, resources,
and markets; enriched uranium for its nuclear industry and oil among
them.

Furthermore, strategically, Japan's population concentration

on four islands denies an In-depth defense capability.

This fact

makes Japan extremely vulnerable to a possible preemptive surgical
first strike from the Soviet Union

or China should Japan decide to

3^
go nuclear.
Internally, the non-nuclear policy has been the least
objectionable policy doctrine.

The memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

-^In accordance with the US-Japanese Security Treaty of i960,
any nuclear power threatening or attacking Japan would risk nuclear
retaliation if it used such weapons on Japan even if Japan itself has
none, Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy, op~. cit., p. 137 > also,
Japan, Sori Fu, op. _cit.f p. 20.
3^
There is a concept of Japan's own nuclear deterrent capability
based on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM1
) carried around
by long-range missile submarines (ULMS). See, for example, Soreson,
op. cit., pp. 30-^3 .
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linger on.

In the wake of popular aversion to "the bomb" in particular

and sensitivity to the nuclear issue in general,

35

the opposition

parties have frequently attempted to extract political gain from any

*36

nuclear issue, actual or imagined.

'

The answer to all this was the

37
"official" policy
of adhering to the Kaku yon Seisaku ("Four Nuclear
\
38
Principles"-) including the "three-non-huclear-principles.
Thus, from the perspective of a rational policy matrix, the combination
of the American alliance and the "Four Nuclear Principles" would ap
pear to he the best.

The Socialists (JSP) and the Communists (JCP)

$

both, in particular, have attacked the American alliance, the former
from the stance of a utopian unarmed neutrality, the latter from
that of anti-American imperialism.

35

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not the only cause of the
Japanese sensitivity to the nuclear issue. There was the Fukuryo
Maru incident. The Bikini H-bomb test of March 1, 1954 resulted in
the death of a fisherman aboard the Japanese fishing vessel from
radiation. Others too suffered from the nuclear fallout. This
incident caused widespread fear which had turned into mass hysteria
in Japan. See, for example, Jijimondai Kenkyujo, Gensuikyo (in
English) (Tokyo: Jijimondai Kenkyujo, 1961), pp. 1-2; Endicott,
Japan's Nuclear Option, on. cit., p. 91*
^ Good examples of the Opposition tactics as such are: .The
1955 Honest John (Missile) incident, see, for example, Weinstein,
op. cit., p. 82; and the suspected nuclear "deals" involving the
Okinawa reversion negotiations, see, for example, Destler, et al.,
o£. cit.,. pp. 31-32, 122-123, and 137-138.
37 The LDP had been successful in resisting the opposition
demands to formally commit the ruling party to the non-nuclear
policy by way of adopting it as a Diet resolution. Langdon in Kim
"(ed.), 00. cit., p. 7- However, on November 24, x97i the Government
finally capitulated, see, for example, Endicott, Japan's Nuclear
Option, o£. cit., p. 4 5 .
OO
These were (l) the "three-non-nuclear-principles";
(2) efforts toward nuclear disarmament; (3) dependence on the United
States nuclear deterrent power based on the US-Japanese Security
Treaty; and (4) peaceful use of nuclear energy, Endicott, ibid.,
p. 43; also, Asahi Nenkan 1969, p. 270.
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(

However, in the absence of a viable policy alternative
that was desirable and practical, the American alliance was the
best answer to Japan's strategic security need.

On the other

hand, for the reasons that have been mentioned already the "four
nuclear principles" were as practical as they were of symbolic
utility.

If nothing else, the "three-non-nuclear-principles" of

Tokyo policy portrayed, externally, the image of Japan as a ‘
peaceful nation.

Internally, they have tended to render the nuclear
39
issue moot and the Opposition harassment less effective. In any

event, in view of the general climate of opinion relative to the
nuclear issue and the Opposition watchdog, any other nuclear policy
would have been political suicide for the ruling LDP.

(

As one considers Tokyo's longstanding policy of leaving
its nuclear option open, postwar Japan's nuclear policy matrix
would appear to be even more rational.

In the wake of the Honest

John Missile incident as early as in 1953» the Government (then of
Hatoyama) of Japan took the position that "if the international
situation should deteriorate to the point where both Governments
[Japan and US] believed the atomic warheads were needed, then
the Japanese Government would agree [emphasis added] to their
40
41
being brought into Japan," but there was no present need for them.

In a sense, the LDP policy of adhering to the "three-nonnuclear-principles" has tended to preemut the Opposition cause.
"Their function . . , is usually one.of‘ensuring that the ,LDP
faitnfully executes its declared policy, Endicott, Japan s Nuclear
Policy, op. cit., p. 78.
^Weinstein, op. cit., p. 82.
B5ei Nenkan, 1956, pp. 177-78.
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Should the United States decide to. bring into Japan nuclear warheads
for the Honest John missile launchers in an emergency, Tokyo would
agree. The message implied in this passively phrased statement was
.clear.

The Peace Clause (Article IX) of the Consitution notwith42
standing,
Tokyo would agree. It was a positive policy statement,
saying Japan would leave its nuclear option’open. Since then.all
.

prime ministers of Japan have persisted in maintaining the same position
on Japan's nuclear option.

Individually considered, Tokyo's professed

non-nuclear policy and its "free nuclear option" policy each stands'
on its own merits.

But when one is juxtaposed with the other, there

are elements of rationality as well as logical contradiction. Logically,
the two cannot co-exist.

Should Japan decide to make nuclear bombs,

the abandoning of its non-nuclear policy would have to be prior to

"’"'The Peace Clause (Article IX) of the 1947 Consitution reads:
"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right
of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling
international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the
•preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of
the state will never be recognized [emphasis added],"Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers, Government Section, Political Reorientation
of Japan, September 1946 to September 1948 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1949), P* 102. Hitoshi Ashida, former
Prime Minister, was chairman of the constitutional committee of the
House of Representatives at the time of the passage of the new Con
stitution. Langdon points out that Ashida claimed responsibility
for inserting the key phrase, "in order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph," at the beginning of the second paragraph of the
article. According to Ashida, it did not forbid armed forces main
tained only for defensive purposes
provided they were not used to
attack or threaten others or arms were too modest to consitute "war
potential." Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy, erg. cit., p. 23Yoshida first used this Peace Clause as one of his excuses to reject
the United States demands (John Foster Dulles) for Japan's.rearmament.
Later, he changed his mind and went along with Ashida s IiDeral inter
pretation. Controversy over the Article still remains alive.
For an excellent account of the question of Article IX, see, for
example, Young C. Kim, "Japan’s Security Policy Debate," in Young C.
Kim "(ed.), o£. cit., pp. 51 -5^»
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such a decision.
co-extensive.

However, as practical policies they can be

Rational considerations of a nation's economic,

political, and strategic security policies would in fact dictate
that it has both.

Japan did have both when the NPT issue came up.

Japan did not want to get caught without a contingency option if
one policy (the "Four Nuclear Principles") did not work.

As a

practical policy' matrix^ all component policies together were a
rational whole.

3.

The Politics of the Treaty Ratification.
As pointed out earlier, the NPT case represented the first

concrete nuclear issue upon which Tokyo had to make a hard decision.
Stripped to its core, the whole NPT issue was simply a matter of
losing, as a nation, its freedom to make nuclear bombs or keep the
freedom by refusing to ratify the treaty.

Signing .away the

freedom and keeping its hands tied to its back for 20 years in itself
was a hard and weighty decision to make.

The whole concept of the

3If the free-nuclear-option policy represented the Japanese
reservations about the American credibility (will and/or capability),
no LDP-Govemment official has made it
public knowledge. In any
event, judging from the circumstances in 1955> not the late 1960s and
the early 197Qs (Vietnam, "Nixon Doctrine," and the first and second
"Nixon Shock ), it is unlikely that the "iree-nuclear-option" policy
was based on any serious reservations on the part of Tokyo about its
U.S. ally. One could only conjecture that it simply was a healthy
principle of national security policymaking, or was it a psychological
reassurance that Tokyo wanted to have?
W The logical dilemma of the co-extensive policies (the
"non-nuclear policy" and the "free-nuclear-option policy" indeed
surfaced in the final stage of the NPT policymaking process. This
will be discussed later.
^Japan's nuclear option has been discussed comprehensively
by Japanese writers and others, including Endicott, op. cit. Some

of them appear in the selected bibliography.
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NPT was, at first encounter, anathema to Tokyo's longstanding
policy of the "free-nuclear-option."

The world around Japan during

the early stage of the NPT issue— from the late l960's on-— did
not seem particularly stable.

There was a volatile Middle East

from which precious oil came for Japan.

In the wake of. Vietnam

and the "Nixon Doctrine" (C-uam), Tokyo was no longer certain as to
the capability and will of the United States relative to the latter's
strategic guarantee for Japan's security.

The first "Nixon Shock"

(Nixon's decision to change U.S. policy toward China without even
informing its principal Asian ally, Japan) made Tokyo feel as much
surprised as betrayed.

The second "Nixon Shock" (Nixon's decision

to impose a 10 percent surcharge on imports, primarily aimed at
Japan, and to let the dollar float, again primarily aimed at the
. kS
yen)
made Tokyo feel as much humiliated as bewildered, especially
in the wake of a bitter dispute over the textitle quota question which
was not a vital issue.

Tokyo's feeling toward its only ally and the

guarantor of its security was, at best, mixed.
A close look at the NPT revealed that it was inimical to
Japan's economic security interests as well.

The NPT was, in Tokyo's

view, unfair, unequal, and even discriminatory against the
commercial nuclear interests of Japan.
Z - g —

—

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

So it seemed.

peaceful

Thus,

^

"Suddenly, on July 15 l.1971j » Tokyo was hit with the
shock of Nixon's announcement of his plan to visit China. And
in another dramatic decision, on August 15 [only a month later]
Nixon announced plans to impose a 10 percent surcharge . . . a floating
of the dollar. . .. Just as the China shock seemed to challenge the
foundation of the international uolitical structure, so the announce
ment of August 15 hit at the heart of the postwar economic structure."
Destler, et al., on. cit., p. W-.
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the policymaking circles in Tokyo, in or out of power, were overly
impressed with the NIT.

On the contrary most, including the Govern

ment officials themselves, found it objectionable for various-reasons.
More than two years had. elapsed before the LDP began even to look
into the matter seriously.

While the Government of Japan was

tfying to make, the NIT less objectionable, there developed within
Japan many different opinions about the. NPT.

To the critics, the

political right within the LDP in particular, the NPT was anathema
to Japan's national security interests.

To the political left, the

NPT was a device on the part of US and USSR to perpetuate their
nuclear hegemony.
way.

It appeared as though Japan would lose either

If Japan ratified the NTT, it might risk much.

not ratify,

Japan would be taking different risks.

But if it did
Within the

LDP-Government, the Foreign Office, which has long been pro-American,
was aware that the United States wanted an early ratification of the
treaty by Japan.

As Tokyo's effort to improve the international

safeguards system relative to the NPT had progressed in a positive
way, the Foreign Office chose to push the NPT issue through the
legislative policymaking channel.

Since the LDP was the dominant

party in the lower house and the majority party in the upper house,
the Diet meant, in essence, the LDP.
the NIT issue, therefore, was crucial.

An intraparty consensus .on
This consensus would not

be obtained until the last stage in the NPT policymaking process.
The power of the political right within- the LDP^ opposed to the
NIT, was simply too overwhelming..

In the meantime, pressures
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from outside Japan had continued to mount in favor of the
pro-KPT arguments.

As it appeared as though Japan would lose

more by not ratifying the NPT, the Foreign Minister stepped up
his efforts to persuade the anti-NPT forces within the LDP to
accept vthe Government-sponsored-KPT bill.

The intraparty .op

position to the NPT was too formidable for the Foreign Minister
to build a minimum working consensus within the LDP Establishment.
It was at this juncture that Prime Minister

Takeo Miki

himself

embarked upon a personal crusade to achieve the necessary intra
party consensus on the KPT and to reach an agreement with the
Opposition on the KPT issue.
*

What follows is a brief examination

of the diffuse nature of the NPT issue, the external context of

(

the KPT policymaking, the internal constraints resulting from
the powerful anti-KPT forces (especially within the LDP), and
the Prime Minister's critical role in consensus-building.

The

following discussion represents, as noted earlier, not a systematic
description of the KPT policymaking process but a broad pattern
analysis in terms of the typicality and representativeness of the
KPT case—

that is, typologically, "of what was it a case?"

C
\
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1.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:

Policy Issue.

In addition to immediately objectionable aspects of the
treaty, the NPT was a diffuse issue due to complex interissue
relationships;.

There were elements of confluence as well as

conflict between Tokyo’s overall nuclear policy (the "Four Nuclear
Principles" and the free nuclear option p o l i c y o n the one hand,
and the professed objectives of the NPT and the mechanisms by which
they were to be achieved, on the other.
• •

•

and conflict^ intrinsic to the

NPT

These elements of confluence
*
*
issue and related issues, rendered

the NPT issue diffuse and complex.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty represented an inter48
national effort to "control"
the spread of thermonuclear weapons
that might bring about the "extinction of man as the dominant form
of life on this planet."^

In 19^7, the two superpowers, the US and

hn
' As Okimoto points out, all four nuclear principles were
"interlinked" and "intended as a whole." As such, the four com
ponent principles should be considered as a whole. Thus, the
"three-non-nuclear-principles" is the most commonly invoked com
ponent policy, the other three policies (to promote nuclear
disarmament around the world; to develop atomic energy solely for
peaceful purposes; and to rely on the United States nuclear
deterrent power) are equally important. For the purpose of this
study, Tokyo's longstanding policy of its free nuclear option,
relative to its policy of developing atomic energy soely for
peaceful purposes, is still another critical factor to be considered.
Daniel Okimoto, "Japan's Non'Nuclear Policy: The Problem of the
NPT," Asian Survey, vol. XV, no. 4 (April I975)i P* 313hO '
The only successful effort for "disarmament" was the RushBagot Agreement of 1817 between the United States and Canada. 'The
frustrations over disarmament have led some thinkers to approach the
problem in a somewhat different way: Arms control [italics in the
original] rather than disarmament. Whereas the disarmer is prima
rily concerned with the actual scrapping of existing weapons, the
arms controller is more interested in stabilizing the climate in
which these weapons exist and in the orevention of additional arms
builups." Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 384.

^ b i d ., p. 373.
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USSR had agreed to freeze the "nuclear club" at its membership
of five:

the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,

France, and the People's Republic of China.

The treaty was ostensibly

intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by obligating the
nuclear weapons states (NWS) not to transfer weapons or weapon
technology to non-Nuclear weapons states (NNWS) and obligating the
latter not to make or receive them.

50

From the beginning, there were several hurdles confronting
the negotiators:

(i) neither France nor. China was expected to sign;.

(2) certain,,threshold" nations such as India and Israel were reluctant
to sign, the former for fear of China and the latter because of Egypt;
and (3) the problem of safeguards inspection.
formidable obstacles:

This matter posed

Would the treaty be policed through self

inspection, regional bodies such as the European Atomic Energy Com
munity (EURATOM), or a United Nations organ, such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)?

These and other knotty problems defied

easy solution and made progress on the treaty slow and arduous.

51

langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 139*
^ Sotessinger, op. cit., p. 385* According to Langdon's
observation, for example, the NPT was a political expression of the
two nuclear superpowers' ulterior motives: "The Soviet Union's motive
in sponsoring the treaty was its desire to see West Germany and
Japan, the two most feared nations able to acquire nuclear weaponry,
bound into an agreement of self-denial. The United States, for its
part, wanted West Germany and Japan to sign the treaty so America
could display its good intentions to the Russians." Langdon, Japan's
Foreign Policy,” op. cit., p. 139* Cf* "The United States had hardly
done all it could to reinforce the allergy [the Japanese, "nuclear
allergy! and this increases the general confusion about the non
proliferation treaty [emphasis added]. If one had concentratedon
selling NF1‘, one would have tried to discredit all military nuclear
equipment. But the U.S. has been reluctant to let the ''nuclear
allergy" make it difficult or impossible for American aircraft or
naval vessels to pass through the area [Japan]," Quester, pp. cit.,
p. 772
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Two major reasons for Japan's objections to the NPT were
strategic and economic considerations relative to the treaty.
When Japan became a signatory to the NIT in 1970,

52

Tokyo specified

three conditions which would have to be met before Japan's ratification
of the treaty could be expected.

These three basic conditions, which

reflected considerations of Japan's strategic and economic security
interests, were:

(l) concrete steps would have to be taken toward

disarmament by the NWS; (’
2) national security interests of the NNWS
would have to be protected; and (3) & fair and equal system of inter
national safequards would have to be worked out.

There was concern

that blatant inequalities would be imposed on the NNWS unless progress
53
was discernible in each of these areas.
52

Even though 56 nations signed the treaty document
immediately after it was drafted, Japan refused to sign the document.
For reasons that are discussed in the following, almost no one was
enthusiastic about the NPT. It was not until February 3> 1970» more
than 18 months after the treaty document was drafted, that Tokyo
signed the NPT. The date of Japan's signing the treaty was slightly
more than a month before the treaty was to go into effect, i.e.,
March 5» 1970, Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, o£. cit., p. 68;
and Stockholm International Peace Research Institutte, The NearNuclear Countries and the NPT (New York: Humanities Press, 1972),
p. 112to
Okimoto, 00. cit., p. 315; Gaimusho, Japan, Kokuren oyobi
Jyunebu Gunshuku Iinkai ni okeru Gunshuku Mondai ni tsuite no Nihon
Koku Daihyo Hatsugenshu [Statement of Japanese Representatives Conceming the Problem of Disarmament at the UN and the Geneva Disarmament
Committee] l9?Ji; and Gaimusho, Japan, Kakuheiki Kakusan no Senzai
Ryoku [The Potential of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], a publication
of the Foreign Ministry, Arms Limitation Office, 1972. Tokyo noted,
specifically, in its accompanying statement that there is the right
of withdrawal, even after its ratification, when it is recognized
that the treaty "has endangered the supreme interest of the nation,"
Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, op. cit., p. 68; also, Gaimusho,
Japan, Kakuheiki Kakusan no Senzai Ryoku, op. cit., p. 116.

(
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Based on these clearly defined conditions as given above,
it is clear that Tokyo found the NIT falling far short of three of
its four nuclear principles and challenging its longstanding policy
54
of free nuclear option. Strategically, it appeared to Tokyo that
the NPT was a design to freeze the status quo in. nuclear.
weaponry which would guarantee

to the US and USSR.

•nuclear hegemony, especially .

Conversely, it would guarantee the

inferior strategic and economic position of the NNWS.

This was the

case especially in view of the fact that (l) France and China did '
not seem to intend to abide by the NPT concept; and (2) there was
no obligation on the part of the NWS td disarm under the NPT.
55
This amounted to discrimination between the NWS and the NNWS.

(

Economically, the NPT also represented discrimination.
The economic (or industrial) arguments against the NPT tended to
hinge on the IAEA safeguards that would be required by Article III
of the treaty.

Because Japan stood near the forefront of nations

engaged in the utilization of fissionable energy, it had more to
lose than other NNWS if the treaty were directly to hinder the
development of commercial energy plans

54

Motivational variables are usually hidden and are not
particularly helpful in generalizing observations. However, Quester,
for example, stated: "Japanese in general do not feel the more immedi
ate disparagement by Western states that so much disturbs the Indian
elite. Yet there is a sense that Japan is not quite acknowledged as
a great power, that her feelings on various tangible and intangible
matters are being ignored . . .," Quester, on. cit., p. 771.
^Endicott, Japan’s Nuclear Option, on. cit., p. 67.
Okimoto, o£. cit., p. 317. As early as in February, 1967>
the Foreign Vice-Minister Shimoda announced that the prevention of
non-nuclear weapons states from conducting peaceful nuclear explosions
would affect the acceptability of the NPT. See, for example, Langdon,
Japan's Foreign Policy, o£. cit., p. 1^0.
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Japan's economic (or industrial) arguments against the NPT
were as much psychological/political as they were economic/technical.
They were all interrelated.

Some of these variables were concrete

and tangible while others were abstract and intangible.

Relatively

trivial as they were, the tangible factors included cost, time, and
other nuisance resulting from inconvenience relative to. the IAEA .
safeguards inspection system.

Psychologically, it was a matter of

principle acting against Japan’ssigning away, gratuitously, its
57
fundamental political and property right.:"
From the strategic point of view, if allowed to pass
unchallenged, the NPT would permit vital areas of technology to be
monopolized by the NWS with Japan's own energy program relegated

(

to a place of competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the superpowers.
All this would mean that Japan would be forced to suffer serious
collateral penalties for renouncing nuclear weapons in the name of
CO
world peace.
It was logical then that these considerations
focused squarely on the problem of nuclear safeguards.

59

Quester, on. cit., p. 770
^Okimoto, o£. cit., p. 3^7
1, sources of information include:
An excellent summary article by George H. Quester, op. cit., pp.
765-77^,
Daniel Okimoto, o£. cit., pp. %6-519>
addition,
there are works including Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, on. cit.,
pp. 71-72, 91; Ryukichi Imai, Kokusai Sasatsu [international
Inspection] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1971); Arnold Kramish,
"The Watched and the Unwatched," Adelphi Papers, no. 36 (June I967);
Ryukichi Imai, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan," Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists (May I969); and "Statement of the grievances
of Japanese industrialists on inspection by the IAEA," Atoms in Japan
(February 1968 ),PP- 3~5*

(
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Objections were raised, try Tokyo against the I 968 system •
of safeguards administered by the IAEA,.

Specifically, the

objections were made on the following four points against the old
on-site inspection system which was founded "on a kind of 'copsand-robbers' approach to catching surreptitious diversions of
fissionable materials".^
Firstly, there was the possibility of an inherent conflict
between greater assurance to the outside world that no bombs were being
produced and economically efficient operations of power reactors.
This problem was potentially acute,rendering moot the whole question
of an international safeguards inspection.

Most physicists

estimated that only about ?$> of the plutonium produced in power
reactors would inevitably be uncontrollable.

It meant that for

the IAEA safeguards inspection to be effective, it would have to
achieve 98% accuracy in control and supervision.

However, according

to Japanese electric power company officials, anything greater than

90%

certainty in inspection would constitute an unberable economic

burden.

In

future Japanese nuclear activity, it would mean a

shut-down of the nuclear reactors.

Aside from the inevitable com

plications resulting from such a shut-down, it would create an.
intolerable problem if it interfered with Tokyo's electrical power.
Also in future terms, even if a 90% or even

98^

degree of control

fiC)

Okimoto, op. pit., p. 317- Unless otherwise specified,
I draw heavily on Question, op. cit., for the following summary of
the various problems involved in the international safeguards
inspection system.
61
Quester, op. cit., p. ? 67.
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on fissionable materials were permitted and achieved, it would
not necessarily prevent a potential nth nation from producing nuclear
.bombs'.

As the quantities of fissionable materials handled increase,

even a 2/6 leakage-may suffice for a politically significant clandestine
weapons stockpile

Secondly, given the likely temptations for sale of information on
commercial reactor designs to rival companies outside of Japan, there
were fears of commercial espionage.

Even in an honest exercise

of the control function, members of the IAEA safeguards staff would
engage in industrial espionage, or perhaps in obstructive legalism.

Thirdly, as noted earlier, there were factors of cost, time, and
extra efforts all of which meant, at best, nuisance.
may sound, there was the problem of language.

Trivial as it

Since Japan conducted

and recorded its scientific operations in Japanese, not in English,
there were time, extra efforts, and cost factors of nuisance involved
in translating and maintaining duplicate records for non-Japanese
inspectors to review.

Finally, the mere uncertainty of emerging industrial prospects
in the nuclear field made it difficult to predict just how costly
monitoring and supervision would be ^
Z.o

'
Ibid., p. 768.

('
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Considerations of these factors led Japan to urge a
much less rigid and more flexible standard for all internationally
operated safeguards, which would be sufficient only perhaps to
force any government wanting to make a bomb to do so deliberately
and fairly explicitly and to have a responsible and effective
national accounting system.

67

68
However, as one looks at some of the."articulate opinions”
in Japan on the NPT issue, it becomes clear just how diffuse the
issue really was without any one dominant definition of the issue.
It is in order at this point to take a look at some of the major
issues involved in the NPT.

69

If Tokyo's three basic conditions represented its relatively
concrete immediate policy objectives, one asks:
Japanese percept ion of the NPT issue as a whole?

what was the overall
Writing prior to

Japan's ratification in 1976 of the treaty, Daniel Okimoto states:
if . . . the NPT wins final approval, how ought Japan's
adherence to the Treaty be evaluated? What significance
can be attached to ratification, if and when it comes?
Perhaps it is best to approach this question negatively
by stating what Japan's adherence should not [italics in
the original] be taken to mean. It does not mean that
Japan will be legally bound to remain forever a non-nuclear
state. 70

67
Quester, on. cit., p. 768.
68
Along with the "general climate of opinion," this will be
discussed later.
69
A penetrating observation in this regard can be found in
Okimoto, op. pit., pp. 323~327?°Ibid., p. 323.
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Likewise, Ryukichi Iraai, a leading defense specialist in Japan,
maintained that in evaluating the significance of the NPT it was
perhaps test to recognize that the Treaty was more probably understood
as an agreement to fundamental principles and objectives than as a
71
binding .set of procedural prohibitions. The symbolic view of the
NPT as such was based on the following four considerations:
loophole in the languages of the NPT
itself which were ambiguous and too inadequately defined to have
operational utility.

ri

As Okimoto puts it,

There is room to wonder to what extent, if at all, the
Treaty can arrest the processes of nuclear metastasis.
In Article I, for example, nuclear weapons and nuclear
devices are prohibited from production or transferral;
but the key terms of the Article, "nuclear weapons" and
"nuclear explosive devices" are left without a technical
or rigorous nominal definition, leaving it unclear
precisely what is being prohibited. 72
Secondly, related to the above loophole of the NPT and more specifically
to a potential nuclear capability, the NPT failed to include provisions
that would bar nations from developing nuclear submarines which, if
loaded with nuclear missiles
(SLBMs)

Submarine-Launched-Ballistic-Missiles

would represent the surest way for a sea-faring nation like

Japan to acquire an invulnerable second-strike capability.

73

Thirdly, the entire question of safeguards inspection system, including
the new Model Agreement, was, as noted earlier, moot in terms of a future
time frame.

Once vast quantities of fissionable materials have begun

to be used on the scale now projected for the world's energy needs,

^ Ibid., p. 325.
™
ooh.
Ibid., pp.
32^-325.
73 Ibid., p. 32^t.
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if a nation so desires, diversions of weapons grade materials would
not be hard under the Model Agreement, hence this new safeguard
system too, like the old "cops-and-robbers" approach, might in fact
be destined for obsolescence.
Finally, there was an "escape clause" written into the Treaty in
Article X which stated that a member nation may be permitted to withdraw
from the NPT if it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized
the supreme interests of its country.
It was with these views that the supporters of the treaty

74
urged Japan's early ratification cfthe NPT.
other factors related to the NPT issue.

However, there were

Some of these factors were

supportive of the pro-NPT policymakers and others the anti-NPT policy
makers.

The net effect of the complex interissue relationships was

to render the entire NPT issue diffuse in nature, hence "policy
immobilism" while the pro- and anti-NPT forces had had their horns
locked with each other's for six years.
The Foreign Office, in particular, had on occasion invoked
the implicit threat that Japan's supply of enriched uranium might
75

be threatened in the absence of its NPT ratification.

7

/■
1

Although

During the final stage of the NPT policymaking process,
Councillor Minoru Genda, a former Air Force General and one of the
critics of the NPT, attacked on March 14, 1975;the Government's
policy of placing Japan's security at the mercy of U.S. policy.
In his reply, Foreign Minister Miyazawa implied that Japan could
always reassess the U.S.-Japanese security arrangements if changed
circumstances so warranted. See, for example, Endicott's article in
Asian Survey, op. cit., p. 281.
75
See, for example, Japan Times, February 4, 1970, P* 11,
"Government Statement 'on Nuclear Pact."
'
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this was one of the reasons why Japan finally ratified the NPT,
as will be discussed later, this argument had had its setbacks in
the process, however.

For example, in 197^ President Nixon promised

to provide nuclear reactors and fuel to Egypt and Israel when Egypt
had not ratified the NPT and Israel had refused even to sign the
treaty. Even though assurances were given that U.S. aid as such
would be for peaceful purposes, the net result of the U.S. policy
was heightened anxieties and uncertainties on one hand, and somewhat
*
*

lessened credibility of the implicit sanction of cut-off of the
enriched uranium supply 'on the other.

The uncertainties and the

reduced credibility of the threat together tended to make the NPT
76
issue diffuse/
Another aspect of the NPT issue which tended to make it
diffuse in nature was related to Japan's projected nuclear tech77
nological development in the future.
As Okimoto noted, as Japan's
peaceful atomic energy program grows and its industrial and tech
nological infrastructure (including space technology) expand and
develop, Japan would come to a stage when it could produce
fissionable explosives within a relatively short period of time.
Japan will arrive at "a plateau of development, sometimes referred
to as 'nuclear weapons minus two years,1 a stage where nuclear
1—1

7z.

1

Okimoto, op. cit., pp. 320, yak.
77

Writing in 197^, Sorenson, for example, maintained that
"the Japanese have [emphasis added] the technological and industrial
know-how to develop an indigenous nuclear force. Some experts assert
that Japan could detonate a nuclear device in six months under a
crash program, and acquire A-bombs shortly thereafter. Others stick
to the official formula of "N minus two years," Sorenson, op. cit.,
P. 29.
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78
weapons can be deployed within two years of a decision.”
As the Japanese policymakers contemplated the question
of the NPT issue, there was still another issue related to the
NPT issue. ‘This was in the
alliance itself.

realm of the US-Japanese security

What meaning would Japan's ratification of the

treaty have for the American alliance?

On the surface, the immediate

answer to that was, as summed up by Endicott, "to reaffirm its
faith in the U.S. nuclear guarantee.
of the U.S.-Japanese

Alliance has

At the most abstract level,

In so doing, the viability
79
been strongly affirmed."

Japan rejected the role of a deviant

ally, a. la France, and tacitly conceded to the superpower desire not
go
to destabilize the military status quo.
More specifically, Japan's

[

ratification of the treaty Indicated the Japanese perceptions of
the role and importance of the US-Japanese security alliance system
in general, and the United States nuclear deterrence for Japan in
particular.

Some might see it as prolonging the structure of the

Security Treaty by heightening Japan's reliance on the United States
81
nuclear deterrence for Japan.

However, the NPT issue had more

dimensions to it than this one-dimensional view of the alliance
might lead one to believe.

Japan's geopolitical security needs

were to be best served by a multilateral process of disarmament
rather than the bilateral alliance system in the long run.

78 Sorenson, Ibid. Also, Okimoto, op. cit., p. 32k.
^Endicott
in Asian Survey, oj>. cit., p. 292.
]
80,
Okimoto, o£. cit., p. 325»
Ibid.
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What the Japanese needed was not a forest of tactical nuclear

weapons as deterrence against the remote threat of invasion hut
the maintenance of a situation of rough parity, at the strategic
level which was the starting point for a multilateral process of
82
disarmament. This explains why Tokyo made the disarmament issue
*

»-

one of its three basic conditions.

Related to and reinforcing

this argument for disarmament on the part of Tokyo is the question:
Would the United States rally to the-side of Japan if it meant
83
probable retaliation against its own territory?
This skepticism
led tc

general erosion in the conceptual foundation of the nuclear

u m l .-'la.-'., theory. Thus the majority of Japanese defense specialists
a.' -op' -• she main thrust of French skepticism on nuclear guarantee:

T . ’ n?

i States would not risk probable retaliation against its
8k

own territory.

In this context, the reported statement by General Bruce
Holloway is noteworthy. In March 1971» Holloway, former commander
of the U.S. Strategic Air Command,was reported to have said that
if Europe were threatened the United States would not necessarily
respond in certain circumstances. See, for example, Endicott, Japan's
Nuclear Option, op. cit., p. 6 .
8^

✓

Okimoto, op. cit., p. 326. The author points out that
several writers in Japan have even expressed doubts about the viability
of the invulnerable second-strike concept. Others like Makoto Momoi,
one of Japan's most articulate and knowledgeable defense analysts,
argued in favor of the maintenance of the alliance system not on the
certainty or high probability of US guarantee, but rather on the
diplomatic, psychological, and political benefits to be derived from
continuing the alliance, ibid based on Momoi Makoto, "Reflections on
the Theory of Conflict Termination," in Shin-Boei Ronshu, vol. 1,
no. 1, June 1973*
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2. The External Context, of Policymaking.

The purpose of the following discussion is merely to point
out the most salient element of change in the external context of
postwar Japan's security policymaking,relative to the NPT issue:
a shift in the United States Fax Eastern policy.. As the change
*

*

ift the American Far Eastern policy was ..perceived by the Japanese
policymakers during this period, the external context of the NPT
policymaking had played a significant part in the entire NPT
policymaking process.

As noted earlier, all three major f a c t o r s ^ f postwar Japan's
nuclear policy were a function of the United States security guar
antee for Japan, including the American "nuclear ubrella."

Viewed

in this manner, it is not too far-fetched to say that the United
States was the single most important determinant of postwar J apan’s
nuclear policy:

it has been the United States

s e c u r itv

guarantee

for Japan which had enabled Japan to adhere to its "three non
nuclear principles," and even to keep its nuclear options open.
Had it not been for this guarantee, Tokyo would have had to make a ■
hard decision on its nuclear security policy long before the NPT
case came up.

Undoubtedly , ^ 6 uncertainty and the nation-centered features
of the contemporary multicentric world order was not created by any
Q£

- - - ----

The three factors being: first, to rely exclusively on the
United States security guarantee (i.e., the American "nuclear um
brella; second, to adhere to the "three non-nuclear principles';
and third, to keep its nuclear options open.
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^

one nation, including the United States.

However, in Japan's

case, because of the tradition of its one-sided exclusive reliance
on the American strategic nrotection of Japan, any shift in
United States Far Eastern policy was bound to have a profound impact
on the Japanese policymakers' perception of their external environ0

ment'.

Accordingly, the unfolding of the so-called "Nixon Doctrine"

and the subsequent "Nixon Shocks,” which are discussed below, had
forced Japan into a policy dilemma, which, in turn, rendered the
NTT issue diffuse and complex in nature.

First; there was the war in Vietnam.

The American debacle

in Indochina had ultimately "demonstrated that the United States

r
^

lacked the capacity to control conflict effectively in the region,
and shattered the bipartisan, internationalist domestic consensus
on which postwar American policy had been built."

86

The subsequent "Nixon Doctrine" represented the first funda
mental reordering of American foreign policy priorities since the
start of the Cold W a r .8'7 Nixon stated that the Asian nations can
Q /r

Hellmann in Scalapino, on. cit., p. 333*
^ N i x o n ' s statement at a press conference in Guam in July
I 969,calling for self-reliance on the part of America's Asian alies,
"Nixon Plans Cut in Military Role for U.S. in Asia," New York Times,
July 26, 1969, p. 1. For military implications of the Nixon Doctrine
relative to Japan, see Robert E. Osgood, The Weary and Wary, op. cit.,
pp. 14-17-
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c
and must increasingly shoulder the responsibility for achieving
peace and prosperity in the area.

88

It was a "set of responses

to altered international conditions and reflected the shift in the
mood within the United States away from internationalism and anticommunism."

89

As President Nixon stated:

•

we are not -involved in the world because we have
commitments [emphasis added]; we have commitments
because we are involved. Our interest must shapeour commitments, rather than the other way aound.°°

The sudden announcement in 1971 by President Nixon of his
plan to visit Peking the following year was even more disquieting
\
i.

to Tokyo for two reasons:

firstly, it indeed signified that the

United States now had "a clear expectation that a stable, new inter
national order ('a generation of peace') can be created in the region
through policies stressing diplomatic maneuvering with the other great
powers (now including China as well as Japan) rather than the farfixing alliances and direct American military intervention"; 91 and
secondly, in spite of the fact that the U.S.-Japan security alliance
system was, in part, built upon the concept of nonrecognition and
containment of the Peoples' Republic of China, the United States,
gg"

U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin,
"President Nixon's Round-the-World Trip," Vol. LXI, No. 1.54?
(August 25, I 969)(Washington: Government Printing Office*.1969)»P.154.
89
Hellmann in Scalapino, o p . cit., p. 333•
90
7 President Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970s: A Report to the Congress (Washington: Government Printing
Office, IQ?!), p. 13.
91 Hellmann, ojd. cit., p. 333•
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the very architect of the alliance system, reversed the funda
mental premise without even prior notice to Tokyo.^

Moreover, as if the "Nixon Shock" (as his 1971 announcement
came to he known) was not enough, there came a second shocks

the

"Second Nixon Shock" (as it was called) followed the first shock
by one month when Nixon announced a series of economic measures.
These measures included the floating of the dollar in terms of gold
and a ten percent surcharge on imports entering the United States.
As Stockwin remarks:
a principal target of these measures was the exchange
parity of the yen, since it was calculated by the Amer
ican Government that the lifting of the surcharge could
be traded for an upward revaluation of the Japanese cur
rency, and thus make Japanese exports less competitive
in the American market.93
These economic measures and the bitter textile dispute of 1969-71
between Japan and the United States

94

implied, among other things, that

the very core of the two fundamental assumptions of postwar Japan's
foreign/security policies was now challenged:

the assumption of

the confluence of national interests of the United States and Japan
and the assumption of a continued separability of Japan's economic
security policies from its strategic security policies.

In addition to this most fundamental change in the external

^ 2Stockwin, o£. cit., p. 218; Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option,
p. 5•

Stockwin, op. cit., p. 218.
^^estler, o£. cit., pp. 35~45-
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context of postwax Japan's foreign/security policies (i.e., the
changing bilateral relations between the United States and Japan),
there were other disquieting factors in Japan's environment such as
a general weakening of the international economic and political
institutions previously devised to mediate and moderate conflict;
an acute shortage of basic resources (most notably a Malthusian
situation in some poor countries); a persistence of profound nation*•

al and ideological differenpes; and nuclear proliferation.

95

The

"confluence of [these] destabilizing factors of staggering proportions'

96

was very much on the Japanese policymakers' minds,

especially in view of Japan's preeminent economic position, global
g

trade network, and its dependence on

*

ticularly oil.

foreign raw material, par-

All this was the external context of the NPT policy

making.

3. The Diffusion of Policymaking Power; The Internal Constraints.
The internal constraints relative to the NPT policymaking
process were characterized by two major factors:

first, the diffuse

and complex nature of the NPT issue itself and related interissue
problems; and second, a nationalistic opposition to the treaty.

Firstly, as they faced the NPT question, the Japanese policy
makers found themselves confronted with a security policy dilemma.

|

^ H e l l m a n n in Scalapino, 030. cit., p. 33^*

96ibid.
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Whether they rejected or ratified the treaty, each option carried
with it -both positive and negative implications.

The Japanese

security policy dilemma resulted from the fact that the fundamental,
concept of postwar Japan's security system was based on the United
States' guarantee.of Japan's security,■which now appeared to be in
doubt. Stated in another way, the Japanese policymakers had to
reevaluate the basic assumptions underlying their postwar foreign/
security policies.

Moreoever, within the parameter of the basic framework of
Japan's security policy, which was based on the US-Japan alliance system,
^

Japan's security was a function of a host of other factors,including:
(1) the power arrangements in the East Asian area

a triangular

balance built by the United States, China, and the Soviet Union; (2)
various destablizing factors in the region— the Sino-Soviet conflict,
the shifting pattern of US-Asian relations, the Northern Territories
question, tension between North and South Korea, Taiwan's uncertain
future, and the Senkaku Islands oil issue; (3) a- heavy concentration
of population in coastal areas amounting to only 20 percent of the
total available land; (k) Japan's peculiar geographic location, and
the immense difficulties for early warning and defense in depth,
especially against an attack from the northwest; and (.5) its maritime
lifelines, which pass through many areas of potential conflict
(■
I

Strait of Hormuz, the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Strait, the South
China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Sea of Japan.

97

^Sorenson, op. cit., pp. 13—14•

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

the

- 4-06 -

Secondly, the net result of the first and second "Nixon
Shocks" and the 1973-7^ economic blackmail by the Arabs was the
rise of a nationalistic sentiment in Japan.

Both were alarming

and humiliating to the Japanese. As noted earlier, the shift in
the United States Far Eastern policy and the manner in which the
United States, the very architect of the North East alliance system,
»•

,

»

reversed its policy were’as disquieting strategically as they were
humiliating psychologically.
%
•
'Moreover, the 1973 Middle East War was a testimonial to
Japan’s vulnerability to the kind of economic blackmail which the
Arabs exerted upon Japan.

98
The war focused on the issue of the uti

lity of force in world affairs.

Furthermore, the episode accentuated

the everpresent security problem of safeguarding Japan's maritime
lifelines, which is a seemingly impossible task even for a nuclear
Japan in view of its worldwide pattern of shipping.

Yet the markets

and the supply of raw materials must be guaranteed by some means for
Japan’s national survival.

99

It was this kind of general context of policymaking in which
the NTT issue confronted Japan
pacifist and a nationalist.

a paradoxical combination of a

Consequently, even among the advocates

of the treaty no one could be classified as "unreservedly enthu
siastic"^^ about the NPT.

98Ibi d.. p. 15
99 At the time of the oil crisis in late 1973 artd early 197^-,
there was a flurry of speculation in Japan about the possibility of
building up naval and military capabilities and even of developing
nuclear weapons, ibid., p. lo.
^^Okimoto, op. cit., p. Jl6.
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The most powerful opposition to the NPT came from within the
LD!P itself.

The right-wing LDP opposition to the treaty included such

101
. 102
suprafactional factions as Seirankai
and Soshinkai.
Extremely

nationalistic, members of these groups, who were scattered up and down
the party hierarchy, were all in favor of strengthening Japan's defense
capability, including nuclear weapons if need be.

The boisterous mem-

• bers of Seirankai, in particular, objected to the NPT on the grounds
that it would tie Japan's hands unnecessarily in the future.

They

believed that the nuclear option ought to be retained, even if it was
never exercised, as a hedge against the uncertainties of the world and
as a potentially useful bargaining lever.
f

In addition, among bureau-

crats and former bureaucrats, who had serious reservations about the
treaty, were such highly-placed figures as Kinji Moriyama, DirectorGeneral of Science and Technology Agency, and Yasuhiro Nakasone, who
once headed the Defense Agency and the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

103

These critics of the NPT, collec

tively, all played a significant role in slowing

almost stopping—

any forward movement toward peaching consensus on the ratification
of the NPT within the LDP.

101

Seirankai was a faction of younger LDP Diet members who
were overtly nationalistic with extreme right-wing views. Okimoto,
op. cit., p. 316; Stockwin, op. cit., pp. 112-113.
102
Soshinkai, another transfactional faction, had. a parti
cularly high degree of representation from the powerful Fukuda faction
and also from Sato and Ishii factions. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear
Option, ojo. cit., p. 49; Paul F. Langer, Japanese National Security
Policy
Domestic Determinants (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corpora
tion, 1972), p. 24.
^Endicott,

ojd.

cit.,

p. 49, 103*
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As for the Opposition parties, all of them also opposed the
NPT for reasons that were different from the arguments of the con. sex-vative right-wing LDP politicians.

To the extent that different

actors opposed the NPT for different reasons, it was indicative of
the diffuse nature of the NPT issue on the one hand, and a national
istic sentiment vis-a-vis the unequal treaty, on the other.

"As with

other nations" resisting the NPT, as Queter notes, "a certain indif
ference to the outside world" now seemed "widespread among- Japanese
elites, "both right and left, and probably also in the Japanese voting

„ ._ . ,,104
public.

^

The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), long an advocate of "un-

l.
armed neutrality" and the "no war" pledge of Article IX of the Constitution, opposed nuclear weapons as a matter of principle.

10-5

However, with a "holier than thou" attitude, the Socialists denounced
both US and USSR for not including full disarmament in the treaty.

106

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) had been an advocate of elimi
nation of militarism and dissolution of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
and an ardent foe of the Security Treaty and "American imperialism."

107

However, having committed itself to neither pacifism nor unarmed neu
tralism, the Communists maintained that Japan needed some defense

forces, implicitly including nuclear weapons.
104
105

Quester, op. cit., p. 773Sorenson,on. cit., p. 24; Endicott, op. cit,, p. 79*

106

107

1O0

Quester, op. cit., p. 773-

Endicott, op. cit., p. 85 .
" "
Sorenson, pp. cit., p. 24.

108
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The more moderate Democratic Socialists (DSP), far less
opposed to the American alliance, also tended to criticize the NET.
Finally, the Komeito (CGP), the somewhat "right-wing" opposition
party of the Soka Gakkai religious sect, joined the other parties
in opposing the NPT for reasons generally similar to those of the
other parties.

109

Peculiar to the NPT policymaking process, as it relates to
the role of big business interest groups, was the fact that, firstly,
they were not closely involved in the policymaking process; and
secondly, the power industry, which would be directly affected by
the NPT, was characteristically unenthusiastic either in opposing
or in supporting the treaty.

If the first observation indicated

that Japan's big business was not involved in every major national
policymaking, the absence of enthusiasm in either opposing or supporting
the NPT was an indication of just how complex the interissue problems
were relative to the NPT issue.

110

109

Quester, on. cit., p. 773110
In May 1972, Atoms in Japan, the monthly magazine of the
influential Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, stated that "the Atomic
Industrial Forum of Japan may scon recommend to the Government that
the NPT should be ratified quickly,” Endicott, o£. cit., p. 69; also
Quester, o£. cit., p. 772. Representatives of the electric utilities
and manufacturers, which would be affected by the IAEA safeguards
agreement, were invited to hearings of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Committee of the LDP Foreign Affairs Research Council. Also,
representatives of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum were members
of a special "working group" of the LDP-NPT Committee which included
bureaucrats from the Foreign Office and the Science and Technology
Agency (Endicott, ojo. cit., p. 68). There is no evidence that these
industry representatives played any significant role either for or
against the treaty ratification. Critical as it was, even the proNPT endorsement, in February 1975> by Hiromi Arisawa, Chairman of
the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, was not a decisive factor in the
NPT policymaking process. Another fourteen months would pass before
the NPT was ratified. See, for example, Endicott, "The 1975-76 Debate,"
o p . cit., passim.
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What about the "public opinion" on the NPT issue?

As noted

earlier, the NPT policymaking process, spanning a period of six long
years, was characterized by a low degree of visibility and the absence
of valence of the issue outside the immediate policymaking circles in
•

•

Tokyo.

Even within the policymaking institution, i.e., the Diet,

peculiarly, there had been no heated debate on the issue.

Much of

the NPT debate had taken place inside the LDP, and the final activities
for consensus building, initiated by Prime Minister Miki, had also taken
place outside the government, and behind the scenes.

There are some plausible explanations for the low visibility of
^

the NPT issue.

It may have been due to the low-key and prudent approach

by the Government to the whole issue.

It may also have been due to the

fact that the whole issue had never left the LDP policymaking apparatus
for a long time.

The fact is that the NPT was, at least initially, such

an unpopular issue that no one moved in any direction except for the
effort on the part of the Government to make the treaty less objectionable
to Japan.

The whole issue and the interissue problems being so diffuse

and complex, one can only conjecture the extent to which the public did
comprehend the nature of the NPT issue.

In the absence of any valance

of the NPT issue even within the policymaking circles in Tokyo, let alone
the public at large, there were numerous "articulate opinions" on the
issue, each defining the nature of the issue and advocating what Japan
ought to do.

The existence of these numerous definitions of the issue

was a testimonial to the diffuse nature of the NPT issue itself and the
related interissue problems.
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Unlike the results of general public opinion surveys,
the numerous "articulate opinions"

112

111

represented the Japanese

response to the new and changing elements in the international
environment with a searching assessment of their possible impact
on Japan as well as Japan’s possible courses of action.

113

111In his discussion of the "depth of opinion," relative to

f
I

postwar Japan's first major foreign policymaking (i.e., the peace
agreement with the Soviet .Union), Hellmann states: "the effective
influence of public opinion depends, in large part, on the kind of
knowledge and political involvement which the opinions reflect.
Were opinions concerning the Soviet-Japanese negotiations rooted in
an intense concern for the issue or were they merely off-hand, in
stinctive reactions to interviewers' questions? Were they informed
opinions? In appraising the public opinion, equal significance
clearly cannot be accorded both to opinions based on careful analysis
or reflecting a deep and direct concern and to those representing
unthinking responses to pollsters. It is not possible to go behind
the survey results to probe rigorously the factors underlying indivi
dual attitudes, but by examining all of the survey data a rough eva
luation can be made of the general nature of the political commit
ments on which public opinion rested," Hellmann, Japanese Foreign
Policy and Domestic Politics, op. cit., p. 8^.
112
The "articulate opinion" is explained by Bernard Cohen
as "the active and articulate expressions on policy of specific
individuals and organized groups including the media of mass com
munication," Bernard Cohen, op. cit., p. 29; Hellmann, op. cit., p. 90.
113
These opinions are summarized by Endicott systematically
and need not be repeated here in detail. See Endicott, Japan's
Nuclear Option, op. cit., pp. 60 ff. Suffice it to point out that
most of these opinions indicate that Japan should follow a foreign
policy independent of the United States. Stated in another way,
these commentators, many of them university professors, prefer
Japan to follow a self-reliant global policy on the one .hand, and
an equidistance policy between the "East" and the "West," on the
other. Some even see .the prospect of the United States becoming
the most dangerous enemy of Japan in the 1970's. Others (the
"idealist" economic model advocates) believe in the image of a
non-nuclear peaceful Japan. In summary, one finds a high degree of
diffusion of opinions among these informed Japanese.
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When one thinks of the nature of the widespread pacifism
114
and the so-called "nuclear allergy," relative to the general
climate of opinion in postwar Japan, a compounding effect of the
diffuse NPT issue upon the Japanese policymakers is not hard to
imagine^ as manifest in these numerous contending definitions of
the issue and the related interissue problems.

4.

Consensus Politics and the Prime Minister.
The official Japanese objections to the NPT were, as noted

earlier, centered around (1) the question of nuclear disarmament
by the NWS; (2) the question of national security interests of the
NNWS; and (3) the question of the international safeguards versus
the need of peaceful use of nuclear energy.

After giving reluctantly, on February 3> 1970» its essentially
negative and much hedged signature to the NPT, the Government of
Japan had actively strived to remove some of the obstacles to its

114
The expression, "nuclear allergy," which is alleged to
have been coined in 1954 by then Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles, does not have a precise definition. It is an ambivalent
phenomenon. Whatever its origin and function, as Herman Khan notes,
the "nuclear allergy" is a complex, widespread, and ambiguous
attitude that "bridges genuine antiwar emotions, anti-Americanism,
and satisfaction with low defense expenditure," Herman Khan, The
Emerging Japanese Superstate; Challenge and Response (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 13-
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ratification of the treaty.

However, progress especially in the

area of disarmament by the nuclear superpowers, including the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, was discouraging.

In the absence

of any satisfactory progress along its original demands/which'were
set forth as preconditions for Japan's ratification of the treaty,
Tokyo did little toward ratification of the NPT.

The LDP did not

even begin to look into the matter seriously until March 1972.
On March 2, 1972, a committee on the NPT was established within the
party

After the NPT Committee was established within the party,
the LDP had been essentially stalemated for three years without
making any progress toward consensus on the NPT issue.

As noted

earlier, the stalemate was due to . powerful transfactional groups
of conservative LDP politicians, all opposed to the treaty.

Ini

tially, even the Foreign Office, which later became the main
driving force for the treaty ratification, was hesitant and cautious
on the NPT issue.
Fukuda stated:
ratify it.

For example, on June 2, 1972, Foreign Minister

"now that Japan has signed NPT, Japan cannot but

But we have no idea yet on when to sign it."

116

Moreover, on July 5> 1972, which coincided with Prime
Minister Tanaka's taking office, Yasuhiro Nakasone, newly appointed

116
^Even this was said to have been a result of external
pressure rather than that of the LDP's own volition. See, for
example, Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, op. cit., p. 68 for a
controversy over the prospect of Japan nuclearizing itself which
stemmed from a report by Jack Anderson.
ll6Ibid., p. 70.
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minister of International Trade and Industry, stated that the
time was not ripe for ratification of the NPT.

117

In January

1973, a government source indicated that the government of Japan
would shelve the effort to ratify the NPT for another year in view
of the original reservations still remaining unsatisfied.

113

In April 1973* the IAEA concluded a safeguards agreement
with the European Atomic Energy Community (EUEATOM)—

Security

Measurement Agreement

permitting the-latter to carry- out inspections

largely independently.

Subsequently, West Germany ratified the NPT.

This became another reason for Japan to delay its ratification of the
^

treaty, for Japan could be expected to demand no less.

119

Still another reason for Tokyo to delay its ratification of
the NPT was the establishment, on June 1, 1973> of the Association
of Centrifuge Enrichment (ACE), with the Netherlands, West Germany,
and Great Britain as members.

This agreement would make valuable

technological information from the nuclear Britain available to West
Germany.

Japan could be the only advanced nation thus placed "in

an unfavorable position as to inspection" and this was cited as
reason enough to reexamine the entire question of the treaty ratifi
cation .

In the meantime, the Foreign Office took the position that
(

:—

--------------------------

>Ibid., p. 70; Atoms in Japan, July 1972, p. 14.
H%ndicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, op. cit., p. 73*
ll9Ibid., p. 71,
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the Government ought to proceed toward legislative approval with
all due speed even though all three original conditions had not yet been
met yet.

The Foreign Office was desirous of having'the NPT bill

ratified on the assumption that Japan's original demands would be
met in the future:

it expressed its desire to see the NPT bill

brought before the winter session of the 197^ Diet for final authori
zation.

As perceived by the Ministry, the following three’assumptions

required rational considerations .in-favor of ah early ratification of
the NPT:

firstly, time seemed auspicious for Diet action in view of

the scheduled convocation of the NPT review conference in May 1975
to which ratification was the admission ticket
^

120

and non-partici-

pation in the conference would mean a diminished voice of Japan in
future arms control negotiations; secondly, in view of prewar Japan’smilitary expansionism, delays in the treaty ratification would invite
foreign fears and suspicions that Japan was intent on arming itself
with nuclear weapons; and thirdly, delays in Japan's ratification of
the NPT might invite adverse effect upon Japan's bilateral, relations
with the United States.

The Foreign Office was specifically concerned about the
possibility that, if Japan hesitated too long on the NPT issue,

Okimoto, op. cit., p. 3 1 8 .
121

Ibid., pp. 318-319-

(
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the United States might suspend or shut off enriched uranium supply
for Japan.

The United States had already hinted that it might take

such actions aga-inst those countries which refused, to ratify the
HPT.

-

122

Persuasive as it

might have sounded, the cause of the Foreign

Office was not to be successful soon.

Legislative action in Japan

being a product of bureaucratic-factional-political process, there
remained three major hurdles yet to be overcome:

first, intra-

bureaucratic coordination; second, intra-LDP consensus building; and
third, interparty coordination.

f

Of five governmental agencies involved,

123
^ none came forth

to support the Foreign Office although they did not object to the
NPT ratification.

However, the Science and Technology Agency under

Kinji Moriyama was at first opposed to

an early ratification of

the treaty on technical grounds relative to the international safe
guards inspection system.

In fact, Moriyama's objection to the NTT

was instrumental in frustrating the attempt by the Foreign Office
to bring the NPT bill before the winter session of the 1974 Diet.
Moreover, Moriyama's opposition as such had brought negotiations
for the finalization of Japan-IAEA safeguards on a EURATOM-level
basis to a grinding halt.

124

122Ibid.; p. 319.

123These bureaucracies were the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Defense Agency,
the Science and Technology Agency, and Prime Minister's Office.
^■^Tn the fall of 1973 preliminary agreement had been reached
between the IAEA and Japan for an inspection system for Japan
similar to the safeguards on a EURATOM-level basis.
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In the meantime, from May through June 1974, a chain of
events had taken place which proved to be detrimental to the proKPT forces in Japan':'
nuclear device.

on May 18, 1974, India detonated'its first'

It was followed by an announcement from Cairo

that President Nixon had agreed to provide Egypt with nuclear
reactors and u r a n i u m . S e v e r a l days later, it was reported
that a similar assistance was promised to Israel.

126 Then on ■

June 17, both China and France conducted atmospheric nuclear
tests.

127

These events, which the Japanese newspapers called

128
"nuclear deluge" (kaku kozui) and "nuclear frenzy" (kaku kyoran),
did little to help the pro-KPT forces in Japan, for the Japanese

(

did not fail to take note of the fact that the United States
promised assistance to Egypt, a nation which had not yet ratified
the KPT, and to Israel, which had refused even to sign the Treaty.

129

The net result of the May-June events was to harden the
old arguments of the anti-NPT groups that Japan should not sign
away its right to nuclearize itself.
look at some of these arguments.

It is useful to take a brief

There was a powerful LDP leader,

Nakasone, who advocated (1) Japan-developed armament; (2) autonomous
defense; and (3) nationalism.

Another leader, Masayoshi Ohira, like

Nakasone, felt the need of reexamination of the whole concept of the

125

Okimoto, op. cit ., p. 320; Endicott, op. cit., p. 75:
■'■^Okimoto, ibid.; Endicott, ibid.; Mainichi, June 19» 1974.
l27Sankei, June 18, 1974; Okimoto, ibid.; Endicott, ibid.

128okimoto, ibid.
129Ibid.
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US-Japan security treaty system.

These two powerful figures

were not even classified as radical right-wingers:

Nakasone was

classified as one of the "middle-of-the-road'' factions, and Ohira,
a "centrist."^3®

All of those LDP politicians who opposed the NPT

had one thing in common!

desire to keep Japan's nuclear option

open.

As one looks at the LDP policymaking apparatus, the weight
of the conservative anti-NPT forces is obvious:

the vice-chairman

of the LDP National Security Research Council, from which security
policy decisions (such as the NPl) originate, was Zenshiro Hoshina,

r
v

an ex-Vice Admiral and a conservative anti-NPT member.

Likewise,

the chairman of the National Defense Division of the LDP, which
was charged with defining national security problems, was Minoru
Genda, an ex-general and the most outspoken "hawk" in the entire
policymaking circle.

In addition, there were men like Shintaro

Ishihara, a young "hawk," who, during his successful campaign in the 1972
election, had openly advocated that Japan should make nuclear weapons
and use them for diplomatic bargaining; Kishi, the hawkish former
Prime Minister; and finally, Akio Doi, a retired general serving
the LDP as an advisor, who argued for making nuclear weapons for
Japan's self-sufficiency.^^

It was the combined force of these

men who locked their horns with any supporter of the NPT that had

■^Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, op. cit., p. 50-

f

131
J Sorenson, op. cit., P* 22.
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frustrated any attempt to move forward toward consensus on the NPT
issue.

Usually consensus was obtained neither quickly nor quietly.
*

»

It took several months to a year or more for a policy resolution
originating from the NSRG to become an official LDP policy recommendation.

132

Intraparty consensus was essential especially in view
of the fact that the LDP was virtually on an even footing with the
Opposition forces in terms of numerical representation on House
committees— a situation referrred to as "hokaku hakuchu" (the
conservative-liberal-match)
^

Moreover, the LDP setback in the

1974 House of Councillors elections reduced the LDP control of .
the needed margin thus making the intra-LDP consensus imperative.

Furthermore, the unprecedented resignation of Prime Minister
Kakuei Tanaka amid charges of "malfeasance, scandal, and financial
corruption"

I34

found the LDP in the midst of the worst crisis of its

twenty-year history.

The ascendancy of Takeo Miki to premiership

as a "compromise" figure was due to his weakness within the LDP
rather than his strength relative to the intrigues of
factional politics.

^^^Endicott, o p . cit., p. 61.
^ ■

^^Okimoto, op. cit., p. 323*

I

^ I b i d . , p. 322.
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In view of the foregoing, the intraparty consensus for the
NPT bill was imperative but was not forthcoming.

Following the

May-June events in 1974, a mope realistic target date now appeared
to be sometime after the summer of 1975*

The NPT ratification drive of 1975-76 (two Diet sessions
from December 27, 1974 to May 24, 1976) marks the final stage of
the NPT policymaking process.

In the face of a continued

stalemate within the LDP establishment between the pro- and antiNPT forces, it was in this final period of the NPT policymaking
process that Prime Minister Miki
^

played a critical personal

role which was responsible for Japan's ratification of the NPT
in 1976.

As the new session began on December 27, 1974, the LDP-govemment establishment remained deeply divided on the NPT issue.

The

pattern of the diffusion of policymaking power within the LDP ap
peared to be overwhelmingly against the pro-NFT forces:

while

there was the Foreign Minister (Miyazawa) on the Government side,
who, under

Prime Minister

Miki , represented the Government

cause for ratification of the NPT, the party side of the LDP-government establishment was a combination of most of the LDP "power house,"
—

( '

'

As noted earlier, a systematic account of this period of
the NPT policymaking process can be found in Endicott's excellent
article, "The 1975—76 Debate Over Ratification of the NPT in Japan,"
op. cit. The following is a broad pattern observation limited to
the scope and nature of this case analysis. The writer owes many
thanks to the work by Endicott for factual information as well as
analytical inspiration although slightly different in focus.
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all opposed to the NPT.

These intraparty anti-NPT forces included

such powerful leaders in the party hierarchy as the party Vice
President (Shiina), the party Secretary General (Nakasone), the
party Executive Board Chairman (Nadao), the Chairman of the party
Foreign Affairs Research Council (Sakamoto), and the party Security
Affairs Research Council (Arita).

Up until the last stage of the NPT policymaking process,.
Prime Minister

Miki

had been working through his principal

ally in the NPT drive and a governmental lieutenant,
Minister

Foreign

Miyazawa . Although Takeo Miki was functionally the

f

LDP president (hence an integrative center, in theory), he was an

'

exception to the rule of the type of the LDP president.

As noted

earlier, he was chosen to be the party president not because of
his strength as the leader of the most powerful faction within
the party but because of his "weakness" in the arena of the LDP
factional battle.
candidate

In short, Takeo Miki was a "compromise”

However, his positional role as the Prime Minister

of the Government of Japan had caused him to drive for ratification
of the NPT.

The force of the powerful anti-NPT factions within the

^•^An interesting account of Miki's position in the LDP
can be found, for example, in Hatakeyama, Rabat sir no Naimaku,
op. cit., pp. 232-23?.
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LDP was such that the intraparty opposition to the NPT was
too formidable for ohe Foreign Minister (Miyazawa) to overcome.
. As. the new Diet session was. convened, it was most likely that the
intraparty stalemate over the NPT issue would continue.

In his policy speech, on January 24, 1975, the Prime Minister
pointed out to the 75th Regular Diet that one of his.bills would be
the NPT for "this" session.

There appeared to be a wide gap between

what the Prime Minister hoped to do and what his fellow LDP members
were prepared to do.

The majority df the members of the LDP Security

Affairs Research Council, for example, took the stand that they would
f

not ratify the NPT even if equality with EURATOM were achieved.

Only

when all of the original demands Tokyo made in 1970 were met would
they ratify the treaty.

It was as though two completely different

parties were in confrontation:

the LDP-President-Prime Minister

of the Government of Japan aU o.handful of lieutenants on the one hand,
and the LDP-Vice-President and the rest of the major policymakers of
the LDP, on the other.

This was when the Prime Minister decided to

take the issue personally in his hands.

As the Prime Minister said:

"I will set out to persuade intraparty circles, personally."

137

The intraparty consensus was imperative for the Prime Minister,
especially in view of the composition of the Diet over most of this

f'
(_

137Endicott, "The 1975-76 Debate," o£. cit., p. 278; Nihon
Keizai, February 19, 1975*
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period,

which gave the LDP a majority in "both houses but

not too comfortably.

"Such a margin made necessary a fairly broad

consensus or strict party discipline within the LDP in order to.
accomplish legislative goals.

Short of this, exceedingly adroit

139
executive manipulation might have worked."

In fact, there was

the "absence of the first of these and insufficient quantities of
the second and third."

140

The confrontation between the Prime Minister and the
"hawk” faction of the LDP opposed to the NPT was characterized by
two equally potent arguments pitted against each other:

on the

one hand, the Prime Minister argued that "the three Non-Nuclear
Principle

that Japan will not possess, manufacture nor allow

the importation into Japan of nuclear weapons

and the argument

for keeping a free-hand (possession of nuclear weapons) do not
coexist.

The government, on its part, will not take the free

hand argument.

On the other hand, in the absence of an

In the lower house, the ruling LDP had 279 members, the
JSP 117, the JCP 39, the Komeito 30, the DSP 20, independent 1, and
vacancies 5- In the upper house, the strength of the LDP stood at
128 while, the JSP had 62, JCP 20, DSP 10, Ni-in Club 4, and inde
pendents 4, thus, the difference between the LDP and all other groups
stood at only four, or possibly eight if the Ni-in Club was included.
Endicott, ibid., pp. 275-276.
139ibid., p. 276
1Zj'°Ibid.
141

Ibid., p. 280.
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explicit guarantee of the security of nonnuclear nations, the
"hawks" placed greater emphasis on the question of the national
security of Japan than they had previously.

Specifically, the

"hawks" focused on two questions relative to Japan's security:
first, some "hawks" held that one of the three Non-Nuclear
Principle

that of not bringing nuclear weapons into Japan--

was incompatible with the objective of maintaining national
security through the United States nuclear guarantee;

142

and

second, other "hawks" argued that the U.S.-Japan .security system
ought to be strengthened before Japan ratified the NPT.

143

Consequently, Prime Minister Miki dispatched in late March 1975
his Foreign Minister (Miyazawa) to Washington in order to obtain
the latter's renewed commitment to protect Japan's security.
In spite of the Foreign Minister’s successful mission which had
resulted in a three-point understanding between Tokyo and
Washington, the "hawk" faction persisted in their demand, putting

142

As noted earlier, "the issue of placing Japan's long
term security in the hands of the U.S. was attacked by Minoru
Genda (former Air Force General and current Upper House member),
who stated that 'if a nuclear bomb were to be dropped on Japan
again, I even think that it might be a U.S. nuclear bomb," ibid.,
p. 281; Sankei, March 15, 1975*

1^2The three point understanding included: *r(l) both Japan
and the U.S. are of the judgment that the maintenance of the
Security Treaty will be in the interests of both sides, when viewed
from a long-range standpoint; (2) U.S. nuclear war potential is an
important deterrent power toward aggression against Japan from the
outside; and (3) the U.S. attaches importance to its treaty obli
gations that it will take charge of the defense of Japan in the
case of it*® being attacked by nuclear or conventional weapons, and
Japan will also continue to carry out its obligations based on the
Treaty,"Endicott, ibid., p. 282; Asani, April 12, 1975> Evening.
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up a last ditch stand to prevent "abandoning the freedom of option
as to nuclear armament."

144

-u
In the meantime, the demand by the

LDP hawks calling for flexible operation of one of the three NonNuclear Principle—
brought into Japan—

i.e., that of not having nuclear weapons
as well as the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan

security system alarmed the Opposition parties.

For example, "the

Komeito considered the LDP attitude as a 'new situation'; the JCP
decided to 'thoroughly' question the LDP position; the DSP, although
supportive, was becoming critical; and the JSP was preparing to
decide its attitude within the week— already the intra-JSP debate
[on the NPT issue] was becoming bitter."

Undaunted by the stiffened Opposition attitudes on the NPT
and the intraparty disunity, the Prime Minister persisted in his
drive for ratification of the treaty.

As one looks at the pro-

NPT forces supporting the Prime Minister, it was indeed a skeleton
crew:

the only major ally the Prime Minister had was his Foreign

Minister (Miyazawa), and Yohei Xono, allegedly a close associate
of the Foreign Minister, who was the main mover in the formation
of a Diet Members' League for Promotion of NPT Ratification.
The Prime Minister's personal effort for the party consensus paid
off slowly but steadily.

Either in person or through his lieutenants,

the Prime Minister was gradually overcoming the stubborn opposition
within the LDP by way of applying the old tactics of personal "arm
twisting" to the principal actors of the anti-NPT "hawk" forces.
Unexpectedly, also along the way, Prime Minister Miki was able to
^■^Asahi, ibid.
^Endicott, ibid., pp. 283-284.
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pick

up some welcome supporters:

former Prime Minister Sato

whose "hawkish” records were well known; Yoshitake Saoaki,
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and concurrent Director
of the Science and Technology Agency; and Hiromori Arisawa,
Chairman of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) as noted
earlier.

Perhaps the biggest and the most powerful "ally" the Prime
Minister had obtained was not a man but a declaration:
good news for Miki forces had been in short supply
generally, but on April 30 [1975] ^ extremely
fortunate development occurred. On that day, the
Final Declaration of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Keview Conference was adopted in Geneva.
This particular meeting had been going on for four
weeks and had been one of the primary reasons Miki
had chosen 1975 for the ratification drive. Even
though Japan had not yet ratified the treaty, its
representatives were granted an equal voice but could
not participate in decision making. They succeeded
in having Japan’s concern over the problem of the
security for nonnuclear nations inserted into the
Declaration. The usefulness of the Review Confer
ence was already apparent when government and party
leaders met at a liaison conference on June 2 at the
Prime Minister's official residence. . . . . The
group agreed "to make all-out efforts to realize
ratification and approval of the Nuclear Non-Proli-^
feration Treaty at the current Diet Session . . .”
In view of the fact that there is some distance between a mere
mention in a declaration and the insistence by the "hawks"
that all three original demands be met, one suspects
that the Declaration "induced” a "voluntarism" ("induced

146Ibid., pp. 2?5-2?6.
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voluntarism" in the tradition of collectivistic approach to
decision--making, i.e., consensus), thus saving the "face"
("form versus substance” which Destler and his associates note
147 \
in the context of the U.S.-Japan bilateral negotiations
)
of those "hawks!' who decided to go along with the persistent
Prime Minister.

Once the intraparty consensus was achieved

within the LDP in favor of ratifying the treaty, the passage
of the NPT bill became a matter of time and some parliamentary
maneuver vis-a-vis the Opposition parties.

As noted earlier,

because of the diffuse nature of the issue, there was little
for the Opposition to extract a political gain from the NPT issue.
In the end, the Opposition also went along with Prime Minister
Miki's NPT bill.

148

In the final analysis, the single most

important factor which was instrumental in bringing about Japan's
ratification of the NPT was Prime Minister Miki's personal role
in the final stage of the NPT policymaking process.

Destler, o£. cit., pp. 114-117148
While there are obvious reasons for the failure of the
passage of the NPT bill in the 1975 session, reasons for the
Prime Minister's sussess in the 1976 session are less clear. As
Endicott notes, Miki was still in the process of building the
necessary minimum consensus within his own party during the 1975
session. By the time Miki had succeeded in achieving the intra
party consensus on the NPT bill, he was running out of time.
Moreover, the NPT bill was in competition with other equally im
portant bills (the Anti-Monopoly Law Reform bill, i:he Electoral
Law Revision bill, the Political Funds Control Revision bill,
and the Continental Shelf Agreement bill
with South Korea) which
compounded the matter in terms of the parliamentary timetable.
Factors specific to the 1976 session were the external pressure
(from Canada, the Soviet Union, and the United States) in terms of
negative consequences of Japan's delay in ratifying the NPT which
might affect adversely the supply of nuclear power industry related
items for Japan, among others, ibid., pp. 289-290.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

The broad image of Japan that emerges from this study is
that of a society characterized by two long traditions:

hier

archical groupism and collectivistic orientation in interpersonal
relations.

Likewise, broadly speaking, the Japanese foreign policy

making process that emerges from this study is a group-centered
political processf operating in a representative democratic frame
work .

The culture of a society is the product of both the collective
history of its social system and the life histories of the people
of that society.

The Japanese politicians, bureaucrats, or business

men, all bring with them to their respective areas of activities

certain legacies from the past.

Their predilection for cliquism

and collectivistic orientation in their interpersonal relations
represent their psychological attitudes and cultural orientation;
which are deeply rooted in their past, spanning a period of two
millennia.

Stated in another way, it is their way of life.

Insti

tutional or even conceptual similarities notwithstanding, the struct
tural and behavioral characteristics of the Japanese foreign policy
making process can be understood only when they are viewed against
the backdrop of their long tradition

the totality of the collec

tive life histories of the Japanese people.

-

^28

-
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The most striking feature peculiar to the Japanese foreign
policymaking structure is its basic unit:

factions.

The nature

and pervasiveness of factions in the Japanese parties, as in other
Japanese organizations, are the product of their tradition of hier
archical groupisnr, which is almost as old as the two millennia of their history.

Hierarchical groupism, which has been the structural
basis of all traditional social institutions, is based on the concept
of the corporate group, such as the traditional,family system, the ie.
On the one hand, in its internal structure, the corporate group
consisted of subgroups hierarchically linked with it.

Accordingly,

each component subgroup was an integral part of the corporate group,
operating independently of one another horizontally.

This, in turn,

facilitated vertical cliquism, as in,.for example, various factions
of the LDP, each comprising a leader of the faction and his followers
operating independently of other factions.

On the other hand, in its

internal interpersonal relations, there was,in each closely cooper
ating corporate group, the mutuality of dependence and obligation
between leaders and followers, as, for example, between the head
of the traditional family, ie, and members of the family, or between
the landowner family and the cultivator families of a village (mura)
work unit in Tokugawa Japan.

A faction of the LDP, for example, is,

in essence, a personal mutual aid club in which the faction leader
relies on his faction members for their vote

and the faction memoers

rely on their leader for political funds, opportunities for appoint
ments (party position or the government cabinet positions), and the
like.

Moreover, the independent nature of each corporate group as
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well as the mutuality of dependence meant the imperativeness of self
perpetuation of each group.

The imperativeness of the perpetuation

of each corporate group necessitated collectivism with emphasis on
group loyalty, solidarity, and harmony.

Collectivism entailed

aversion to individualism in favor of collectivistic surface harmony/
based on the collective approach to making decisions.

The collectivistic

emphasis on group harmony, in turn, resulted in such orientation as
"induced voluntarism," the importance of "face" ("form"), and
punctiliousness in language as well as sensitivity to mannerism.

Unlike

their origins in the traditional past, which were

conceptually hierarchical, in their contemporary application
the two traditions—
making—

hierarchical groupism and consensus policy

implied co-extensive conceptual contradiction.

On the

one hand, the tradition of hierarchical groupism meant horizontal
grouping resulting in the proliferation of cliquish groups, each
operating independently of one another, hence the diffusion of
policymaking power ("the fragmented political structure").

On the

other hand, the tradition of the collective approach to decision-making
through consensus, within and among groups, necessitated coordination
and integration of various heterogeneous groups horizontally.

As a result of the proliferation of independent "cliquish"
groups and the need of integrating these groups, the policymaking
leadership in postwar Japan, as in prewar Japan, is one
type, lacking bold imaginative leadership in
making.

of the broker

foreign policy

The consensus politics intrinsic to the foreign policymaking
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rendered the process of making policies a slow time-consuming one,
often resulting in indecision or non-decision ("immobilism").
The policy indecision or non-decision has teen inevitable in view
of the importance of "induced voluntarim" or "form" (or' "face")
intrinsic to the concept of consensus.

Likewise, the final outputs

of foreign policies, which have been reactive rather than active,
have been eclectic in nature reflecting compromises and accomoda
tions that have taken place in the process of' consensus building.

As for the ruling-LDP establishment, the primacy of intra
party factional politics results from the fact that the LDP is, in
essence, a loose federation of factions ("mini-parties" within a
party).

The battle of

intraparty factional politics is decided

by the coalition of factions which becomes the majority coalition (the
"main current" faction) of factions, which captures the presidency of the
party.

Although his power and authority as president of the party

are a function of the intricate coalition of factions, the party
president is thus functionally central to the party.

By virtue of the LDP being the majority party in both houses,
the party president automatically becomes Prime Minister of the Govern
ment of Japan, hence party-government.
tion of

Since premiership is a func

party factional politics, the composition of an LDP Prime

Minister's Cabinet reflects his factional political strategy.
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Unlike, for example, an American President’s cabinet,
the members of an LDP Prime Minister's Cabinet are not all "the Prime
Minister's men."

This, in turn, entails a small group of

close advisors, around the Prime Minister to assist him, while the
routine.cabinet meetings tend to be ceremonial.

As.the chief execu

tive of the Government of Japan, at the apex of a huge national admin
istration, the Prime Minister is positionally central to the Govern
ment of Japan.

The ubiquitous groupism entails the diffusion of policymaking
power,calling for an integrative role player.

Because of his func

tional and positional centrality, it has been the Prime Minister of
the LDP-govemment who has played that role.

His integrative role

as such increases in proportion to the degree of diffusion of policy
making power which is, in turn, a function of the proliferation of
cliquish groups.

Because of the functional and positional oentrailitv, it is
the Prime Minister of the LDP government who plays an integrative

role in the policymaking process involving any important issue,
"critical" or "diffuse," which requires consensus among various
groups with different views on a given issue. The more

groups

compete with different views on a given issue, the more important
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the Prime Minister's integrative role becomes.

The more diffuse

the nature of a given issue is, the more groups with different
views on the issue there tend to be, hence

the more integrative roles

to be played by the Prime Minister.

The NPT policymaking process, as a case, supports the thesis
and hypotheses of this study.

The NPT was a diffuse and complex

issue and it required Prime Minister Miki's personal integrative
role for a minimum working consensus to be built.

The NPT issue was diffuse and complex in nature:

the nature

of the NPT issue itself and related problems were economic, poli
tical, psychological, and strategic all at once.

If Commodore

Perry's "Black Ships” in Tokyo bay touched off the rise of m o d e m
Japanese nationalism and the subsequent industrialization of Japan,
the battleship Missouri in Tokyo bay a century later signified that
the economic rebuilding of Japan, upon the ashes of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, was a national issue for national survival.
circumstances of the postwar world, especially

Under the

nuclear parity,

Japanese nationalism found its outlet in economic greatness.

However, just as the Nixon Doctrine threatened to under
mine the very premise of postwar Japan's foreign/security policy,
which was conducive to the economic approach to Japan s greatness,

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

the NPT. especially the international safeguards inspection system,
appeared to threaten the long-term economic competitiveness of
Japan.

Moreover, the oil blackmail

against Japan in the wake of

the 1973 Middle East War as well as the first and second "Nixon
Shocks" were as disquieting as they were humiliating.

These and

other factors tended to cause some Japanese to be nationalistic.
To the Japanese policymakers,

"to be or not to be" a nuclear

power was the question.

In spite of (or because of) the defeat in World War II,
and the subsequent democratic reforms, there are those in Japan
who cherish their tradition and uphold their nationalism.

Most of

the powerful leaders in the LDP, involved in the NPT policymaking,
happened to be part of those

with a strong nationalistic

sentiment and they all opposed the NPT.

It was this group of the

LDP leadership with which the Prime Minister of the Government of
Japan had to cope.

Following a long period of nondecision on the NPT issue,
mainly because of the immediately objectionable international
safeguards inspection system, Miki's government assumed ratifi
cation of the NPT to be in the best national interest of Japan.

Failing to persuade, through his governmental lieutenant
(the Foreign Minister), the formidable intraparty opposition
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to the NPT, Prime Minister Miki himself finally embarked upon
a personal crusade for consensus building in favor of the NPT.
Owing partly

to the Geneva NPT Heview Conferation Declaration,

which saved the "face" of the "hawks" ("induced voluntarism"),
Miki was first able to break the intraparty deadlock on the
issue and then succeeded in enlisting the consent of the Opposition.
In the final analysis, it was the Prime Minister's personal
crusade that enabled Tokyo to ratify the NPT.

Concluding this study, it is in order to make the following
three points:
First , this study maintains that the structural and behavioral
+it
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groupism and consensus politics

represent those aspects of

the enduring qualities of the Japanese way of life which are rooted
in their long tradition.

Therefore, a proper understanding of how

Japanese people make their foreign policies calls for a careful
examination

of these critical variables which are intertwined

with their culture;
Secondly, from a methodological point of view, this study suggests
that, superficial insitutional similarities notwithstanding, the
subtlety of the culturally rooted behavioral orientation in the
foreign policymaking of Japan requires

careful generalization.

Any application of Western^oriented methodology runs the risk of
('

superficial artificiality devoid

V
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(
of substantive knowledge.

As such, this study invites others

to improve and refine the conceptual orientation which has guided
this study; and
Third > it is likely that the structural and behavioral
characteristics of the Japanese foreign policymaking process will
persist through time.

The social metastasis or not, the old

and the new will coexist.
In fact, at times, the two are mutually reinforcing and supportive
of each other.

{

('
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groups

1*5

policymaking process.

However, unlike the power elite model,

the focus of the second model is on the primacy of the LDP Prime
Minister's role in the foreign policymaking process.

Thus, the

three dominant groups are subordinated to the Prime Minister whom
they support as his three "pillars" ("tripod system").

The Japanese foreign policymaking process has been charac
terized by various scholars as a "fragmented,” "truncated pyramid"
system structurally, and, behaviorally "immobilist."
question that this study asks is twofold:

The central

the first question

pertains to the intraelite structure and the dominant intraelite
behavioral pattern; and the second question focuses on the nature
of the Prime Minister's role, on the one hand, and on the question
of variations in the Prime Minister's role according to the type
of policy issues involved, on the other.

The last question relates to the "critical case" model
advanced by Haruhiro Fukui.

Fukui classifies all non-crisis policy

issues into two broad categories:

"routine" cases which can be

handled administratively by bureaucrats and "non-routine" case
(Fukui calls it "critical”case) which

are handled by the Prime

Minister and a small group of his associates and assistants.

In

this regard, a major question arises relative to those issues which
are neither "routine" in nature nor "critical," as defined by
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Fukui.

The NPT was one of this category.

As it were, the NTT

issue was characterized by a low degree of visibility.

However,

it took Japan six years before it decided to ratify the treaty.
The question specific to the NTT policymaking process is:

of what

was it a case?

The thesis of this study, relative to the NPT policymaking case, is that, because of his functional and positional centrality,
it was Prime Minister Miki who played the central role in bringing
about Japan's ratification of the NPT.

Moreover, the study hypo

thesises that the Prime Minister plays the central role (or integ
rative role) in the foreign policymaking involving "diffuse" issues
(such as the NPT) as in the "critical" case policymaking.

Likewise,

it is further hypothesized that the more diffuse a policy issue is,
the more integrative role there is for the Prime Minister to play.

The conceptual orientation of this study is based on two
critical variables which are deeply rooted in the cultural tra
dition of Japan:
of

hierarchical groupism and collectivistic norms

consensus decision -making.

The conceptual orientation of this

study suggests that the'traditonal hierarchical groupism was based
on the concept of a. corporate group, which was vertically structured
and independent of one another horizontally.

In its contemporary

application, this meant the proliferation of groups (such as the
factions of the LDP).

In its origin, the collectivistic norm of
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consensus decision-making stemmed from the concept of mutuality
of dependence and obligation which, in turn, emphasized group
solidarity, loyalty, and harmony.

The emphasis on collectivism

resulted in the collective decision-making for the sake of group
harmony which would facilitate the perpetuation of each corporate
group.

In its contemporary application, it is as much practical

necessity as it is culturally sanctioned social norm.

-

In view of

the proliferation of independent corporate groups, such as the
party factions, operating independently of one another, the consensus,
means, in reality, integration of different views through compromise
and accomodation.

This integrative role is played by the Prime

Minister of the LEP-govemment.

Using a broad historical/descriptive method, this study
traces the origins of these two critical variables to the ancient
national religion, Shinto, in the primitive society an.- follows
their pattern of development through centuries of political change
down to the present. The study argues that, because these two
variables represent part of the Japane.se cultural orientation,
they are, by definition, part of the enduring qualities of the
Japanese way of life.

Thus, they are likely to persist through

time, side by side with elements of change, i.e., modernity.

Finally, the study shows that the NPT policymaking process
was a typical case, involving a diffuse and complex issue, which
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(
was characterized by the diffusion of policymaking power
(between the pro- and anti-NFT forces within the LLP on the
one hand, and between the LDP-govemment under Prime Minister
Miki and the Opposition parties, on the other) and consensus
politics.

The study suggests that, in the final analysis, it was

the Prime Minister's personal role which was instrumental in
building a minimum working consensus that enabled Tckyc- to
ratify the treaty.
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